

ROUTLEDGE STUDIES IN MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS

The Turkish Deep State

State Consolidation, Civil-Military
Relations and Democracy

Mehtap Söyler

The Turkish Deep State

The deep state ranks among the most critical issues in Turkish politics. This book traces its origins and offers an explanation of the emergence and trajectory of the deep state; the meaning and function of informal and authoritarian institutions in the formal security sector of a democratic regime; the involvement of the state in organized crime; armed conflict; corruption; and massive human rights violations.

This book applies an innovative methodological approach to concept formation and offers a mid-range theory of deep state that sheds light on the reciprocal relationship between the state and political regimes and elaborates on the conditions for the consolidation of democracy. It traces the path-dependent emergence and trajectory of the deep state from the Ottoman Empire to the current Turkish Republic and its impact on state-society relations. It reads state formation, consolidation, and breakdown from the perspective of this most resilient phenomenon of Turkish politics. The analysis also situates recent developments regarding Justice and Development Party governments, including the European Union accession process, civil-military relations, coup trials, the Kurdish question, and the Gülen Movement in their context within the deep state. Moreover, this case study offers an analytical framework for cross-regional comparative analysis of the deep states.

Addressing the lacuna in academic scholarship on the deep state phenomenon in Turkey, this book is essential reading for students and scholars with an interest in democratization, politics and Middle East Studies.

Mehtap Söyler received her doctorate in political science from the Humboldt University, Berlin, where she is currently conducting her post-doctoral research. Her research foci are qualitative methods, democratization, civil-military relations, coming to terms with the past, and international politics of the EU.

“A very original project that sheds light on the historical legacy and the nature of the deep state in contemporary Turkey. The author brings her profound theoretical knowledge and methodological expertise to elucidate the origins, the transformation and the particular dimensions of the deep state through time and as it engaged different parts of society. This is an important addition to the the political science literature on the state, authoritarianism and democratization as well as a key contribution to the analysis of the Turkish state.”

Karen Barkey, Professor of Sociology and History,
and Director of the Institute for Religion, Culture
and Public Life, Columbia University

“A historically and conceptually profound look into the deep state in Turkey. There is much talk about the deep state, but it is rare to find a scholarly discussion of what it means and what it does not mean.”

Dr Esra Özyürek, Chair for Contemporary
Turkish Studies at the European Institute,
London School of Economics.

“A strong addition to the comparative historical literature on the state. It combines a fascinating account of the development of the Turkish state, with close attention to methods and a clear theoretical argument.”

Gary Goertz is Professor of Political Science at the Kroc Institute for
International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.

“This book takes issue with an almost untouched and surprisingly understudied problem in Turkey and elsewhere: the ‘deep state.’ It provides an *original and compelling* analysis of the criminal, undemocratic and corrupt facets of the state which have become more effective and visible in weak democracies in many parts of the world more intensely than ever in the last few decades. The issue is troubling and has serious consequences ranging from grave human rights violations and human security abuses to governance deficiencies and legitimacy problems for the regimes, certainly playing a primary role in the popular uprisings against the state in many corners of the world. It is important to note that this is *not just a Turkey-specific book*. The author’s analysis is extremely useful for the interdisciplinary community of researchers, students, policy makers, and investigative journalists specializing in many related areas of civil–military relations, Middle East/Latin American studies, democratization, authoritarian politics, national security governance, as well as for the average reader interested in security, armies and democracy globally and in the region.”

Ümit Cizre is Professor of Political Science at Istanbul Şehir University

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Mehtap Söyler

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Abbreviations

AKP	Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
ANAP	Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi)
AP	Justice Party (Adalet Partisi)
ASALA	Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
BDP	Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi)
CHP	Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DEHAP	Democratic People's Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi)
DEP	Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi)
DİSK	Revolutionary Confederation of Trade Unions (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu)
DP	Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti)
DSP	Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti)
DTP	Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi)
DYP	True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi)
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EOKA	National Organization of Cypriot Struggle (Ethnikí Orgánosis Kipriakou Agónos)
EU	European Union
FP	Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi)
HADEP	Party of People's Democracy (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi)
HAK-İŞ	Confederation of Worker's Union (Hak İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu)
HDP	People's Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi)
HEP	The Party of People's Labor (Halkın Emek Partisi)
HSYK	Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (Hakimler ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
İTC	Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti)
İTF	The Union and Progress Party (İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası)
JAMMAT	The Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey

JGK	The General Command of the Gendarmerie (Jandarma Genel Komutanlığı)
JİT	Gendarmerie Intelligence Agency (Jandarma İstihbarat Teşkilatı)
JİTEM	Gendarmerie Intelligence and Anti-terror Organization (Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele)
JUSMMAT	Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey
KOBİ	Small and medium size enterprises (Küçük ve Orta Ölçekli İşletmeler)
MBK	Committee of National Unity (Milli Birlik Komitesi)
MEH	National Security Service (Milli Emniyet Hizmeti Riyaseti)
MGK	National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu)
MHP	Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)
MİT	National Intelligence Organization (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı)
MNP	National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi)
MOSSAD	Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations (HaMossad leModi'in uleTafkidim Meyu'adim)
MSP	National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi)
MÜSİAD	Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ÖHD	Special Warfare Department (Özel Harp Dairesi)
OPC	Office of Policy Coordination
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OYAK	Army Mutual Trust Fund (Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu)
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan)
RP	Welfare Party (Refah Partisi)
SKB	Unity of Armed Forces (Silahlı Kuvvetler Birliği)
SHP	Social Democrat Peoples' Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti)
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SP	Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi)
SSDF	Defense Industry Support Fund (Savunma Sanayi Destekleme Fonu)
TBMM	Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi)
TESK	Confederation of Turkish Craftsmen and Tradesmen (Türkiye <i>Esnaf</i> ve Sanatkarlar Konfederasyonu)
TİP	Workers Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi)
TİSK	Confederation of Employers' Trade Unions in Turkey (Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu)
TMSF	Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu)
TMT	Turkish Resistance Organization (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı)
TSK	Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri)

xiv *Abbreviations*

TSKGV	The Foundation for Strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Güçlendirme Vakfı)
TÜRK-İŞ	Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Türk İşçi Sendikaları)
TÜSİAD	Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği)
UN	United Nations
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USEUCOM	United States European Commands
YAŞ	Higher Military Council (Yüksek Askeri Şura)

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Introduction

Deep state is associated with authoritarian, criminal, and corrupt segments of the state that function in a democratic regime by exploiting and reproducing its deficiencies. At the same time, the deep state derives legitimacy from that political regime in exerting a coup threat, instigating military interventions, and committing organized crime and extrajudicial killings within the boundaries of the formal security apparatus. Perpetrators are held responsible for massive human rights violations ranging from massacres and assassinations to extrajudicial executions and disappearances. Since the term was coined by then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit in 1974 in addressing the operations of “Counterguerilla”, several political leaders including Süleyman Demirel including Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have admitted the existence of the deep state.¹

An accident in Susurluk, a small town in the Northwest of Turkey, brought the state-mafia connections to the headlines in 1996. In the same car, Abdullah Çatlı, a wanted killer and drug trafficker on the Interpol’s Red List, and Hüseyin Kocadağ, a former deputy head of the Istanbul Police Department died; Sedat Bucak, the leader of a Kurdish village guard clan (who also was a parliamentarian from the DYP in the then coalition government led by the Islamist RP) was wounded. A fake passport, official diplomatic credentials and weapon’s permits, drugs, weapons, and money were found in the car. Solid official evidence on Susurluk traced activities of the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Anti-Terror Organization (JİTEM) and Special Operations Department Presidency of the police; they also implicated members of the National Intelligence Agency (MİT) and the RP-DYP government, such as then Minister of Internal Affairs Mehmet Ağar.²

In 2005, a bookstore was bombed in Şemdinli, a city in Southeast Turkey. A PKK informant and two non-commissioned officers allegedly in charge of JİTEM were caught red-handed. Despite its denial, JİTEM’s existence has been ascertained through “certificates of appreciation, governmental salary rolls, investigation committee reports, depositions and confessions of those who worked for the organization”.³

Since 2008, the deep state ranks as one of the most critical issues in Turkish politics due to the court case called “Ergenekon”⁴ which tried alleged suspects

2 Introduction

on charges of planning to overthrow the religious-conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Erdoğan. For the first time in the history of the republic, hundreds of active and retired military men – including the top brass – were brought to justice due to coup plots. Many operations were conducted and several court cases opened, including the “Operation Sledgehammer” (*Balyoz Harekatı*) court case and the court case on the February 28, 1997 coup. It is fair to argue that they were instrumentalized in the power struggle between the AKP and the military. These trials only delved into alleged coup plots against the AKP and could not expose the deep state. Moreover, JİTEM’s existence and operations have still not been properly accepted by the state. A few inconclusive court cases on JİTEM have only confirmed the impunity of this institution.

The Sledgehammer and Ergenekon coup trials sentenced hundreds of suspects, including members of the military, businessmen, lawyers, journalists, to lengthy prison terms, in 2012 and 2013 respectively. The İstanbul 13th High Criminal Court sentenced the former chief of General Staff İlker Başbuğ and many former force commanders such as Hurşit Tolon, Nusret Taşdeler, Hasan İğsız and Şener Eruygur, General Veli Küçük, lawyer Kemal Kerinçsiz on charges of involvement in Ergenekon plot to aggravated life imprisonment. Former vice chief of the Special Operations Department İbrahim Şahin and mafia leaders Sedat Peker and Sami Hoştan were also among the convicts.

Undoubtedly, these operations and trials could not have strengthened the AKP’s grip on power if this political party had not been backed by the network of Fethullah Gülen affiliated to faith-community leader Bediüzzaman Said-i Nursi. Gülen’s transformation from a local religious functionary in the late 1960s to a leader of a nation-wide movement active in education, media and business with a transnational outreach ranging from Central Asia and Africa to the Balkans and Southeast Asia in the 1990s illustrates the transformational power of neo-liberal globalization in taming and partially secularizing the radical Islamic challenge through a “passive revolution”.⁵ The AKP functioned as a major agent in the transfer of this social and economic capital to political influence and in the absorption and incorporation of the Gülen Movement to power structures in Turkey.⁶

Public opinion is highly polarized between those who regard these court cases as a pretext of the AKP and Gülen Movement to suppress opposition and those who see Ergenekon as a real threat to democracy. As an ally of the AKP from the start of the single-party period in 2002, the Gülen Movement widened its network in the judiciary, ministries, and in the security sector, especially in the police. It has been argued that the police operations and the court cases conducted by Specially Authorized Courts (*Özel Yetkili Mahkemeler*) could not have been realized without the functionaries of this movement in crucial state institutions. Critics have rightly pointed to the inconsistencies in the indictments and the long detention periods. Due to the belated reasoned decision of the court, the sentences have not been appealed at the Supreme Court of Appeals and a final verdict could not be reached.

The growing rift between the Gülen Movement and the AKP since 2011 general elections came to a break with the graft probe involving several members of the cabinet on December 17, 2013. Before this date, AKP had supported the coup cases by addressing the military tutelage in Turkey, whose democracy was interrupted through four coups. In the aftermath of corruption operations, the chief political advisor to Erdoğan accused the Gülen Movement of “plotting against the national army”.⁷

In March 2014, the Specially Authorized Courts used to try those involved in conspiracy plots were abolished. Moreover, the maximum period of detention before a final verdict on an appeal was reduced to five years. Anyone who had been in prison for five years without a final verdict on their case was released. Hence, the majority of Ergenekon convicts were released. In April 2014, the İstanbul 13th High Criminal Court issued its 16,600 pages long reasoned decision stating that the Ergenekon organized crime network within the Turkish Armed Forces plotted not only against Erdoğan but also against the former prime ministers Abdullah Gül and Ecevit. The reasoned decision of the court also delivered substantial evidence on Susurluk scandal of 1996, which exposed the mafia–state connections.

In the midst of growing tension between judicial authorities and intelligence officers since the start of the anti-corruption operations in late 2013, the concept of deep state has become a catch-all concept through which political antagonists blame each other and justify their actions. The opposition parties have pointed to the new tutelage of the executive organ, especially after the government passed a new law on the MIT that grants this institution extraordinary powers and greater immunity from prosecution. These claims are founded on the decisive authoritarian turn of the AKP policies, which dates back to the police crackdown of massive Gezi Park protests of May-June 2013 and the following further restrictions of the freedom of the press, expression and assembly.

In response to corruption allegations, then prime minister Erdoğan has referred to a “parallel state” indicating that Gülen and his followers are trying to overthrow his democratically elected government.⁸ In order to purge the judiciary of Gülen sympathizers, the AKP has transferred thousands of police officers and tightened its grip on the courts by strengthening the power of the executive in the appointment of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors. Against corruption allegations, Erdoğan has resorted to conspiracy theories resembling his reaction to the Gezi protests, which were described as the workings of the “collaborators of external forces (*dış mihraklar*)” and infamous “interest rate lobby”.⁹

Despite being placed at the core of Turkish politics, deep state remains a theoretical puzzlement that merits due scholarly attention and debate. Studies on democracy, security sector, and human rights violations in Turkey provide a fertile basis for understanding this phenomenon, yet there is limited discussion of the notion itself. It is true that this concept is almost strictly born out of the Turkish context. Nevertheless, the theoretical debate initiated by the

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parapolitical literature shows that this concept has a wider relevance for the students of political science. The following elaborates on the basic theses of this literature and explains in which ways this books departs from them.

Peter Dale Scott describes parapolitics, or deep politics, as a political system, in which the accountability principle is diminished. Deep politics is a practice of covert politics, which by public deception hides the political instrumentalization of public agencies or parastructures in achieving extra-judicial ends. The major feature of parapolitical literature is the deconstruction of the monist liberal notion of the state in conventional political science. The “dual state” comprises a public state and a deep state; the latter “emerges in a false-flag violence, is organized by the military and intelligence apparatus and involves their link to organized crime”.¹⁰

Eric Wilson critically reinterprets Carl Schmitt in addressing the dissociation between legality and legitimacy in the liberal state. As such, the deep state becomes an almost omnipresent quality of the modern state, whose deepness stems from its legitimacy concern within the context of the liberal parliamentary paradigm of democratic state.¹¹ Parapolitical studies also focus on the international dimension of deep politics. *Government of the Shadows* investigates the role of foreign interventions in the form of covert governmental operations and transnational organized crime in sharpening corporate gains.¹² In the same vein, Peter Dale Scott, Jonathan Marshall, and Jane Hunter detail the striving of the US for unilateral hegemony through covert activities to avoid restrictions such as public accountability and the law during the Reagan era in *The Iran-Contra Connection*.¹³

Notable contributions of Ryan Gingeras and Ayşegül Sabuktay to the literature on the Turkish deep state provide theoretical insights that confirm the postulates of parapolitics. Gingeras defines deep state coalitions as a matter of the state’s reaction against high-level security risks. Deep state stems from “an inherent weakness of modern state ... an acknowledgment of the limits to which the nation’s political centre can exercise legal authority, particularly when those charged with executing policy fail to live up to their side of the bargain”.¹⁴

Sabuktay defines the deep state as extra-legal activities of the state, in the sense of political crime and state crime,¹⁵ or “political state crime”;¹⁶ thus, deep state is exemplified in the Susurluk scandal in Turkey, the killing of ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) members by the GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación) in Spain between 1983 and 1987, the US’s weapon sales to “Contras” against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua in 1986, and the enforced disappearances in Argentina between 1976 and 1983. Her view regards the law itself as manipulative, an instrument of the Kafkaesque state.¹⁷

This book clearly shares the research interests of these studies, especially its holistic point of departure, which is dismissive of the deep state’s ontological reduction to an interest network inside the state. It is illusionary to assume that the trial of these interest groups might purge the deep state. Such a misidentification loses sight of the historical-structural sources and the

multifaceted institutional fabric in which the deep state has been able to develop, flourish, and rise to power.

Nevertheless, this book consciously uses the methodological tools and theoretical frameworks of conventional political science for three main reasons. First, the parapolitics literature calls any extra-legal means to enforce authority emanating from the state's high-level security concerns or economic or political interests a sufficient signifier of the deep state. This diffuse generalization proves to be a great impediment against systematically capturing the deep state's characteristics in different polities. It might also lead to a tautology that deep state is the state; put differently, it could render the concept of deep state redundant. To illustrate, Alfred McCoy refers to the "surveillance state" instead of the dual state in his account of the impact of covert operations and policing on the US security sector and the Philippine state.¹⁸

Second (and a corollary of the first point), parapolitics applies the deep state to all regimes without differentiating between different types, the major difference between democracy and autocracy being that, in the latter case, the deep state is on the surface. Here it is suggested that in consolidated democracies the deep state's historical roots, institutions, functions, and the characteristics of its actors are different than the deep state's in the polities that are in the gray zone between authoritarian regimes and liberal democracies. Therefore, we need to develop relevant parameters in order to account for these differences. This study aims to discover the parameters for the emergence and workings of deep state institutions in that gray zone. A comparison with the deep states in consolidated democracies is out of the scope of this case study.

Third, the conception of deep politics as an essential part of the state leaves a quite limited margin for the study of the deep state's emergence, rise, and most importantly, for the possibility of its demise. In giving the central role to the regime question and related (in)formal institutional framework, this book aims at expanding the debate to cover the institutional setting of contemporary political systems. It is suggested that this approach can widen our grasp of the conditions and consequences of the deep state's upward and downward trajectories.

This book develops the literature on democratization, civil-military relations, state consolidation, and democratic consolidation. It makes five claims based on theoretical debates with respect to these study fields. First, as mentioned above, by referring to democratization studies, this book explores the deep state in the gray zone between authoritarian regimes and consolidated democracies, specifically tutelary democracy and delegative democracy. The analytical framework incorporates the interplay of formal and informal institutions.

Second, by referring to the agency-structure debate and the debates on state consolidation, this book employs an integrative, path-dependent approach to analyzing the emergence and trajectory of the deep state. It demonstrates that deep state refers to a specific pattern of state consolidation. The modern

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Turkish state employed a similar pattern of state consolidation to the Ottoman Empire that involved fabricating and incorporating banditry/organized crime into the state. Historical double-coding of banditry in Turkey as social bandits for the cause of national liberation during the War of Independence and as a criminal informal institution is a recurring theme of the democratic era and sheds light on the polarization of public opinion on the deep state.

Third, this book explores the endogeneity, or reciprocal causality, between the state and political regime. The deep state is a mode of dual (formal and informal) type of “domination”¹⁹ *Herrschaft* in a Weberian sense. The critical juncture for the emergence of the deep state in the Turkish Republic refers to the *change of the state through regime transformation*, while democratic consolidation refers to a *change of the regime through state transformation*.

Fourth, by referring to the methodological debates, the debates on civil–military relations and democratization studies it is argued that the autonomy of the military, or its ability to reach decisions, is correlated with the existence and flourishing of the deep state in tutelary democracies. In delegative democracies, the deep state is correlated with the excessive powers of the executive branch. Moreover, it is claimed that the evaluation of the deep state increases our clarity in delineating the boundary between democracy and autocracy correlated with the level of informality of domination.

Finally, this book develops a two-level theory pertaining to democratic consolidation and claims that consolidation requires the breakdown of the deep state, elite settlement, and international anchors.

This study is divided into five chapters. The methodological chapter examines in depth the inferential potentials and limitations of case studies. It suggests five parameters for strengthening the causal inferences of a case study. Inferences are based on (1) a historical approach to causality, specifically, on (2) path-dependent explanations, which identify (3) causal mechanisms and justify hypotheses by applying (4) process tracing methods via theory-driven narrative. Finally, (5) concepts represent the main building blocks of ontology; two-level theories help to identify the structural relationship between the main components of concepts.

The theoretical chapter generates an analytical framework of the deep state and discusses the consolidation of democracy in that setting in four sections. First, it opts for a path-dependent integrative approach in the agency–structure debate by emphasizing the mediatory role of institutions between structure and agency as well as the impact of critical junctures on institutional change. An appraisal of the works in the Barrington Moore research program detects the state and cleavage structure as omitted variables in understanding regime change. A comparative analysis of feudal and patrimonial domination with the guidance of two-level theories sheds light on the causal relationship between democracy, state consolidation, and state breakdown. Consequently, democracy is related to cleavages and the role of the state in the development of a particular cleavage constellation is addressed. Second, this chapter

classifies political regimes in a continuum and conceptualizes the gray zone between authoritarian regimes and consolidated democracies. Third, the deep state is defined as a mode of dual domination in this gray zone based on the interplay of formal and informal institutions. Finally, this chapter suggests an alternative path-dependent explanation of regime change. It elaborates on the two-level theory of consolidation of democracy as a *regime change through state transformation*.

The third chapter analyses, in three steps, the antecedent conditions for the path-dependent emergence of deep state. First, it analyzes the qualities of the Ottoman patrimonial domination, specifically the methods imposed by the state to impede collective action. Second, it examines the Ottoman state-banditry relations in the seventeenth century, which constitute the deep state's informal sources. Third, it details the different shapes of banditry during the decline and dissolution of the Empire in response to changes in the empire. It deals with the conditions that paved the way for the bureaucratic takeover of 1908, including the autonomy of bureaucrats in the nineteenth century, the formal source of the deep state. The fourth section details the critical juncture for the emergence of the deep state (1908–13). Finally, this chapter traces the process of the revolution from above, specifically state breakdown during the Independence War between 1919 and 1923 facilitated by the collaboration with bandits.

The fourth chapter begins with a categorization of the authoritarian regime under single-party rule from 1923 to 1947. It analyzes the ideological tenets and formal design of the regime which shed light on the legacy of this period for the deep state. Second, it examines the critical juncture between 1945 and 1947 when the choices of powerful international actors and the Turkish ruling elite paved the way for the transition to democracy. It demonstrates that the critical juncture led to the transition to the deep state, which refers to the *change of the state through regime transformation*. Third, it estimates the level of military autonomy on an ordinal scale, which confirms the existence of the deep state in the 1950s. Fourth, it traces the path-dependent causal mechanisms based on an analysis of the interaction between cleavages, actor constellations and actors' choices between 1960 and 1980 when the deep state was restored through the 1960 coup and the 1971 coup by memorandum. It suggests that the state fabricated “modern bandits” for state consolidation in the 1960s and 1970s. Finally, it evaluates the gradual increase of military autonomy between 1960 and 1980.

The last chapter is divided to six sections. First, it elaborates on the rise of the deep state after the 1980 coup by dealing with the 1982 Constitution, transition to liberal economy, cleavages, and voter alignments. Furthermore, it explores of the relationship between the Kurdish question and the deep state. Second, it demonstrates the further increase in military autonomy in the 1980s. Third, this chapter sheds light on the 1990s when the deep state was transformed to *the state*. It discusses the economic crises in the context of the transition to a neo-liberal economy, corruption, the cleavages and party

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system, the relationship between organized crime and the armed conflict, and the causes and consequences of the 1997 putsch. It asks how “modern bandits” were upgraded in organized crime and involved in intricate political and economic relations. Fourth, it outlines the highest levels of military autonomy in the 1990s. Finally, this chapter traces the critical juncture (1999–2002) for the decline of the deep state. The conditions of democratic consolidation is examined by addressing the democratic conditionality of the European Union, the democratic reform process, cleavages and the requisites of an elite settlement. The decline of the deep state is demonstrated by the analysis of how some path-dependent causal processes that operated since the emergence of the deep state discontinued. Finally, it evaluates the military autonomy and undemocratic control of the security sector from 2000 to 2014. The decline of the deep state under tutelary democracy signals its ongoing restoration under delegative democracy.

Notes

- 1 “Ecevit: ‘Türkiye’de Derin Devlet Var”; Donat, “Demirel Derin Devleti Anlatıyor”; “Başbakan Erdoğan: ‘Derin Devlet İnkâr Edilemez.’”
- 2 For official investigation documents, see İstanbul Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığı, *Susurluk Fezlekesi*; Savaş, *Susurluk Raporu*; Özdemir, *Susurluk Belgeleri Cilt: 2. İfade Tutanakları. TBMM Komisyon Raporu’na Muhalefet Şerhleri İle Birlikte*; TBMM Araştırma Komisyonu, *Ülkemizin Çeşitli Yörelerinde İşlenmiş Faili Meçhul Siyasal Cinayetler Konusunda Meclis Araştırma Komisyonu Raporu*.
- 3 Beşe, “Intelligence Activities of the Gendarmerie Corps (JITEM/JIT),” 176.
- 4 Two explanations account for the use of “Ergenekon” as the name of the network of coup plotters. The first relates to the legend of Ergenekon about a gray she-wolf *Asena* which rescued the Turkic clans by guiding them through the insuperable Central Asian Altay Mountains to the mythical, spiritually sacred valley called “Ergenekon”; thus, she saved the Turks from extinction. “Howling wolf” in a crescent is the symbol of far-right Turkish nationalism and the pan-Turkist ideal of uniting all Turkic peoples. The far-right nationalist association “Gray Wolves” uses this symbol as a coat of arms. The latter explanation relates to the retired Colonel Necabettin Ergenekon, who was a commander officer of Veli Küçük, convicted during the court case; Ünver, “Turkey’s ‘Deep State’ and the Ergenekon Conundrum,” 2–3. See, Kaya, “The Rise and Decline of the Turkish ‘Deep State’: The Ergenekon Case”.
- 5 Tuğal, *Passive Revolution*.
- 6 Hendrick, *Gülen: The Ambiguous Politics of Market Islam in Turkey and the World*.
- 7 “PM’s Adviser Accuses Gülen Movement of Plotting against Turkish Army, Nation.”
- 8 “Parallel State Has Blackmailing Tapes of Army Chief, President and Myself: PM Erdoğan.”
- 9 Gibbons, “Erdoğan’s Chief Adviser Knows What’s Behind Turkey’s Protests – Telekinesis.”
- 10 Scott, *The War Conspiracy: JFK, 9/11, and the Politics of War*, 238.
- 11 Wilson, *The Dual State: Parapolitics, Carl Schmitt and the National Security Complex*.
- 12 Wilson and Lindsey, *Government of the Shadows*.

- 13 Scott, Marshall, and Hunter, *The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in Reagan Era*. Also see, Scott, *The Road to 9/11*; Scott and Marshall, *Cocaine Politics*.
- 14 Gingeras, "Last Rites for a 'Pure Bandit': Clandestine Service, Historiography and the Origins of the Turkish 'Deep State'," 155.
- 15 Turk, *Political Criminality*; Ross, *Dynamics Of Political Crime*.
- 16 Barak, *Crimes by the Capitalist State*.
- 17 Sabuktay, "Locating Extra-Legal Activities of the Modern State in Legal-Political Theory: Weber, Habermas, Kelsen, Schmitt, and Turk"; Sabuktay, "Tracing the Deep State."
- 18 McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State*. He also studied the indirect complicity of the US in the Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle until 1972, when the "French connection", an alliance between the Corsican, Sicilian, and American mafia in the smuggling of heroin originating from the opium-producers in Indochina (then Turkey) to the US was dismantled. See, McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic*.
- 19 Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*.

1 Methodology

Sartori stresses the virtues of being a conscious thinker, who in contrast to an unconscious or an over-conscious thinker, “steers a middle course between crude logical mishandling on the one hand, and logical perfectionism (and paralysis) on the other hand”.¹ This chapter follows his guidance and falls into three sections. The first section discusses the characteristics of case studies and examines in depth the inferential potential of the case-study method. The second section addresses the limitations of case studies. The third section introduces five parameters to strengthen the causal inferences of this case study. Inferences are based on 1) a historical approach to causality, specifically, on 2) path-dependent explanations, which identify 3) causal mechanisms and justify hypotheses by applying 4) a process tracing method via theory-driven narrative. Finally, 5) concepts represent the main building blocks of ontology; two-level theory helps to identify the structural relationship between the main components of concepts.

Case-study method and its potential

This section addresses first the controversy among methodologists in defining central concepts by distinguishing between a case, case study, and comparative method. It is argued that “case” and “case study” should be differentiated; the N question does not inevitably apply to the distinction between comparative method and case-study method. Then, it elaborates on the potentials of the case-study method, which operates within the confines of the qualitative research tradition.

A controversy pertains to the distinction between a case, a case study, and the comparative method. For Lijphart,² in contrast to the statistical method, the comparative method covers a small number of cases. However, many methodologists consider that the N question does apply here only to some extent; case studies and the comparative method cannot be differentiated primarily through the number of cases.³ A case is defined as “an instance of a class of events”;⁴ put differently, “an in-depth study of a single unit (a relatively bounded phenomenon) where the scholar’s aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena”.⁵ Gerring distinguishes between case

studies that aim at within-case variation and cross-case studies that aim at cross-case variation. Within-case methods may entail three types of variation: temporal variation, spatial variation, or spatial and temporal variation within-unit.⁶

Indeed, “a case study can employ cross-sectional, time series cross sectional, hierarchical, hierarchical time series, and even comparative-historical models”.⁷ To illustrate, an individual unit, such as a revolution, could cover multiple cases depending on the temporal variation, before, during, and after the revolution. Case studies can explore within-unit analysis in a single unit as well as a comparison of a single-unit.⁸ This book involves a within-case temporal variation of a single unit (and the dependent variable): the state. It explores the style of state consolidation under the seventeenth century patrimonial Ottoman Empire, the breakdown of the Ottoman state, the making of the Turkish state and its consolidation in the twentieth century. The deep state, an outcome of state consolidation in modern Turkey, is exposed to temporal variation to study its emergence, rise, and decline.

Another controversy arises on the question whether the case-study method can be considered to be a subset of qualitative methods, as George and Bennett argue,⁹ or whether it belongs to a different category. Yin regards qualitative and quantitative methods as mere types of evidence; case studies may have qualitative or quantitative evidence.¹⁰ Gerring joins him in not making a distinction of qualitative and quantitative methods.¹¹ Mahoney and Goertz¹² show that qualitative or quantitative research methods are traditions distinguished in the first place in their understanding of causality. The following lists characteristics and inferential potentials of this case-study by comparing how quantitative research tradition differs from the qualitative tradition in grasping causal complexity. Case-study method operates within the confines of the latter.

First, quantitative methods aim to explain “causes-of-effects”, while qualitative methods aim to explain “effects-of-causes”.¹³ Case-study methods prize causal mechanisms over causal effects. Types of causal mechanisms that are studied in this book are presented in the third section. Second, quantitative analyses apply correlational causes based on probability assumptions, while qualitative analyses apply necessary and sufficient causes. Third, quantitative methods find out the net effects of individual variables, while qualitative analyses are context-sensitive; they capture the effects of a combination of variables that are assumed as dichotomous or continuous.¹⁴ The third section shows how necessary and sufficient causes and combination of variables are applied in three-level concept generation and two-level theory formation.

Fourth, in quantitative analyses, cases are selected on individual independent variables whose causal effects are generalized, whereas in qualitative analyses, cases refer to specific causal path(s) on the way to dependent variables. Therefore, unlike quantitative studies, qualitative analyses are able to take multiple causation, or “equifinality”,¹⁵ into consideration.¹⁶ The third section introduces a specific method to study causal path(s): path-dependent

explanations. This single case study illustrates equifinality in the theoretical chapter concerning the development of the deep state phenomenon. Peter Hall suggests that studying a causal path allows us to detect omitted variables that are related to the dependent variable.¹⁷ Here, the theoretical chapter critically assesses the Barrington Moore research program on regime change and integrates the state and cleavage structures, omitted variables, into the analysis of regime change.

Fifth, according to Bennett and Elman,¹⁸ case studies offer more parsimony in analyzing interaction effects. Quantitative methods assume that causal variables are not affected by the dependent variable. Case studies capture interaction effects illustrated by reciprocal causation, i.e. endogeneity. The causal paths studied in this book reveal the endogeneity between the state and political regime. Sixth, in qualitative analyses observations are weighted; any diverging individual observation can disprove the theory. In quantitative analyses, on the other hand, observations are considered equal.¹⁹ The weighting of observations is explicitly elaborated in the theoretical chapter.

Finally, concepts are the building blocks of qualitative analyses and misfits or errors require a revision of the ontological basis of the research. Measurement errors are attached to problems related to the conceptual structure. In quantitative analyses, however, measurement errors are eliminated only if they result in a systematic error. Mahoney and Goertz²⁰ argue that clarification of concepts increases conceptual validity and makes the ontological basis of the research sounder. We can conclude that quantitative methods are more prone to “conceptual stretching”,²¹ or too vague and amorphous conceptualizations, than qualitative methods. As put succinctly by Sartori: “quantification enters the scene after, and only after, having formed the concept ... the rules of concept formation are independent of, and cannot be derived from, the rules which govern the treatment of quantities and quantitative relations”.²²

Limitations of the case-study method

Limitations of case-study methods are related in the literature to the lack of hypothesis testing, case selection bias, identifying scope conditions and necessity, lack of representativeness, and degrees of freedom. The following discusses each limitation and their relevance to this book and asks whether they are inevitable. It is argued that some of these limitations can be traced back to divergent conceptions of observations, cases, theory testing, and validation.

The first limitation relates to the conventional view that case studies are useful for generating hypotheses rather than testing them.²³ Hall maintains that the low regard of case studies stems from the pervasive confusion about the definition of a case and theory testing, which can be traced back to Eckstein²⁴ and Lijphart,²⁵ who claimed that testing a theory is viable if it is based on observations on the dependent variable and a few independent variables. This assumption reduces a case to a single unit; consequently, it reduces observation to data drawn from that unit. More importantly, it reduces small-N

comparison or comparative method in general to a less important version of statistical analysis.²⁶ Rueschemeyer traces this misunderstanding to the mistaken sharp distinction made between the “context of discovery” and the “context of validation”.²⁷ According to George and Bennett, this misjudgment is reflected in Karl Popper’s²⁸ proposition that there can be no logical method of discovering ideas.²⁹ However, his distinction overlooks that the process of making discoveries includes both explanation and testing. This book generates hypotheses, but at the same time tests hypotheses.

The second limitation relates to selection bias, which is according to Bennett and Elman³⁰ often misleading. A preconstituted population is not applicable to case studies. Furthermore, this limitation does not apply to within-case process tracing or causal process observations – applied in this book – since the *process* connects the causes to the outcome.³¹ Third, George and Bennett³² address the issue of identifying scope conditions and necessity: “Case studies remain much stronger at assessing *whether* and *how* a variable mattered to the outcome than at assessing *how much* it mattered”.³³ Therefore, we should identify precisely the unit(s) we refer to in our claims of causality with respect to necessary condition. Gerring³⁴ warns against possible caveats. We need to specify secondary units that are dealt with besides the primary unit under study. If not taken into account, the priority of the primary unit can be blurred. In this study, the state is the primary unit, while institutions, cleavages, and elites are secondary units. Gerring adds that, in comparing a single unit with other units, the boundaries of a single- and cross-unit analysis should not be conflated. Moreover, in order to identify scope conditions and necessity, scholars should study the unit, but relate it to a group of cases.³⁵ The theoretical chapter analyzes the state by relating it to Western European cases and confines the analysis to the deep state in a particular political regime, i.e. to the deep state in democracies which are the gray zone between autocracy and consolidated democracy.

Closely related to the scope conditions and necessity is the fourth limitation, the representativeness of case studies, or the limits to generalization. According to Mahoney and Goertz, qualitative studies have a narrow scope and generalization, since expanding the scope raises the problem of causal heterogeneity; more cases may mean more causal paths and imply modifications of the theory to explain new cases.³⁶ George and Bennett³⁷ remind us to be clear on three points: whether we refer to an entire population, a historical context, and/or to the relation of a conjunction of variables to a particular outcome; whether the necessary condition applies only for a single case, for a type of case, or to the outcome in general; equifinality should be taken into account since it could possibly diminish the causal weight of necessary causes for a particular case in other cases.

George and Bennett also suggest that the representativeness of the case can be increased if we can detect a subclass or cases with a similar causal mechanism and lesser values of variables.³⁸ Yin calls the limit to generalization radically into question by stating that case studies are “generalizable

to theoretical propositions, not to populations, or universes”.³⁹ This book explicitly refers to a historical context that is specified in the theoretical chapter, which introduces a conjunction of variables that constitutes the theoretical propositions for context-based generalizations. Necessary conditions of deep state apply not for a single case, but for a specific type of democracy. This case study provides an explanation of equifinality in the two-level model of the deep state concept.

Finally, the degrees of freedom problem refers to “the potential inability to discriminate between competing explanations on the basis of the evidence.”⁴⁰ Following George and Bennett, it will be argued that this limitation would not apply in this case study, since it is based on a theoretically grounded process traced with reference to historical sequences leading to the outcome. The selection of a particular explanation is justified through a specific theory or theories.⁴¹

What are the potentials and limitations of a single case study? Gerring claims that single-case studies that are based on within-case variation – as illustrated by this case study – have higher internal validity in contrast to cross-case analyses that have the virtue of external validity and the limiting of lower internal validity.⁴² Another disadvantage of single-case analyses is the difficulty of tracking whether that single case is independent from other cases.⁴³ The issue of external validity or generalization is a point discussed above. As Yin suggests, we should distinguish between “statistical generalization” that generalizes on samples and “analytical generalization” in case studies that generalizes the results of the study on a broader theory.⁴⁴

This single-case study aims, as Rueschemeyer suggests, at developing a theoretical framework, i.e. a “focused meta-theory”,⁴⁵ which entails few directly testable hypotheses, but focuses on problem formation or reformulation as well as on the generation and revision of related concepts. Hypotheses based on necessary and sufficient causes can be disproved by evidence drawn from a single case. More importantly, discovering necessary and sufficient causal variables and causal mechanisms becomes a value added for looking at other cases. The value of a single-case study increases exponentially if we exploit the complementarity of single cases and cross-case analysis by determining “conceptual equivalence”⁴⁶ through a focused meta-theory. Rueschemeyer regards this as one of the major achievements of comparative research.⁴⁷

To conclude this subsection, this case study involves a within-case temporal variation of a single unit, the state, in its historical-institutional settings from the rise of the Ottoman Empire to the current Turkish Republic. Institutions, cleavages, and elites constitute secondary units. This book explicitly refers to a historical context and draws on a conjunction of variables leading to an outcome in order to establish theoretical propositions for context-based generalizations. Necessary conditions for the deep state apply not only for a single case, but also for a particular type of political regime. In order to exhaust the inferential virtues of its genre as a subset of qualitative methods, this case study assesses interaction effects exemplified by reciprocal relations (between

the state and the political regime) and introduces a conjunction of variables leading to the deep state.

Methodologists contend that two major limitations of case-study methods, the case selection bias and degrees of freedom, do not apply to theoretically grounded causal process observations with reference to historical sequences leading to the outcome. Process tracing with a historical approach to causality serves as a safeguard to these basic limits of case studies. The most distinctive potential of the case-study method is to elaborate on causal mechanisms. In this book, causal mechanisms are pinpointed through process-tracing via theory-driven narrative, while explanations of the causal path reflect a historical approach to causality. The single-case study generates a focused meta-theory to grasp the deep state phenomenon; further studies would have the potential to establish conceptual equivalences and complementarity with other cases. Therefore, ontology is aligned with methodology at the end of this chapter by elaborating on concept formation and two-level theories. The following section expands on these findings and develops five steps to strengthen this case study: a historical approach to causality, path-dependent explanations for delineating causal paths, process tracing via theory-driven narrative, causal mechanisms, concepts and two-level theories.

Strengthening causal inferences

Historical approach to causality

Pierson⁴⁸ claims that scholars should take the time horizons of different causal forces into account and warns against overlooking the causal forces that operate in various time spans and speed, hence, produce outcomes with various time spans. Therefore, it would be a mistake to delimit our temporal vision to the immediate causes of outcomes by attributing causality to triggering events. We should bear in mind that both causes and outcomes might extend over a long-term period.

Capoccia and Ziblatt⁴⁹ warn of three pitfalls of studying democratization without history. The first is to disregard the causal heterogeneity of units, or to assume that the impact of a change in the value of an independent variable would have the same *importance and direction* for all cases and *at all times* on the dependent variable. The second pitfall is to jeopardize the study of the micro level and the strategic interactions on that level. This might lead to the reification of social actors. Thirdly, not taking adequate account of the impact of institutions in the distant past is to ignore possible reciprocal causality between variables. Studying democratization without history could lead to a negligence of endogeneity and, hence, to a misjudgment of the direction of causality.⁵⁰

According to Pierson, slow-moving causal processes are threefold: causal chains, threshold effect, and cumulative causes. Causal chains end in an outcome through a multi-sequence and multi-stage causal process over extended

periods and have higher relevance when political actions produce multiple consequences with major outcomes that are not clearly intended products of these actions. Threshold effects culminate in an outcome after having reached a certain critical level. Causal chains and thresholds have a long-term horizon of causes and a short-term horizon of outcome. In this study, causal chains pave the way for the emergence of banditry and bureaucratic takeover. Revolution is analyzed as a major change triggered by threshold effects. Cumulative causes exert a long-term gradual change of a variable.⁵¹ Here migration, suburbanization, and conceptions of nationhood are linked to long-term resilience and shifts in power relations.

Capoccia and Ziblatt suggest an explicitly *historical approach to causality* that reads history “forward” and not “backward” in order to account for the complexity of institutional formation and the impact of these institutions on regime outcome. The following aspects guide us in the analysis of the formation of institutions. First, institutions are created and changed through a sporadic and protracted “one institution at a time” process in different episodes. Second, multiple lines of conflict shape these episodes, i.e. not only class actors and socio-economic factors but also other types of cleavages, such as ethnic, religious and linguistic divides, need to be taken into account. Third, to correlate the extent and impact of episodes might be misleading: a big event such as a world war might have played a transformative role in national trajectories, but shifting the analytical focus to the creation of a single institution makes small events also methodologically relevant for understanding these episodes.⁵²

Path-dependent explanations

The reciprocal causality between the state and political regimes is analyzed here through a path-dependent explanation of the deep state and regime change. Pierson distinguishes the structural approach from the path-dependent approach in reflecting about temporal separation between cause and effect in historical analyses. A structural cause denotes that an outcome is *determined* by the causal process, i.e. it would happen sooner or later independent of the character and timing of triggering effects. A path-dependent cause denotes that outcome is a result of a self-reinforcing “historical causation”,⁵³ i.e. an outcome or a pattern was set in motion that would operate even under the absence of the original cause. The timing and the character of triggering effects of events play an important part in the path-dependent cause.⁵⁴

Path-dependent explanations offer a holistic approach to understand causal mechanisms and their context, detect left-out variables, and find interaction effects in the contingent period.⁵⁵ Any demonstration of path dependence can identify conditions under which stability of a given phenomenon is undermined. It can invalidate the claims of stability that rest on a limited temporal view.⁵⁶

Referring to Bennett and Elman, path dependence in this case is justified via four basic parameters: causal possibility, contingency, closure connotes,

and constraints. Causal possibility refers to the possibility that actors might have chosen other paths leading to different outcomes. Contingency means that one or more factors occur randomly, not explained by the main theory. This might lead to a more unexpected, inefficient outcome than the path(s) that was (were) available before. Closure connotes refers to the increase of the propensity of a particular group of outcomes compared to the range of possible outcomes before the decision was made. Degree of constraints means that actors are bound by the chosen path, because resistance would cost them more than obeying it.⁵⁷

Causal mechanisms

Elster defines causal mechanisms as “frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences”.⁵⁸ Thelen observes that path-dependent causal mechanisms for institutional creation and (re)production are different in political science than in economics. She criticizes the usage of “increasing returns”,⁵⁹ which refers to the generation and resilience of institutions due to the increase of relative benefits provided by the path over time. Thelen adds that power, legitimacy, and functionality play a crucial role in political science.⁶⁰

The path-dependent analysis of the Turkish deep state illustrates the three types of causal mechanisms described by Bennett and Elman who follow the remarks of Thelen: increasing returns, negative feedback, and cyclical process. Increasing returns suggests that the installation of an institution reproduces itself (diagram of sequence: $a \rightarrow a \rightarrow a$). Negative feedback denotes that “a” reoccurs even if other institutions are installed, i.e. “a” is the equilibrium (diagram of sequence: $a \rightarrow g \rightarrow a \rightarrow d \rightarrow a$). Cyclical process occurs if two or more institutions reproduce each other (diagram of sequence: $a \rightarrow b \rightarrow a \rightarrow b \rightarrow a$).⁶¹ Mahoney reminds us here that the mechanisms creating an institution should be distinguished from the mechanisms that maintain an institution.⁶² Bennett and Elman suggest that interaction mechanisms that lead to the lock-in or breakdown of institutions should be taken into account.⁶³

Process tracing method via theory-driven narrative

Case studies can be further strengthened through the process-tracing method via theory-driven narratives, which trace the intervening causal process, chain, or mechanism between an independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable.⁶⁴ A case study which adopts systematic process observations can play a crucial role in causal inference and theory testing.⁶⁵ Like path-dependency, process tracing allows for inferences from causal mechanisms, detects interaction effects and omitted variables, and accounts for rare or unique events.⁶⁶ Process tracing explains the diagram of sequence by investigating causal variables and outcomes and by comparing predictions of theories about causal mechanisms through multiple observations.⁶⁷ Hypotheses

of theories are not only tested on variables, but also on the intervening steps of a case. Therefore, it can be a methodological safeguard against the problems which confront case studies.⁶⁸

Process tracing can alleviate the limits of Mill's method of similarity and difference by selecting and narrowing the list of causes. It can check for omitted variables and equifinality; thus, deviant cases can be better investigated and integrated into comparative analyses. "The deviant-case method selects that case(s) which, by reference to some general understanding of a topic (either a specific theory or common sense), demonstrates a surprising value."⁶⁹ Yin claims that deviant features of a case may serve a revelatory purpose.⁷⁰ Deviant cases and cases with equifinality may pave the way for contingent generalizations; if analyzed by process-tracing, they generate middle-range theories.⁷¹

Due to the features of democratic transitions introduced by the military as an institution, Turkey has been called a deviant or a unique case compared to its Latin American counterparts. The Turkish strong state was excluded from the comparisons with the mainly weak Latin American or African states. With respect to the Middle East, Turkey was regarded as an exception and "a torn country";⁷² the democratic experience of Turkey is considered to be hardly comparable to these countries. Turkey has rarely been included in the comparative democratization studies, although several publications went beyond Turkish particularism and widened the debate on Turkey.⁷³

By relating cleavages and informal institutions to the analysis of the state, process-tracing paves the way for the generation of new hypotheses that can incorporate the Turkish case into comparative, inter-regional democratization studies. The Turkish case has the potential to transform into an on-liner typical case of the deep state, especially with regard to the interaction of formal and informal institutions. Even if it is not possible to measure the new causal factors since they were not tested in a medium-N cross-model, as Gerring suggests, it may still be plausible to assert (based on general knowledge of the phenomenon) that the chosen case is representative of a broader population.⁷⁴

As illustrated below in the theoretical chapter, this book deals with four types of causal processes that appear in process-tracing explanations: path-dependent causal process, complex forms of causality, interaction effects, and linear causality.⁷⁵ This book claims that the deep state emerges through a path-dependent causal process. Concepts such as revolution, deep state, and democratic consolidation are conceived as complex forms of causality, i.e. a conjunction of several variables and conditions in a multi-level theory. Moreover, interaction effects between formal and informal institutions are elaborated; the state and the regime are related in a reciprocal causality, i.e. in a cyclical interaction. Linear causality relates to the simple micro-level phenomena that can be explained through the characterization of direct chains of events.

The hardest challenge to the process-tracing method is the issue of the persuasiveness of causal chains, since the validity of causal inferences is

dependent on the proof of the causal path that links the cases and the effects on the relevant level(s) of analysis in an uninterrupted way. First, the timing of the start and end of the account must be relevant and convincing for the case. Second, continuity in the causal chain should be sustained. The fewer breaks invoked in the causal chain, the more persuasive is the account. Third, solid theoretical or empirical grounds for the key links in the causal chain must justify the hypothesized process. It might be the case that there is no evidence, or none can be obtained, or that theories are not exact on the issue.⁷⁶

Another challenge is the issue of persuasiveness of causal mechanisms. George and Bennett⁷⁷ note that more than one causal mechanism might be present and consistent with the process-tracing evidence. We might not be able to differentiate which of the causal mechanisms has a better explanatory power, or whether the outcome is over-determined. These competing mechanisms might explain different aspects of the case and might not be commensurate.

Both challenges warn against a possible confirmation bias. the second challenge is especially onerous to overcome. However, we can alleviate them when we revise and refine the theory or generate a compelling analytical framework to account for the existence of contrasting evidence or the lack of evidence. Furthermore, for Bennett and Elman, a case study can be guarded against confirmation bias if we give priority to the best explanation. This requires disproving alternative explanations through evidence of the process tracing and comparing hypotheses from a wide range of other explanations against the evidence.⁷⁸

This case study breaks the causal chain on three occasions in order to avoid infinite regression during process tracing: at critical junctures, at points which prove to be difficult to trace causal connections, and according to the theoretical guidelines.⁷⁹ “Critical junctures”⁸⁰ bear high value here due to their theoretical link to path-dependent explanations of regime change. Capoccia and Kelemen define critical junctures as times of contingent actions with high political impact and long-term consequences.⁸¹ But, these are “specific decisions taken by powerful actors during narrowly circumscribed periods” instead of “moments” of choice.⁸²

Soifer refers to two separately necessary and jointly sufficient conditions that cause a critical juncture. The permissive condition changes “the underlying context to increase the causal power of agency or contingency and thus the prospects for divergence”,⁸³ while the productive condition shapes “the outcomes that emerge and are ‘locked in’ when the window of opportunity marked by the permissive conditions comes to close”.⁸⁴ The critical antecedent precedes the critical juncture; it is unrelated to permissive condition but connected to the productive condition by “helping to determine the differential causal effect of the independent variable”.⁸⁵

Four aspects should be considered in identifying critical junctures. First, a critical juncture may affect the macro structure, while leaving many institutions unchanged. Furthermore, the continuity of some institutions may be challenged, while other institutions remain stable. Therefore, the unit(s) of

analysis critically affected by the juncture and time horizons of the critical juncture should be specified. Second, the prolongation of a critical juncture bears the possibility that political decisions will be hindered or forced in other directions by structural constraints. Thus, a short-term cause for the critical juncture is better suited for causal explanations. Third, it should be taken into account that change is not the necessary outcome of critical junctures; restoration could be equally possible. Finally, in contrast to institutional economics, studies in political science attach more importance to power asymmetries rather than small contingent events in detecting critical junctures.⁸⁶

In order to judge how critical a critical juncture is, the probability jump and temporal leverage should be assessed. The probability jump occurs if an outcome becomes more probable at the conclusion of a critical juncture relative to its probability immediately before or during the lowest point of the critical juncture. The higher the probability jump is, the more critical the juncture is. Temporal leverage is a measure of the duration of the impact of the critical juncture relative to the duration of the juncture itself. The duration of a critical juncture is shorter than the path-dependent process it instigates. The longer the duration of the path-dependent process is, compared to the duration of the critical juncture, the more critical the juncture is.⁸⁷

Capoccia and Kelemen refer to non-formal theory-driven narrative and game theoretical formal modeling as two methods of process tracing. The disadvantages of game theoretical tools are numerous: oversimplifying critical junctures in models; providing flawed findings if the causal mechanisms during critical junctures implied by the game were not present during a critical juncture; failing to analyze different units of analysis in cross-sectional analysis with a single model; and failing to consider the “paths not taken.” Nonformal narrative methods’ advantage is the absence of these disadvantages, but the risk is losing parsimony. The pay-off of the non-formal narrative method can be alleviated through presenting a regimented line of theoretical argumentation.⁸⁸ For George and Bennett, process tracing can be in the form of detailed narrative, the use of hypotheses and generalizations, analytic explanations, and more general explanation. Analytic explanation will be opted for here, since it selects causes in the historical explanation through the guidance of a theory. The non-formal narration will be theory-driven. More general explanation will be applied if theory or data do not exist or if they do not suffice for an analytical explanation.⁸⁹

Three-level concepts and two-level theories

Sartori suggests that “data is information which is distributed in, and processed by “conceptual containers”.⁹⁰ Measurement can be regarded as operationalizing a concept. However, “operational definitions implement, but do not replace, definitions of meaning”.⁹¹ If we ignore the making of concepts, we come up with a checklist rather than a classification and measurement. Methodology should be aligned with ontology, i.e. “fundamental assumptions

about the nature of the social and political world, as well as the causal relationships within that world".⁹² Concepts "are theories about ontology: they are theories about the fundamental constitutive elements of a phenomenon".⁹³

Concept formation is an essential part of the theoretical chapter, since the concept of deep state is formed through a specific approach, while the comparison of the Turkish case with the Western European cases is based on a two-level theory of liberal democracy and revolution from above; the concept of deep state is linked to the concept of democratic consolidation in a two-level theory. The following elaborates on this specific approach of concept formation and two-level theories.

Goertz claims that he offers an "ontological, realist, and causal"⁹⁴ approach to concepts compared to the "semantic and definitional" approach of Sartori.⁹⁵ If we look closer, however, we see that Sartori's approach entails realism and causality as well, but Goertz has a more rigorous and sophisticated approach to causality. Therefore, the latter will be applied in this book. Sartori suggests that a concept is built in three steps: anatomy, extension, and intension. First, the anatomy, i.e. constitutive elements of a phenomenon, will be made explicit; second, these constitutive elements are reconstructed and organized in order to determine the extensions, i.e. class of referents, or real cases; third, concept formation connects these constitutive elements in terms of their intensions, i.e. degrees, in order to refer to real cases.⁹⁶ Goertz explores constitutive (noncausal) elements of a phenomenon for grasping the causal relationship between constitutive elements and the phenomenon (internal causality) which clarifies causal hypotheses, explanations and mechanisms based on ontological attributes of a phenomenon and the empirical (realist) representation of this phenomenon (external causality).

According to Goertz, a concept is built on three levels: basic, secondary, and indicator level. The basic level is the dependent variable or outcome. With respect to the basic level, special attention must be paid to four aspects: making the positive and negative poles explicit; specifying the content between these poles, which would reveal either a continuum or a dichotomy (choosing a continuum has the advantage of identifying gray zones); theorizing this gray zone; and avoiding confusing empirical distribution of cases with the basic level.⁹⁷ The secondary level can either be regarded as representing the independent variable of the basic level (dependent variable) that houses causal conjunctions or as the basic level's constitutive (noncausal) elements that house noncausal conjunctions along with ontology.⁹⁸ The theoretical relationship between the basic and secondary level can involve ontology, causality, and substitutability. Ontology refers to semantic parts of the concept; it is a noncausal relationship that defines the concept. Causality between these levels can imply causes of causes. Substitutability refers to the availability of multiple means to an end, or equifinality.⁹⁹ The theoretical relationship of secondary and indicator/data level can either be substitutable or causal. The indicator level connects the basic and secondary level to empirical practice; hence, they exert lesser theoretical abstraction and compromise the theoretical generality

at the basic and secondary level. Therefore, they can represent multiple means to an end. If the relationship between the secondary and indicator level is causal, it offers a detailed causal analysis of the secondary level dimensions.¹⁰⁰

Two prototypical forms establish a multidimensional concept structure, “necessary and sufficient conditions” and “family resemblance”. A “necessary condition” is implied if the exclusion of a dimension leads to the absence of the concept itself, i.e. if it is nonsubstitutable (symbolized as logical *and*). “Family resemblance” indicates sufficiency without necessary condition, i.e. substitutability (symbolized as logical *or*). Without making sufficiency criteria explicit, a concept formation is not complete. We can name it jointly sufficient if there is no specification of sufficient condition.¹⁰¹ Necessary and sufficient condition would, as a definition, mean an equal weighting. Family resemblance indicates substitutability, which requires weighting dimensions. However, if we formalize concept structure in the substitutability continuum, the necessary and sufficient condition lies at the nonsubstitutability end of the spectrum, while the family resemblance structure lies in the complete substitutability pole. The substitutability question is linked to the relative significance and weighting of dimensions. The individual weights of dimensions must be tied to the theory or to empirical findings. Weighting dimensions can be easily avoided if the structure is built on necessary and sufficient conditions or dichotomous variables. However, as the substitutability continuum suggests, there are in-between concept structures, which could necessitate explicit justification of weighting.¹⁰²

Goertz and Mahoney claim that constructing two-level theories can bring clarity and transparency to theoretical debates, since it prevents confusion about which variables operate on which level, and the structural relationship between levels.¹⁰³ In a two-level theory, the basic level refers to the causal variables and the outcome variable of the theory. The secondary level covers the variables that are subordinate to them, but play a substantial role in causal inference. Secondary level variables affect the main outcome variable by helping to bring into being more temporally proximate causal variables at the basic level. We speak of remote causes (secondary level variables) and proximate causes (basic level causes). The relationship between them can involve ontology, causality, and substitution. Secondary level variables are causes of causes (causal), constitutive features (ontological), or share the same effect on the basic level with other variables (substitutability).¹⁰⁴ If causal factors at the basic level are both individually necessary and jointly sufficient, then we identify a “conjuncture of necessary causes”. If they are substitutable, i.e. if there are multiple variables paving the way for the same outcome, we identify equifinality.¹⁰⁵

To recapitulate this section, this case study pursues a historical, path-dependent approach to causality, whose specific importance for this case lies in assessing the direction of causality, especially in grasping reciprocal causality. It takes the protracted nature of institution formation, multiple lines of conflict, and small events into account. Slow-moving causal processes

depicted in this book are causal chains, which pertain to the emergence of banditry and the autonomy of bureaucrats, cumulative causes such as migration, (sub)urbanization, nation-building, and threshold effects exemplified by revolution.

A primary potential of case studies is to pinpoint causal mechanisms. The main causal mechanisms in this study are related to path-dependent causal processes. Increasing returns, negative feedback, and cyclical processes are types of causal mechanisms employed to explain the path-dependent development of the deep state. Path-dependent cause denotes that the outcome is a result of a self-reinforcing historical causation initiated after a critical juncture. Critical junctures bear high value in this book due to its theoretical link to path-dependent explanations of regime change. Path dependent emergence and decline of the deep state is justified via four criteria of critical junctures: causal possibility, contingency, closure connotes, and constraints. The permissive and productive conditions, as well as the critical antecedent, are basic components of a critical juncture. In order to judge how critical a critical juncture is, the probability jump and temporal leverage will be assessed.

As a safeguard to overcome two major limitations of case-study methods, this book applies theoretically grounded causal process observations with reference to historical sequences leading to the outcome. Process tracing and path-dependency allow us to detect causal mechanisms and explain interaction effects between formal and informal institutions. The Turkish case generates new hypotheses through process tracing and finds out causal factors, such as cleavages, that could incorporate the study of the Turkish state into comparative research. The types of causal processes illustrated in this book are complex forms of causality, path-dependent causal process, interaction effects, and linear causality. Concepts such as revolution, deep state, and democratic consolidation are conceived as complex forms of causality; the deep state emerges through a path-dependent causal process; interaction effects between formal and informal institutions are elaborated; the state and the regime are related in a reciprocal causality, i.e. in a cyclical interaction. Linear causality relates to the simple micro-level phenomena that can be explained through characterization of direct chain of events.

In order to maintain the persuasiveness of causal chains and to avoid infinite regression during process tracing, the causal chains are broken at critical junctures, at points which prove to be difficult to trace causal connections, and according to theoretical guidelines. As a type of process tracing, analytic explanation will be applied, since it explicitly refers to theory; more general explanation will be opted for, when data or theoretical references are insufficient.

Concept formation and two-level theories are essential for aligning methodology with ontology in the theoretical chapter. The first section of the theoretical chapter compares – in line with the path-dependent approach to causality – the Turkish case with the Western European cases based on a

two-level theory of liberal democracy. It constructs two-level theories by detecting the variables on the basic and secondary level and the structural relationship between levels. The next chapter generates the concept of deep state on the basic, secondary, and indicator level. On the basic level, it makes the positive and negative poles explicit; it specifies the content between these poles and theorizes the gray zone. Moreover, it describes the formal relations between these levels. Necessary conditions, if any, are made explicit; a sufficiency criterion is identified; and dimensions are weighted according to their importance. The concept of deep state is linked to the consolidation of democracy in a two-level theory.

Notes

- 1 Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," 56.
- 2 Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method."
- 3 Hall, "Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics"; Rueschemeyer, "Can One or a Few Cases Yield Theoretical Gains?"; George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*; Yin, *Case Study Research*, 2008.
- 4 George and Bennett, "Case Studies and Theory Development," 17; Ragin, "Introduction: Cases of 'What Is a Case?'"
- 5 Gerring, "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?," 341.
- 6 Gerring, "The Case Study: What It Is and What It Does," 95–96.
- 7 Gerring, "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?," 343.
- 8 George and Bennett, "Case Studies and Theory Development," 18.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 19.
- 10 Yin, *Case Study Research*, 2002, 14.
- 11 Gerring, "The Case Study: What It Is and What It Does"; Gerring, "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?"
- 12 Mahoney and Goertz, "A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research."
- 13 Bennett and Elman, "Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study Methods," 457. They also remind us that this distinction between "inquiries into the cause of a given effect" and "into the effects or properties of a given cause" dates back to Mill, *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation*, 388.
- 14 Mahoney and Goertz, "A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research," 232–36.
- 15 George, "Case Studies and Theory Development," 11; George and Bennett, "Case Studies and Theory Development."
- 16 Mahoney and Goertz, "A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research," 236.
- 17 Hall, "Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics," 382–87.
- 18 Bennett and Elman, "Complex Causal Relations and Case Study Methods: The Example of Path Dependence," 263.
- 19 Mahoney and Goertz, "A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research," 241–42.
- 20 *Ibid.*, 244.
- 21 Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," 1038.
- 22 *Ibid.*

- 23 King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, 14; Gerring, "The Case Study: What It Is and What It Does," 98–101; George and Bennett, "Case Studies and Theory Development," 20–21.
- 24 Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Macro-Politics."
- 25 Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method."
- 26 Hall, "Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics," 395–96.
- 27 Rueschemeyer, "Can One or a Few Cases Yield Theoretical Gains?," 309.
- 28 Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, 32.
- 29 George and Bennett, "Case Studies and Theory Development," 12.
- 30 Bennett and Elman, "Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study Methods," 461–62.
- 31 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 207; Bennett and Elman, "Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study Methods," 461.
- 32 George and Bennett, "Case Studies and Theory Development," 25–32.
- 33 *Ibid.*, 25.
- 34 Gerring, "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?," 347–48.
- 35 *Ibid.*, 344–45.
- 36 Mahoney and Goertz, "A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research," 236–38.
- 37 George and Bennett, "Case Studies and Theory Development," 26–28.
- 38 *Ibid.*, 30–32.
- 39 Yin, *Case Study Research*, 2002, 10.
- 40 George and Bennett, "Case Studies and Theory Development," 28.
- 41 *Ibid.*, 28–30.
- 42 Gerring, "The Case Study: What It Is and What It Does," 98–102.
- 43 George and Bennett, "Case Studies and Theory Development," 33.
- 44 Yin, *Case Study Research*, 2002, 36.
- 45 Rueschemeyer, "Can One or a Few Cases Yield Theoretical Gains?," 318.
- 46 *Ibid.*, 330.
- 47 *Ibid.*, 332.
- 48 Pierson, "Big, Slow-Moving, and Invisible."
- 49 Capoccia and Ziblatt, "The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond," 935.
- 50 *Ibid.*, 935–39.
- 51 Pierson, "Big, Slow-Moving, and Invisible," 181–82, 187–88.
- 52 Capoccia and Ziblatt, "The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond," 939–42.
- 53 Stinchcombe, *Constructing Social Theories*.
- 54 Pierson, "Big, Slow-Moving, and Invisible," 193–98.
- 55 Bennett and Elman, "Complex Causal Relations and Case Study Methods: The Example of Path Dependence," 260–64.
- 56 Rueschemeyer, "Can One or a Few Cases Yield Theoretical Gains?," 311.
- 57 Bennett and Elman, "Complex Causal Relations and Case Study Methods: The Example of Path Dependence," 252.
- 58 Elster, "A Plea for Mechanisms," 45.
- 59 David, "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY"; Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics."
- 60 Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," 392–99.
- 61 Bennett and Elman, "Complex Causal Relations and Case Study Methods: The Example of Path Dependence," 256–59.
- 62 Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology."
- 63 Bennett and Elman, "Complex Causal Relations and Case Study Methods: The Example of Path Dependence," 264.

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- 64 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 206–7.
- 65 Campbell, “Degrees of Freedom and the Case Study”; Hall, “Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics”; Collier, Mahoney, and Seawright, “Claiming Too Much: Warnings about Selection Bias.”
- 66 Bennett and Elman, “Complex Causal Relations and Case Study Methods: The Example of Path Dependence,” 251.
- 67 Hall, “Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics,” 391–95.
- 68 George and Bennett, “Case Studies and Theory Development,” 24.
- 69 Gerring, “Case Selection for Case Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques,” 655.
- 70 Yin, *Case Study Research*, 2002, 39–40.
- 71 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 207, 209, 214–16.
- 72 Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 179.
- 73 See Raza, “Does Turkish Model of Democracy Lack Empirical Validity in the Arab World? A Comparative Analysis”; McCargo and Zarakol, “Turkey and Thailand: Unlikely Twins”; Duman and Tsarouhas, “‘Civilianization’ in Greece versus ‘Demilitarization’ in Turkey, A Comparative Study of Civil-Military Relations and the Impact of the European Union”; Demirel, “Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy: The Turkish Case in a Comparative Perspective”; Şatana, “Civil-Military Relations in Europe, Middle East and Turkey”; Atlı, “Societal Legitimacy of the Military: Turkey and Indonesia in Comparative Perspective”; Sayarı and Sunar, “Democracy in Turkey”; Karaosmanoğlu, “The International Context of Democratic Transition in Turkey.”
- 74 Gerring, “Case Selection for Case Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques,” 656.
- 75 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 212–13.
- 76 Pierson, “Big, Slow-Moving, and Invisible,” 188; George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 222–23.
- 77 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 222. See Collier and Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research.”
- 78 Bennett and Elman, “Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study Methods,” 459–60.
- 79 Pierson, “Big, Slow-Moving, and Invisible,” 188–89.
- 80 Lipset and Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*.
- 81 Capoccia and Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” 358–59.
- 82 *Ibid.*, 362.
- 83 Soifer, “The Causal Logic of Critical Junctures,” 1574.
- 84 *Ibid.*, 1575.
- 85 Slater and Simmons, “Informative Regress: Critical Antecedents in Comparative Politics,” 891. In Soifer, “The Causal Logic of Critical Junctures,” 1576.
- 86 Capoccia and Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” 348–55.
- 87 *Ibid.*, 361.
- 88 *Ibid.*, 358–59.
- 89 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 210–11.
- 90 Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” 1039.
- 91 *Ibid.*, 1045.
- 92 Hall, “Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics,” 374.

- 93 Mahoney and Goertz, "A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research," 5.
- 94 Goertz, *Social Science Concepts*, 27.
- 95 Sartori, *Social Science Concepts*.
- 96 *Ibid.*, 11, 34–35.
- 97 Goertz, *Social Science Concepts*, 27–35.
- 98 *Ibid.*, 62.
- 99 *Ibid.*, 53, 58.
- 100 *Ibid.*, 62–64.
- 101 *Ibid.*, 36–38.
- 102 *Ibid.*, 45–47, 50.
- 103 Goertz and Mahoney, "Concepts in Theories: Two-Level Theories," 250.
- 104 Goertz, *Social Science Concepts*, 240–45.
- 105 Goertz and Mahoney, "Concepts in Theories: Two-Level Theories," 240.

2 Theoretical framework

This chapter aligns the methodology, specifically the path-dependent approach to causality and conceptual validity standards, with theoretical propositions. The first section introduces diverse integrative strategies in the agency-structure debate and opts for path-dependent integrative strategy. To shed light on the path-dependent emergence of the deep state, this section firstly evaluates the iterated hypothesis testing based on the seminal books on the path-dependency of regime change. Secondly, the informal roots of the deep state are elaborated by comparing patrimonialism with feudalism historically in terms of types of domination and styles of state consolidation. The formal roots of the deep state are analysed by referring to two concepts, liberal democracy and revolution from above, which depict complex forms of causality in two-level theories. These analyses expound on the relationship between democracy and the state (state consolidation, the emergence of strong state, and state breakdown). Finally, this section relates cleavages to democracy and emphasizes the role of the state in sustaining a cleavage constellation.

The second section focuses on contemporary political systems, since this case study explores the reciprocal causation between two basic concepts of “transformation research,”¹ the state and political regime. In discussing political regimes, it addresses the controversies surrounding the issue of delineating the boundaries between autocracy and democracy. This book opts for a continuous concept of political regimes, which allows for defining the gray zone between authoritarian regimes and liberal democracies.

The third section generates the concept of the deep state as a mode of domination on the basic and secondary levels. The deep state is defined by taking the peculiarities of the gray zone, specifically the interplay of formal and informal institutions, and its impact on the forms of state into account. Furthermore, the causal mechanisms underlying the deep state are examined. The indicator level of the concept is analyzed by identifying and justifying the criteria and spheres, and by weighting them.

The fourth section sheds light on the transition from the deep state to democratic consolidation as a *regime change* through *state transformation*. A four-dimensional approach to democratic consolidation will be applied and

elaborated in a two-level theory. The theoretical chapter ends with the presentation of an alternative path-dependent explanation of regime change.

Path-dependency in the agency-structure debate

Mahoney distinguishes knowledge accumulation from its generation, since the former is a conscious effort of knowledge generation based on previously acquired knowledge by using causal hypotheses as stepping stones for generating and testing theories. The elaboration of hypotheses leads to the extraction of new independent variables, extends independent variables to account for more outcomes, and identifies the scope conditions for a given hypothesis.² Mahoney and Snyder distinguish the structuralist and voluntarist approaches through two parameters: the extent of agency socialization and the causal impact of the structure on agency. The structuralist approach conceives of an oversocialized agency and regards structures as generators of agency, whereas the voluntarist approach conceives of an undersocialized agency and regards structures as contingent constraints. The former relies on objective conditions as primary explanatory variables, while the latter relies on the subjective condition of actors. The structuralist approach explains regime change at the macro level, which deals specifically with the international/world systemic impacts on the national level, and at the domestic-structural level, which comprises impersonal, noncontingent social groups, such as social cleavages. The voluntarist approach operates at the micro level referring to subjectively defined social groups, e.g. ethnic groups, as well as to personal leadership, e.g. party leaders. The meso level of formal institutions, including political parties, military, and constitutional rules, does not constitute the primary explanatory variables of these approaches.³

Three strategies integrate agency and structure in the study of regime transformation: funnel, path-dependent, and eclectic strategy. They differ in their conceptual “bias” and their approach to the mode of causation between five levels: macro-structural, domestic-structural, institutional, social group, and leadership. The funnel strategy has a voluntarist assumption that the analyst should go unidirectionally down the ladder of levels to find the real causes, because structural factors are necessary, but never sufficient, causes. The regime transformation results from the sum of these variables that are seen as vectors, i.e., forces with a particular direction, which favor or disfavor regime transformation. The path-dependent strategy has a structuralist assumption that historical sequences driven by critical junctures in the remote past are the main causes of present actions. Institutions are the intermediary level between structure and agency. The structure causes agency’s action in an evolutionary way, while institutions provide the reflexive agency with room for initiating change. The eclectic strategy is not based on a consistent conceptual base, i.e., it indiscriminately attaches causality to both structure and agency. The payoff of not having a “bias” is loosing parsimony and lacking a systematic capture of regime transformations.⁴

This case study uses a path-dependent strategy, since issues pertaining to the agency-structure debate can be alleviated through the analysis of “the concrete configuration of political institutions”.⁵ North set the parameters of neo-institutionalism with his definition of institutions as “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. Corollary, they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic”.⁶ Institutions enable and constrain actors by offering options and providing sanctions, i.e., they influence the cost-benefit calculus of actors; thus, institutions reduce uncertainty, prolong time frames, and make processes more predictable. In this neo-institutionalist vein, the state and political parties can be regarded both as actors and institutional arenas.⁷

The path-dependent explanation here integrates different levels of analysis in the regime question. On the macro level, it discusses the international/world systemic impacts on state formation, consolidation and breakdown. The causal relationship between the state on the macro-structural level and cleavages on the domestic-structural level are analyzed. The concept of deep state is formed by explicitly relating it to the meso level, specifically to (in)formal institutions and the security sector. The next section emphasizes the interaction between formal and informal institutions while generating the concept of deep state. Formal institutions encompass state institutions (courts, legislatures, bureaucracies) and state-enforced rules (constitutions, laws, regulations). They are made and enforced “through channels that are widely accepted as official”,⁸ whereas informal institutions do not. Democratic consolidation is related to the deep state and international anchors on the macro-level and to elite settlement on the micro level.

Path-dependent explanations are the trademark of historical institutionalism. Longitudinal analyses emphasize the historicity of social institutions that are shaped by critical junctures in the remote past. “Critical juncture” refers to relatively brief periods of heightened contingency with institutional flux and structural fluidity that offer substantively heightened probability that agents’ choices close off alternatives and set institutions on path-dependent trajectories.⁹ “Once an option is selected, it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available”.¹⁰ Path dependency occurs “when the choices of key actors at critical juncture points lead to the formation of institutions that have self-reproducing properties”.¹¹

Mahoney lists the analytical components of path-dependent explanations in terms of sequential stages. In the first stage, antecedent historical conditions influence options that are available for actors. In the second stage, the critical juncture occurs when a window of opportunity for various actions is opened to actors who select a particular option from the alternatives. In the third stage, that particular option creates an institution which is reproduced due to structural persistence. In the fourth stage, a reactive sequence, i.e., reactions and counter-reactions to that institution, intervene and challenge the structural persistence. In the last stage, the regime outcome depends on the resolution of the conflict.¹²

Weaknesses or challenges of historical institutionalism appear in the translation of critical junctures to lasting political legacies or, put differently, in the specification of different types of reproduction mechanisms behind different institutional arrangements. This point was discussed in the methodological chapter. The second challenge is the overemphasis on the institutional “lock-in” effect, which makes path change and path departure exceptional cases or even implausible.¹³ Phrases like “freezing” or “crystallization”¹⁴ of particular institutional configurations might be misleading. It would be more fruitful to ask how the mechanisms that sustain and (de)stabilize different institutional configurations vary.¹⁵ The following questions must be answered as well: who has invested in particular institutional arrangements; how these institutions are sustained over time; and how those who do not have vested interests in these institutions are kept out. Here, ideational and material foundations must be taken into account.¹⁶

Structuralist meta-theory: The Moore Research Program

This study utilizes knowledge accumulation on the causal hypotheses of the Moore Research Program for extracting variables and identifying the scope conditions of the path-dependent trajectory of the Turkish state. By referring to the iterated hypothesis testing based on the causal findings in Moore’s *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*,¹⁷ it aims at contributing to this program through the introduction of new variables. Through an appraisal of path-dependent explanations in this program, the state is qualified as the dependent variable. State and cleavage structures are detected as omitted variables in the study of path-dependency and regime change.

Moore claims that democracy emerged where a strong bourgeois impulse that was in hostility to absolutism could seek independence from the crown and could entice the peasantry to collaborate against the crown; expressed succinctly: “No bourgeois, no democracy”.¹⁸ The emphasis on rural commercialization predating modernization challenged the modernization theory. Instead of pro-democratic middle classes, Moore introduced cross-class alliances between the landed and urban upper classes and the peasantry. The emergence of democracy, fascism, and communism depended on the strength of the bourgeoisie, the form of agriculture (“labour repressive” or “market” forms), and the peasant revolutionary potential.¹⁹ The scholars who applied iterated hypothesis testing in this research program confirmed Moore’s hypotheses on a limited and highly conditional base. Most of the significant evidence came from new data introduced on the cases rather than from new cases.²⁰

The authors, who overwhelmingly employed class actors/coalitions as independent variables explaining regime change, pursued a non-integrative path-dependent approach. Two studies on governmental elites pursued an integrative path-dependent strategy.²¹ In *Capitalist Development and Democracy*, Rüschmeyer and his collaborators claimed that the bourgeoisie is “a much less consistently and radically anti-democratic force” than the landed

upper class that relies on “labour repressive agriculture”, while the historical articulation of working class interests was pro-democratic.²² The emergence of democracy depends on the balance of power among different classes and class coalitions.²³ In *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe*, Luebbert argues that the pro-democratic role of the working class is bound to a “genuine class compromise”,²⁴ i.e., the alliance with another class or its substantial fraction. Transition to mass politics or the stabilization of democratic institutions is only possible through a “consensual routinization of a certain distribution of authority”.²⁵ In *The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central America*, Mahoney used an integrative path-dependent approach to study the emergence and persistence of democracy, military authoritarianism, and traditional dictatorship by elaborating on the liberal reforms during the nineteenth century capitalist transformation of Central America and their impact on the state-building and agrarian capitalist development. Democracy was prevented if these reforms required military repression.²⁶

Mahoney presents the five sequences of path-dependent explanations of regime change. In the first stage, the antecedent conditions are the relative power of key economic and political actors. In the second stage, the critical juncture occurs when actors opt for a specific state policy and/or specific coalitional partner. In the third stage, that particular option creates an institution which reproduces class, state, and/or state-class structures. In the fourth stage, a reactive sequence, response and counterresponse of elite and subordinate groups intervene and challenge the structural persistence. In the last stage, the regime outcome depends on the resolution of the conflict and the creation of new regimes.²⁷

The Moore Research Program demonstrates knowledge accumulation on the path-dependent explanation of regime change in line with the sequential analysis suggested by Mahoney. Moore explains the divergence of regime outcome (democracy, communism, or fascism) by looking at the extent to which the “bourgeois impulse” is regarded as an antecedent condition; critical juncture refers to the adoption of a coalition ally by the bourgeoisie; the relative power of class actors is reproduced in the sequence of institutional persistence; and class conflicts challenge the structural persistence in the reactive sequence. The study of Rüchemeyer and his collaborators confirms the sequence of institutional persistence, but revises the remaining sequences. Antecedent conditions for the critical juncture – the formation of a class alliance with respect to democracy – depend on the relative power of different class actors; regime outcome (democracy and authoritarianism) is explained by the reactive sequence which refers to the demands of subordinate classes and response of dominant classes.²⁸

In their integrative approach to regime change, Luebbert considers the extent of divisions among middle classes as antecedent conditions; in the critical juncture, the liberals’ decision to forge an alliance with labor or not creates an institutional persistence in which working-class organizations and

movements are reproduced; the course of regime change (liberal democracy, social democracy, and fascism) depends on the reactive sequence, the interaction between labor movements and political parties. Mahoney refers to the political power of liberals relative to conservatives as antecedent conditions for the critical juncture of liberal's policies with respect to the state and agrarian modernization, which causes an institutional persistence, where different class and state structures persist; the regime outcome (military-authoritarianism, democracy, and traditional dictatorship) depends on the struggle between the elites and the democratic movements.²⁹

A critical assessment of these works, most of which relate to Western European countries, confirms the aim of Cappocia and Ziblatt in exploring causal powers of non-class factors in the emergence of democracy in Europe.³⁰ Referring to Moore, Theda Skocpol calls for introducing new variables such as the autonomous role of the state organization, state elites, and the interaction between the state and international factors.³¹ However, we still lack an explanatory scheme which adequately accounts for macro-social settings different to those in Western Europe, where the presence of neither bourgeois nor peasant revolution was historically possible; where late capitalist transformation was realized after a state breakdown and formation of a new state; where the working class operated in a different type of capitalism. An adequate account of the different paths of state formation, consolidation and breakdown in these settings can shed light on the outcome of different political regimes. The following subsection shows that non-class actors, such as the state and cleavages have a high explanatory value for path-dependent analysis of Turkey.

State, cleavages, and democracy

This subsection theoretically explores the legacy of patrimonial domination for the deep state. First, the early modern, feudal roots of liberal democracy in the context of the prior existence of medieval constitutionalism and the absence of military revolution will be contrasted to patrimonial domination for grasping the Ottoman state. Second, state centralization efforts in Western Europe is distinguished from the Ottoman route to state consolidation. It is argued that the specific pattern of state consolidation based on the state-banditry relations is an informal source of the deep state. Third, the relation of democracy to the strong state is discussed. The analysis of state breakdown and state making through revolution reveals the causal chain leading to the autonomy of bureaucrats, which is regarded as a formal source of the deep state. Fourth, the role of the state in the development of cleavage constellations and the party system is elucidated.

For Max Weber, medieval times are characterized by traditional authority,³² which can take the form of a patrimonial and feudal state. As feudalism emanates from the breakdown of a patrimonial regime, it can be regarded as an extreme or marginal case of patrimonialism.³³ A patrimonial state develops

when a patriarchal ruler extends his household administration over a wider political territory. Military and administrative staff, are recruited at first from the ruler's personal dependents. Officials retain land in return for their service, but they do not possess them.³⁴ Under patrimonial rule, land is always a prebend, a nonhereditary form of support at the discretion of the ruler. Land and land benefices are attached to the office rather than to incumbent. Patrimonial rule prevents the emergence of landed aristocracy and the ascent of individuals outside of the privileged stratum. Patrimonial officials became a status group with honor and privileges vis-à-vis the general population. Their prestige remained tied to office; they were the sovereign's personal dependents. Without an independent power base, land, they could not develop an independent organization.³⁵

In feudalism, land benefices granted to officials became not only hereditary fiefs but also personal property, not under the control of the ruler. Feudal lords used their control over the land for more contractual rights from the king. The vassals were organized independent of the state and became an estate, or a corporate aristocracy, with collective consciousness of their status interests.³⁶ As Weber, Otto Hintze regards lord-vassal ties, political immunity of feudal lords under *Ständestaat*, rule of law, the flourishing of autonomous towns, local military organizations, and the possibilities of resistance under feudal domination as the unique features of medieval Europe which led to constitutionalism and made the genesis of democracy possible.³⁷

In *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe*,³⁸ Brian M. Downing identifies medieval constitutionalism and the absence of military revolution as necessary and sufficient (basic level) causes of liberal democracy. Downing challenges Moore by pointing to the existence of parliament and local autonomy predating the rise of the bourgeoisie and commercial agriculture. Representative assemblies, the main predisposition toward democratic political institutions, were unique in Europe in the late medieval world. This system was characterized by a decentralized government, where parliaments controlled taxation and warfare; where the power of the monarchs was limited by local centers; where basic freedoms and rights were conceded to a large group of the population; where an independent judiciary and the rule of law emerged. His hypothesis is twofold: constitutional governments in Europe, which were involved in international warfare and failed to mobilize extensive human and economic resources to finance a modern army as a result of the financial and constitutional strains (posed by the estates which refused to pay taxes), were demolished by military-bureaucratic absolutism; whereas constitutionalism coupled with the lack of international challenges and/or limited pressure for mobilizing domestic resources laid down the basis for democracy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Military revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries refers to the gunpowder-inspired transformation of small, decentralized feudal self-sustaining mercenary armies into large, state-organized, and centralized permanent forces.³⁹

Expressed via the terminology of two-level theories, medieval constitutionalism (the basic level cause) is related to secondary level variables ontologically: parliaments, local power, basic freedoms, and independent judiciary. The relationship of the other basic level cause, absence of military revolution, to the secondary level is equifinality. Alternative causes of the absence of military revolution are geographic position, alliance constellation, commercial wealth, and foreign resources.⁴⁰

Downing's study underpins theoretical approaches to state consolidation. Karen Barkey maintains that state consolidation in feudal and patrimonial systems involved warfare, taxation, and administrative imposition. However, different outcomes ensued due to differences in the social structure, i.e., organization, autonomy, and resources of social classes, hence differences in the state's actions for centralization.⁴¹ She refers to the studies on state consolidation developed by Charles Tilly and Michael Mann, who identify three routes in a continuum ranging from coercion to coercion-capital accumulation and to capital-intensive types. According to Tilly, the coercion-intensive type emerged in agrarian social structures such as in Russia and Prussia, where the state had to deal with the nobility and rural classes in order to extract surpluses by imposing coercion on landed populations.⁴² In Russia and Prussia, the nobility allied with the state in extracting resources and in recruiting a centralized military from the peasantry.⁴³ Elite or peasant rebellions were a response to the state's attempt to centralize administrative jurisdiction and demilitarize regional power holders in order to extract resources and transfer surpluses directly to the state.⁴⁴ Downing confirmed these conclusions by referring to the military-bureaucratic absolutism of Brandenburg-Prussia as similar to Russia under Peter the Great.⁴⁵

Tilly maintains that the capital-intensive route emerged in commercialized Dutch and Swedish cases, where the state dealt with the merchant capital, guilds, and city organizations and extracted resources from the merchant classes in return for protection.⁴⁶ These support Downing's hypotheses regarding the role of wealth and foreign resources of the Dutch and the absence of military revolution in Sweden. State formation in France and England required both coercion and capital,⁴⁷ whereas Mann maintained that the constitutional state in England stemmed from the extensive use of capital; in the French case, an absolutist bureaucratic administration followed in the lack of capital, and the state mobilized its population into a centralized military.⁴⁸ Tilly gives a more compelling glimpse into the French case by stating that in the commercialized areas of France, the state was able to force the nobility to repress the peasantry, which fueled anti-feudal rebellion.⁴⁹ The anti-state revolts of the elites and peasants were triggered by centralization efforts that were directed to extract surpluses from both cultivating and non-cultivating classes.⁵⁰ This is again in line with the Downing's arguments on the vulnerable absolutism of France that was broken by the bourgeois revolution of 1789.

Barkey's study of the Ottoman route to state consolidation provides a theoretical guideline for tracing the causal chain paving the way for the

emergence of banditry. She criticizes the common perception that regards the Western feudal course of state-making that involved increasing concentrations of capital and coercion over a rebellious society as “*the* course of action through which states centralize, allowing for little variation”.⁵¹ Barkey borrows the terms of Tilly to describe patrimonial and brokerage styles of centralization:⁵² in the patrimonial style, the rulers “sought tribute much more than they sought the stable control of the population and resources within the territories they overran”, while in the brokerage style the rulers’ sovereignty in the territories they overran were subject to contention and the state responded by waging war conducted by mercenaries and the state bargained with mercenaries over their territorial gains.⁵³ The French state demobilized regional powers by hiring mercenary armies from abroad, which were mobilized during wartime; when the war ended, they were discharged outside the borders.⁵⁴

Unlike the French case, the Ottoman state used domestic bandits, and not only during wartime as mercenary armies but also for further objectives. In the patrimonial rule, the mode of land tenure and specific state actions were aimed at preventing collective action that could challenge the state. The prevention of collective action mostly affected the peasantry, i.e., those at the end of the vertical social structure. In the absence of a corporate entity, banditry emerged in the Ottoman (1590–1648), Russian (1708–1836), and Chinese empires (1796–1864). The Ottoman bandits were mostly peasants and landless soldiers who became members of mercenaries available for hire and switched to banditry after demobilization. The state bargained with the bandits over their deployment in wars as mercenaries; while provincial officials used them to suppress the peasantry for extracting supplies, the state turned a blind eye to that; when peasants complained against these officials and bandits, the state allowed the arming of peasants and, hence, reinforced banditry. Then, the state smashed the banditry it once employed; this, in turn, legitimized state centralization further.⁵⁵ The brokerage style of state consolidation, which depended on the collaboration of the state with organized crime and the incorporation of bandits into formal state institutions, constitutes an informal source of the deep state.

In order to find the formal sources of the Turkish deep state, the following elaborates on stateness and revolution from above. Scholars have investigated causal linkages between stateness and political regimes.⁵⁶ Linz and Stepan argue that “without a state, no modern democracy is possible”.⁵⁷ Kenneth Dyson posits the strong state that is “a generalizing, integrating, and legitimizing State as an idea and institution”,⁵⁸ in the continuum of horizontal and vertical dimensions of democracy. He refers to Dahl,⁵⁹ who relates the horizontal dimension of democracy to rights and liberties (hence, participation) while the vertical dimension is related to the state. The first refers to the divide between political elites and institutions; the latter refers to the divide between state elites and institutions. Dyson’s taxonomy of strong states posits France and Germany at the two extremes of the continuum. The French case exemplifies the tension and coexistence between the vertical and horizontal

dimensions. As the concept of “party states” illustrates, the strength of contenders of the state institutions makes Germany an extreme case for strong states, compared to the gray zone examples, such as the British “party-government” and the Dutch and Swedish harmonious relationship between the legislature as a representative institution and the executive branch representing the state.⁶⁰

Heper challenged Dyson’s taxonomy by placing the Ottoman-Turkish case at the polar end instead of the French state. “If civil society as an entity effectively impinging on the affairs of the state, has been a limited one in the Prussian-German context, it has been virtually absent in the Ottoman-Turkish case”.⁶¹ The strength of the strong state is correlated with the autonomy of the civil-military bureaucracy that directly affected the type of state breakdown in the Ottoman Empire and the type of political regime in the Turkish Republic. Autonomy of the civil-military bureaucrats is a formal source of the deep state. Instead of a “bourgeois revolution” whose connection to democracy was studied by Karl Marx, Adam Smith, Ralf Dahrendorf, Reinhard Bendix, and Barrington Moore, an unfinished, political revolution through bureaucratic takeover driven by state elites paved the way for the abolition of the absolutist regime in 1908. These bureaucrats led the revolution from above, which resulted in the breakdown of the Ottoman state.

In *Revolution from above*, Ellen Kay Trimberger explores the state breakdown through bureaucratic takeover: in the Meiji restoration of Japan (1868–1912), the Turkish War of Independence (1919–23), the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, and Peru’s 1968 coup. She defines revolution as “an extralegal takeover of the central state apparatus, which destroys the economic and political power of the dominant social group of the old regime”.⁶² Revolutions from above were led by high-ranking civil and military bureaucrats, who held state resources independent from classes, which is traced back to patrimonial legacy that has deprived social groups from the possibility of collective action. The bureaucratic elite was autonomous from the economic means of production, i.e., it gained its social status and wealth primarily from office. They had no economic interest in land, commerce, or industry nor were they dependent on an economically dominant class of landowners or businessmen. They led nationalist movements and initiated state-led industrialization after the revolution.⁶³ The autonomy of bureaucratic elites is referred to as the formal source of the Turkish deep state.

If we translate Trimberger’s hypothesis to a two-level theory, her theory involves on the basic level a conjunction of necessary causes. Bureaucratic takeover and state breakdown constitute the basic level, jointly sufficient causes of revolution from above. The logical structure of the relationship between the secondary level variables and basic level causes is again a conjunction of necessary causes. These variables are slow-moving causal paths, which combined produce threshold effects. Bureaucratic takeover necessitates bureaucratic autonomy from class domination, radicalization of the military bureaucrats, and landlord vulnerability. State breakdown necessitates national movements from below and the opportunity for international maneuvering.




Figure 2.1 Two-level theories: *Revolution from above* by Trimberger

The provincial power base of bureaucrats is a necessary condition in decentralized or heterogeneous polities. Her theory directly relates the secondary level variable to the outcome variable, revolution, in an ontological relationship with the revolt of civil and military bureaucrats, mass demobilization, state transformation, and class transformation.⁶⁴

With regard to the development of political systems, this study confirms Skocpol's hypothesis that particular class and cleavage constellations were not a cause but an outcome of the way the state was organized.⁶⁵ Lipset and Rokkan compare the development of mass politics in Western European countries. "The party alternatives and the party organizations in Europe are older than the majorities of the national electorates",⁶⁶ since party systems represent interests of cleavages that have economic and political power base.

Lipset and Rokkan categorize infrastructural conflicts under four master variables: urban, rural, ethnic-linguistic, and church. In critical junctures, these infrastructural conflicts manifested themselves as structural constraints and were translated through specific actor alliances into concrete institutional forms as party systems. The timing and type of state formation and nation-building were significant for democratization. An earlier overcoming of the cultural-territorial cleavages before mass mobilization, and creation of national churches during Reformation, facilitated early nation-building and produced institutions prone to democracy as illustrated by the consociational state formation in Switzerland and the Netherlands in contrast to the absolutism in Piedmont and Prussia of Italy and Germany. Two dimensions, the center-periphery dimension and the economic, cultural, and religious dimension, affected actor alliances and opposition-building. During the critical junctures of the Reformation, democratic revolution, industrial revolution,

and the decisions of the center about the religious and economic sides of cleavage affected the options of the periphery; these decisions were in turn affected by the alternatives offered in terms of religious and urban-rural cleavages.⁶⁷

Turkey was quite different from the Western European countries due to the timing and type of state formation and nation-building. The translation of infrastructural conflicts into concrete institutional forms as party systems was distorted by the state that affected the outcome of conflicts. The state conquered the center of politics and maintained a particular center-periphery divide through coercion. The state situated itself against the political forces of the center and the periphery, which are defined in terms of their distance from the state. Military interventions and (in)formal institutions targeted the absorption or elimination of those political forces of the center and/or the periphery, which were seen as the power bidders challenging the state. This argument modifies the third stage in the template of path-dependent explanations of regime change – structural persistence. Instead of the reproduction of class, state, and/or state-class structures, this stage indicates the reproduction of state-cleavage structures.

This book tests some of the basic hypotheses of Lipset and Rokkan regarding the hierarchy and cross-cutting of cleavages that affect democracy. They hypothesized that cultural cleavages exert more influence than economic cleavage and cleavages have a higher impact than election systems. The more crisscrossing of multiple memberships in the system, the more tolerance and trust can develop towards citizens on the other side; the fewer crisscrossings, the more intolerance and distrust grow.⁶⁸ The convergence or cross-cutting of cleavages in Europe was made possible largely by the owner-worker cleavage. Better conditions for democracy were provided due to strong bonds between parties and constituency as a result of slow expansion of suffrage, and late transition from majority to proportional election system, whose introduction is the more necessary if citizens are ethnically and religiously heterogeneous.⁶⁹

Political regimes

Autocracy and democracy

Linz provided the first detailed analysis of the typology of political regimes: totalitarian, authoritarian, and democratic regimes.⁷⁰ By expanding on Linz's typology, Merkel suggests six secondary level dimensions for differentiating autocracy (negative pole) from democracy (positive pole): legitimation of domination, access to domination, monopoly of domination, structure of domination, claim to domination, and use of domination. Autocracy legitimizes its power through an extensive and penetrating ideology, or *Weltanschauung*, whereas sovereignty of the people legitimizes democracy. Autocracy prohibits access to domination, whereas elections open access to domination in a

democracy. Autocracy's monopoly of domination is exercised without democratically legitimated authorities, whereas in a democracy, it is exercised through democratically legitimated authorities. Autocracy's structure of domination is monistic, whereas democracy is pluralistic. Autocracy has an unlimited claim to domination, whereas democracy has a limited claim to domination. The use of domination in authoritarian regimes is repressive, arbitrary, and terroristic, whereas in democratic regimes it is based on the rule of law.⁷¹

Accordingly, authoritarian regimes can be categorized according to their legitimation of power: communist authoritarian regime, fascist-authoritarian regime, military regime, corporatist-authoritarian regime, racist-authoritarian regime, authoritarian-modernizing regime, theocratic-authoritarian regime, monarchic-authoritarian regime, sultanistic-authoritarian regime.⁷² Geddes differentiates between military, personalist, single-party regime, and amalgam of these types, along the access to power.⁷³ The fourth chapter analyzes the authoritarian era of the Turkish Republic according to the legitimation of power and access to power.

Systematic attempts among political scientists for concept formation can be found, in the 1970s, in the pioneering work of Dahl, *Polyarchy*,⁷⁴ which has set criteria for cross-national measures in comparative research. Dahl's conception of democracy resembles, in a narrow sense of the word, a Platonic idea (*eidos*) with no perfect representation, while polyarchies approximate to this ideal, since it combines public contestation (liberalization) and political participation (inclusiveness).⁷⁵ Dahl lists eight institutional guarantees for these three necessary, but probably not sufficient, conditions: (1) freedom to form and join organizations, (2) freedom of expression, (3) the right to vote, (4) eligibility for public office, (5) the right of political leaders to compete for votes and support, (6) alternative sources of information, (7) free and fair elections, (8) institutions for making government policies dependent on votes and other expressions of preference.⁷⁶

A major controversy arises over the classification of deviations from this definition. Shall we regard deviations as a part of democracy or classify them as a part of autocracy? Moving up the ladder by referring to regimes instead of democracy guards us against conceptual stretching, but hinders differentiation. Moving down the ladder by adding more detail and qualities to a concept would allow for differentiation and create classical subtypes, which fully represent the concept. Colliers and Levitsky argue that scholars cannot do both if they do not employ intermediary means. There are three alternatives. First "diminished subtypes"⁷⁷ could represent the "root concept,"⁷⁸ i.e., a definitional point of departure, less than fully, but would be a conceptual contribution. To illustrate, "tutelary democracy" represents a type of democracy, which is vulnerable to the military's entrenched powers. This option is possible if we conceive of democracy as a continuous dependent variable and allow for gray zones. Second, we either move up the ladder of abstraction by categorizing it as a regime type or opt for a dichotomous concept by using "dismissive subtypes" such as "façade democracies". A major controversy arises

regarding where to delineate the line between autocracy and democracy. The dichotomous concept would make precise the definition of the root concept by adding attributes, but it can lead to gerrymandering. Third, we shift the overarching concept by identifying democracy as a regime subtype. Thereby, we either lower or raise the standards of democracy. However, the latter bears the risk of conceptual stretching.⁷⁹

A dichotomous concept of democracy makes cases clearer, the introduction of necessary and sufficient conditions easier, and high *n*-analyses simpler. Nonetheless, it is unable to account for the threshold question. This book opts for identifying a continuous concept of democracy and a gray zone between liberal democracy and full-blown authoritarianism. This kind of differentiation provides a wider analytical precision contrasted to dichotomous differentiation between political systems as democratic and nondemocratic, since it can take the gray zone into account. Autocracy and democracy are two ideal, polar types which are differentiated according to the degree of societal control exercised by the government. Autocracy is an illegitimate rule comprising totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, while democracy is a legitimate rule comprising defective democracy and polyarchy.⁸⁰

Defective democracy

With respect to the root concept “polyarchy”, this study follows Merkel *et al.*, who argue that although institutional guarantees of Dahl might be interpreted to cover a wider range of issues, they are limited to procedures rather than institutions or structural constraints. Hadenius’ insistence on “meaningful elections”⁸¹ becomes crucial, since institutional guarantees emphasize elections, but do not suffice to account for (at least not explicitly deal with) the period between the elections. This root concept is not comprehensive enough to cover instruments designed to guarantee civil rights and the rule of law, checks and balances between institutions, and democratic political culture.⁸²

Scholars who employ a continuous concept of democracy that transcends electoralism, either choose the negative pole (authoritarianism), or the positive pole (liberal democracy) of the basic level for extracting diminished subtypes. Those who chose the negative pole have claimed to break with the “transition paradigm”⁸³ of the 1980s and 1990s. This book remains in this paradigm. Among the concepts based on the positive pole, “illiberal democracies”⁸⁴ or “delegative democracy”⁸⁵ do not explicitly theorize the positive pole.

The root concept “embedded democracy” enables us to attach attributes to diminished subtypes of “defective democracy”.⁸⁶ Embedded democracy refers to a stable constitutional democracy that is internally embedded in three dimensions and five partial regimes: electoral regime, political rights of participation, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and effective power to rule.⁸⁷ They are externally embedded in socio-economic context, civil society,

stateness, and international and regional integration;⁸⁸ internally, they are embedded in five partial regimes that relate to six dimensions of political regimes.⁸⁹

Electoral regime is at the core of embedded democracy, since it relates to the access to power through regular, free and fair elections that are based on the contest of people with equal political rights. Dahl's "institutional guarantees" for this regime would be the (3) right to vote, (4) eligibility for public office, (5) right of leaders to compete for votes, (7) free and fair elections. The regime of political rights of participation was covered by Dahl under remaining guarantees, such as (1) freedom to form and join organizations, (2) freedom of expression, and (6) alternative sources of information. In order to provide for political rights in a wider sense of the word, the democratic regime should allow for (8) institutions for making policies dependent on votes and other expressions of preference, such as public and private media and open public arena in Habermasian terms.⁹⁰

For elections to be meaningful, the dimension of liberal constitutionalism and the rule of law should complement vertical accountability. Under the rule of law, the state abides by clear-cut prerogatives to defend and support them effectively. Only an egalitarian concept of citizenship enshrined in the constitution can ensure civil rights that contain state power, so that the individual's rights bear priority before the state and minorities are protected. Equal access to law and equal treatment before law are indispensable components of civil rights.⁹¹ The regime of horizontal accountability denotes, in accordance with O'Donnell, the separation of power between legislative, executive, and judiciary organs, in a way to allow mutual interdependence and autonomy. Horizontal accountability is mostly violated through infringement of governmental powers and through corruption.⁹²

The effective power to govern denotes the principle that only the democratically elected representatives are allowed to control the agenda. If another state organ, such as the military or the police, intervenes in the decision-making process through institutional prerogatives or through acquiring veto or tutelary powers, this principle is violated. Since these organs are not made democratically accountable, two basic principles – government of the people and government for the people – are also violated. Tutelary powers can be guaranteed in the constitution or acquired through the infringement of the constitutional prerogatives of the government.⁹³

The concept of "defective democracy" captures the gray zone by disaggregating a political system into normatively and functionally interdependent partial regimes. In consolidated democracies, these partial regimes remain intact and mutually embedded, whereas in defective democracies the electoral regime functions fairly and partial regimes are no longer mutually embedded. Depending on which partial regime is mostly damaged, a certain subtype emerges: exclusive democracy (electoral regime, political rights of participation), illiberal democracy (civil rights), delegative democracy (horizontal accountability), and tutelary democracy (effective power to govern).⁹⁴

Deep state

Informal institutions, forms of state and democracy

Democratization studies have proven that the main difference between autocracy and democracy is, counterintuitively, not the basic regime structure, but rather, the function and validity of formal democratic institutions.⁹⁵ In defective democracies, formal institutions disguise specific informal institutions which are usually “the actual rules that are being followed”.⁹⁶ This section generates the concept of deep state that sheds light on this gray zone, particularly on a specific mode of domination. Deep state is defined as a type of formal and informal, or dual modality of domination, which results primarily from the interplay between formal and informal institutions in post-transitional settings.

Following the advice of Collier and Levitsky for conceptual innovation, this book employs Sartori’s strategy of “moving up and down the ladder of abstraction”.⁹⁷ The concept of deep state is formed on the basic, secondary, and indicator level. With respect to the dependent variable of the basic level, deep state, the positive and negative poles should be made explicit. In the continuum of three classical subtypes of state (formal, semi-formal, and informal state), the positive pole of deep state constitutes the semi-formal state, while the negative pole is the informal state.

The state oscillates between these three forms. The form of the state changes according to the extent of undemocratic informal institutions’ fusion with formal institutions, whether civilian rulers tilt the balance in the informal domination’s favor, or whether the deep state exerts ideological “hegemony”⁹⁸ – that is, if it becomes the cohesive signifier of the collective will by instilling a particular way of thinking and seeing, while subtly eliminating alternative meta-languages.

In the formal state, informal institutions are basically in accord with formal democratic institutions. In the semi-formal state, dual domination signals deep state’s existence; civilian rulers appease this modality of dual domination. However, when the deep state shifts to the informal state, political power holders actively cooperate with criminal, semi-formal institutions and enforce a *sui generis* repertoire. This close fit between informal rules and behavior emerges without fail, if militarism and *raison d’état* – alone or instilled by an official ideology – manages to unite segments of society under its hegemony. In a permanent state of exception, formal institutions turn into a façade. In the informal state, deep state is converted into *the* state, the rule, and the norm. As such, the informal state inhabits precisely the line of demarcation between autocracy and democracy where the difference between authoritarian regime and defective democracy is nominal.

For theorizing the basic level causes (or independent variables) of the deep state concept, we move down the ladder, to the political regime. In autocracies, the formal design is in obvious conformity with undemocratic informal

institutions: in this sense, authoritarian regimes display minimal tension between formality and informality. Due to its legitimacy concerns, the deep state arises in defective democracies that lack democratic civilian oversight of the security sector, which is either – as in tutelary democracies – devoid of any control, or – as in delegative democracies – under undemocratic civilian control. For tutelary democracy, the lack of civilian supremacy over the security sector is a cause of deep state, whereas for the latter, the lack of democratic civilian control of the security sector causes the deep state. The theoretical relationship at the basic level involves causality and equifinality.

The relationship between secondary level and the basic level is also causal. For the period between the 1950s and the 2000s, the deep state's power will be correlated with "military autonomy",⁹⁹ i.e., the military's authority to reach decisions, developed by Pion-Berlin. Secondary level variables relate causally to indicators/data in the professional-political-judicial spheres of military autonomy. The recent evolution of deep state in Turkey is elaborated by referring to delegative democracy. The deep state's existence is correlated with the degree of the executive's power to steer patronage networks inside the security sector and to impose its priorities on the legislative and judicial branches. Thus, these secondary level variables relate causally to indicators/data regarding the undemocratic control of the security sector and the excessive prerogatives of the executive whose continuity depends on effective deterrence and compromise of the coercive state apparatus.

The deep state is an outcome of the interaction between formal and informal institutions. "Perverse institutionalization"¹⁰⁰ creates and fosters undemocratic informal rules and/or enshrines them as formal codes. It creates pervasive undemocratic informal rules that disrupt and destroy the logic and function of constitutional institutions, regardless of their being inscribed as formal rules or not. Therefore, perverse institutionalization provides the background behind the negative feedback causal mechanism: the reproduction of power, legitimacy, and functionality of the deep state despite the emergence of various virtuous (in)formalities.

The negative feedback occurs because the interaction of perverse institutionalization with virtuous institutions is ultimately perverse. While they act, protesters on the street, businessmen, members of the parliament, and the military men in barracks know that there are additional games to forming governments. Indeed, undemocratic informal rules are considerably upgraded to state-enforced codes to secure the elites of preceding authoritarian regimes a trade-off for the transition to democracy. Social groups would not apply completely different strategies from consolidated democracies to press their demands. However, the absence of perverse institutions makes the outcome in consolidated democracies uncertain.¹⁰¹ Therefore, it is essential to tackle the fusion of undemocratic informal institutions and formal rules as reflected in Janus-headed constitutional institutions.

By referring to Lauth's categories of informal institutions, deep state's *sui generis* repertoire of informal institutions comprises forms of special

relationships (autocratic cliques and mafia), of the violent exertion of influence (putsch threat, organized crime, and extrajudicial execution), and of material exchange (corruption).¹⁰² Autocratic cliques and mafia can exert direct political influence; the first operates within the state, the latter within society. An autocratic clique refers to a group with restricted access, which gathers political support and exerts direct influence by employing hierarchical ties.¹⁰³

In deep states, the patron of the autocratic clique can be either from the political establishment or from the coercive state apparatus. Autocratic cliques consist of some leaders in the security community and organized crime. The security community, i.e., “those elements of the regime most directly involved in the planning and execution of repression, intelligence gathering, interrogation, torture, and internal clandestine armed operations”, can either be steered by the military institution, or operate autonomously.¹⁰⁴ Autocratic cliques are semi-formal criminal institutions because they lack formal recognition despite their official operation at large. Semi-formality grants impunity. A putsch threat does not necessarily require the use of force, but merely the skills to keep the “sword of Damocles” hanging over the head of elected civilians.¹⁰⁵

The symbiotic relationship of the deep state with organized crime and low-intensity warfare accounts for the causal mechanism of cyclical process. Extrajudicial execution is added here as a form of influence exerted by autocratic cliques which can be either an enforced or a “permissive rule”¹⁰⁶ that allows for deviant behavior instead of enforcing it. Autocratic cliques manipulate the political agenda through extrajudicial killings, such as assassinations, “unknown assailant” murders, disappearances, and massacres. Territories of low intensity warfare provide safe havens in which they extract resources through the illegal trafficking of arms and drugs, gambling, and money laundering. Low-intensity warfare and organized crime are reproduced in a cyclical process. And yet armed conflict is not a necessary condition for deep state to emerge, but a decisive moment for its assertiveness. This *sui generis* repertoire of informal institutions effectively competes with formal rules because the ideological “glues” of nationalism legitimize the deep state and/or autocratic cliques are able to alleviate deeply rooted inequality by offering informal public service.

Deep state has a robust relationship with the “military-industrial complex”,¹⁰⁷ i.e., a mode of capital accumulation which delivers political, economic, and industrial resources to military imperatives; hence, decision-making, defense spending, technical innovation, and research agendas serve national security and compromise democracy. In deep states, the military-industrial complex is either ruled by a too-powerful executive branch or by military men in their multiple guises as “an industrialist, a merchant, a financial investor, and a rentier”.¹⁰⁸ The increasing returns mechanism maintains the economic and political power of the deep state, hence, of the military-industrial complex.

The major part of this study illustrates the deep state in tutelary democracy. Therefore, it is essential to elaborate on this regime type and its relation to the deep state. Tutelary powers, putsch threat, reserved domains, and

serious distortions of the electoral system provide the backdrop against which the “vicious cycle of perverse institutionalization” unfolds.¹⁰⁹ In tutelary democracies, the military usurps civilians’ power to rule and violates vertical accountability, whereby tutelary powers institutionalize a putsch threat. “Reserved domains remove specific areas of governmental authority and substantive policy making from the purview of elected officials”.¹¹⁰ “New professionalism”¹¹¹ characterizes the politicized military, which gathers public approval for its unrestricted scope of professional action in its reserved domains, especially in internal security. Not only political decision-making, but also judicial decisions of high political impact are susceptible to perverse institutionalization. Permissive rules, such as unauthorized press briefings and statements of the military elite, affect the judiciary and lead to serious discrimination in election processes, such as the closure of political parties. If the military’s autonomy is high, constitutional institutions become Janus-headed. Veto powers, such as the National Security Council, penetrate the legislative and executive branches. Furthermore, the military penetrates the judicial system through military courts. Of course, a Janus-headed judiciary may also exist without the military courts; the civilian judiciary, especially the higher judiciary, may serve due to its fragile independence as the “unarmed pillar” of the state by protecting the privileges of armed forces.

The Janus-headed feature of constitutional institutions represents formal and informal domination. The following conditions cause informal domination: first, the state’s claim of legitimacy is detached from the legal framework concerning (human) rights and obligations; the imposition of a state of exception declares *raison d’état*, i.e., the survival and security of the state, the ultimate reference point of legitimacy.¹¹² Second, deep state organizes societal consent. The state-civil society boundary is sublated due to the military’s multiple identities in military, political, and economic sectors. Militarism, or the appeal to and glorification of military means to govern society at large, generates and harnesses consent. The survival and security of the state is equated to the survival of the nation, hence any action in defense of a *raison d’état* would constitute the realm of legitimacy that endows a given coercive apparatus with impunity.

Military autonomy

This section deals with the causal relationship between the secondary and indicator level, which is causal and offers a detailed causal analysis of the secondary level dimension. For a detailed causal analysis of the secondary level dimension, the autonomy of the military, this book follows Coppedge’s concept of “thickening thin concepts”¹¹³ in order to provide more comprehensive and reliable concepts. Thick concepts explain more than one indicator and are often multidimensional, covering more than one aspect that needs separate analysis. Large-N analyses produce (“reductionist and simplistic”) thin concepts, but are generalizable, whereas small-N analyses produce

(“complex or multidimensional”) thick concepts, but are not generalizable.¹¹⁴ Pion-Berlin applied the military autonomy on a ordinal scale on small-N; here, modification and expansion of this concept on a single-case study thickens it, since it also takes informal institutions into account.

Pion-Berlin has measured the decision-making authority of the military by conceiving of a “professional-political continuum”.¹¹⁵ This is modified and expanded to a professional-political-judicial continuum. The military professional sphere consists of military doctrine and education, military reform, force levels, and junior-level personnel decisions. Defense organization, senior promotions, military budgets, and arms production and procurement constitute the professional-political sphere.¹¹⁶ The political-judicial sphere consists of internal security, intelligence gathering, and judicial prosecution. The military manipulates judicial branches, and in some cases, such as extrajudicial executions, acts in the name of the judicial authorities. Judicial autonomy can be defined as the military personnel’s impunity pertaining to criminal acts that are of a civilian nature. Judicial autonomy of the military does not lead only relate to human right offenses, but also to corruption. The security personnel’s involvement in organized crime pertains to the political-judicial sphere. The state switches to the deep state if the military’s autonomy reaches a level ranging from high to very high and constitutional institutions become Janus-headed.

While forming the concept, the conceptual structure is placed on the substitutability continuum. Dimensions are weighted, since the military autonomy spheres are neither fully at the necessary and sufficient condition pole nor at the complete substitutability pole of the continuum. The spheres and categories in the professional-political-judicial continuum are weighted in order to generate estimates. This estimation uses ordinal categories rather than concrete figures due to the inherent characteristics of the phenomenon. By weighting spheres and categories, we improve concept formation compared to analyses without these considerations. Nonetheless, these estimations cannot provide the accuracy of cardinal scales.

High to very high levels of military autonomy refer to sufficiency criteria for deep state; these levels signal the existence and rise of the deep state. If the autonomy ranges from high to very high, constitutional institutions become Janus-headed and can enforce a *sui generis* repertoire of undemocratic informal institutions. This modality of formal and informal domination, dual domination, is called the deep state.

The level of military autonomy is assessed by a 12-point scale: low (1–3), medium (4–6), high (7–9), and very high (10–12). The weight of these spheres increases as the autonomy moves up in the hierarchy from the professional to political and judicial realms. Put differently, the deep state becomes more evident as the military yields higher influence in the political-judicial sphere. The second sphere has double the value of the first sphere, because the professional autonomy is not necessarily a threat to democracy; the third sphere has triple the value of the first sphere, because the political-judicial sphere deals intensely with

criminal informal institutions. “Military education and doctrine” and “organization of defense” have a double value compared to the other categories in their respective spheres, due to their importance in the maintenance of the autonomy in these spheres. The weighted average of the category scores gives the score of each sphere; the weighted average of the spheres’ scores gives the military autonomy score.

The informal state clarifies the boundary between the two classical subtypes of political regimes: autocracy and democracy. The concept of deep state will be used to explain the consolidation of democracy in a two-level theory. Consolidation of democracy is necessary for exploring the possible demise of the deep state and *regime change through transformation of the state*.

From the deep state to consolidated democracy

This section generates a two-level theory of the transition from the deep state to consolidated democracy, which refers to a *change of the regime through state transformation*. A two-level theory of the “second transition”¹¹⁷ depicts necessary and sufficient causes: the breakdown of the deep state, elite settlement, and international anchors. The theoretical chapter ends with the presentation of an alternative, path-dependent explanation of regime change.

For Linz and Stepan, democratic consolidation occurs in five arenas: civil society, political society, rule of law, stateness, and economic society.¹¹⁸ Here, it is suggested, four arenas are subordinated to the deep state: either military tutelage causes a split between the government and state by disempowering the first, or the executive organ impinges upon the separation of powers and binds the coercive state apparatus to itself by undermining accountability and the rule of law. Civil society is controlled, politicized, and/or militarized. More importantly, political capitalism and crony capitalism do not only subordinate the political society but also the economic society. Economic elites are tied to the state; military elites and businessmen are transformed to rentiers. Therefore, the breakdown of the deep state constitutes the first necessary cause of democratic consolidation.

In order to evaluate the breakdown of the deep state, international anchors, and elite settlement as causes of consolidation, a four-dimensional approach is applied. Merkel lists constitutional, representative, and behavioral consolidation and the consolidation of civil society as the basic components of consolidation. Constitutional consolidation involves state transformation and the making of a social contract; representative consolidation succeeds if the party system fulfils the functions of representing interests; behavioral adaptation requires abiding by democratic rules and norms, the consolidation of civil society necessitates the proliferation of civic culture because of its vital mediatory function in managing social conflicts.¹¹⁹

The breakdown of the deep state consolidates the constitutional and representational dimensions of democracy. O'Donnell and Schmitter¹²⁰ as well as Mainwaring *et al.*¹²¹ stress the uncertainty potential during transition

periods. Outcomes of conflicts as well as the procedures and rules governing institutions are challenged. Valenzuela adds that consolidation requires eradication of the perverse institutions that facilitated the transition to democracy.¹²² Consolidation succeeds in the post-transitional settings if perverse institutionalization is undone as the interplay of formal and informal institutions changes. "Uncertainty of outcomes"¹²³ makes sense if it is accompanied by the (re)generation of democratic (in)formal institutions as well as the regularity and relative certainty of these institutions. Informal institutions are subordinated to formal democratic institutions as the deep state declines in its legitimacy. Helmke and Levitsky state that the interplay between formal and informal institutions changes if the distribution of power and resources changes, formal institutions are amended and shared beliefs and experiences about costs and benefits alter.¹²⁴

Constitutional consolidation or state transformation requires the weakening of perverse institutionalization. When perverse institutionalization is undone, it exerts an empowering effect on the four arenas that were subordinated to the deep state. The termination of putsch threat, reserved domains, and serious discrimination in election processes contributes to representative consolidation. Furthermore, representativeness must be anchored in formal institutions through reforms. Nevertheless, a weakening of the deep state would not suffice for a social contract to be based on civilian democratic principles and the rule of law – it must be accompanied by behavioural consolidation.

Political elites (on the micro level) function in the political parties (on the meso level) as intermediaries between the cleavages (domestic structure) and the state (macro structure) by carrying the demands to the political arena and influencing the political agenda-setting. Behavioral consolidation requires attitudinal change according to which actors abide by the uncertainty of the conflict results. Democratic rules constitute the only game in town if they are subject to an elite consensus, defined as the basic understanding between elites on "democratic procedures", i.e., the means and methods as opposed to fundamental consensus on "ultimate values" and "specific governmental policies".¹²⁵ O'Donnell suggests that, for the second transition to succeed, actors should make clear implicitly (through an accord) or explicitly (through a pact) that an authoritarian regression is not an option.¹²⁶ An elite pact is defined as "an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or, better, redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees".¹²⁷ However, Linz and Stepan argue that pacts are neither theoretically nor historically a necessary condition for democratic transitions. Pacts can exclude large segments of society, while privileging some groups. Moreover, not all pacts that are created can be maintained.¹²⁸

Referring to Higley and Gunther, this book prefers the term "elite settlement"¹²⁹ to elite pacts, since settlements are more inclusive and broader in terms of the negotiated content. Democratic consolidation is regarded as a process whereby elites are transformed into a consensually unified elite when

they play the democratic game through an elite settlement or/and an elite convergence. Elite settlements are made if “previously disunified and warring elites suddenly and deliberately reorganize their relations by negotiating compromises on their most basic disagreements, thereby achieving consensual unity and laying the basis for a stable democratic regime”.¹³⁰ By referring to Przeworski, they claim that elite settlements are “a contingent institutional compromise” in contrast to pacts that might lead to a “substantive compromise”.¹³¹ Due to the vital role played by political elites between the state and cleavages, elite settlements act as a catalyst for a democratic cleavage transformation, which weakens the power of the (deep) state in the center, transforms the center to include segments of social forces which were excluded from the center, and facilitates the consolidation of civil society and the management of social conflicts.

International anchors are the third necessary condition for democratic consolidation. Levitsky and Way refer to “leverage and linkage”; the first is defined as the governments’ vulnerability to external pressure, while the latter refers to “the density of a country’s ties to the United States, the European Union, and Western-led multinational institutions”.¹³² Pridham maintains that it might be misleading to prioritize domestic factors over international ones, whose long-term impacts permeate domestic factors through globalization. Membership of the European Community by South European countries illustrates the institutionalization of external influence – Europeanization functioned as a grantor of credibility and eased the consolidation of democracy.¹³³

However, the linkage has not always been positive. Agüero takes military security doctrines developed by international defence organizations, specifically the role of the US intelligence agencies, into account. In many South American countries, the US role has been undemocratic since it strengthened the military mainly as a means to counter communism and terror during the Cold War, and as a means to counter insurgency and drug wars during the post-Cold War period.¹³⁴

The two-level theory of democratic consolidation involves, on the basic level, a conjunction of necessary causes. International anchors, the breakdown of the deep state, and elite settlement constitute the basic level, jointly sufficient, causes. The theoretical relationship of the basic level cause, the breakdown of the deep state, to the secondary level is causality and equifinality. Alternative causes of the deep state’s breakdown are civilian supremacy over the security sector in tutelary democracies and democratic control of the security sector in delegative democracies. This theory directly relates the secondary level to the outcome: consolidation of democracy is jointly constituted by state transformation, elite settlement, and cleavage transformation.

To conclude, this study aims at contributing to the Moore Research Program by introducing state and cleavages as new causal variables for regime change and by suggesting an alternative explanation for *regime change through state transformation*. Like Mahoney, this case study applies an integrative path-dependent strategy, which regards institutions as mediatory units between

Table 2.1 An alternative path-dependent explanation of regime change

<i>Antecedent Conditions</i>	<i>Critical Juncture</i>	<i>Institutional Persistence</i>	<i>Reactive Sequence</i>	<i>Regime Outcome</i>
The deep state's power relative to subordinated cleavages	Formation of a cleavage alliance vis-à-vis democracy.	Reproduction of different state and cleavage structures.	Demands of the periphery and responses of the deep state.	Consolidated democracy, defective democracy, authoritarianism.




Figure 2.2 Two-level theories: From the deep state to consolidated democracy

the structure and agency. In critical junctures, in times of heightened contingency, key agents' choices close off alternatives and set institutions that have self-reproducing properties on path-dependent trajectories.

In contrast to Moore, Rueschemeyer *et al.*, and Luebbert, who refer to classes as the main variables for the emergence of democracy, the central role is given to the state at the macro-structural level. In line with the historical approach to causality, this book contrasts Downing's hypothesis, which traces the roots of liberal democracy to medieval constitutionalism that predates the rise of bourgeoisie, to the Ottoman context. Referring to Weber, Barkey, Tilly, and Mann, the Western European medieval experience is contrasted to features of Ottoman polity with regard to the type of land tenure, style of state centralization, transformation to capitalist economy, and sources of social change and state breakdown. The informal source of the deep state is traced back to the brokerage style of state centralization under the Ottoman patrimonial domination that involved the fabrication of, and negotiation with, bandits.

Following Heper, the Ottoman-Turkish monist polity is posited at the vertical polar end in the continuum of strong states. The power of the strong state is correlated with the tutelary powers of the military. The formal source

of the deep state is traced back to the autonomy of bureaucrats, a secondary level variable of the basic level cause, bureaucratic revolt, in the two-level theory on the revolution from above. Tilly's hypotheses on state-making and capital accumulation guide us in exploring how and why banditry is involved in the making of the deep state. The third chapter deals with the bureaucratic revolt of 1908, which was a political, unfinished revolution, and elaborates on the other basic level cause, state breakdown, which led to the revolution from above (1919–23).

At the domestic-structural level, this book refers to the hypotheses of Lipset and Rokkan on cleavages pertaining to infrastructural conflicts: urban, rural, ethnic-linguistic, and church. Unlike the Western European cases, due to the timing and type of state formation and nation-building, the translation of infrastructural conflicts to concrete institutional forms as party systems was distorted by the state. The state conquered the center and exerted influence to subordinate the center and/or the periphery through coercion. Therefore, the third stage in the template of path dependent-explanations of regime change, structural persistence, pertains to the reproduction of state-cleavage structures. As depicted in the table above, the first stage of antecedent conditions for regime change accounts for the power of the state in the center relative to subordinated cleavages. The higher the power of the deep state, the more difficult it is for political parties to exert influence in the political arena; in other words, the more they are subordinated to the deep state.

This book addresses the question of political regimes and places them on a continuum between the negative pole (authoritarianism) and the positive pole (democracy). Diminished subtypes of authoritarian regimes are categorized according to the criteria of access to power and legitimation of power. By referring to Merkel *et al.*, the gray zone between autocracy and liberal democracy are delineated by referring to the positive pole (liberal democracy). Defective democracy comprises the diminished subtypes by disaggregating a political system into normatively and functionally interdependent partial regimes.

The concept of the deep state as a dual mode of domination sheds light on the gray zone between semi-formal (positive pole) and informal state (negative pole). Concept generation relates the dependent variable of the basic level, the deep state, to the independent variables (causes) of the basic level by referring to tutelary and delegative democracy: the lack of civilian and democratic control of the security sector. The theoretical relationship at the basic level involves causality and equifinality. The secondary level variables are causally linked to the basic level by referring to the analysis of institutions. The indicators with respect to the professional-political-judicial continuum of military autonomy and the executive's excessive prerogatives offer a detailed causal analysis of the secondary level.

In delegative democracies, the undemocratic civilian control of the security sector enables the executive to sustain the deep state's power. The major part of this case study illustrates tutelary democracy, where the vicious cycle of

perverse institutionalization comprises tutelary powers, putsch threat, reserved domains, and serious distortions of the electoral system. Perverse institutionalization characterizes the maintenance of military autonomy in post-transitional settings, in which undemocratic formal and informal rules prevent formal democratic institutionalization. The informal institutions of the deep state encompass forms of special relationships, of violent exertion of influence, and of material exchange.

In the second stage of regime change, critical juncture happens when the hierarchy between the center and the periphery is broken through a cleavage alliance vis-à-vis democracy. The policy options of elites in political parties representing the cleavages in the periphery weaken the vertical dimension of the state and strengthen the horizontal dimension of participation. In the third stage, that particular option creates an institutional persistence, which reproduces state-cleavage structures. Whether the critical juncture leads to the breakdown of the deep state and the transformation of cleavages (democratic consolidation), or restores the deep state's power relative to cleavages (and defective democracy), or leads to the transition to informal state (authoritarian rule) is decided by the fourth stage. During the reactive sequence, the demands of the periphery challenge the structural persistence; the deep state responds to them. In the final stage, the regime outcome depends on the resolution of the conflict. International anchors, elite settlement, and the breakdown of the deep state are jointly necessary and sufficient causes of democratic consolidation. The breakdown of the deep state consolidates the constitutional and representational dimension. Elite settlement refers mainly to behavioral consolidation and the consolidation of civil society. Consolidation succeeds when perverse institutionalization is reversed and the interplay of formal and informal institutions is changed to abolish the deep state.

Notes

- 1 It should be borne in mind that transformation refers to an overarching concept, which explains all forms, time spans, and aspects of modification and/or replacement of political systems, whereas transition research deals with the move from dictatorships to democracy. The basic concepts of transformation research, namely government, political regime, state, and political system, refer to certain durations of the organization of domination. Government is the least lasting organization of domination. Regime is a longer lasting domination that organizes the access of elites to domination, as well as the elites' relationship among themselves, to rulers and to the ruled. The state is defined as a long-lasting domination that organizes the legitimate coercive measures and resources to rule. The political system encompasses these three concepts and enables a comprehensive analysis of the political, economic, social, and cultural parts of a system, which undergoes a transformation (Merkel, *Systemtransformation*, 65–66). Merkel borrows the first three concepts from Robert Fishman; see Fishman, "Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe's Transition to Democracy."
- 2 Mahoney, "Knowledge Accumulation in Comparative Historical Research," 132–137.

54 *Theory*

- 3 Mahoney and Snyder, "Rethinking Agency and Structure," 6–11.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 11–25.
- 5 Merkel, *Systemwechsel. Band 1: Theorien, Ansätze Und Konzeptionen*, 314.
- 6 North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*, 3.
- 7 Scharpf, *Games Real Actors Play*.
- 8 Helmke and Levitsky, "Introduction," 5.
- 9 Capoccia and Kelemen, "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism," 348.
- 10 Mahoney, *The Legacies of Liberalism*, 6.
- 11 Mahoney, "Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative Perspective," 111.
- 12 *Ibid.*, 111–116.
- 13 Beyer, "Pfadabhängigkeit Ist Nicht Gleich Pfadabhängigkeit! Wider Den Impliziten Konservatismus Eines Gängigen Konzepts."
- 14 Lipset and Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, 3.
- 15 Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," 391.
- 16 *Ibid.*, 396–397.
- 17 Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*.
- 18 *Ibid.*, 418.
- 19 *Ibid.*
- 20 Mahoney, "Knowledge Accumulation in Comparative Historical Research," 145.
- 21 Mahoney and Snyder, "Rethinking Agency and Structure," 21.
- 22 Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy*, 61.
- 23 *Ibid.*, 5.
- 24 Luebbert, *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy*, 315.
- 25 *Ibid.*, 314.
- 26 Mahoney, *The Legacies of Liberalism*, 12.
- 27 Mahoney, "Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative Perspective," 134.
- 28 *Ibid.*, 130.
- 29 *Ibid.*
- 30 Capoccia and Ziblatt, "The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond," 945–46.
- 31 Skocpol, "A Critical Review of Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy."
- 32 Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, 2: Chapters 7 and 8.
- 33 *Ibid.*, 2: 1069.
- 34 *Ibid.*, 2: 1026.
- 35 Trimberger, *Revolution from Above*, 97–101.
- 36 Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, 2: 1081.
- 37 See Gilbert, *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*.
- 38 Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change*.
- 39 *Ibid.*, 9–10.
- 40 Goertz and Mahoney, "Concepts in Theories: Two-Level Theories," 252–54.
- 41 For a review of state consolidation, see Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*, 4–10.
- 42 Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States*, 30.
- 43 *Ibid.*, 137–43.
- 44 Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," 174.
- 45 Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change*, 84–112.
- 46 Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States*, 30.
- 47 *Ibid.*

- 48 Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Vol. 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760*.
- 49 Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States*, 137–43.
- 50 *Ibid.*, 100.
- 51 Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*, 229.
- 52 *Ibid.*, 10–13.
- 53 Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States*, 29.
- 54 *Ibid.*, 80–81.
- 55 Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*, 12.
- 56 Stateness is regarded as intact, internal and external territorial sovereignty that is not undermined by the absence of ethnic, linguistic, religious, or cultural homogeneity in nation-states, chronic poverty and dependence on the help of other states or international organizations (Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 16–37; Merkel *et al.*, *Defekte Demokratie, Bd.1: Theorie*, 58–59). Theda Skocpol and her collaborators also investigated this relationship (Skocpol, Evans, and Rueschemeyer, *Bringing the State Back In*).
- 57 Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 17.
- 58 Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe: Study of an Idea and Institution*, 208.
- 59 Dahl, *Dilemma of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy versus Control*.
- 60 Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe: Study of an Idea and Institution*, 279.
- 61 Heper, “The Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy: Turkey and Germany Compared,” 178.
- 62 Trimberger, *Revolution from Above*, 2.
- 63 *Ibid.*, 3–5.
- 64 *Ibid.*, 3, 151–158.
- 65 Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*; Skocpol, *Social Revolutions in the Modern World*; Skocpol, Evans, and Rueschemeyer, *Bringing the State Back In*; Mahoney, *The Legacies of Liberalism*.
- 66 Lipset and Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, 50.
- 67 *Ibid.*, 66.
- 68 *Ibid.*, 17.
- 69 *Ibid.*, 45.
- 70 Linz, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes,” 1975; Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*, 2000.
- 71 Merkel, *Systemtransformation*, 24–28.
- 72 *Ibid.*, 37–44.
- 73 Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years.”
- 74 Dahl, *Polyarchy*.
- 75 *Ibid.*, 7–8.
- 76 *Ibid.*, 3.
- 77 Collier and Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research,” 437.
- 78 *Ibid.*, 435, note 18.
- 79 *Ibid.*, 437–45.
- 80 Merkel, *Systemtransformation*, 21–54.
- 81 Hadenius, *Democracy and Development*.
- 82 Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies,” 34.
- 83 Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm.”
- 84 Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracies.”
- 85 O'Donnell, “Delegative Democracy.”
- 86 Merkel *et al.*, *Defekte Demokratie, Bd.1: Theorie*, 36–37. The semantic antonym of “defective democracy” is an “embedded democracy”, i.e., functioning

- constitutional democracy, rather than “perfect democracy” (*ibid.*, 15; Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies,” note 15).
- 87 Merkel *et al.* borrows these partial regimes from Schmitter (Schmitter, “Civil Society East and West”). In precisising these partial regimes, they follow the system-theoretical ideas of Niklas Luhman, who “describes the ecological communication of partial regimes with interdependence and independence strictly or loosely coupled” (Luhmann, *Ecological Communication*; Merkel *et al.*, *Defekte Demokratie*, Bd.1: *Theorie*, note 44; Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies,” note 41).
- 88 Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies,” 33–34.
- 89 *Ibid.*, 36–42.
- 90 Merkel *et al.*, *Defekte Demokratie*, Bd.1: *Theorie*, 52.
- 91 Hadiwinata, Schuck, and Wahid, “Embedded and Defective Democracies,” 37–38.
- 92 O’Donnell, “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies.”
- 93 Merkel *et al.*, *Defekte Demokratie*, Bd.1: *Theorie*, 92–93.
- 94 Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies,” 36–51.
- 95 For the institutionalist turn in democratization studies, see O’Donnell, “Another Institutionalization: Latin America and Elsewhere”; O’Donnell, “Polyarchies and the Un(rule) of Law in Latin America: A Partial Conclusion”; Merkel and Croissant, “Formale Und Informale Institutionen in Defekten Demokratien”; Weyland, “Limitations of Rational Choice Institutionalism for the Study of Latin American Politics”; Helmke and Levitsky, *Informal Institutions and Democracy*.
- 96 O’Donnell, “Illusions about Consolidation,” 10.
- 97 Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” 1041.
- 98 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*; Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*.
- 99 Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America.”
- 100 Valenzuela, “Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions,” 62.
- 101 *Ibid.*, 68–69.
- 102 Lauth categorizes informal institutions as forms of specific relationships (clientelism, or more precisely autocratic cliques, clientelist parties, and mafia), of material exchange (corruption), of violent exertion of influence (putsch threat, guerrilla warfare, riots, and organized crime), of civil resistance (civil disobedience), and of legal practice (custom law). See, Lauth, “Informal Institutions and Democracy,” 27–43.
- 103 *Ibid.*, 28–29.
- 104 Stepan, *Democratizing Brazil*, 30–31.
- 105 Lauth, “Informal Institutions and Democracy,” 37.
- 106 Brinks, “The Rule of (Non)Law: Prosecuting Police Killings in Brazil and Argentina,” 205.
- 107 Pursell, *The Military-Industrial Complex*.
- 108 Akça, *Military-Economic Structure in Turkey: Present Situation, Problems, and Solutions*, 6.
- 109 Valenzuela, “Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions,” 68.
- 110 *Ibid.*, 64.
- 111 Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role-Expansion.”
- 112 Sancar, “Yasallık ve Meşruluk Geriliminde Hukuk Devleti.”
- 113 Coppedge, “Thickening Thin Concepts: Issues in Large-N Data Generation.”
- 114 *Ibid.*, 468.
- 115 Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America,” 84.
- 116 *Ibid.*, 93.
- 117 O’Donnell, “Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes,” 22.

- 118 Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 3–16.
- 119 Merkel, *Systemtransformation*.
- 120 O'Donnell and Schmitter, "Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies," 67.
- 121 Mainwaring, "Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues," 316–317.
- 122 Valenzuela, "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions," 65.
- 123 Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," 58.
- 124 Helmke and Levitsky, "Introduction," 23–25.
- 125 Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*, 90–91.
- 126 O'Donnell, "Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes," 22–24.
- 127 O'Donnell and Schmitter, "Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies," 37. Elite pacts were regarded as facilitators of consolidation. See Karl and Schmitter, "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe."
- 128 Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 55–65.
- 129 Higley and Gunther, *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*.
- 130 *Ibid.*, XI.
- 131 Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," 59–60; Higley and Gunther, *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, 33–35.
- 132 Levitsky and Way, "International Linkage and Democratization," 21.
- 133 Pridham, "The International Context of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective."
- 134 Agüero, *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy*, 175–76.

3 Banditry and the Ottoman State

The Ottoman State

The three sections in this chapter elaborate on the antecedent conditions for the path-dependent emergence of the deep state. This section examines the lack of medieval constitutionalism, a basic level variable in the two-level theory of Downing on the origins of liberal democracy. It explores the mentality underlying the Ottoman patrimonial domination and the methods imposed on the vertical and horizontal lines of the social structure. Due to the success of these methods, the Ottoman strong state did not face the challenge of civil society. The next section deals with the second basic level variable – the absence of military revolution.

According to Weber, the Ottoman patrimonial polity represented a sultanic form of traditional domination in which the administration and the military were personal instruments of the sultan and the ruler ruled by discretion.¹ However, Shaw points to the bureaucratic move away from sultanic patrimonialism in the period from the reign of Mehmed II (1451–81) to the rule of Süleyman the Lawgiver (1520–66) during the classical age (1300–1600), in which the Ottoman sultan's rule extended over a massive territory ranging from central and southern Europe to the Middle East and Asia. Mehmed II issued decrees concerning the government and the subjects based on sultanic secular law (*kanun*) and traditional law (*örf*), which did not refer to, and differed from, the religious Islamic law (*şer'iat*); Süleyman consolidated the state by incorporating the periphery through the codification of provincial regulations. Moreover, a mixture of meritocracy, professional networks, and sultanic favoritism enabled upward mobility in the state.² For İnalcık, during the reign of Süleyman, the Ottoman state gained rational-bureaucratic qualities. It became an institution not only under the sultan's rule, but also under the rule of an extensive bureaucracy, whose internal solidarity made the bureaucracy an institution representing more than its staff; its legitimacy derived from its service to religion and the state.³

More importantly, the sultan had no local power base outside state power. The crucial difference between feudal and patrimonial domination is the prebendal land tenure of patrimonialism that precludes any private ownership

rights.⁴ Property rights were solely attributed to the state, which was symbolized by the sultan. The partition of “property” among the sultan’s household ended after the legalization of fratricide by Mehmet II in 1477 and the abolition of the sending of the immediate heir to the throne as governor to Anatolia by Mehmet III in 1595. This made the sultan a *Kapıkulu* (slave of the Porte) with privileges stemming from his dynastic ancestors, and demystified his semi-divine status for the *Kapıkulu* army, but the state maintained its semi-divine status for ordinary people.⁵

The Ottoman patrimonial domination combined patriarchal and authoritarian mentalities harmoniously. The patriarchal mentality was based on the belief in a hierarchical and heterogeneous world order (*nizâm-ı alem*) that was governed by a divine mind according to which everything has its predestined place. The authoritarian mentality conceived of human beings as a material reality and differentiated between those who were closer to the knowledge of this reality and others, who were devoid of it; in constructing a hierarchy between them, it homogenized others. The notion of justice legitimized the Ottoman patriarchal mentality. The power center – parallel with the divine order of cosmos – maintained order and protected the particular status of each group for their proper functioning and service in the system.⁶ The sultan’s “circle of equity” promised justice and welfare, that is the “protection of subjects against power abuses of the representatives of the central authority, especially against illegal taxation. To ensure this protection was the sovereign’s most important duty”.⁷ The redistributive patrimonial state controlled the division of labor, methods, and purposes of production.⁸ It regulated economic activities and price mechanisms, created and manipulated cities and controlled their associational, commercial and political activities. Moreover, the Islamic tradition of *hisba* affirmed the concern of the ruler of his people and prohibited merchants and artisans from maximizing their profits. *Hisba* allowed the state to interfere with the market mechanism and redirect it for the supposed good of society.⁹ Peasants and merchants were tied separately to the state. Productive activity was autonomous from external trade. Peasants could use the prebendal and non-hereditary land (*timar*) for household subsistence; *timar* was more a political-administrative unit under the *timarli sipahi* (cavalry) than an economic unit. The state granted merchants monopolies and provided them with secure trade routes; in return, merchants gave loans to the state, collected taxes and customs charges, and delivered luxury goods through long-distance and transit trade.¹⁰

The harmony of patriarchal and authoritarian mentalities rested on religion beside étatism, specifically on the Sunnite/Hanefi interpretation of Islam which is, among other teachings, more prone to praise worldly power and the state. Jeopardizing the harmony, hierarchy, and heterogeneity of world order was considered a threat to the state and divine powers. Harmony and hierarchy were interdependent concepts, since harmony could be sustained in the hierarchical relations between groups in the system and within the group. Thus, heterogeneity was secured by precluding the interaction between members

of different groups, which were organized as collectives in congregations, religious orders, and guilds. Attempts to break the group identity were considered as instigating anarchy. Each power center in these groups was separately and directly tied to the state, which undermined their potential of collective action. They reproduced patriarchal mentality by maintaining religious practice and education; at the same time, the power centers within groups shared state authority. This granted them twofold legitimacy; in return, they strengthened state authority.¹¹

The Ottoman society was divided in a two-tiered class hierarchy:¹² the ruling and the subject classes. The ruling class, referred to as *askeri* (literally “the Military”), was composed of the officers of the court, the standing army (*Kapikulu* infantry (or Janissary) and cavalry), civil servants, and *ulema* (or Islamic scholars). *Devşirme* system was a specific method of recruitment to the *askeri* class from among male Christian children through conquest or purchase from slave markets. *Kapikulu* cavalry troops were recruited from among Muslim subjects and the elite forces of the army.¹³ These were the representatives of the sultan who were trusted religious and executive powers through an imperial diploma. The sultan’s household, Janissary, and *Kapikulu* cavalry were paid in coin, whereas most other high officials received land grants and were paid from the tax receipt of prebendal lands attached to their office. The subject class, referred to as *reaya*, comprised ordinary Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, who were excluded from government, were involved in production, and paid taxes.¹⁴

Unlike the *Ständestaat* of the Western Europe, with autonomous jurisdiction based on reciprocal rights and privileges,¹⁵ the Ottoman state prevented the emergence of corporate entities such as self-governing towns. Patrimonial domination impeded the collective action of elites and peasants, and hence the conditions for local power, parliaments, independent judiciary, and basic freedoms. The following deals with the methods employed by the Ottoman state to prevent the collective action potential of the *askeri* and *reaya*.

The preclusion of private land ownership, the non-hereditary feature of granted lands, confiscation, and Islamic inheritance laws prevented the emergence of landed aristocracy. First, officials could endow their estate to a religious estate (*vakıfs*) and hold its surplus, but the *vakıfs* belonged to the state.¹⁶ Moreover, the fate of all officials was separately tied to the state; thus, the servant elite could not become an autonomous entity.¹⁷ Second, state actions controlled and moved around officials sent from the center and prevented a possible allegiance of peasants to landholder. Third, provincial officials at all levels were rotated. Rotation was perceived as an opportunity for receiving larger lands and upward mobility in the meritocratic system; increasing competition decreased solidarity. Fourth, *timar*-holders could not gain autonomous power, as *timars* were allocated to include pieces of lands from diverse villages. Finally, the intermediary role of the judge (*kadı*) prevented peasants’ allegiance to the landholder and tied peasants to the state. Despite their lack of independence, the peasants trusted *kadıs* as adjudicators in their

relations to the landholder, causing “overlapping jurisdictions”¹⁸ as they represented military-administrative and religious-administrative authority respectively. Furthermore, their competition increased as judges could become district-governors or governor-generals.¹⁹

The autonomy of religious and ethnic minorities under the *millet* system was limited to internal affairs. It allowed for the maintenance of an integrated and cohesive community,²⁰ but the individual community was isolated, as its decision-making was limited to internal religious administration, community maintenance, election of leaders, and the patterned interaction with the state.²¹ Moreover, judges had the duty as administrators and adjudicators to integrate orthodox and heterodox Islamic forces. These Islamic scholars helped especially to neutralize the Sufi orders, either through leadership cooptation or the counterforce Sunni establishment.²²

At the end of the vertical structure lay the peasantry whose interaction on the horizontal line impeded collective action. First, the organization of peasant households as self-sufficient units prevented within-village integrative interaction. Second, within-village interaction was hindered due to the fluid identities of the peasantry, who were cultivators in the village and nomads in highlands and mezzas. Third, they were further divided along orthodox and heterodox lines. Finally, village to village interaction was hindered because of the nature of the market in the Ottoman Empire, which directed production to markets in towns rather than markets in another village.²³

Banditry in the service of state consolidation

In the presence of a standing army, military revolution was absent in the mid-seventeenth century Ottoman Empire. Unlike Russia and Prussia, in which military revolution through coercion established absolutism, the Ottoman state sought new alliances to use coercion on rural population and consolidate its power. Banditry in the service of the state prevented the empire from a possible decline. From a comparative perspective covering the works of Downing, Tilly, Barkey, and Moore, this section traces the causal chain, which starts with the long-term dissolution of provincial *timar* system that was implemented as a response to the exigencies of the monetary, demographic, and political crisis that plagued the European and Asian continents from the early sixteenth century onwards. The causal chain ends in the mid-seventeenth century with the emergence of large-scale banditry, when provincial cavalry decayed as the traditional economy was transformed to a peripheral-capitalist economy. The brokerage style of state consolidation, based on the fabrication and instrumentalization of banditry, is the informal source of the deep state.

The multi-sequence and multi-stage causal process began with the world systemic impacts of the major crisis due to the expansion of the European market economy from the early sixteenth century onwards. Rapid demographic growth occurred simultaneously with the proliferation of new warfare technologies and the development of European industry and commerce

through the rerouting of trade routes, compounded by price revolution and monetary fluctuations. The role of the cavalry was downgraded after the use of gunpowder weapons by the Dutch and Swedish militaries in the sixteenth century and the change of warfare from pitched battles, where the place of battle and the position of the armies were known beforehand, to siege and counter-siege battles. The gunpowder-inspired transformation from small, decentralized cavalry units to large standing armies in Europe ensured military superiority and its rise to global dominance.²⁴

Unlike the traditional Ottoman economy that reduced economic activity to the transaction of goods for their use-value, capitalism created surplus and profit, had regulative functions, and could serve social integration. The rerouting of international trade routes decreased the trading benefits of the Ottoman state drastically. Alongside this, the doubling of population from 22–26 to around 50 million from the sixteenth to the seventeenth century, increased the pressure on the treasury. The crisis revived the European economy, whose military superiority in the wars of consolidation and territorial unity devastated the Ottoman treasury. Moreover, international inflation and devaluation due to the influx of silver from the New World caused the debasement of the Ottoman currency. In a facet circle, as the reserves lowered, the currency was debased to afford the salaries of state employees, especially soldiers. This led to a greater dislocation of prices and fuelled the financial crisis.²⁵

The dissolution of the provincial *timar* system produced multiple consequences with major, long-term impacts. Murat IV increased direct taxation on high-ranking officials and changed tax collectors in 1632. As cavalymen were dismissed and peasants fled to towns due to the rise of direct taxation and increased taxes, *timar*-holders increasingly obtained others' *timars* instead of establishing new ones. High-ranking officials from the center were also rewarded with land. The *timariot*-system became a system of funds, pushing *timar* and large prebend (*zeamet*) holders to avoid sending men to war campaigns in exchange for a yearly fee. Moreover, the state controlled and manipulated its tie to each class: it kept provincial elites dependent on the state, increased interclass competition and struggle, and divided officials into winners and losers. Governor-generals were empowered at the cost of governors in the competition for larger estates and armed men. The decay of the meritocratic recruitment of tax collectors further undermined the upward mobility of provincial officials. Vacant high-ranking posts decreased considerably as the granted land increased and the duration of rotation decreased.²⁶ At the end of the crisis, the Ottoman economy was transformed into a semi-feudal type of "peripheral formation"²⁷ in the gray zone between capitalist and traditional economy, since tax-farming changed the provincial system from direct control through appointed officials to mixed center-periphery control.

Conditions of repression or facilitation create opportunities for collective action, i.e. the organization and mobilization of an aggrieved group as a

collectivity around key issues and, when they acquire enough resources, to struggle for their ends.²⁸ Downing's hypothesis on military revolution is compatible with the arguments of Tilly on peasant rebellions against the state's attempt to centralize administrative jurisdiction and demilitarize regional power holders.²⁹ Coercion-intensive type of state consolidation emerged in agrarian social structures like Russia and Prussia, where the nobility and the state allied in extracting surpluses by imposing coercion on rural society.³⁰ Military revolution through coercion established military-bureaucratic absolutism in the Brandenburg-Prussian polity in the mid-seventeenth century, which lasted until the fall of the Hohenzollern in 1918.³¹ The absolutism in Russia under Peter the Great reduced the power of the nobility in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and this lasted until the Russian Revolution of 1917.

Coercion was an integral part of the seventeenth-century Ottoman centralization. Despite the major crisis, the Ottoman state did not decline. Neither elites nor peasants rebelled during commercialization of agriculture in its repressive forms. Instead, victims of this transformation turned to banditry. In the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, vagrant ex-peasants, former *tımar*-holders and their cavalry, defiant and unruly members of official retinues, and religious students made up the bulk of the bandits. It must be noted that the outlaw phenomena of banditry (*eşkiyalık*) was used by the Ottoman state as a catch-all term for all unruly armed provincial groups exerting extra-legal violence, ranging from the robbery of highwaymen to local turf wars and wider regional or political factions such as revolutionary organizations. Whether backed by the state or by provincial elites, the dynamics of their emergence and function for multiple "causes" depended on the power shifts within the Empire.³²

In the absence of regional power-holders, the Ottoman state made deals to control and repress rural society during the long-term dissolution of the *tımar* system. Instead of eliminating bandits, the state hired them as mercenary units in the military for coercion and control. Thus, banditry became an artificial construct of the Ottoman state for consolidation. Periods of important battles against the Habsburgs and Persians were followed by large-scale bandit activity and corollary state consolidation between 1590–1611 and 1623–48. The "rebels" did not fight against the system; they were status-seeking rebels. The state negotiated with their condottiere-style leaders, organized them in line with the *Kapıkulu* army, and even rotated them to forge competition. Forceful leaders successfully made deals for high official titles; they even became governor-generals.³³

When demobilized, mercenaries switched to banditry and plundered peasants. The state formed militia from the peasants, when they resorted to the sultan, for self-help. However, the militarization of the countryside was detrimental to the tax base of the treasury, as peasants increasingly became bandits. These disposable elements were eliminated by ruse and subterfuge when they were not wanted. This further legitimized state consolidation. Large-scale

banditry was destroyed, yet the conditions for the emergence of banditry were never eliminated.³⁴ Banditry spread throughout Anatolia, the heartland of the Empire by the 1700s. Mercenaries amounted to two-thirds of the Ottoman provincial army at the end of the seventeenth century.³⁵ High provincial officials hired them as personal retainers in their constant competition for cheaper armies.³⁶

A comparison of Russia, China, and Japan with the Ottoman Empire stresses the relevance of the state as an actor. Moore traces the failure of democracy in Russia and China to a weak bourgeoisie impulse, labor-repressive agriculture, and high peasant revolutionary potential.³⁷ For Barkey, the Ottoman brokerage-style state consolidation resembles the Chinese incorporation of bandits (1796–1864) and the Russian incorporation of the Cossack region (1708–1836). However, the tax-resistant rural militarization in China was a societal creation, which later turned to extensive banditry and threatened the state. In contrast, the Ottoman state created militia to control the rural society; bandits were co-opted and incorporated into the state.³⁸ Moore's variables enter the scene only when combined with the state's incapability of preventing the collective action of peasants (incorporated in communist organizations) and international pressure emanating from the world wars. In the long-run, "social revolutions" destroyed the Czarist regime in Russia (1917) and Manchu regime in China (1911–49), whereas a bureaucratic revolution from above (1919–23) destroyed the Ottoman state.

Moore traces reactionary authoritarianism in Japan to a moderately strong bourgeoisie, labor-repressive agriculture, and the low revolutionary potential of peasants. Trimberger contests his hypothesis that Japan's landed elites were the driving force behind fascism and criticizes the exclusion of pre-commercial and pre-industrial agrarian systems from the analysis. She claims that neither Japanese landed elites nor the bourgeoisie were powerful enough to challenge the bureaucratic elites who took over the state under the Meiji Restoration (1868–73) and initiated industrial modernization, which strengthened the bourgeoisie in the long-run.³⁹ The Japanese and Turkish revolutions from above were caused by the weak collective action possibility of the bourgeoisie, landed aristocracy and peasantry at the domestic-structural level. The autonomy of the military and civilian bureaucratic elites was a necessary driving force behind the bureaucratic takeover.

Banditry for multiple causes: Decline and dissolution of the Empire

This section traces two causal chains for the emergence of bureaucratic takeover, the first basic level cause of the revolution from above. These causal chains are related to three secondary variables of bureaucratic takeover: autonomy from class domination, landlord vulnerability, and radicalization of bureaucrats. The first causal chain begins during the decline of the Empire in the eighteenth century and ends with the *Tanzimat* (Reorganization) period in

the mid-nineteenth century. This period is characterized by the emergence of Janissaries and Muslim landlords as intermediary powers between the state and the people, as well as by widespread banditry in the Ottoman Balkans. Reforms geared to enfeeble these powers paved the way for the autonomy of civil and military bureaucrats and the emergence of local notables as the new landed upper class vulnerable to the state.

The second causal chain begins with the emergence of the patriotic Young Ottoman movement (1865–76) and traces the process of radicalization of bureaucratic elites under Young Turk leadership from 1906 until the bureaucratic takeover of 1908. This causal chain details the background of banditry in the Ottoman Balkans and Western Anatolia as well as the organization of the Young Turks and their collaboration with bandits in restoring the constitutional monarchy against the absolutist regime in 1908.

The rise of Janissaries and Muslim landlords (*ayan*) as intermediary powers between the state and the people was a long-term unintended impact of the two policies of the Ottoman state: the change of the *devşirme* system and the lack of protectionism. The first brought about the expansion of territorial losses, and the latter triggered the demise of many industrial centers. In the late sixteenth century, the sons of highly esteemed urban Muslim families were allowed to enter palace schools; Janissary troops and lower religious and administrative posts were filled with lower urban families. Janissaries filled the ranks in the frontier regions, established familiar, economic, and political ties with *reaya*, lost their military cohesion and skills, and became disorganized and corrupt.⁴⁰ Moreover, European markets increasingly demanded Ottoman primary goods in exchange for manufactured European goods, while the Empire loosened its control of external trade. The traditional protection (*aman*) for the passage from land and sea was expanded to allow merchants privileges. Due to provisionism, a kind of *laissez-faire* type of trade policy, the state interfered with export, but not with import. When it interfered, it targeted increasing export volumes with fiscalist considerations. Imports decreased local production as the export of raw materials increased.⁴¹ As the treasury could not meet the Janissaries' demands, their uprisings, supported by the urban masses, forced the resignation of high officials, even abdication of sultans in the late eighteenth century and in the nineteenth century.

The defeat of the Ottomans by Russia, which lasted from 1768 to 1774 and from 1787 to 1792, deprived the state of its major economic base in the Black Sea and weakened its authority. The lease of land to the highest bidding tax farmer, especially the sale of tax farms on a life-time basis since 1695, paved the way for the emergence of Muslim landlords with personal retinues. By the 1800s, despite the lack of an official title to land, *ayans* became powerful semi-feudal aristocracy in Rumelia and Anatolia.⁴² The state was forced to delegate indirect control to *ayan*, who interfered with tax collection. The *ayan* was politically tied to the state and was not interested in extracting surpluses and profits. The state and commercial groups perceived each other more as potential exploiters than as partners for common enterprise.⁴³

Banditry reached epidemic proportions as a resilient element in most of the Ottoman Balkans, especially in geographic Macedonia, Morea, southern Greece and Serbia, from the 1770s to 1800s. The exigencies of long capitalist transformation and war-induced loss of state control over provincial territories exacerbated rivalry between *ayans* who exerted ever more repression on the local communities to protect their borders and extend them against other power bidders. The state did not interfere, since it depended on the dispatch of men to the army from *ayans'* retinues. In their impoverishment and misery, peasants turned to banditry. Not just peasants, but also deserters from the private retinues of *ayans* joined large gangs. The majority of the bandits were not ethnic Turks but (mainly Muslim) Albanians. Ranks-and-file soldiers in irregular troops of the imperial government (*levends* or *sekbans*), the majority of which were Albanian, battled bandits. However, these soldiers changed sides, if the government could not pay them promptly, which was often the case.⁴⁴

Elite status was the sole source of political power in the Empire. Thus, reforms could derive from an exclusive intra-elite conflict that aimed at abrogating or enfeebling the Janissaries and *ayans* by the state. The Janissary revolt in 1807 halted Selim III (1761–1808), “the father of Ottoman Turkish Westernization”⁴⁵ who targeted with a new order *Nizam-ı Cedid* and a modern army in 1793 to reassert authority over the *ayans*. The state granted *ayans* property/inheritance rights and made concessions similar to those granted to foreign and minority merchants through a Pledge of Alliance (*Sened-i İttifak*) in 1808. However, this was not “a consequence of vertical allocators of sovereignty, which characterized Western feudalism, but as a consequence of vertical dissociation that was a function of the horizontal integration of the estate system with the world-market.”⁴⁶

The military was the locus of systematic modernization efforts in the nineteenth century, a response to the ascendancy of the West.⁴⁷ In 1815, the Empire was tied through the Congress of Vienna to the power struggle in Europe with the British, Russian, and Austrian rivals. In the same year, a group of bureaucratic reformers confiscated the lands of *ayans* and disbanded their armies by mobilizing the modern army and implementing *Nizam-ı Cedid*. Mahmut II (1808–39) destroyed the Janissaries and established a new army in 1826, and abolished the remaining *tumars* in 1831. The high *ulema* conceded in the hope of eliminating the threat from the heterodox Janissary. The religious hierarchy was bureaucratized and subordinated to civil administration.⁴⁸

Istanbul could crush the *ayans*, but could not restore order. International pressures and secessionist revolts in the Balkans forced the state to implement large-scale reform in order to prevent disintegration.⁴⁹ The Balkan secessionist movements and commercial/territorial interests of Britain, Russia, France, and Austria kept the Empire barely alive. The Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention of 1838, that settled low import tariffs and allowed British merchants free access, brought the economy almost to collapse. The handicraft and industry were destroyed. Indigenous economic power was in the hands of

Greek, Armenian, and Jewish urban merchants.⁵⁰ In Balkan towns, the Christian middle class, together with more prosperous non-Muslim peasants, pushed Muslim peasants to the edge. Non-Muslim merchants, intellectuals, and ex-military bandits became the banner-bearers of the secessionist revolts and the Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian independence covering the time span from 1804 to 1878.⁵¹

The abolition of Janissaries and disposal of *ayans* prompted the loyalist bureaucrats – the new genre of bureaucracy (Sublime Porte or *Bab-ı Ali*) – led by Reşit Pasha and his pupils Ali and Fuad Pashas, former grand viziers who were called prime ministers, to conduct *Tanzimat* reforms between 1839 and 1876 in an attempt to save the state. International pressure was the major factor behind the Imperial Rescript of Gülhane (*Gülhane-i Hatt-ı Humayun*) of 1839, which declared security for life and property, equality before law for all subjects, reformed taxation and military conscription, and restructured internal organization of bureaucracy. The Reform Edict (*Islahat Fermanı*) of 1856 coincided with the signing of the Paris Treaty through which the Empire confirmed it would abide by the provisions of international law. Equality for Christian subjects added more privileges for non-Muslim merchants, created a basic infrastructure for commerce such as banks, codified penal and commercial laws, annual budgets, and reformed prisons.⁵² Reforms secured for civil bureaucrats a social status equal to *ulema* and the military, introduced schools of science, military technology, and languages to educate civil servants, and instituted new secular courts. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, first French and British, then German missions reformed the military.⁵³

In his analysis of the legacy of the Ottoman Empire on social cleavages in Turkey, Özbudun expands on Mardin's seminal work⁵⁴ on the cultural center-periphery cleavage between the rulers and the ruled by underlining the territorial connotation of this divide, specifically the confinement of peripheral culture to the rural areas and provinces. Referring to Mardin, he adds that the modernized and gradually secularized bureaucratic center was confronted by the religious opposition of the periphery. Thus, the center-periphery cleavage was intertwined with the church-state cleavage in the Ottoman Empire. In contrast to most Western societies, where the bourgeoisie was the banner-bearer of secularization, the military and bureaucratic elites carried out secularization against the religious and conservative periphery. The overlapping of cleavages granted unmatched popular support to peripheral-Islamic opposition; later, when party politics was introduced by the Young Turks, dissident factions appealed to the demands of the Islamic periphery.⁵⁵

Indeed, reforms during the *Tanzimat* period caused some shifts in the class structure of the Empire, and hence diversified the periphery by including various actors. The Land Code of 1858 allowed some relaxation of sale, use, and mortgage of state lands under specific conditions, and granted some peasants direct title to land. The *ayans* were superseded by a Muslim middle class that began to emerge from landowners, communal leaders, *ulema* families, small merchants, tribal chieftains, and intellectuals. The wealth and

inherited social status of *eşraf* (local notables) gradually made them the new Muslim upper landed class. However, it could not stimulate production due to lack of private property and benefits. Peasants preferred landholders to the state. In contrast to the state, the landholder could provide peasants with some basic services in return of increased taxation. Nonetheless, the new upper landed class was vulnerable to both the Ottoman state and the wealthy non-Muslim merchants.⁵⁶

The multi-stage, gradual, causal process leading to the radicalization of the bureaucrats began with the emergence of the patriotic Young Ottoman movement (1865–76), which was nurtured by the new era of mass indoctrination of the middle and upper bureaucratic cadres and urban groups. The Young Ottomans pressed for constitutional reform to save the Empire from disintegration and to preserve Islamic political tradition and Ottoman principles of government. They embraced anti-Western nationalism that combined the historical romanticist concept of fatherland (*vatan*) – paradoxically – inspired by Western philosophers Rousseau and Montesquieu and the ethos of the martyr religious warriors (*gazi*). The Young Ottoman movement pledged protection of Turkish merchants, the establishment of a Muslim bank, and criticized capitulations and interference in internal affairs.⁵⁷ In 1876, a constitutional monarchy with no significant powers of parliament was installed. Two years later, it was suspended by the absolutist regime of Abdülhamit II.

Banditry proved to be a remedy for refugees, peasants, and deserters, against a backdrop of worsening of life conditions in a war-ridden economy. The disastrous effects of the Russo-Turkish war (1877–78), or the “93 war” according to the Rumi calendar (1293), and the ensuing treaties of San Stefano and Berlin of 1878 marked a sharp decline of the Empire’s European territory and income. The loss of wars caused seismic shifts in the demography of European holdings of the Empire as well as a serious refugee problem. Starting with the defeat against Russia in the 1770s to 1913, millions of Muslim-Turkish refugees immigrated to Anatolia from the Balkans, Crimea, and the Caucasus, while the percentage of Christians decreased from 40 to 20 percent.⁵⁸ These Muslim immigrant communities bore the seeds of banditry that reached a peak during the First World War.

Banditry rose in Western Anatolia from the late nineteenth century onwards as a consequence of mass Muslim-Turkish migration to Anatolia and the repression of local communities. The Ottoman Public Debt Administration led by a consortium of European banks in 1881 introduced capitulations. Before the outbreak of World War I, Europeans administered the major ports, owned the overwhelming majority of the rail lines and important mines, and had a majority share in public utilities. In order to tap a stable revenue, tax-farms for short-term rotation (*iltizam*) turned to life-time estates (*malikane*); corporate religious estates (*vakıf* lands) became the property of their users. Due to the numbers of intermediary tax collectors and the corruption in the province, the state allied with the minority merchant class. This put Muslim merchants in jeopardy and fueled nationalist sentiments. Devaluation

of the currency repressed those with fixed incomes, lowered the value of primary goods, and pushed for their increased export. Due to their dependence on primary goods, the state, landholders, and merchants sought new ways to exploit the peasants. Self-sufficient peasants became a cheap labor force – share-croppers, tenants, and ultimately hired labor in towns. Jobless in the stagnating economy, they entered the military, religious schools, and rebellious bands.⁵⁹

In the Ottoman Balkans, from the defeat in the “93 war” to the early twentieth century, Bulgarian, Serb, Albanian, and Greek bands called “*komitadji*” were fighting against each other and against Ottoman rule. In his study of the local, regional, and transregional dynamics behind the clashes between various gangs (*çeta*), Blumi argues that strict ethno-nationalist or sectarian terms, which were subsumed under “national awakening”, would not be able to account for the varying motives and survival strategies of rebels with multiple, fluid, ambiguous identities at the end of the nineteenth century. Those social groups, who would later be called Albanians by national histories, were rather striving for a safe home against economic pressures, the intervention and state-making attempts of the great powers, and the intrusion of neighboring countries to divide local communities along sectarian lines. The Ottoman reforms, however, managed to tie the fate of these communities to the fate of the Ottoman state.⁶⁰ Later, Albanian gangs in Macedonia proved to be a crucial support for the Young Turks in their revolts against the absolutist regime to “save the state”.

Demographic characters, reform efforts, and banditry rendered Macedonia significant for Ottoman politics. In Macedonia, where the major Muslim population of the Ottoman Balkans resided in the early twentieth century, Muslim bands supported by Muslim landlords and notables were fighting against Christian bands, especially the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO). Moreover, the intervention of the great powers was a source of fear among Muslims. Through their initiative (the Mürzteg program), the Russian and Austria-Hungarian empires pressed for further reforms in Macedonia. However, Hanioglu calls this program, led by Austria-Hungary, a relatively conservative intervention, not directly challenging the Ottoman rule, thus allowing the Ottoman state to pursue evasive tactics to gain time.⁶¹ The *komitadtji* method of rebellion in Macedonia would later become a source of inspiration for the Young Turk opposition movement, which toppled the absolutist regime of Abdülhamit II.

The Young Turk movement emerged as a result of cumulative causal processes; in particular, mass migration and urbanization gave birth to a new intelligentsia from the large lower-class groups who could reap the benefits of the new education system and enter the bureaucratic cadres of the Ottoman state. In 1889, an underground organization called the Committee of Union and Progress (İTC) was founded by the students of the imperial military-medical school, the War College (*Harbiye*) and the Civil Administration College (*Mülkiye*). The major motive of the organization was saving the Ottoman

Empire. The military was reorganized among staff (*Erkan-ı Harb*) officers recruited from various provincial towns of the Empire.⁶² Some junior officers became *komidtajis* themselves in their fight against the Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian bands in Macedonia and Thrace. These *komidtajis* would later form the bulk of the “Ottoman Freedom Society” (*Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti*), whose members played a vital role in the Young Turk movement.

The İTC was an umbrella organization against the absolutist regime until the first congress in 1902. Between 1902 and 1905, the Young Turk movement was organized in exile; it had quite limited organizational activity inside the Empire. During this period, the “majority” focused on coup and assassination plots and perished after a fiasco of a coup attempt (1902–3) and its inability to carry out a coup despite British backing. On the other hand, the “minority” pursued organizational groundwork through journalistic activities to reinstall constitutionalism in exile in centers in Geneva and Paris as well as in Egypt and in the Balkans. The latter assumed leadership of the organization after 1906.⁶³

It must be noted that constitutionalism was seen as a means of overcoming difficulties on the way to save the Empire. The *Weltanschauung* of the Young Turks – involving positivism, social Darwinism, and elitism – dismissed any type of egalitarianism or socialism as these were regarded “unscientific” by Ludwig Büchner and Carl Vogt, two exponents of scientific materialism and the idols of intellectual Young Turks.⁶⁴ They were positivists, convinced of scientific neutrality in detecting universal laws following Auguste Comte, late nineteenth century disillusionment with parliamentary government, and Emile Durkheim’s solidarity.⁶⁵

The Young Turks disliked, even feared the masses. In this sense, they were evolutionary than revolutionary. They admired Gustave LeBon, a French thinker who was inspired by Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer in his theory of the races. According to LeBon’s theory on irrational mass psychology, in line with Comte’s authoritarianism, democracy was impossible to attain in industrialized societies. The masses reminded them of the Paris Commune. In their staunchly elitist project, populism had a paternal connotation instead of its popular Latin American version.⁶⁶

As Hanioglu argues, the ideals of the Young Turks in their journals and the actions they pursued often did not match. This discrepancy can be only understood by considering the realities on the ground and the Young Turks’ political opportunism. The greatest priority for the Young Turks was to save the state. To illustrate, between 1902 and 1907, the Young Turks’ journals used the terms “Turk” and “Ottoman” interchangeably. They employed Turkism, Ottomanism, and Panislamism interchangeably as long as a prospect for saving the Empire from disintegration was valid. Nonetheless, despite their language, the Turkish component dominated over others.⁶⁷

The Young Turks never challenged the state. The state was the playground of politics; the actors attempted either to conquer the state or to strengthen the state against the individual.⁶⁸ This premise and the multi-ethnic fabric of

society shaped the national ideology of the Young Turks. State nationalism or the cultural nationalism of Ziya Gökalp, rather than the ethnic nationalism of Yusuf Akçura, defined Turkish nationalism, according to which the state represents the general will of the nation.⁶⁹

Two conflicting principles, represented by Ahmed Rıza and a nephew of the sultan, Prince Sabahaddin, both in exile, shaped the intellectual discussions on the political strategies of the Young Turks' opposition. Ahmed Rıza advocated the preservation of a strong central government legitimized by loyalty to Ottoman-Muslim identity. Mass involvement was rejected due to the fear of inciting chaos that could invite foreign powers to intervene and grant autonomy to ethnic minorities. Prince Sabahaddin favored a decentralized empire, built on an alliance with non-Muslim minorities, especially with Ottoman Armenians and foreign allies.⁷⁰

With the reorganization of the İTC in 1906, the Committee was transformed from an intellectual platform of mainly expatriates to a political activist organization with local branches abroad and inside the Empire. It formed clandestine five-man cells with multiple power centers, political convictions, and changing leadership. Moreover, the İTC provided the officer cells inside the Empire with organizational links and coherence, although it was incapable of carrying out a coup before the merger with the Ottoman Freedom Society (*Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti*).⁷¹ *Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti* established in Salonica under the leadership of Mehmet Talat, a postal officer at the time, played a major part in activism in 1906. The organization spread in the Second and Third Armies in Macedonia and Thrace. Two officers of the Third Army in Salonica, Major Ahmed Cemal and Captain Enver, who joined the ranks, would later constitute the Enver-Talat-Cemal triumvirate of 1913–18.

Between 1905 and 1907, several rebellions erupted in Eastern Anatolia. Hanioglu warns against misinterpretation. It would be misleading to subsume them under a revolutionary movement coordinated by the same center. We cannot presume that the Young Turks started these regional disturbances or participated in them during its later phases. On the other hand, specifically for Erzurum, he contends that the Young Turks in general, the alliance of the Armenian revolutionary party *Dashnaktsutium* and the League of Private Initiative and Decentralization led by Sabahaddin Bey in particular, turned the popular dissatisfaction into a constitutional movement.⁷²

In September 1907, the İTC abroad merged with the *Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti*. This alliance had an impact on the change of organization and strategic action endorsed at the Second Congress of the opposition parties in December 1907, when the leadership decided to recruit and organize Muslim bands in Macedonia into cells of militia resembling the Greek and Albanian bands that had already demonstrated success against the Empire. Thus, the proponents of evolution (and opponents of mass uprising), such as Ahmed Rıza compromised as they acceded to limited mass involvement and revolutionary activism. The Young Turk Revolution was carried out with the critical collaboration of Albanian gangs and the establishment of new bands in

Macedonia and Thrace, where rebellions had taken place prior to the revolution of 1908.⁷³

The emergence of the deep state: Critical juncture (1908–13)

Capoccia and Kelemen argue that critical junctures should be differentiated from long-term cumulative causes, as they pass a threshold and cause a rapid change, such as revolution, after reaching a tipping point. Therefore, short-term causes are far better suited to understanding an actor's choices in a critical juncture framework.⁷⁴ The approach pursued in this study resembles that of Lipset and Rokkan, the pioneers of this approach, who traced the roots of the West European party systems to the Reformation, democratic revolution, and industrial revolution. The critical juncture as “a set of ordered consequences of decisions and developments”⁷⁵ explains not the actions taken on the verge of the tipping point, but rather the actions taken in the conditions of institutional fluidity and instability caused by threshold effects. As will be elaborated below, threshold effects are not devoid of contingency. The decisions of the great powers over the “Macedonian issue” in June 1908 provided the Young Turks with sufficient leverage to carry out a revolution. These marked the start of a critical juncture characterized by a highly contingent period that ended with the advent of the Enver-Talat-Cemal triumvirate in July 1913.

In this account of critical juncture, the impact of cumulative effects such as mass migration and demographic change on banditry, urbanization, and the formation of bureaucratic opposition are inseparable in the causal chain leading to the 1908 Revolution. Since critical junctures account for a new path, reintegrating structure and agency in a self-reproducing institutional setting, they unavoidably involve a changing structural component. This section elaborates on the choices and actions of powerful actors in this changing context that closed off alternatives other than the emergence of the deep state institutions. It examines critical antecedent, permissive and productive conditions as the main components of path dependency. Moreover, it justifies critical juncture by referring to the causal possibility, contingency, closure connotes, and degree of constraints. It asks how critical this juncture is in terms of a probability jump and temporal leverage.

The 1907 decision constitutes the critical antecedent for this juncture, since the decision to mobilize Muslim bands and form militias in Macedonia under the command of officers set the course of the movement on revolutionary activism. This antecedent accounts for the differential causal effect of the İTC's strategic decision on the course of action. As a consequence of this decision, junior officers especially became the main agents for carrying out the 1908 revolution.⁷⁶ Nonetheless, as Hanioglu aptly puts it, the revolution was “the work of a broad political organization with far-reaching aims, and not the accomplishment of a small group of junior officers”.⁷⁷ It must be noted that, despite the significance of military activism, the ownership of the revolution remained in the hands of the İTC as an institution until 1913.

The great power struggle over “Macedonian reform” provided an internal context of contingency that propelled the revolutionary activism of the Young Turks. The so-called railway wars between the Russian and Austria-Hungarian empires caused a rift between these great powers and a radical change of leadership, with Great Britain replacing Austria-Hungary. The Russo-British rapprochement that was formalized with the Reval meeting of June 1908 set the terms for replacing the Mürtzeg program with widespread reforms to solve the “Eastern Question” which would turn Macedonia into a formal suzerainty of the Ottoman sultan. This provided the İTC with the most effective pretext to start the revolution. As the rumors about Russo-British partition plans reached the public, and the fear of an imminent foreign intervention, not only Muslim bands and local elites but even the left wing of IMRO took the side of the İTC to topple the government.⁷⁸

The Reval meeting of June 1908 affected the timing of the revolution to a great extent. It heightened contingency by allowing the revolutionaries of Salonica, Manastir, and Skopje to risk everything. For path-dependent explanations, the timing and character of triggering events have high relevance. Public anxiety grew, due to the perception of an imminent threat, which certainly accelerated the pace of revolution. It would have made a major difference if this opportunity had arisen a few years later, or before the Balkan War, when the Young Turks had to fight in several fronts without being able to suppress the power of the palace and without having consolidated its power.

It must be stressed again, that although popular support of the Young Turks stemmed from the slogans of 1789 French revolution “Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity” used by the movement, it would be misleading to qualify the 1908 as a popular constitutional movement inspired by the 1905 revolution, as Soviet historiography propagated.⁷⁹ The elitist creed of these intellectuals and civil and military bureaucrats, combined with the strong censorship of the regime, prevented the diffusion of their ideas to ordinary people.⁸⁰

The revolutionaries in the Third Army declared the Young Turk manifesto calling for the restoration of constitution on July 3, 1908. Göcek asserts that probably the most crucial factor for the decision of Abdülhamit II to accede to the demands of the Young Turks on July 23, 1908 was the report of the Third Army commander, İbrahim Pasha, to the sultan warning that in Macedonia he could neither resort to advice and admonition, nor to force and compulsion.⁸¹ Although the revolts leading to the revolution were limited to the Western part of the Empire, the major factor behind the decision to reinstall constitutionalism was the fear of a civil war between the Third Army on the side of the Young Turks and the First and Second Armies situated between Macedonia and the capital. The revolutionaries succeeded without setting a foot on the capital.⁸²

In the aftermath of the revolution, the possibility of other casual paths than the emergence of the deep state can be found in the analysis of the power struggle between the liberals, the conservatives, and the unionists (and their representatives within the army). Against the authoritarian and centralizing

policies of the unionists (or the İTC), liberals opted for parliamentary democracy and decentralization. Conservatives made up the bulk of Islamist opposition against the secularist policies of the unionists. Despite other challenges, the major potential to produce a divergent path arose from the cleavage between the liberals and unionists within the Young Turk movement, whose result was contingent on several factors, especially on the international context emanating from wars.

The loss of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Crete, and the full independence of Bulgaria in the aftermath of the revolution jeopardized the power of the Young Turks, who lacked unity, a coherent political program, and the means and experience to implement the constitution. Indeed, the İTC remained an underground organization, with congresses held secretly, until 1912. They constrained the power of the palace and controlled the parliament, but the leading bureaucrats of the Porte could again become an independent political factor, especially in the government.⁸³

The first challenge to the unionists arose from the conservative opposition, *alaylı* officers, who had risen from the ranks and were loyal to the sultan. A schism emerged between the revolutionary upper echelons of the army, who were mostly *mekteplis*, graduates of new military schools and those within the lower echelons, the *alaylı* officers. Most of the officers abstained from political involvement, but they could not sustain their neutrality in the face of growing political turmoil complicated by foreign wars.⁸⁴

The reactionary rebellion of 1909 (known as the 31st of March incident) led by the *alaylı* officers (probably encouraged by the liberals)⁸⁵ could have seriously damaged the unionists, if the Third Army had not suppressed the rebellion. After martial law was installed, the İTC headquarters in Salonica consolidated its power over the sultan and the Sublime Porte by tying the grand vizier and the government to the parliament instead of the sultan, became a parallel government, widened its provincial branches, and purged and reshuffled the bureaucracy.⁸⁶

However, the hope of the Young Turks of preventing disintegration by uniting Ottoman subjects under the constitution could not materialize. The Young Turks did not incorporate non-Muslim bourgeoisie into the revolution, which deprived them of an ally with whom to forge alliances after the revolution. More importantly, the expatriate organizations of various ethnic groups that allied with the İTC against the common enemy, became dissidents of the new regime after the revolution due to the aggressive Ottomanism of the Young Turks, which was perceived as Turkification by these organizations, in which nationalist clubs and communities were overrepresented.⁸⁷

Hale suggests that the events from 1909 to 1913 depicted a “confused picture of shifting powers between the high command of the army, the liberals, the unionists, and dissident ethnic groups”.⁸⁸ By 1911, a broad alliance of liberals, conservatives and non-Turkish communities formed the Party of Freedom and Accord (*Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası*) and won in a by-election. Challenged

by liberals, and confronted with decreasing public support after the invasion of Libya by Italy, the unionists flagrantly manipulated the results of the January 1912 general elections (also called “the Big Stick Election”), in which they won all but six of the 275 seats; only a few liberals had the chance to enter the parliament. In response, the army officers in Istanbul and rebellious groups in the Balkans formed the “Saviour Officers” which pressed for the withdrawal of the army from the İTC and forced the formation of a new government in July 1912. This cabinet was replaced by another government under the liberal Kamil Pasha after the devastating defeats against the Italians in Libya and in the First Balkan War against Greece, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Serbia from October 1912 to May 1913.

The disaster of the First Balkan War constitutes the permissive condition that changed the underlying context increasing the power of the unionists as an agent of change. The First Balkan War provided an internal context that empowered the unionists to launch the 1913 coup that occurred when Kamil Pasha was conducting peace negotiations, including the secession of Edirne, once capital of the Empire, to Bulgaria. On January 10, 1913, Enver (then the Chief of Staff of the Strategic Reserve in Istanbul) overthrew the central government, the Sublime Porte (*Bab-ı Âli*) with paramilitary fighters. After a plot of the liberals was uncovered in March 1913, martial law was re-imposed and the liberals’ networks were destroyed.⁸⁹ The *Bab-ı Âli* solved the tension between the liberals and unionists at the expense of the first.

The formation of the Enver-Talat-Cemal triumvirate occurred due to “a lucky turn of the roulette wheel of Balkan politics”.⁹⁰ In July 1913, Bulgaria was separated from its allies, Greece and Serbia, over Macedonia. In the Second Balkan War, Bulgaria had to defend its Western borders and left Edirne unprotected. Enver and Talat took this opportunity of returning Edirne back to the Empire. The advent of the triumvirate comprising the Minister of War Enver Pasha, the Minister of Interior Talat Pasha, and Minister of Navy Cemal Pasha, constitutes the productive condition that produced “lock-in” effects, as the window of opportunity marked by the permissive condition of the First Balkan War came to close. In the second phase of the Balkan war in 1913, the Union and Progress Party (İTF), the successor of the İTC, established a dictatorship under the leadership of the triumvirate and began to bind large segments of the military politically and ideologically.

The critical antecedent, the December 1907 decision, is connected to the productive condition of July 1913 due to its impact on regime change. As the militias in Macedonia were subordinated to the revolutionary officers, it increased the significance of military segments in the movement. Coup-making, which had already been an instrument in solving political tensions, ended the power struggle between the İTC and the liberal opposition. More importantly, the military and the triumvirate shared the ownership of the movement in times of the heightened fragility of the Ottoman borders. Hence coup was the first and main institution of the deep state, and made the installation of other institutions possible.

Closure connotes refer here to the increase of the propensity of deep state institutions compared to the range of possible outcomes before the 1913 coup. Civilian intellectuals, such as Ahmed Rıza, who expressed their critical stance on using paramilitaries and violence in implementing governmental policies, were marginalized or forced into exile. The replacement of the rather sophisticated current of Young Turks by a pan-Turkist activism following the intellectual references, such as Ziya Gökalp and the power of gunmen, such as Bahaeddin Şakir and Dr. Nazım, increased the degree of constraints, and forced the opposition to follow the path. The closure of the critical juncture in July 1913 anchored actors in the chosen path. The following elaborates on the installation of extrajudicial executions, autocratic cliques, corruption and organized crime.

The policies of the Young Turks targeted destroying the non-Muslim commercial bourgeoisie. Protectionism and collaboration with armed provincial gangs brought increasing returns for the national economy and the Turkish bourgeoisie, which emerged from within its own ranks and from members of the *eşraf* (local notables), artisans (*esnaf*), and small merchants (*tüccar*) who joined the party as well as the landowning peasantry and professionals. The revolution deprived the aristocracy (*ulema* and *eşraf*) of political power, but not of their economic power base, while the *ulema* also retained their religious and spiritual powers. The Young Turks unequivocally protected capitalists, effectively suppressed organized labor, and never opted for the redistribution of land. Liberal, free trade policies for the growth of industry and trade were not primarily directed at protectionism in the first years after 1908.⁹¹

After the 1913 coup, nationalist protectionist measures, including the unilateral abolition of capitulations in 1914, were imposed. The wartime black-market under the İTC's patronage brought high predatory profits and rampant corruption, and laid down the foundations of capitalist accumulation. After the defeat of the British troops in Gallipoli in 1915, new tariffs were introduced on external trade. At the outbreak of the war, peasants were subject to forced labor. The landowners and the Committee were partners; the latter sold agricultural goods for high prices to German and Austrian companies, and hence prevented the direct sale from the producers. They were aware of dependence on foreign capital and were not hostile to foreign investment.⁹²

Gang members were integrated in the local cells of the İTC, mainly comprised of the *fedaiin* (martyr-assassins) recruited from refugee communities. The imperial government settled Muslim immigrants and refugees from the Balkans and North-Caucasia (mainly Georgia, Circassia, and Abkhazia) in the northern Aegean region. Gingeras stresses the significance of economic and identical marginalization, demographic changes, and patron-client relationships in diaspora for the origins of organized crime, exemplified by the North Caucasian diaspora in northwestern Anatolia.⁹³ The role of *fedaiin* in capital accumulation is best illustrated by the "Istanbul's Laz underworld" (Muslim ethnic group from the Black Sea coastal area of Turkey and Georgia),

which suppressed opposition and oversaw Muslim labor unions against the non-Muslim unions.⁹⁴

In the aftermath of the coup, violence became systematic and massacres and assassinations of *komitadjis* were narrated as acts of patriotism.⁹⁵ Autocratic cliques were institutionalized after the triumvirate of Enver, Talat, and Cemal decided to enter the world war on the side of the losing Central Powers. Special Organization (*Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*), the intelligence agency of the İTF, was the main autocratic clique of the deep state with its chief operators from the gangs formed by Muslim immigrants from North Caucasus and the Balkans recruited to the İTC during the Balkan War. *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* was subordinated to the Minister of War, Enver Pasha, in 1914, and was financed partly by the German government; the state bureaucracy and the parliament did not have access to its activities and operation. In the wake of the First World War, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* provided the military with recruits from the private militias of local notables.⁹⁶

The İTC reshaped the ethnic and religious structure of Anatolia between 1913 and 1918; one third of the population was deported and mixed. This settlement policy was designed to Turkify the Arab, Albanian, Bosnian, Gypsy, Circassian, Laz, Georgian and more importantly, Kurdish population. In line with their positivistic ambitions, the Young Turks conducted social engineering according to principles of ethnographic studies, geographies, ethnic statistics, and mathematics. They applied the Western statistical approach on the participation of the Christian subjects in the government according to their percentage in the population. Accordingly, the quota of for non-Turkish and non-Muslims among the Turkish population should not exceed 5 percent, for Armenians 10 percent in their deported settlements and 2 percent in Halep region.⁹⁷

The *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* and the Hamidiye regiments, orchestrated by the İTC, conducted the mass deportation and massacre of Ottoman Armenians (1915–17) and suppressed separatist movements and Greek businessmen in Western Asia Minor. The Committee released prisoners and gang members to participate in the deportation and execution of the Greek, Armenian and Syriac Christians.⁹⁸ Special laws and funds were issued and weapons and ammunitions were supplied to strengthen the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*.⁹⁹ It is conservatively estimated that between 600,000 to 1,000,000 Ottoman Armenians were slaughtered or died on the marches. By the time the armistice of Mudros in 1918 was concluded, the wartime leaders of the İTC, Cemal, Enver, Talât, Bahaeddin Şakir, and Dr. Nazım had fled to Germany; all of them – except Enver – were assassinated by Armenian revolutionaries in 1920 and 1921.

This juncture facilitated a high probability jump, since at the conclusion of the critical juncture in July 1913 the power of the triumvirate and the leading figures of the Committee made the installation of deep state institutions highly probable, compared to immediately before or during the lowest point of the critical juncture, June 1908, Reval meeting. With respect to the temporal leverage, the critical juncture lasted five years, but the path-dependent

process it instigated has lasted until today. Here a qualification of this relatively high temporal leverage is necessary. The authoritarian regime after the foundation of the Turkish Republic will be regarded as an interim period, in which the deep state became superfluous. The transition to democracy marked a reemergence and reorganization of the contemporary deep state.

Banditry and the breakdown of the Ottoman State

Scholars observe a continuity between the Second Constitutional Period (1908–18) and the post-World War I era. Zürcher contends that *Erkan-ı Harb* officers made up the bulk of the political elite of the Young Turk era, which began with the restoration of the constitutional regime in 1908 and lasted until the end of the authoritarian republican era in 1950.¹⁰⁰ This section traces how the bureaucratic revolt of the Young Turks is attached to state breakdown, the second basic level cause of the revolution from above. The secondary level causes of state breakdown, which are the opportunity for international maneuver, national movements from below, and the provincial power base of bureaucrats, are analyzed in conjunction with three ontological components of revolution from above: mass demobilization, state transformation, and class transformation. It is suggested that the threshold for state breakdown and transformation was reached by 1923, but the revolution was unfinished due to the alliance of revolutionaries with the landed aristocracy that impeded class transformation.

Skocpol emphasises the war-related processes, or international pressures, that led to the gradual breakdown of state repressive capacities in Russia. In 1905, the failed social revolution gathered momentum in the midst of a losing war against Japan, which culminated in the demands of civil liberties, legal equality, and a legislative assembly.¹⁰¹ She claims that World War I was a necessary cause of the revolutionary crisis that was responsible for the demise of Imperial Russia, because “born and tempered in warfare, insulated from, and supreme against, the forces of society, the Russian state could only succumb through massive defeat in total war.”¹⁰²

Likewise, the extreme international pressure that provided a context of international maneuver and national movements from below in a total War of National Liberation were necessary causes of the revolutionary crisis that brought the demise of the Ottoman state. Leon Trotsky’s comparison of imperial Russia in 1905 and the communist Soviet Union of 1917 can be partially applied to the Turkish case; thus, the anti-absolutist 1908 revolution can possibly be called a “dress rehearsal” for the revolution from above (1919–23).

As the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War came close, the İTF leadership, specifically Enver Pasha, decided to reorganize the provincial power base of the Committee into Anatolian Resistance to fight against the looming foreign occupation. The center of this movement was to be the deep state’s autocratic clique, *Teskilat-ı Mahsusa*, which was turned

into *Karakol* under new commanding officers. *Karakol* organized the provincial power base of bureaucrats into the so-called National Forces (*Kuva-yı Milliye*).¹⁰³

It must be noted that, during the revolution from above, the masses were politically neutralized and the participation of commoners in the resistance movement was brought under elite control. In this sense, the masses were demobilized. Indeed, the neutralization of the masses occurred before the organization of Anatolian Resistance, specifically after 1908 with the introduction of party politics that lessened the role of local notable families, religious orders, and *tekkes* as channels of political participation. Center-province communication was redefined through the incorporation of local powers into committee and clubs. In this sense, the masses became even more underrepresented.¹⁰⁴

The İTC could preempt the organs and symbols of the old regime. The armistice in 1918, signed by Mehmet VI Vahdettin, positioned the palace against the Committee and appeased the Allied powers, Great Britain, Italy, France, and Greece. The İTC controlled the parliament, the army, and the police forces until the British occupation of Istanbul in March 1920. In a month, the parliament prorogued itself in protest against the pressure of the British forces.¹⁰⁵ The Committee created civil bureaucratic and legislative organs and manipulated traditional symbols to gather support from Anatolian peasants, artisans, and local notables. Their propaganda involved the fight in the name of the Caliphate and Sultanate. It was not until the early Republic that Turkishness bore ethnic connotations.¹⁰⁶

Between 1918 and 1920, it was mainly the local branches of the İTC that established the "Societies for the Defense of the National Rights" (*Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti*); the leading cadres organized regional congresses held by the invited members in the six easternmost provinces claimed by the Armenians, Cilicia claimed by France and the Armenians, and in some areas of the west around Izmir and Thrace claimed by Greece.¹⁰⁷

Mustafa Kemal (later named as "Atatürk") became the leader of the resistance in 1919. He was an early member of the İTC who took part in the 1908 regime change, in the Third Army in 1909, served with distinction on diverse fronts, and had been excluded from the power center after the 1913 putsch, and was therefore not associated with the war crimes of the Triumvirate.¹⁰⁸ Following the British occupation in March 1920, M. Kemal disbanded *Karakol* and replaced it with the National Defense (*Milli Müdafaa*) organization, whose local branches formed the Grand National Assembly, which met for the first time on April 23, 1920. The Assembly gave the responsibilities of government to the headquarters of the resistance in Ankara.¹⁰⁹

The collaboration with bandits played a considerable role in the first phase of the resistance movement before 1920, before the regular army could gain strength, especially in the Western Anatolia. During the War of National Independence, gangs (*çete*) gained a highly positive connotation and legitimacy by symbolizing the national struggle. Gangs, militias, and paramilitaries flourished during World War I, when the mounted gendarmes withdrew and

gangs were filled with deserters. Militias in the countryside became armed criminal syndicates. The rural gangs threatened the state in the far-flung territories. In December 1918, the İTF issued a blanket amnesty to the culprits who engaged in banditry during the world war. Muslim-Turkish gangs, local notables and the İTC affiliates in the army, in the gendarmerie, and provincial administration were incorporated in the *Kuva-yı Milliye* as the Armenian and Greek paramilitaries backed the Greek and British troops. Nonetheless, the collaboration was not always smooth; some gangs of Muslim immigrants, former *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* officers such as Şah İsmail, led a mass rebellion against the National Forces along the southern and eastern shores of the Sea of Marmara between October 1919 and June 1920.¹¹⁰

Banditry was crucial for war-making, state-making, and capital accumulation – put differently, the “largest examples of organized crime” were defined as protection rackets.¹¹¹ Here, “political capitalism”¹¹² refers to political rent-seeking via the state. Weber attaches three sources for political capitalism: predatory profit, such as war finance; opportunities due to the power of the state; and opportunities for unusual transactions with the state and state agencies. In the absence of the majority of Greek and Armenian merchants, the political capitalism of the İTC could succeed. Businessmen favored by the Committee profited from the black market during World War I; food and military equipment, in particular, were supplied by these political favorites, who had the privileges of using railway freight cars. During the War of Liberation, these agents, who prospered through nationalization, financed the war efforts against the occupiers. The state banks nurtured new businessmen in their industrial enterprises through a patron-client relationship.¹¹³

The leading Committee cadres tried to dominate the independence movement during the wars between 1921 and 1922, which mainly included the fight against the Greek forces. However, the most threatening challenge against M. Kemal were the gang of Çerkes Ethem, the former minister of war Enver Pasha, and the conservatives of the parliament. In 1920, M. Kemal issued a decree that called for men in arms to join the regular army and banned any paramilitary activity as a sign of rebellion and treason. After the decisive victory in August 1922 that forced the Greek army to retreat and flee, he consolidated his power. Some of the prominent bandits who fought in the nationalist struggle, such as Çerkes Ethem, resisted this subordination and were purged by M. Kemal.¹¹⁴

Gingeras underlines the fine line between “traitors” and “heroes” at the time of the founding of the Turkish Republic. Şah İsmail, a former member of *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* later became an enemy of the *Kuva-yı Milliye*; Çerkes Ethem, a prominent social bandit and hero of the national struggle, fled to Greece to escape prosecution; Rauf Orbay, a commander of the National Forces was prosecuted later as a traitor; and Mustafa Kemal became the founder of the Republic.¹¹⁵

State transformation could succeed as bureaucrats gained the support of the conservative moderate elites for their cause. Instead of abolishing the old

regime, conservatives preferred the reform of the constitutional monarchy. The bureaucrats introduced changes as limited reforms. During the war, in 1921, M. Kemal persuaded the Grand National Assembly to pass a constitutional act that stated that sovereignty rested in the nation and the parliament administered the state, while he did not specify the form of state. The first parliament balanced the tense relationship between parliamentary legitimacy and the chief system because it truly reflected the plurality of the national liberation movement. Although the members were not elected, they were sent as delegates from each province. The parliament had a diversified democratic opposition against the rule of M. Kemal, who was also the chief of the military.¹¹⁶

The 1921 Constitution (*Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu*) reflected an authoritarian "chief system" in which the executive branch resided over other powers. It was based on the principle of the unity of powers which secured the superiority of the parliament over the executive branch (*İcra Vekili Heyeti*). The people's will and the will of the parliament, called the Grand National Assembly, were considered identical. Nonetheless, the president of the parliament M. Kemal was elected by the members of the executive branch.¹¹⁷

Nationalist appeal of the revolutionaries was strengthened as the palace collaborated with foreign powers. The National Forces defeated royal loyalists in the battle of 1920 and the Greek army in September 1922. After the victory of the independence struggle, the allied powers invited both the sultanate and the parliament to a peace conference in Lausanne. M. Kemal took this crisis as an opportunity and proposed the separation of the sultanate and the caliphate in November 1922 before the peace conference was opened. The Assembly accepted abolishing the political authority of the sultan, while keeping his religious authority as a caliph intact. The sultan fled the country after the abolition of the sultanate. Thus, the old regime was abolished by political and nonviolent means.¹¹⁸

The religious and landed aristocracy was destroyed in incremental steps. However, class transformation did not follow state transformation because of the alliance of the bureaucrats with local notables. *Ulema* and local notables constituted the main opposition in the Second Constitutional Period and the first parliament. Turkish *ulema* could have acquired a potential power of a landed class, because their lands and estate were protected by the imperial fiat. The *ulema* monopolized the legal and educational state resources; they were dependent on the state for status, economic and spiritual power. They lived off taxes collected from peasants. The power of the *ulema* was destroyed when the secular legitimacy of the state was established by abolishing the caliphate in 1924, confiscating the economic assets of the *vakıfs*, closing all religious courts, and outlawing all religious schools and instruction. A unified political elite was only possible by the substitution of Latin for Arabic script in writing. Thus, the new religious elite was cut off from its Ottoman heritage.¹¹⁹

On the other hand, the economic power of local notables was only partially challenged, because the bureaucrats chose to ally themselves with them.

Therefore, the revolution from above was marginal, or abortive.¹²⁰ If we consider that military officers were recruited from lower middle class and salaried middle class, the choice of landowners as allies seems to be, at least, not inevitable. The reason behind this choice was the bureaucrats' elitist conception of modernization which made them select the relatively well-educated local nobility, who were more exposed to Western culture than traditionally oriented peasants. Indeed, this choice of the bureaucrats and the lack of land reform and labor legislation in favor of workers imply an alienation from the peasants and the workers, the rural and urban lower classes. Contrary to the stable, gradually democratic single party system after the nationalist, anti-clerical, and developmentalist Mexican revolution that forged a coalition between the lower and middle classes, the lack of such a coalition in the Turkish revolution proved Turkish politics to be unstable and prone to military interventions in the long term.¹²¹

Trimberger argues that counterrevolution was repressed without the persecution of conservatives. The reforms for centralization and secularization targeted the social and economic base of the traditional aristocracy, who rejected language and territory as the basis of nationhood. She illustrates this by the Kurdish Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925, led by a hereditary chieftain of a local Naqshbandi order and aimed at restoring the sultanate and caliphate. The Kurdish rebels were aided by dervishes, who were distinct from *ulema* and had roots in society. She argues that the government was concerned with the personal fate of the conservatives and initiated some compensation after the revolt was suppressed. Religious officials could perform in local mosques, had resources from farms and lands, and were employed in new educational and judicial departments. No violent polarization occurred between the revolutionaries and the conservative aristocracy.¹²²

It is true that religious officials and conservatives were coopted after the revolution, but there is more behind the rebellions of the Kurdish tribes and their religious leaders, whose history dates back to the nineteenth century, when feudal lords and sheikhs rebelled to retain their privileges under local autonomy. The Kurds were regarded as an ethnos with distinct regional, linguistic and religious characteristics. The majority of Kurds acquired explicit ethnic-national consciousness during republican times. At the start of the national liberation struggle in 1919, M. Kemal promised political and cultural autonomy to Kurds. The Kurdish conservative elite contributed to the War of Independence.¹²³ However, after the foundation of the Republic, the nation was defined on the basis of Turkish ethnicity, regardless of religion and ethnicity. Any resistance to this modernization dictum was repressed violently.¹²⁴

The rebellions of Koçgiri 1921, Sheikh Said of 1925, and Ağrı of 1927 were called by the state religious fundamentalism, reactionaryism, counter-revolutionism, and banditry.¹²⁵ However these rebellions had an ethnic dimension. The Sheikh Said rebellion is regarded as the first ethnic revolt of Kurds in republican history and reflected the disappointment of the Kurdish

conservative elite over their exclusion despite their contribution to the War of Independence. As Olson argues, the basic motivation of this rebellion was nationalism, reflected in their protest of prohibition of education in Kurdish language and the lack of upward mobility of Kurdish officers.¹²⁶

In order to grasp the issues of ethnicity and secularism, ruptures and continuities with respect to the ancient regime must be dealt with adequately. Bureaucrats fought for revolution, but, in their ideological predisposition, change did not signify a self-propelling dynamism with an internal departure point. Revolution strengthened and bolstered the power of the state vis-à-vis society. Change was conceived of as a single rupture to the "correct" order, which must become static as soon as possible.¹²⁷ The main rupture was the creation of a nation-state that linked individuals directly to the state. When abrogation of the caliphate abolished the legitimate existence of the sultan, a conflict emerged between the mentality of the state and the existential dispositions of individuals. The Ottoman state, with a patriarchal mentality, played the role of an arbitral, did not discriminate against a certain congregation despite the hierarchical order. However, the Republic took the side of an ideological bearer, guardian, and conveyor of Turkish secularism. Turkish "assertive secularism"¹²⁸ denotes the control of religious institutions and public sphere by the state. Turkish laicism favors Muslims against non-Muslims; Sunnis against non-Sunnis. Despite the lack of a legitimating patriarchal mentality, the state reproduced congregational mechanisms by defining the "admissible" Turkish/secular congregation; the state was conceived of as sacred. The state used Kemalism against the religious and Kurdish segments and prevented their merger with the Turkish/secular congregation. Nationalism, an ideology of nation-state and a supra-identity, became a sub-identity in bureaucratizing and subordinating the Sunnite/Halefi congregation and spurred the emergence of a Kurdish congregation.¹²⁹

Trimberger's final steps are the selective political repression of the traditional political elite's moderate opposition and the lack of a reign of terror. Her argument is based on the number of executed counterrevolutionaries (less than fifty people) by Special tribunals, in contrast to the reign of terror in France, where 17,000 people were guillotined.¹³⁰ However, the state's response to the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925 was the destruction of 306 villages, 8,758 houses, and the death of 15,205 people; the population was largely displaced. The Ağrı rebellion (1926–30) depicts continuity in the Kurdish nationalist movement and marked a transition to guerilla warfare.¹³¹ The so-called "Sèvres syndrome" deeply informed the Kemalist response to ethnic or sectarian opposition. This syndrome produced nationalist sentiments identical to those against "the imperialist West" that tried to partition the country in line with the Sèvres Treaty in 1920.¹³²

Political repression of the opposition was widespread rather than selective. Forty days after the proclamation of the Republic in October 1923, the Courts of Independence (*İstiklal Mahkelemeri*) with extraordinary powers were established in Istanbul. After the Sheikh Said Rebellion, the promulgation of

the Law on the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu*) created a *de facto* state of emergency rule, repealed only in 1929. But these courts not only punished rebels but also political opposition. The courts silenced those who could have stopped M. Kemal and his trusted military ally in the War of Independence, General İsmet İnönü, from installing single-party rule.

Notes

- 1 Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, 2:231–32, 1025.
- 2 See Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Vol 1. Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire*.
- 3 İnalçık, “Decision Making in the Ottoman State”; İnalçık, “Osmanlı Hukuku’na Giriş: Örfi-Sultani Hukuk ve Fatih’in Kanunları”; İnalçık, “Comments on ‘Sultanism’: Max Weber’s Typification of the Ottoman Polity,” 63–64.
- 4 Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, 2:1077–79.
- 5 İnşel, *Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı*, 36–37, note 14.
- 6 Mahcupyan, *Türkiye’yi Anlamak: Zihniyet, Değişim ve Kriz*, 48–49.
- 7 İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire*, 66.
- 8 Mardin, “Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire,” 264; İnalçık, “The Nature of a Traditional Society: Turkey.”
- 9 İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire*, 140, 145.
- 10 *Ibid.*, 15.
- 11 Mahcupyan, *Türkiye’yi Anlamak: Zihniyet, Değişim ve Kriz*, 37.
- 12 A controversy exists in the literature regarding the classification of social stratification in the Ottoman Empire. Class versus subject class dichotomy is suggested by Halil İnalçık and applied by Karen Barkey in contrast to a four-tiered classification of estates defined along occupations (men of sword, men of pen, merchants and craftsmen, and peasants) suggested by Kemal Karpat. Here, following İnalçık, the term “class” defines in a Marxian sense the relations of production. İnalçık, “The Nature of a Traditional Society: Turkey,” 44; Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*, 30; Karpat, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History*, 303–5.
- 13 Uyar and Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans*, 95.
- 14 İnalçık, “The Nature of a Traditional Society: Turkey,” 44.
- 15 Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction*, 33, 48.
- 16 Trimberger, *Revolution from Above*, 55–56.
- 17 Kunt, *The Sultan’s Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550–1650*, 26–29; İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire*, 117. In Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*, 37.
- 18 Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, 1:128. In Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*, 39.
- 19 Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*, 55–76.
- 20 Karpat, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History*, 611–46; Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Vol 1. Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire*.
- 21 Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*, 43.
- 22 *Ibid.*, 39, note 49.
- 23 *Ibid.*, 85–140.
- 24 Parker, *The Military Revolution, 1500–1800: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West*.

- 25 Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*, 49–53.
- 26 *Ibid.*, 66–83.
- 27 Sunar, *State, Society and Democracy in Turkey*, 13.
- 28 Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*. In Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Consolidation*, 20.
- 29 Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” 174.
- 30 Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States*, 30.
- 31 Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change*, 84–112. Military-bureaucratic absolutism refers to a highly bureaucratized and militarized central state that either destroys or circumvents the parliament. *Ibid.*, 11.
- 32 Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Consolidation*; Anscombe, “Albanians and ‘Mountain Bandits’,” 88. I would like to thank Ryan Gingeras for drawing my attention to the changing role of banditry in the Ottoman state.
- 33 Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*, 172–75.
- 34 *Ibid.*, 189–202, 227.
- 35 Uyar and Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans*, 95.
- 36 Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*, 15–65; Uyar and Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans*, 89.
- 37 Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*.
- 38 Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*, 14–15, 236.
- 39 Trimberger, *Revolution from Above*, 57–61. Also see Skocpol, *Social Revolutions in the Modern World*; Huber and Stephens, “Conclusion: Agrarian Structure and Political Power in Comparative Perspective,” 261–67.
- 40 Uyar and Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans*, 89–94.
- 41 Sunar, *State, Society and Democracy in Turkey*, 2–5.
- 42 Karpát, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789–1908,” 33–35.
- 43 Sunar, *State, Society and Democracy in Turkey*, 13.
- 44 Anscombe, “Albanians and ‘Mountain Bandits’,” 87–92.
- 45 İnalcık, “The Nature of a Traditional Society: Turkey,” 53.
- 46 Sunar, *State, Society and Democracy in Turkey*, 12.
- 47 İnalcık, “The Nature of a Traditional Society: Turkey,” 42.
- 48 Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 95, 131; Karpát, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789–1908,” 254–255.
- 49 Anscombe, “Albanians and ‘Mountain Bandits,’” 106–107.
- 50 Karpát, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History*, 302–308.
- 51 Karpát, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789–1908,” 33–36.
- 52 *Ibid.*, 43–47.
- 53 Ahmad, *From Empire to Republic*, 8–9; Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire. The Sublim Porte, 1789–1922*.
- 54 Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?”.
- 55 Özbudun, *Party Politics and Social Cleavages in Turkey*, 19–20.
- 56 Karpát, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789–1908,” 258–60.
- 57 Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*.
- 58 Zürcher, “The Importance of Being Secular: Islam in the Service of the National and Pre-National State,” 58.
- 59 Sunar, *State, Society and Democracy in Turkey*, 8–11, 21–25.
- 60 Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans: Alternative Balkan Modernities, 1800–1912*.
- 61 Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908*, 235.
- 62 Karpát, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789–1908,” 63–71.
- 63 Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 8.
- 64 Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908*, 314–316.

- 65 Mardin, "Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey," 4.
- 66 Zürcher, "Kemalist Düşüncenin Osmanlı Kaynakları," 51–53.
- 67 Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908*, 295–302.
- 68 Mağcupyan, *Türkiye'yi Anlamak: Zihniyet, Değişim ve Kriz*, 63.
- 69 Zürcher, "Kemalist Düşüncenin Osmanlı Kaynakları," 50.
- 70 Ramsaur, *The Young Turks Prelude to the Revolution of 1908*, 62–75.
- 71 Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908*, 147–73.
- 72 *Ibid.*, 106–124.
- 73 *Ibid.*, 221–27, 254–258.
- 74 Capoccia and Kelemen, "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism," 351.
- 75 Lipset and Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, 44.
- 76 Sohrabi, "Global Wars, Local Actors: What the Young Turks Knew about Other Revolutions and What It Mattered," 66.
- 77 Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908*, 313.
- 78 *Ibid.*, 232–237.
- 79 *Ibid.*, 94.
- 80 *Ibid.*, 5.
- 81 Göçek, *The Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era*, 71.
- 82 Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908*, 278.
- 83 Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 99–100.
- 84 Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, 37–38.
- 85 Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 103–104.
- 86 Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908*, 279–288.
- 87 *Ibid.*, 315.
- 88 Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, 41.
- 89 *Ibid.*, 43–45.
- 90 *Ibid.*, 44.
- 91 Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 127–31.
- 92 *Ibid.*, 130–31.
- 93 Blok, *The Mafia of a Sicilian Village 1860–1960*; Chesneaux, *Secret Societies in China in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*; Schneider, *Vampires, Dragons, and Egyptian Kings*. In Gingeras, "Last Rites for a 'Pure Bandit': Clandestine Service, Historiography and the Origins of the Turkish 'Deep State,'" 158.
- 94 Gingeras, "Beyond Istanbul's 'Laz Underworld': Ottoman Paramilitarism and the Rise of Turkish Organised Crime, 1908–50," 218.
- 95 Göçek, *The Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era*, 92–93.
- 96 Gingeras, *Sorrowful Shores*, 55–77; Gingeras, "Last Rites for a 'Pure Bandit': Clandestine Service, Historiography and the Origins of the Turkish 'Deep State,'" 160–62.
- 97 Dündar, *Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi: İttihat ve Terakki'nin Etnisite Mühendisliği (1913–1918)*, 425–27.
- 98 Akçam, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility*. Deportation policy regarding the non-Muslim population was not only imposed on the Greek, Armenian and Syriac Christian minority, but also on the Bulgarian, Nestori, Jewish as well as Kurdish (despite their Muslim origins) minorities; see Dündar, *Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi: İttihat ve Terakki'nin Etnisite Mühendisliği (1913–1918)*.
- 99 Kutay, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Teşkilat-I Mahsusa ve Hayber'de Türk Ceng*, 38; Dadrian, *Ulusal ve Uluslararası Hukuk Sorunu Olarak Jenosid*, 57–59; Tunçay, *Cihat ve Techir*; Akçam, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility*; Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 114–15.

- 100 Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 97–137. For analyses which set the foundation of the republic as the start of the modern history, see Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Vol 1. Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire*; Ward and Rustow, *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*; Tachau and Heper, “The State, Politics and the Military in Turkey.”
- 101 Skocpol, *Social Revolutions in the Modern World*, 94–95.
- 102 Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, 94.
- 103 Gingeras, “Last Rites for a ‘Pure Bandit’: Clandestine Service, Historiography and the Origins of the Turkish ‘Deep State,’” 162.
- 104 Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908*, 314–16.
- 105 Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 142–143. There is a controversy among scholars as to the dominance of the İTC in the Independence movement. Zürcher claims that the movement was created by the Committee; Ahmad argues that it was created under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal who expanded on the provincial networks of the Unionists. Both of them have merits, since the İTC created the movement, whose leadership later passed to Mustafa Kemal. See Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, 101; Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement 1905–1926*, 81–105.
- 106 Zürcher, “Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: Identity Politics 1908–38,” 158–173.
- 107 Trimmerger, *Revolution from Above*, 14–16.
- 108 Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 148–149.
- 109 Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement 1905–1926*, 89–92, 122–123.
- 110 Gingeras, “Beyond Istanbul’s ‘Laz Underworld’: Ottoman Paramilitarism and the Rise of Turkish Organised Crime, 1908–50,” 219–22; Gingeras, “Notorious Subjects, Invisible Citizens: North Caucasian Resistance to the Turkish National Movement in the South Marmara, 1919–23.”
- 111 Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.”
- 112 Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, 2:164–66; Swedberg, *Max Weber and the Idea of Economic Sociology*, 46–53.
- 113 Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey*, 62, 66–69, 79; Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 131.
- 114 Shaw, *From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation 1918–1923: A Documentary Study*, 1197–99; Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 163–67.
- 115 Gingeras, “Last Rites for a ‘Pure Bandit’: Clandestine Service, Historiography and the Origins of the Turkish ‘Deep State,’” 174.
- 116 Demirel, *Birinci Meclis’te Muhalefet İkinci Grup*, 398–99.
- 117 Parla, *Türkiye’nin Siyasal Rejimi: 1980–1989*, 18.
- 118 Trimmerger, *Revolution from Above*, 14–18.
- 119 *Ibid.*, 27–28.
- 120 *Ibid.*, 3.
- 121 Özbudun, “Established Revolution versus Unfinished Revolution: Contrasting Patterns of Democratization in Mexico and Turkey,” 396–401.
- 122 Trimmerger, *Revolution from Above*, 31–32.
- 123 Yeğen, “Kürt Meselesi. Ne Oldu?”; Perinçek, *Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları (1923)*, 105.
- 124 Seufert, “Was Ist Ein Deutscher? Was Ist Ein Türke?”
- 125 Tunçay, *Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923–1931)*, 134–144.
- 126 Olson, *Kürt Milliyetçiliğinin Kaynakları ve Şeyh Said İsyanı*, 74.
- 127 Mahçupyan, *Türkiye’yi Anlamak: Zihniyet, Değişim ve Kriz*, 64–65.

88 *Banditry and the Ottoman State*

128 Kuru, *Secularism and State Policies toward Religion*.

129 Maḥcupyan, *Türkiye'yi Anlamak: Zihniyet, Değişim ve Kriz*, 44–47, 55–57.

130 Trimberger, *Revolution from Above*, 33–34.

131 Tunçay, *Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923–1931)*, 135.

132 Oran, *Türkiye'de Azınlıklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama*, 116–19.

4 The reorganization and restoration of the deep state

The legacies of single-party rule

The authoritarian regime under the single-party rule of the Republican People's Party (CHP) delivered new legacies for the deep state. This section elaborates on the *raison d'état* defined by the regime, which is here analyzed first according to the criteria of legitimatization of power, because it provides us with an accurate grasp of access to power. First, in order to tackle the issue of legitimization, it deals with the ideological lines of continuity between Young Turks and Kemalists. The regime is called an authoritarian-modernizing regime with corporatist features. Second, with respect to the criteria of access to power, the formal design of the regime, its constitutional tenets, and internal party dynamics are analyzed. *Raison d'état* was based on a specific mixture of secularism, nationalism, and modernism. However, this *raison d'état* in general, and the state's ideological perception of the Islamist threat in particular, underpinned perverse institutionalization, which involved putsch threat and serious discrimination in the electoral system.

As elaborated in the theoretical chapter, the Weberian definition of the state refers to a legal entity which has the legitimacy and the monopoly to use force. Legality in state-society relations refers to "*res publica*-commonwealth".¹ However, according to *raison d'état*, the state reserves the right to violate this legal framework and as well as human rights. In Turkey, Kemalism/Atatürkism identified the principles and means of commonwealth, the Rousseauist-Jacobin idea of "general will".² Therefore, the analysis of *raison d'état* addresses the relevance of the state ideology of Kemalism in legitimating an authoritarian regime.

Zürcher detects the ideological lines of continuity between the era of the Young Turks and the single-party rule. Kemalism's six principles were inscribed in the CHP program in 1931: reformism, secularism, nationalism, and populism, republicanism, and étatism. A crucial continuity with the Young Turks is the ontological positions and positivism of the Kemalists, their authoritarian mentality manifested in their conviction to embody the necessary resources to realize the "general will". Another continuity is their approach to revolution and reform. The Young Turks and the Kemalists preferred reforms controlled

by elites to revolution.³ In this sense, they neutralized the masses and brought the commoners under elite control in their revolution from above.

The founders of the Republic themselves chose the term reform (*inkilab*) rather than revolution (*ihtilal*). In this way, the Kemalists like Young Turks claimed to prevent reactionary movements. This point was shared by conservative thinkers, the sole opponents of the Kemalists. Reform was referred to by a conservative thinker like Peyami Safa as regeneration (*tekamül hamlesi*) and by Hilmi Ziya Ülken as maturation (*tekamül*), which point to a gradual evolution that had its roots in the Second Constitutional Period.⁴

Positivism as a scientific method preceded and empowered Kemalism, and it became an instrument in the hands of its bearers. In this vein of secularism, the repudiation of religion referred to a precondition of scientific, universal truth; scientificism justified the intervention of the state in society in order to homogenize society and impose a particular lifestyle.⁵ Epistemologically, secularism “clears” ideological aspects related to religion from the minds of the people. Ontologically, secularism is a precondition of science and development. However, authoritarian positivism upgrades secularism from a precondition of science to a determiner of correct action; thus, it becomes an ideology.⁶ The republican elites discovered a divine mind in the secular state and instrumentalized this patriarchal mentality for authoritarian ends in contrast to the harmony between both mentalities in Ottoman times. Westernism and modernization “emancipated” authoritarianism and provided the will to rehabilitate and educate society.⁷

Republicanism and étatism, i.e. state interventionism, were used as instruments for homogenizing society and imposing a lifestyle.⁸ Moreover, étatism provided a normative context for concrete forms of secularism and nationalism in Turkey, because state interventionism facilitates and legitimizes the use of power by excluding ethical norms. Republicanism could not free congregations from the Ottoman hierarchy and create citizens out of them; on the contrary, the state owned the public sphere.⁹

Secularism and nationalism were the main pillars of Kemalism. Secularism legitimized the state; nationalism gathered society around the state. The Young Turks laid the grounds of Turkish nationalism in the beginning of the twentieth century around Turkish Hearts (*Türk Ocakları*). The secularizing effects of the *Tanzimat* reforms challenged the dominance of the *ulema* in science and in the state by educating bureaucrats in French *grandes ecoles* and importing new laws. Young Turks and Kemalists defended rational and progressive “pure” Islam against the “ignorant” *ulema*. The Young Turks excluded *sheikh-ül Islam* from the cabinet and reformed sharia-based civil law in 1916–17, while the republican elites abolished the caliphate and *sheikh-ül Islam*, unified education under a secular ministry, and tried to control the practice of Islam by bureaucratizing it through the Ministry of Sharia and Foundations (*Şeriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti*) in 1924. The republican elites went further and abolished seminaries (*medrese*) and religious schools (*tekke*) in 1925, imported the Swiss Civil Code and Italian Penal Code in 1926, and

guaranteed political rights to women in 1934. The change of headgear and dress meant a radical change in lifestyle.¹⁰

Contrary to the basic definition of secularism as the separation of church and state, Kemalist laicism aimed at transforming mass behavior and its consciousness. Mardin addresses the great anxiety among the Kemalists concerning the masses. Religion interacted with the Ottoman society through institutions such as *ulemas*, *medreses*, pious foundations (*vakıfs*), and Sufi orders by referring to existential questions. This interaction created informal bridges for exchange of discourse between the state and society, between upper and lower classes, and a form of solidarity and socio-political identity called *asabiyya*. The republic radically diverted from the Ottoman practice of integrating guardians and literati into daily life; instead, religion was normatively conceived as a scholastic remnant of the past. Their lack of contact and ideological disposition impeded them from grasping how Islam became a culturally and practically organic component of daily life. This explains why Kemalists have been preoccupied with constant feelings of insecurity about the revival of Islam in Turkey since the foundation of the republic.¹¹

The populism of the Kemalists was based on the denial of the existence of classes. The revolution from above was abortive since it caused minimal injury to the landed aristocracy; the bureaucrats sought alliances with local notables. In line with the principle of populism, political and cultural reforms in the 1920s and 1930s were imposed in a paternalistic manner through educational institutions and cultural practices. But social reforms failed to transform the provinces.¹²

In line with the premise of a classless society, what the regime formally called étatist economic policies bore corporatist features. Ziya Gökalp, an intellectual founder of Turkish nationalism, claimed that a single party could meet the needs of citizens because Turkish society is a classless unified society; political parties can only be legitimated in a society of different classes.¹³ It is true that the Kemalists' economic policies were in tune with the ITC 1913 economic program to bolster the development of a national bourgeoisie. However, the national bourgeoisie and industrialization were brought under strict state control. For this purpose, population exchange with Greece took place; foreign capitulations were abolished; foreign firms expropriated and all mines, utilities, railways were nationalized with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, and foreign capital was restricted, except for a British and Russian loan.¹⁴

In the debates over the 1921 Constitution, influential Kemalists defended the establishment of a corporatist assembly built by representatives of guilds from different professions instead of political parties, but it was refused. The regime established corporations that overtook the functions of the local banks that were weakened; the autonomy of the chamber of commerce and industry was abolished. From 1924 onwards, monopolies on several consumable goods – such as sugar, alcoholic beverages and tobacco – and harbors were set up. In order to enhance political control of the economy, the Supreme Economic Assembly (*Âli İktisat Meclisi*) was established in 1927, but it was closed

in 1935 due to resistance from business circles. Corporatist policies aimed at keeping peasants in villages for the sake of an economic stability that was based on the production of wheat, sugar, and cotton. This proved to be detrimental for industrialization. After the great depression of 1929, the regime could control imports and exports; it was able to impose tariffs on imports. In the 1930s, the Land Agricultural Products Office (*Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi*) controlled the agricultural sector, Sümerbank conducted industrial control, and Etibank controlled mineral wealth. They controlled prices and sale orders.¹⁵

International economic pressure, technological gaps, and geographic proximity to Europe were impediments to self-sufficient autonomous industrialization. Japan industrialized self-sufficiently before the 1850s, when the capitalist economies had not achieved high control over the world economy. For Turkey, in the 1930s, the only way to achieve industrialization without foreign domination was to temporarily withdraw from the world economy and mobilize the masses for large-scale production. However, first, Turkey did not have the vast resources and population; second, corporatist policies were aimed at keeping peasants in villages; and, more importantly, the Turkish bureaucrats allied themselves with pre-capitalist local rentier landlords, a class that was intrinsically opposed to autonomous industrialization. This alliance secured bureaucrats a social base. On the other hand, like Peru and Egypt, Turkey was more closely tied to the world capitalist economy as a subordinate supplying raw materials to international markets.¹⁶

Before 1945, almost all industrial enterprises were state-owned. The opening of new cultivated land and the expansion of farm credit increased agricultural productivity. The import substitution model was based on self-sustaining production and consumption, the export of agricultural goods that supported the import of heavy machinery. The state distributed revenue through informal mechanisms; social production became dependent to the state, so that potential opposition was co-opted.¹⁷ Industries were transferred to the banks with close ties to bureaucrats. Those who were trained as managers in state enterprises left to start businesses with financing from development banks. The government bureaucrats became private capitalists of new industries. Capitalism increased the population in the cities, but corporatism aimed at keeping the peasants in villages. The bureaucrats' coalition with the local rentier landlords had high costs for the rural middle classes: it led to the depoliticization of the family peasantry. Furthermore, the small size of independent peasant farms and the rise of small tenant farms on large estates blocked internal capital formation and accumulation as well as the ability to develop enterprises in Turkey.¹⁸

What was the formal design of the regime? The single-party rule limited access to power in the parliament and the government with the ascendance of the "First Group" during the election of the second parliament. M. Kemal combined the groups of Committee for Defense of Rights in Anatolia and Rumelia (*Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti*) in May 1921, which

was referred later as the “First Defense of Rights Group”. The first organized political opposition was founded in July 1922 as “the Second Group” in the first parliament.

As Özbudun argues, the cleavage between the unionists and liberals was transferred to the new setting as the cleavage between the First and the Second Group.¹⁹ Since the War of Independence, they had conflicted with the emerging republican leadership. The members of the opposition party differed in their sensitivity on the dominance of the parliament. They supported reforms, but wanted to retain the traditional, especially religious, Ottoman institutions, and favored free enterprise and the encouragement of foreign capital investment. As the Second Group was identified by the center as representative of the religious peripheral opposition, the official historiography depicts the Second Group as Islamist reactionaries, although civil servants, professional merchants and farmer-merchants were similarly represented in both groups – only one third of its members were muftis, religious teachers, and sheikhs, and members with a religious education background were more represented in the First Group.²⁰

After the War of Liberation ended with the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in July 1923, M. Kemal founded the People’s Party (*Halk Fırkası*, in 1924 *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası*) in September 1923 from branches of the Committee for Defense of Rights in Anatolia and Rumelia. The election of the second parliament was a milestone for the authoritarian regime, since it limited the access to power by excluding religious elites and local notables almost completely; less than one third of the first parliament was reelected. The new representatives were mostly recruited from high-ranking military officers and civil bureaucrats.²¹ The political party exercised control over delegates, most of whom had no social power base.²² This parliament declared the republic as the form of government in October 1923.

The CHP did not have an independent ideological “personality”; it was attached to the state and largely bureaucratized. The president (the chairman of the party), the prime minister (the executive chairman), the cabinet, and the members of the parliament were decisive for the party.²³ The CHP gathered its ultimate power from the military until 1927. As the composition of the Grand National Assembly shows, ex-civil and military bureaucrats worked as the largest occupational grouping in the single party rule. The constitutional amendments from 1923 created the institutions of the presidency and Prime Minister. But, the hallmark of the parliamentary system, the right to dismiss the executive organ, did not exist. The executive organ was decoupled from the legislative organ in contrast to the first parliament, but it was not given the capacities and qualities that would bring about a separation of powers. Rather, it resembled the cabinet system, as the executive organ had common responsibility. The president could, if necessary, lead the executive organ. The judiciary was separated and was declared independent. The 1924 Constitution introduced the principle of the superiority of the constitution and the hierarchy of the law. However, it neither kept the unity of

powers nor installed a separation of powers system, although it promised the latter.²⁴

As secularism and nationalism are the main pillars of Kemalism, *raison d'état* was associated with them. Kemalism determined that if the borders of politics are crossed, this can be punished severely under accusations of being a "traitor", "enemy of the state", "reactionarist", or "separationist".²⁵ The CHP tried twice to form an opposition party from among its conservative members. As they allegedly posed a religious fundamentalist threat to the regime, they were closed. The ideological perception of "reactionary (*irtica*) threat" developed during the authoritarian period. This rhetoric had a long-lasting impact on civil-military relations in the democratic era, since it legitimized putsch threat, tutelary powers, and serious discrimination in the electoral system, hence perverse institutionalization.

Four prominent generals in the Second Group, who started the national resistance with M. Kemal, founded the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) in 1924. The urban lower class supported this party. The promulgation of the Law on the Maintenance of Order after the Sheikh Said rebellion increased the repressive capacity of the regime. Using the rhetoric of struggling reactionarism, members of the former "Second Group" and Progressive Party were brought before the Courts of Independence, the press and parliament were silenced, and the party was banned in 1925.²⁶ Disloyal cadres of the İTC such as Kara Kemal were purged in the aftermath of their alleged assassination attempt on M. Kemal in 1926. Former Unionists and CHP members and founders of the Progressive Party such as Rauf Orbay and Adnan Adıvar were taken to the Courts of Independence. The first was convicted, while the latter was acquitted; both went into exile. The CHP was discomfited by the popular support for prominent pashas. The military heroes Kâzım Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Refet Bele, and Cafer Tayyar Eğilmez were released due to public pressure, but they were deprived of their political leadership positions.²⁷

After the ban of the Progressive Party, there was no real opposition left. Socialists were a variant of Kemalism and supported the CHP policies. Only the communist party, with ties to Moscow, opposed the CHP. A loyal, "official" Turkish communist party was established against the "illegitimate" Bolsheviks. In 1927, a new law prohibited active military staff from becoming parliamentarians. This ban on the double-tenure of military men was not a move toward democratic control of the military; it aimed at preventing any ex-officer opposition from gathering support from the military. Prominent pashas were forced to resign from the military or from their duty in the parliament. Up until the elections of 1927, parliamentary opposition and opposition from the military were eliminated.²⁸ The second opposition party, the Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) was closed by its civilian founders a few months after its establishment in 1930.

Atatürk resorted to personalist rule derived from his charisma after the promulgation of the Law on the Maintenance of Order in 1925. The regime

gained personalist features after the prominent pashas resigned in 1927. In contradiction to constitutional systems, the regulations of the party adopted the “chief system” in 1927 that endowed the president, the “unchangeable general chief”, with extraordinary powers as the natural chief of the parliament, party, government, and parliamentary group. Until 1927, the military was dominant in the state, but after 1927, M. Kemal represented the military’s power, whose loyalty was secured through the chief of General Staff, who ranked after the prime minister and above the cabinet members. The regulations of 1931 added the appointment of candidates to the parliament from the party by the chief. Parliament was *de facto* excluded from the decision-making system and reduced to a mere legitimizing factor by the chief and a small group of cronies. Recep Peker, the representative of the totalitarian tendencies of the party, was selected as the general secretary of the party in 1931. In 1935, a resolution of the party united it with the state, which made heads of provincial party organizations governors of provinces. In the 1930s, no civil society organizations were allowed; associations close to the CHP were closed.²⁹

It is important to discuss why the strong state needed to increase repression. The revolution depended on the neutralization and depoliticization of the masses. The centuries-old antipathy of the villagers towards the center was retained. The installation of people’s houses (*halkevleri*) and village institutes (*köy enstitüleri*) aimed at closing the gap by rehabilitating the people, with limited success.³⁰ The level of repression increased tremendously between 1924 and 1938, when several Kurdish riots erupted in the eastern territories, especially those supported by Kurdish Alevites. The rebellion of Ağrı (1926–30) was considered to be the first guerrilla movement. The state responded with large-scale destruction, displacement, and killings. However, the state did not wait for a real revolt in Dersim. Between 1937 and 1938, according to official figures around 13,000 persons – almost one third of the population – were killed; however, in the local registration records 50,000 persons disappeared.³¹ The failure of assimilation pushed the Turkish state to pursue an ethnic based nationalism.³²

After the death of Atatürk in 1938, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) were crowned by Kemalism and proclaimed as the impersonal, supra-political embodiment of the state.³³ Under the “national chief” regime of the 1940s, Atatürkism delineated the boundaries of the tamed opposition.³⁴ İsmet İnönü laid down the ideological grounds of the chief system by declaring Atatürk the “eternal chief” with a change in the party regulations of 1935, which also provided a legal ground for the succession problem by enabling the general meeting of the party (*kurultay*) to convene and decide about the successor. To justify the change, the term “national chief” was used, which was attributed to İnönü, who automatically became the “unchangeable general chief”. The general meeting of the party was never able to convene and decide about the successor. The chief system had a profound impact on the CHP beyond the authoritarian period. The rule of the party by İnönü and his presidency

strengthened the hold of the military and of Kemalism; the latter became the common denominator of Turkish political thought.³⁵

Transition to democracy and deep state: Critical juncture (1945–47)

The authoritarian regime provided the deep state with *raison d'état*, or reason and legitimation for action after the transition to democracy. The formal design of the single-party rule did not require a dual form of domination or specific informal institutions for societal control. This necessity arose after the transition to democracy. The heightened contingency in the immediate post-World War II years between 1945 and 1947 created by structural fluidity of the international order opened a corridor of change, in which the choices of powerful international actors and the Turkish ruling elite set democratic institutions. At the same time, these choices closed off alternatives other than the resurface of the deep state. Therefore, this critical juncture refers to the *change of the state through regime transformation*. Path dependence in this case is justified again via four basic parameters: causal possibility, contingency, closure connotes, and degree of constraints. Moreover, this section elaborates on the period between 1947 and 1952, when informal institutions of the deep state, specifically autocratic cliques, extrajudicial executions, and organized crime were reinstalled over a period of time.

Haggard and Kaufman³⁶ as well as Huntington³⁷ conclude that single-party regimes are more resilient than other types; external shocks more than internal splits are likely to bring about regime change. Single-party cadres under international pressure and internal opposition face the incentives of negotiating an solution which ensures their grip of resources and rule from behind the scene. In contrast, most personalist regimes cling tightly to power and are prone to be overthrown through violent means.³⁸ Turkey's transition took place neither through violent means nor through negotiation. Referring to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Ergun Özbudun concludes that the transformation was a *reforma* in contrast to a *ruptura*; the authoritarian regime did not disintegrate, instead, the single-party under the ex-military leadership initiated the transition to democracy.³⁹ It was also not a *pactada*, which denotes a binding agreement between the leaders of the government and the opposition on the "rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the 'vital interests' of those entering into it".⁴⁰

For Yılmaz, the external pressure, the intense threat of sovereignty and lack of international response to this threat between June 1945 and April 1946 led the ex-military leadership to install democracy and placed Turkey in the orbit of the Western Block. The imminent threat of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) made the leadership to opt for transition in the post-war global conjuncture that was marked by the triumph of democracy.⁴¹ Despite the widely acknowledged merits of the external pressure argument, it needs to be supplemented with the incorporation of internal contingency during the

transition period. The following elaborates on the exigencies of the period and combines them with internal dynamics.

The critical antecedent that operated before this critical juncture is the political and ideological strength of the military before the end of World War II. The immediate post-World War II international context, the isolation of Turkey, and the Soviet threat refer to the permissive conditions which led to the political liberalization policy of the authoritarian regime. The productive condition is the transition to democracy as a member of the Western Block. The critical antecedent determined the characteristics of the productive condition by paving the way for the emergence of tutelary democracy and the installation of (in)formal institutions of the deep state. The membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) served as an international anchor for the Turkish deep state.

Permissive conditions were created by the international context at the end of World War II. Turkey maintained neutrality and pursued Westernist status quo policies during the war. However, neutrality left Turkey alone in the immediate post-war years, when the president of the USSR, Joseph Stalin, brought the issue of the straits to the agenda. At the Yalta Conference of February 1945, Stalin declared the status quo on the straits unacceptable. The meeting of foreign ministers Molotov and Sarper in June 1945 formalized the revisionist and expansionist policy of Stalin who did not want to renew the Bilateral Friendship Pact of 1925 and asked for a sea and land base in the straits, revision of the strait regime established by the Montreux Convention of 1936, and demanded Kars and Ardahan in the East of Turkey.⁴² Turkey's isolation beginning from the Molotov-Sarper meeting on June 7, 1945 until the arrival of the United States' (US) battleship Missouri to Istanbul on April 5, 1946 was a significant factor behind political liberalization.

At the Potsdam Conference of August 1945, Stalin declared the issue of the Straits to be a private matter. Britain and the US were more concerned with the return of their soldiers and bipolarity was not regarded as a close option.⁴³ In the immediate post-war years, Britain and the US wanted to retain normality with the Soviet Union within the confines of the UN founded in June 1945. In order to become a founding member of the UN, Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan in February 1945, but membership did not bring relief. Unlike the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, who rejected it vehemently, the US president, Harry S. Truman, agreed with Stalin to change the Montreux Regime (albeit for another reason, that is to change the Straits' status to the same international status as the Suez Canal, which meant the disarmament of the region and the overt weakening of Turkey's defenses) and to leave the issue of land annexation as a private matter for both countries. Three countries were undecided about the Straits and concluded that each would contact Turkey separately regarding this matter.⁴⁴

In his note to Turkey dated November 1945, Truman proposed convening a conference to discuss abolishing restrictions imposed by the Montreux Regime and abandoned the idea of an internationally monitored straits regime.⁴⁵ In a

time of isolation against the Soviet threat and the post-war global conjuncture of the “second wave”⁴⁶ of democratic transitions, the CHP ruling elite began to approach the US and Britain and proceeded with political liberalization. As the banned Progressive Party emerged from within the CHP, the Democrat Party (DP) was established in January 1946 by a former İTC member, a prominent figure during the National Liberation struggle and former prime minister during the single-party regime, Celal Bayar, and former CHP deputies Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü and Refik Koraltan. Referring to Ahmad,⁴⁷ Özbudun challenges the view that the clash of interests between the state elite and large landowners over land reform attempt of the CHP in 1945, which was never realized, brought about the emergence of the opposition. In its formation, the DP differed from the CHP on a few points, mainly in electoral reform and further liberalization.⁴⁸

Scholars maintain that the fear of isolation from the West remained the main reason for the start of political liberalization. On the other hand, the “external pressure” argument should be complemented by taking into account the internal contingency and indeterminacy between the local elections of May 1946 and July 12, 1947, when İnönü announced the opposition as equals in the competition for free elections.⁴⁹ Özkurt maintains that the ruling group in the CHP aimed in the first place to install a “broadened” type of authoritarianism⁵⁰ which would allow for the limited autonomy of civil society and its integration into the regime; the closure of the DP remained as an option. In fear of sharing the same fate as the former opposition parties, the DP boycotted the May 1946 local elections to protest against insufficient liberalization; on the other hand, it participated in the general elections of July 1946 won by the CHP. Until April 1947, the CHP pursued a policy of broadened dictatorship and assumed that the DP could be closed when necessary.⁵¹

Özkurt refers to Przeworski’s hypotheses about the “mistaken assumption”⁵² of reformers that pave the way for transition: in the contingent period, the transition succeeds when the reformers ally with the moderates, while the hardliners and radicals are controlled.⁵³ The broadened authoritarianism assumption of the CHP leadership was a miscalculation, since the costs of repression increased in the meantime. The US changed its policy, as the Soviet Union was unwilling to withdraw its troops from Iran from January 1946 onwards, as well as from Poland and other occupied countries, in line with the Yalta Conference resolutions.⁵⁴ Control of Iran by the Soviet Union would have jeopardized the US interests in the Middle East, especially its access to oil resources.⁵⁵ Therefore, Turkey had to be protected against the Soviet Union. The arrival of the US warship *Missouri* in April 1946 in Istanbul was considered a clear sign of this protection.

As a measure of liberalization, President İnönü’s title of national chief was removed from the charter of the CHP in May 1946. In March 1947, Turkey became a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The next day, Truman declared the US doctrine for the containment of the Soviet Union and the protection of Greece and Turkey from the

“communist threat”. Repression would put the adoption of the Truman Aid Bill to Turkey at risk. Moreover, the DP became the locus of popular opposition as defender of democracy and voice of social unrest. The CHP sought protection, economic relief, and democratic legitimacy for the regime. İnönü announced the opposition as equals on July 12, 1947, the same day as the Truman Aid Bill passed. Later, the state of emergency was lifted and the party was reorganized to accommodate itself to the new context. The more religiously conservative flank of the DP formed the Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*) in 1948 under the leadership of the former Chief of Staff, Çakmak.⁵⁶ İnönü’s leadership succeeded in silencing the hardliners in the party, especially Peker.⁵⁷

Could actors have chosen other paths? Were there other causal possibilities? The timing of the decision for liberalization is of vital importance. If Truman had joined Churchill in backing Turkey against the Soviet threat during the Potsdam Conference, the leadership of the regime could have felt relieved. Broadened authoritarianism might not have even begun. Timing is crucial, since in the two years from June 1945 to June 1947, the DP gathered considerable public support. Thus, by the time the Truman Doctrine was announced, the reformers could convince the radicals of the costs of repression. If İnönü had not made the announcement on that day, the prospects for the inclusion of Turkey would have been jeopardized. During the congressional debates of April-May 1947, many Congressmen attacked the policies of the CHP that were against the democratic spirit of the doctrine.⁵⁸ If they had been excluded from the Truman Bill, Turkish elites might have opted for broadened authoritarianism.

Closure connotes refers to the increase of the propensity for a particular group of outcomes compared to the possible outcomes before the decision was taken. During the critical juncture between 1945 and 1947, the transition to democracy was closely tied to protection and aid from the US. As will be explained below, the membership to the NATO played a major role in the emergence of the autocratic cliques of the deep state. Without the transition, NATO membership would be highly at risk.

Degree of constraints refers to the boundedness of actors by the chosen path, because resistance to the path would cost them more than following it. In the 1950s, Turkey’s deep state was already deeply embedded in NATO and the Western Bloc. The economy developed a dependent relationship due to US foreign loans. Diverting from this path would have cost incumbents their political and economic power. In the period from 1947 to 1952, the Truman Doctrine was followed by a growing involvement of the US in Turkish economic and military restructuring.

In the face of the Soviet threat, the Truman Doctrine of 1947 foresaw primarily the delivery of military aid to Greece and Turkey, 300 million and 100 million US dollars respectively. However, with the Marshall Plan of 1948, the US policy shifted from an individualist to a collective recovery perspective since neither IMF-led stabilization programs nor the reconstruction plans

designed by the World Bank and UN would suffice for Europe, whose economy was devastated; by providing loans on favorable terms through the Marshall Plan, the US helped these countries increase their purchasing power so as to provide a market for US goods and products. The economic and military aid under the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan opened the Turkish economy to unrestricted external influence. From 1947 to 1951, US military aid to Turkey amounted to 400 million dollars. The majority of the products delivered to Turkey consisted of surplus World War II supplies, but these were regarded as a modernization of the obsolete weaponry of the TSK. This equipment was in the possession of the US and their use was dependent on its consent. According to the terms of disbursement, Turkey had to import the products for maintaining and repairing this equipment; for 100 million dollars of grant equipment, Turkey had to spend 143 million dollars in annual outlay from the budget. These expenses were detrimental to the balance of payments, since they diminished foreign exchange reserves considerably.⁵⁹

Economic aid restructured the military and economy mainly in line with the priorities, strategies, methods, and technologies of the US.⁶⁰ The economic policies of the recipient countries could be influenced through the Plan, since the utilization of aid was determined in consultation with the US. Moreover, the US had a special account in the central bank of the recipient countries with the local currency counterpart of the loan that could only be used with its consent. Thus, it had another opportunity to exercise leverage on the economy. From 1948 to 1952, the total amount of the Marshall aid was 352 million dollars, almost half of which was bound to US procurement; the remaining amount was indirect aid that could be used for procurements from the members of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation established in 1948. Turkey could get 3.6 percent of the Marshall economic aid; 60 percent of this aid was invested in agriculture; a negligible amount was diverted to industrialization efforts. The US preferred automobile highways and airports to railroads, which increased the import of the automobiles and petroleum.⁶¹

The landslide electoral success of the DP in 1950 brought about the first change of government through free and fair elections. The periphery represented by the DP could challenge the center represented by the civil and military bureaucrats. It would be inaccurate to trace the DP's success to the breakup of the alliance of bureaucrats with the landlords, since the CHP received backing from the traditional landed elites and gentry in the East and Southeast of Turkey. The DP gathered the votes of various peripheral groups from different segments of society, which saw their interests underrepresented. Unlike the CHP, the DP appealed to the traditional values and lifestyle of the small peasantry, and gained most of their votes. Moreover, the market-oriented landlords in western Turkey, small-town merchants and urban mercantile class to religious groups, which were estranged by exclusionary policies of the single-party regime, voted for the DP.⁶²

The Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT) was established as the highest institution of the US Armed Forces in 1947, when the US National Security Council created the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) as the covert action arm of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In the name of rescuing countries threatened by communism, the OPC's charter unambiguously called for "propaganda, economic warfare; preventative direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements."⁶³

The critical antecedent, the political and ideological strength of the military, determined the characteristics of the productive condition: the transition from authoritarian regime to tutelary democracy as a member of the Western Bloc. NATO was the biggest part of the Pax Americana. To ensure NATO membership, Turkey sent troops to the Korean War in 1950; a brigade sustained high casualties in protecting US soldiers from annihilation in the Kunuri battle of November 1950 against the Chinese.⁶⁴ After becoming the leader of the DP in 1950, Adnan Menderes overplayed the "communist menace" in order to extract foreign aids and loans. US aid and protection was welcomed as a guarantor of democracy. On the other hand, leftist intellectuals, university professors, and politicians were subjected to "anti-communist" persecution similar to the McCarthy investigations in the US.⁶⁵ NATO membership of Turkey in 1952 exerted an institutional "lock-in" effect for the sporadic and protracted development of informal institutions of the deep state over time. The main autocratic clique of the deep state was founded under the General Staff. The CIA and the Secret Intelligence Service of Great Britain (SIS, or MI6) established a covert intelligence and armed operations organization called "Operation Gladio" under NATO to counter the "communist threat" in several member states. The Turkish Gladio was founded under the code name Counterguerrilla. Over the course of time, operation Gladio deviated from its official purpose and was authorized not only to destroy political dissidence, but also to subvert governments if necessary.⁶⁶

Counterguerrilla's official name was the Special Warfare Department (ÖHD), and it was attached to the General Staff, Presidency of Military Operations; Counterguerrilla was supported by a subterranean civilian branch called "White Forces", from diverse professions. The ÖHD operated under four other names – Tactical Mobilization Council (*Seferberlik Tetkik Kurulu*) between 1952 and 1967, ÖHD between 1967 and 1991, Special Forces Command (*Özel Kuvvetler Komutanlığı*) from 1991 to 1994, and Special Forces (*Özel Kuvvetler*) from 1994.⁶⁷ In the 1950s, autocratic cliques comprised the leadership of the ÖHD and the National Security Service (MEH), the predecessor of the National Intelligence Organization (MİT). During the Cold War, the ÖHD closely cooperated with the CIA. JAMMAT was renamed to The Joint US Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JUSMMAT) in 1958. Up until 1974, the JUSMMAT financed ÖHD.⁶⁸

Tense relations with Greece over Cyprus paved the way for the first large-scale operation of the autocratic cliques. After the rejection of Greece's proposal to the UN for the "self-determination" of Cyprus, the National Organization of Cypriot Struggle (EOKA) began attacks on the British administration in Cyprus to unite the island with Greece. Britain called for a Tripartite Conference with Greece and Turkey in London in August 1955. The last two days of the London Conference (August 29 to September 7, 1955) witnessed a pogrom in Istanbul. The MEH collaborated with the ÖHD (then named the Tactical Mobilization Council) in launching a psychological campaign about a possible attack on the Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriots. The irredentist "Cyprus is Turkish" Association, the National Federation of Turkish Students, and some trade unions supported by the DP party organization were prepared and organized by the Tactical Mobilization Council for riot. As a result of the manipulative news from mainstream dailies about the bombing of the Turkish consulate and the birthplace of Atatürk in Salonica, the Greek minority in Istanbul was attacked between September 6–7. In the aftermath, the majority of the Greeks in Istanbul left the country.⁶⁹

The Cyprus question paved way for the collaboration of the MİT with organized crime. The ÖHD established the clandestine Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) as a "junior" Turkish Gladio in Cyprus in 1958 to counter the EOKA activities for uniting the island with Greece. The arms supply to the TMT was carried out by the Ministry of Defense without the knowledge of the JUSMMAT. As the arms transfer to the island was blocked in international waters, the ÖHD contacted arms smugglers for this task. The then chief of a smuggler gang, Alaattin Çakıcı, who was subcontracted by the MİT in the late 1950s, would become a prominent mafia boss in the deep state in the 1990s.⁷⁰ It must be noted, however, that the self-sustaining and overtly political relations of the "modern gangs" to the deep state dates back to the 1970s.

The critical juncture between 1945 and 1947 had a long-term impact on the Turkish political, economic, and military structure. Without the Truman aid, Marshall Plan, and NATO membership, the military might not have gathered high levels of autonomy. Besides, NATO membership also provided international status for the Turkish military. At the outset of the Cold War, a tutelary democracy worked better for alleviating security concerns of the Western Block in the Southern flank of NATO. In the absence of NATO membership and US finance, the manipulative capacity of autocratic cliques would decrease as their resources decreased. Put differently, this critical juncture was highly significant in terms of probability jump and temporal leverage. It facilitated a high probability jump, since at the conclusion of the critical juncture with the announcement of İnönü in 1947 it made the emergence of the deep state institutions highly probable compared to immediately before or during the lowest point of the critical juncture, here in 1945, when the world war ended. The temporal leverage is also high, since the critical juncture lasted only two years, but the path-dependent process it instigated has lasted until today.

After discussing the critical juncture for the reemergence of the deep state, the following traces the process, specifically the interaction effects from the transition to democracy to the 1960 coup. Hypotheses from a wide range of explanations are compared and the best explanation is given priority. First, theoretical considerations are tested for analyzing the effects of the Truman and Marshall aid at the international macro level, on the interaction between the military at the meso level and the political elites at the micro level. Second, the polarization of the party system and the economic downturn are discussed as factors behind the authoritarian policies of the DP before the intervention of the military.

For Finer, military and civilian organizations are distinguished in their discipline, hierarchy, symbolic status, and coercive competence. Thus, we should wonder why they would be subordinate to civilians. If they lack the skills to manage politics and legitimacy from people to their intervention, they would obey civilians.⁷¹ Huntington suggested that a coherent ideological basis and a corporate institutional autonomy might strengthen the professionalism of the officer corps who would opt out of any involvement in politics to preserve professionalism.⁷² But, “new professionalism”⁷³ characterized the Turkish military, whose high levels of professionalism coexisted with a corporate identity based on a guardianship role. Through state ideology, the TSK was involved in politics and enjoyed legitimacy.

In the immediate post-war era, the military was confronted with problems such as severe economic deprivation, lack of equipment, and physical fatigue. President İnönü controlled the appointment of the chief of staff and senior promotions between 1945 and 1950. The leadership skills of the “Second Man” İnönü, his high esteem among the military cadres, and the organizational weakness of putschist groups prevented coup plans.⁷⁴ During DP rule, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan restored the military’s power for active political involvement. After 1954, junta movements were founded. Junta committees were not led by higher ranking military persons; they were asked to lead the coup only after the coup was planned.⁷⁵

Nordlinger argues that the social background of soldiers, especially the preservation of middle-class interests, is crucial for their intervention capability. The “class origins” argument is not relevant if economic resources are not necessary to launch a coup and if the military is equipped with necessary legitimacy for intervention.⁷⁶ For Linz and Stepan, the extent of military factionism and the dispersion of political power between the loyal, semi-loyal and disloyal factions facilitated military intervention.⁷⁷

The 1960 putsch was neither caused by the military as an institution nor by the elites with economic resources. The putsch plans were made by disloyal factions who gained solidarity and self-confidence. The Truman Doctrine and the US modernization program affected the military at the meso-level through the emergence of factionalism. It had an impact on the rank and file, since it increased the importance of the junior officers who were trained to use modern technology, educated in soft-skills, and encouraged to take the

initiative. This especially disturbed the Prussian-style hierarchically disciplined generals.

The Truman doctrine contributed to the solidarity of the disloyal faction, since it clashed with Kemalist nationalism; the dependence on the US began to create anti-imperialist and anti-American sentiments among all ranks. Junior officers criticized the fact that large landowners and commercial groups benefited from the Marshall Plan instead of state industries and peasants. They criticized the free market policy of the DP, but not out of class consciousness, since it would harshly clash with the Kemalist vision of a classless society. As Trimberger suggests, despite their protest, the junta leadership did not plan any coherent strategy for rural reform, since they were thinking in terms of nation, not class. They formed ties with right-wing movements, and defended their agrarian interests and traditional values, not with leftist movements.⁷⁸ Moreover, the deterioration of soldiers' economic status⁷⁹ cannot be the main reason, since both the CHP and DP tried to improve their conditions; their economic level had been improving since the 1920s. Most junior officers had expectations about the DP government's response to their demands for upward mobilization. The class argument has little explanatory power, since the economic power of the military derives from its political power, not vice versa.⁸⁰

The Truman doctrine contributed to the solidarity of the disloyal faction, since it clashed with Kemalist nationalism and the dependence on the US began to create anti-imperialist and anti-American sentiments among all ranks.⁸¹ After becoming a NATO member in 1952, Turkey signed bilateral military and economic agreements with the US which aimed at expanding military bases to control the Middle East and keeping Turkey away from other pacts. Economic and political stability were conditions for the US aid. From 1949 to 1953, economic aid totaled to 225 million dollars and military aid to 305 million dollars. From 1954 to 1962, the economic aid totaled to 867.5 million dollars and the military aid totaled to 1,55 billion dollars. After 1952, the aid was delivered as grants; after 1954, they were channeled to imports rather than investments and to aid in kind rather than cash.⁸²

The electoral victory of the DP brought about a polarization between the two parties, since the election results enflamed the deep-seated fears of the CHP about the "Islamic revival," which can be traced back to the "cultural and psychological alienation between the center and the periphery".⁸³ The transition to democracy made Islamic symbols reappear in public from the 1950s onwards, with mosques and saints' tombs (*türbe*), and religious schools (*imam hatip*) to educate preachers and prayer leaders. Religious orders (*tarikât*) and congregations (*cemaat*) went public and began to take part in politics. The DP policies were blamed by the military and the CHP for feeding the Islamist threat.

However, as Cizre argued, the DP operated within the context of market capitalism and Kemalist étatism; neither was a threat to the state. The DP pragmatically appealed to religious sentiments and gave a legitimate space for

cultural traditional demands of its constituency. It did not establish patron-client ties with religious orders as the "Islamic revival" thesis suggests. On the other hand, the state used Islam extensively for anti-communist propaganda.⁸⁴ Moreover, Islamist sections embraced Westernism and sought protection as shown in the demand of the religious conservative political parties (e.g. the Nation Party under Fevzi Çakmak) for constitutional protection.⁸⁵

The legitimacy of the regime was undermined as its efficiency was challenged by economic failures.⁸⁶ The DP abolished all taxes on agriculture in order to please landowners and peasants. Parochialism and log-rolling replaced elitist corporatism. A new middle class of traders, instead of productive enterprise, was encouraged, and over half of individual savings was invested in real estate. State resources were invested mainly in infrastructure. As peasants made up 77 percent of the people and produced 40 percent of the GNP, inflation rose rampantly.⁸⁷ With the Marshall Plan tractors, agricultural productivity boomed from 1950 to 1954, but it forced the sharecroppers to leave the villages and settle permanently in the squatter towns of big cities as unskilled laborers. By the end of the 1950s, the mass labor migration increased the population of the cities by 10 percent a year. Despite the boom, in 1960 external debt rose to 1,5 billion US dollars, a quarter of the GNP, due to the high imports of machinery and material, and the decision not to tax the rich landowners and substantial farmers whose income exceeded one fifth of the GDP but paid 2 percent of the total tax revenue. The government borrowed from the Central Bank which meant printing extra money, hence, inflation rose; the National Defense Law of 1940 was revived to control prices, but it only revived the black market. In 1958, the first of many IMF packages followed suit with devaluation of the currency, debt rescheduling, and the raising of prices.⁸⁸

Inside the DP, opposition started to grow not only due to the economic downturn but also due to the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of Menderes, supported by extensive powers of the government derived from the majoritarian election system. After the 1954 elections, the horizontal control of power holders was damaged in favor of the executive, when the government took measures to purge dissidents in the military, judiciary, civil bureaucracy, universities, and the press. Menderes did not tolerate any criticism and used the military against protestors. The party was a collage of diverse sections of society, which made it prone to split when there were major internal disagreements. The economic downturn coupled with the restrictive legislation caused a split in the party; the liberal wing split from the party in 1955.⁸⁹

Increasingly after 1955, in a vicious circle, as the polarization between the CHP and the DP escalated, the DP resorted to authoritarian tendencies to cope with its own insecurity.⁹⁰ The polarization between the center and the periphery was "corrected" by the military through a coup. Despite the fact that the CHP gathered more votes and representatives in the parliament after 1957 elections, the Committee of National Unity (MBK) of colonels, majors,

and captains, headed by General Cemal Gürsel, overthrew the government on May 27, 1960.

Military autonomy (1950–60)

The professional sphere comprises the categories of military doctrine and education, force levels, military reform, and junior level personnel decisions. Professional autonomy does not immediately pose a threat to civilian supremacy, but it might strengthen the military's political assertiveness,⁹¹ particularly if an official ideology is lodged in military doctrine and education. The Turkish Armed Forces was the guardian and conveyor of state ideology. The military not only transferred Kemalism to military cadres, but also expanded it to the whole society. From the outset of the multi-party system, Kemalism called the general drift of society the "Western-national-secular state-society" and it became a common denominator that penetrated all schools of Turkish political thought.⁹² It has not been possible for any political party of any political persuasion to hold power without referring in one way or another to Kemalism. As a pragmatic ideology devoid of an integral epistemology and method, Kemalism proved to be flexible and easy to integrate into diverse political thoughts.⁹³ The autonomy level in military education and doctrine was very high.

The military aid and reform was undertaken according to "the Law on the US Aid to Greece and Turkey" which stipulated large-scale modernization reforms, decreased the number of private soldiers, and guaranteed financial aid for the economic recovery of Turkey. These improved the career prospects of the junior levels. Due to the dependence on external aid, the level of autonomy with respect to force levels, military reform, and junior level personnel decisions was low. The level of autonomy in this sphere was middle in the 1950s.

The professional-political sphere comprises the categories of the organization of defense, senior promotions, military budgets, arms production and procurement. With respect to the first category, the General Staff and all national defense agencies were subordinated to the Ministry of Defense in 1949, largely due to the American Aid Agreement, which obliged the civilian administration to meet the agreement.⁹⁴ However, this subordination could not establish democratic control. The military autonomy level in the organization of defense was high.

With regard to senior promotions, the Menderes government purged high command members, whose opposition to the party was suspected, in a comprehensive and fast operation of retirement in the aftermath of the DP's electoral victory in 1950. However, this operation was not aimed at initiating a generational change, but at guaranteeing obedience to the DP. Junior officers tried to persuade the government for such change, but the generals were successful in subordinating the government to their will. Senior promotions were a result of power relations between major cliques within the military

rather than of merit or the will of the government. Therefore, the generals were not willing to change the parameters that would jeopardize their future prospects.⁹⁵ The level of autonomy in senior promotions was middle.

The Truman Aid made military budgets as well as arms production and procurement largely dependent on the US. The level of autonomy in these categories was low. Part of the military aid, in the form of military information and equipment, was foreseen as being delivered as a grant. On the other hand, the fourth paragraph of the Truman Aid Agreement stipulated that the TSK could not possess or endorse any other munitions or equipment without the permission of the US authorities. Moreover, the usage of these items outside the permitted sites and purposes were not allowed.⁹⁶ The overall level of autonomy in the professional-political sphere was middle in the 1950s.

The political-judicial sphere of military autonomy comprises the following categories: internal security, intelligence gathering, and judicial prosecution. Internal security is a reserved domain of the military that can be defined as specific areas of governmental authority that are occupied by the military and governed by the military's self-defined rules, guidelines, goals and missions.⁹⁷ The study of this category will be supported by an analysis of the post of president and the gendarmerie, which served as significant pillars in this category.

The institutional arrangements regarding the ÖHD in the General Staff after NATO membership were treated as the reserved domain of the military. It was out of the scope of the governmental authority and parliamentary oversight. The post of president symbolized the perseverance of Atatürk's secular legacy. After the 1950 elections, Celal Bayar became the president. He was convicted to death during the Yassıada trials following the 1960 coup, but was not executed due to his old age. The gendarmerie was established in 1839 according to the French model. It was situated in "a semi-military grey zone between the General Staff and the Ministry of Internal Affairs"⁹⁸ which often led to confusion as to its zone of duty and, hence, to a serious conflict between the police and the gendarmerie in gathering intelligence. In the period from transition to democracy to 1960 coup, civilian oversight of the gendarmerie was largely absent. The overall level of military autonomy in this category was high.

The intelligence agency, MEH, was found as a successor to the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* in 1927. It did not have a legal base of operation until the foundation of its successor, MİT, in 1965. Its personnel were hired under the staff of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The first chief of the MEH was an officer who worked for NATO, Major General Behçet Türkmen. Unlike the Gladio in France, Portugal, and Holland, the ÖHD was not established by the intelligence agency; instead the Turkish Gladio was subordinated to the General Staff. However, its leading cadres were recruited from the intelligence agency. The first chief of the ÖHD, Colonel Daniş Karabelen, was trained in the tradition of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* and worked for the MEH. The CIA chief, Dulles, entrusted ex-Nazi officers Reinhard Gehlen, Walter Rauff, Otto Skorzeny, Klaus Barbie, and Dr. Joseph Mengele

with the training of the future Gladio armies in the Unconventional Warfare Department camps of the US, where military officers of the MEH were sent. Karabelen, Turgut Sunalp and ultra-nationalist officers were among the first trainees, such as the pan-Turanian, Colonel Alparslan Türkeş, from the radical wing of the MBK, who propagated a reunion of Turks in the Soviet Union under Turkey. Officer Faik Türein from the military and Fuat Doğu from the MEH followed them. They played major roles in future deep state politics. Before key covert operations, the ÖHD exchanged its staff with the MEH.⁹⁹ The level of military autonomy in this category was high.

The Janus-headed judiciary in Turkey is reflected in the coexistence of civil and military courts. The military's judicial autonomy was legally secured under the Law of Military Criminal Procedures of 1930 through the establishment of military courts and the Military Court of Appeals. Military jurisdiction and the composition and function of the Military Court of Appeals impaired the independence of the judiciary. Autonomy in judicial prosecution made the military personnel untouchable before the law and exacerbated massive human rights violations. The perpetrators of the pogrom of September 6–7, 1955 were released. Turkey paid some compensation to churches and private persons for damages to property. After the 1960 coup, the judges appointed by the junta blamed the DP also for organizing the pogrom during the trials on Yassıada Island and convicted Menderes and the Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu to death. The ÖHD have enjoyed impunity to date. The level of autonomy in this category was high.

Restoration through putsch: Fabricating the “modern bandits” (1960–80)

At the two poles on the continuum of strong states, the Ottoman-Turkish monist polity, an imbalance on the vertical dimension, was in contrast with the Prussian-German dual polity in which parliament and civil servants coexisted. Unlike the landed aristocracy – the Junkers – and the middle classes, who inhabited the civil service stratum before and after the Second Reich (1871–1918), the Turkish bureaucrats had their own stratum aloof from class interests and a self-imposed mission of “saving the Ottoman state”.¹⁰⁰ After World War II, the transition from totalitarianism placed Germany on a liberal democratic track, since the transition offered a breeding ground for a gradual development of a *modus vivendi* that demythologized the state and established party politics. In Turkey, on the other hand, the transition from authoritarianism was marked by an imbalance in favor of the vertical dimension. The state elites constantly undermined and delegitimized party politics, and the political elites tried to conquer bureaucracy whenever they came to power.¹⁰¹

By invoking Kemalism, the TSK intervened through two *coups d'état* in 1960 and 1980 and two “unarmed” military interventions in 1971 and 1997. Each time, after a certain interval, it reinstated a semblance of civilian rule,

confident that Kemalism would remain the political meta-language. The track record of Turkish democracy demonstrates the impact of putsch (threat) in politics. How many times after 1950 was a government replaced, without interruptions, through general elections by another government? The government was renewed 18 times through general elections and 12 times a governing political party lost power: 4 times through coup, 8 times through general elections (1950, 1965, 1977, 1983, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002). However, in 1965, 1983, and 1999, the elections were, to a certain extent, restricted, since the replacement of the outgoing government with a new one followed an interim period. Hence, in 64 years, the government was renewed only 5 times without interruption. The first renewal was from the CHP to the DP in 1950; in 1977, from the National Front Coalition government (AP-National Salvation Party (MSP)-Nationalist Action Party (MHP)-Republicanist Trust Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi*)) to the CHP government;¹⁰² in 1991, from the Motherland Party (ANAP) government to the coalition government of the True Path Party (DYP) and the Social Democrat People's Party (SHP); in 1995 from this coalition government to another coalition government of the Welfare Party (RP) and the DYP; and, in 2002, from the Democratic Left Party (DSP) MHP-ANAP coalition government to the AKP government.

Two path-dependent causal mechanisms for the institutional resilience of the deep state operated in the period from 1960 to 1980. These mechanisms strengthened perverse institutionalization. Increasing returns refers to the continuously rising power of the military-industrial complex. Negative feedback mechanisms placed the recurring military interventions in 1971 and 1980 in an equilibrium, despite the top military brass's efforts to cooperate with civilian authorities to hinder the junta activities of the junior levels, the strategies of the conservative party in the periphery to prevent a coup, and changing cleavage constellations.

This section analyzes first the negative feedback mechanism by elaborating on actors' strategies after the 1960 coup, the period of redemocratization and the ensuing constitution-making. Second, it discusses the cleavage structures, their relations with classes, and voter alignments in the process leading to the 1971 coup by memorandum. Third, the analysis of the ÖHD's strategy to strengthen autocratic cliques with civilian recruits as "modern bandits" in the service of the state demonstrates that as the Ottoman state fabricated banditry for state consolidation, the Turkish state fabricated banditry by recruiting the ultranationalist militants in the late 1960s and 1970s. Finally, this section traces the interaction effects of actors' strategies, cleavage structures and the deep state activities from 1971 coup to the 1980 coup. It tests the hypotheses of O'Donnell on bureaucratic authoritarianism by discussing the factors that paved the way for the 1980 coup and the role of the autocratic cliques in the escalation of political violence in the 1970s.

The negative feedback mechanism after the 1960 coup paved the way for recurring military interventions in 1971 and 1980 due to the paradoxical consequences of the cooperation of civil and military elites in hindering junta

movements and restoring hierarchy. As Agüero suggests, strong internal cohesion can strengthen the political power of the military.¹⁰³ Akyaz analyzes the paradoxical effects of the top military brass's efforts in achieving strong internal cohesion. From 1960 to 1980, the joint endeavor to hinder the junta activities of the junior levels gradually established the strength of the high command and institutionalized its intervention capability in daily politics, since civilian governments were gradually more willing to guarantee reserved domains to the military through constitutional prerogatives. Coupled with the growing internal cohesion in the military, this joint endeavor to restore the chain of command and prevent junta movements paved the way for the 1971 and 1980 coups. The 1980 coup was organized and directed exclusively by the chain of command that achieved the highest internal cohesion.¹⁰⁴

The top military brass's priority was to preserve military institutions, i.e. the corporate identity of officers. This aspect is referred to in the literature on redemocratization as a major reason for the military's willingness to hand power to civilians. Early transitions of the military rule occurred mostly as a result of internal splits.¹⁰⁵ The corporate identity of the Turkish military impeded the installation of a military government. The military initiated the transition after a relatively short interval in its struggle to end internal splits and restore order.¹⁰⁶ Referring to the concepts of Stepan,¹⁰⁷ Özbudun characterizes the Turkish redemocratizations as "borderline cases between redemocratization initiated by military-as-government and redemocratization led by military-as-institution".¹⁰⁸ Redemocratizations in Turkey were initiated by military-as-government, since the leaders of the military government opted for transition, although it was contested by opponents. At the same time they were led by military-as-institution, since the military saw a long-term rule as being in contradiction with its corporate interests. This mode of transition had formidable implications on constitution-making during the transitions that were neither based on *pactada* nor on agreement among elites on the role of the military in politics.

Redemocratization after the 1960 coup was not smooth. Although the chief of staff and the force commanders were natural members of the junta, the MBK tried to influence these positions. This created chaos and disintegration within the ranks. The coup officers used their power through the highly disorganized MBK, which was divided soon into lower rank hard liners and higher rank soft liners; the latter purged the former to unite these units and restore the chain of command. Moreover, the Unity of Armed Forces (SKB), which was founded as a bottom-up organization, was in conflict with the hierarchy. As the SKB approached the higher command, it became in agreement with the hierarchy when the Chief of Staff, Cevdet Sunay, became its leader. However, the junta of colonels in the SKB gained with time more power compared to the generals. As no political party could gain a majority to form a government in the elections of October 1961, the junta had to either intervene or force the politicians to accept a CHP government. The colonels' junta and their supporters in the MBK split over this issue. The generals and

the junta of colonels decided to intervene, but the politicians, especially İnönü, convinced the top brass to open the parliament in the last minute. Cemal Gürsel, the former commander of the Armed Forces and the leader of the MBK, became the president; in November 1961, İnönü became the prime minister.¹⁰⁹

The 1961 Constitution was made by a bicameral Constituent Assembly composed of the MBK and the House of Representatives, in which the CHP was overrepresented due to the ban of the DP. In order to prevent the abuse of majority power, the state took the necessary measures to maintain its power at the center. This jeopardized the superiority of the parliament, the separation of powers between the executive branch and the parliament, and the subordination of the bureaucracy to the executive branch. A bicameral system was installed to counterbalance the parliament. Through the Senate, non-elected persons such as ex-generals could become president. The constitution introduced a Constitutional Court, strengthened the administrative courts, and granted autonomy to universities and the media. Civil rights were provided a better shelter. On the other hand, it increased the vertical dimension through the administrative councils, committees, and semi-autonomous regulatory bodies that took over several functions previously left to the parties and the parliament. Another weakness was the executive organ's internal composition. Members of the parliament, or persons who fulfilled the conditions of becoming a member of the parliament, could be ministers. Giving more power to the president and the president of the parliament was designed to ensure political stability, but in effect reduced parliament's superiority.¹¹⁰

The transition to democracy was forced by the top brass to restore democracy and protect the 1960 coup. High-ranking military joined the 1960 coup, but never embraced its ideals of imposing radical reforms. The radical wing of the junta of colonels, led by Türkeş, made purges in universities and military in line with their vision of "perpetual coup". However, their ambition to prolong the military regime and impose fascist measures to control cultural life were met with suspicion by the moderate wing of the MBK and the political parties.¹¹¹ Within six months of the coup, top officers of the junta (with the support of the army high command) dismissed 14 of the most radical junior officers in the 38-member ruling committee.¹¹²

The translation of infrastructural conflicts into concrete institutional forms of party systems was distorted by the state. The development of strong bonds between the parties and their constituencies was impeded by military interventions. When the transition to a proportional election system in the 1960s paved the way for an "opening" of the party system in Western Europe, the military coup combined with the introduction of proportional representation in 1961 led to fragmentation and volatility in Turkey.¹¹³

Three unstable coalition governments were led by the CHP under İnönü between November 1961 and February 1965. In 1961, the weak popular support of the putsch was reflected in the 61 percent acceptance of the constitution through a referendum; the successors of the Justice Party (AP), the

Republican Peasant Nation Party (CMKP, established in 1958) and the New Turkey Party gathered around 62 percent of the votes in the 1961 elections. Despite İnönü's efforts, the emergence of junta movements could not be stopped. The colonels, led by Colonel Talât Aydemir, attempted two coups based on a fascist ideology that combined social reform with traditionalist ultra-nationalism and military elitism. After the first coup plot in 1962, senior officers tried putschists and retired 69 young officers implicated in the plot. After the second abortive putsch in 1963, a public trial was convened and Aydemir was executed. 160 cadets were convicted and all the students of the military academy were expelled.¹¹⁴

The AP came to power as a single-party government in 1965 and stayed only until the 1971 coup by memorandum – which was an equilibrium in the negative feedback mechanism – despite its strategy of collaborating with the chain of command to hinder military intervention. The 1961 Constitution nurtured a diversified and dynamic public sphere. However, the putsch threat constrained and shaped the strategies of the AP. We can expand the analysis by referring to the heuristic grid of Lipset and Rokkan which comprises a two-dimensional space that places the alliances of voters behind the parties within the center-periphery axis and the cross-local-functional axis (interest-specific divides and ideological opposition).¹¹⁵ As argued by Cizre, the AP struggled to secure its existence in the periphery by demonstrating its ideological proximity to the center. Since the military was constantly suspicious of its anti-Kemalist tenets, the party embraced a staunchly anti-communist stance in order to gain legitimacy.¹¹⁶ On the other hand, the CHP in the center sought to widen its constituency beyond the secular middle class to include diverse interests, such as the urban working classes. These decades were marked by steadily increasing left-right ideological tension which was connoted with (anti-)communism and (anti-)Islamism.

In order to manage its highly delicate relations with the military, the AP approached the military through a double-discourse: in the official realm, it used a secularist rhetoric; in the public realm, a softly belligerent rhetoric emphasizing personal religious beliefs and appealing to provincial-rural voters. The latter was based on the concept of “national will”, interpreted as the original purpose of Atatürkism. On the other hand, “common interests” referred in the actual politics of the AP to the will of the majority that justified restrictive measures. Anti-communism was attached to “Westernization” and provided a common ideological basis with the military.¹¹⁷ In order to stop junta movements and prevent a coup, the AP collaborated with the top brass in expanding reserved domains through the incorporation of putsch threat in the Internal Service Code of the TSK, the formation of the National Security Council, the subordination of the force commanders to the General Staff (instead of the Ministry of Defense), and the legislation of the MİT Law. They were trade-offs to reclaiming the right to active politics.¹¹⁸

The extension of liberties and the autonomy granted to universities increased political activism on the left of the ideological divide. Some trade

unionists and leftist intellectuals founded the socialist Workers Party of Turkey (TİP). Due to the proportional representation system, TİP was represented in the parliament in 1965. It did not get more than 3 percent of the votes, since the inhabitants of the *gecekondu* took their religious and primordial values and their vote for the AP from the village to the cities. Urban lower classes lacked regular jobs, but found chances for integration, since their demands were transferred into votes by local politicians who provided services to the *gecekondu* in return of political power. On the other hand, under the pressure of sustaining economic development, the AP increasingly represented the interests of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. The CHP split in 1967, and moved to the left-of-center led by Bülent Ecevit, who softened the secularist stance to compete with the TİP for the votes of the urban lower classes. But the ambiguous position of İnönü with respect to the new line and his emphasis on official Kemalism and anti-communism impeded the extension of votes. The TİP and the militant left appealed to the demands of the radicalized student opposition and proletariat. Debates in Marxist publications and political debating societies of the major universities spawned revolutionary factions such as the National Democratic Revolution organization, which attributed a revolutionary duty to the military.¹¹⁹

The autocratic cliques took part in this left-right ideological divide, which became clearer with the 1969 elections, when the urban working classes began to shift its vote to the CHP. ÖHD cadres were strengthened with young fascist elements who were recruited from the urban poor and university students. The MBK purged a great deal of opposition in the military, *inter alia* the head of the ÖHD, Karbelen, since the ÖHD was regarded as an agent of the Menderes government. Colonel Türkeş, one of the first trainees of the Unconventional Warfare Department, was undersecretary of then Prime Minister and the leader of the MBK, Cemal Gürsel. Through Türkeş, the ÖHD was provided with the financial support of the Ministry of Defense. Nonetheless, Türkeş was among the 14 men who were sent into exile due to his insistence on the military regime. The US financial support to the ÖHD continued. The ÖHD was upgraded to division status under the new chief Cihat Akyol.¹²⁰

The Turkish state fabricated banditry in the late 1960s. In his return from exile, Türkeş recruited civilian branches of the ÖHD from the Associations of the Struggle against Communism, established in 1963. Due to the proportional representation system, another ideologically oriented party, the CMKP (renamed the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) in 1969), entered the parliament in 1961. After becoming the head of this party, Türkeş organized the fascist youth organization Idealist Hearts (*Ülkü Ocakları*), which asserted race, nation, and religion, in 1968, and their members were trained in commando camps.¹²¹ These commandos, coined “Gray Wolves”, engaged with the leftist opposition in gradually escalating political violence.

Moreover, political capitalism tied the fate of commercial and industrial bourgeoisie to the state. The economy was dependent on the import of industrial goods and almost all consumer durables. The import substitution

strategy involved restricting imports and imposing high tariffs on foreign industrial products, manipulating the exchange rate by keeping the Lira artificially high by lowering the value of the foreign industrial goods, and stimulating an internal market by offering guaranteed high prices to farmers and high wages to workers in large industrial firms. In some sectors, it was based on a joint venture between a foreign and a Turkish partner; the first providing the know-how, licenses, and raw materials, the latter providing capital, workforce, and official contacts. State economic enterprises produced about 40 percent of the total industrial production. Between half and two-thirds of fixed capital investment was dedicated to these enterprises, but its contribution to the total value added dropped to one third. The access to largely government-held foreign reserves instead of productivity was decisive for the sustainability of an enterprise. On the other hand, the government was dependent on the foreign aid of the US and the remittances of the migrants in Europe.¹²²

The military was the major Turkish partner and entrepreneur in the new industries. The political autonomy of the TSK underpinned an increasing returns mechanism pertaining to its economic corporate interests. In 1961, the Army Mutual Trust Fund (OYAK), a “military holding” in terms of its membership, decision-making, and operation, was founded. The fate of Turkish private entrepreneurs was tied to the state and to joint ventures with the OYAK. Through the OYAK, the military played a pivotal role in shaping the import substitution period between 1960 and 1980 and later in the (neo-)liberal financial capital accumulation strategy. It ranked among the five largest holdings in Turkey through the distribution of low interest rate credits, subventions, and privileges in state procurement projects.¹²³

The state remained as the primary entrepreneur with infrastructural investments in rural areas. The siege of bureaucracy by the changing cadres of incumbent governments and the political uncertainty made businesses search for short-term profits rather than long-term industrial investments. In the shadow of the main stable determinant, the state, highly flexible, multi-sector family holdings could sustain their existence. Koç and Sabancı holdings in Istanbul grew due to more than 20 years of state-controlled politics of import substitution. The associational organization of the Istanbul capital developed rather late, through the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSİAD) that was established in 1971.¹²⁴

The 1961 Constitution was instrumental in the emergence of the labor movement, since it guaranteed the right to strike and collective bargaining. Due to the protection from international competition in the 1960s, real wages in the industry rose by around 50 percent and agricultural goods were guaranteed high prices. The Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (TÜRK-İŞ) tried mainly to establish good relations with governments and improve wages. The working class was divided between a minority of the workers in large industrialized firms and a large proportion of unorganized workforces in small firms. Trade unions became a part of the ideological competition after 1967, when some trade unions from TÜRK-İŞ, led by members from the TİP,

founded the Revolutionary Confederation of Trade Unions (DİSK).¹²⁵ As Lipset and Rokkan reminds us, the priority of pre-industrial cleavages over class consciousness is detrimental for workers' organizational power.¹²⁶ The rural ties of the urban lower classes impeded the alignment of workers' votes behind the TİP. The working class substituted their lack of organizational coherence with a political ally, the CHP.

Contrary to the expectations of the AP, the emphasis on anti-communism and order failed to make the AP an ally of the military; it could not even neutralize the military. Instead, the AP was seen as one of the main rival power centers against the military.¹²⁷ Coupled with the increased autonomy of the military through the National Security Council and other constitutional amendments, the policies provoked junta movements led by leftist Kemalists and their contenders. The Marxist writers gathered around the journals called *Yön* (Direction) and *Devrim* (Revolution) cooperated with junior officers in their plan for a leftist revolution through a coup. They were in contact with another junta led by the army chief of staff and the air force chief of staff. The latter defined themselves as the heirs of the 1960 coup against the AP and collaborated with some of the instigators of this coup.

In line with its policy of appeasement, the AP refrained from taking any measures to purge the explicitly known junta members through retirement or to invoke the internal disciplinary measures of the TSK. This strategy proved to be a grave mistake. The former Chief of Staff, Cevdet Sunay, was elected as President in 1966. Sunay and the Chief of Staff Memduh Tağmaç defended the maintenance of the civilian constitutional order, but were rather passive and a minority in the military. If Demirel had actively dealt with these junta movements, President Sunay, in line with his implicit consensus with the AP to collaborate in finding a balance with the TSK, could have cooperated in the purge of junta members. Especially given the factionism within the military and the Marxist line of some junta movements which fell out of the Kemalist premises, the tide of politics could have been turned in favor of the AP. Moreover, the policy of appeasement legitimized those groups inside the CHP and AP who supported military interventions.¹²⁸

Political violence escalated with the murder of the leftist student leader Taylan Özgür at Beyazıt Square in 1969, which was a turning point for the armed radicalization of both left and right. Violence on the streets gave impetus to the junta movements to set the dates for realizing their coup. The MİT was informed that junior officers, supported by pro-Soviet leftist intellectuals, planned to launch the coup on March 9, 1971. This attempt was prevented on March 12, 1971 with the memorandum of senior officers with the cooperation of the Chief of the Army, Faruk Gürler, who had already made contact with another leftist Kemalist junta, but decided to make a counter-putsch. President Sunay knew about the intervention, but did not inform Demirel. The memorandum was directed against the AP government to restore order and built a technocratic government; Demirel resigned, and the government was formed.¹²⁹

The negative feedback mechanism boosted the repressive powers of the deep state. Martial law was proclaimed in 11 provinces and all big cities, which became a witch hunt against the leftists and liberals. With the help of the AP, the government made wide-ranging amendments to the constitution to curb civil liberties and to end the autonomy of universities and the media. Special State Security Courts were established and tried over 3000 people up until 1976 when they were closed.¹³⁰ The commander of the First Army, an anti-communist Korean War veteran Faik Türein, and Lieutenant General Turgut Sunalp, among the first officers trained in the Irregular Warfare Camps of the US, conducted interrogations through torture, and extrajudicial executions. Türein launched interrogations in Villa Ziverbey in Istanbul. Brigadier General Memduh Ünlütürk, working under Sunalp, who was reporting to Türein, led these interrogations of alleged members of the junta of March 9 (*inter alia*, colonel Talat Turhan, journalists İlhan Selçuk, Çetin Altan, Mümtaz Soysal, Uğur Mumcu, and intellectuals Murat Belge, Azra Erhat, and Doğan Avcıoğlu). These people, who were interrogated by the Counterguerilla, were among the first persons to disclose it.¹³¹

After the coup-by-communicé, a “cabinet above parties” was formed by technocrats outside the parliament, supported by the members of three leading parties, including the AP. The AP shifted from its strategy based on a double-discourse to full cooperation with the interim governments in restricting constitutional rights and to a hawkish support of the military, provoking it against the CHP. This strategy of weakening the left against the state was directed at subverting the communist threat and creating favorable conditions for effective and strong AP single-party governments. The AP interpreted the crisis of civilian politics as a product of power politics and blamed the efforts of the “communist” left and (Kurdish) “separatists” to overthrow the regime, whereas the CHP interpreted the crisis as a result of the socio-economic grievances of the people and their deprivation from civil rights guaranteed by the 1961 Constitution.¹³²

The AP split as political Islam was organized in the National View Organization (*Milli Görüş*) under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, who gathered significant support from the Sufi order, especially the Naqshbandi order. The splinter group blamed the AP for serving the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie and foreign capital. The foundation of the National Order Party (MNP) in 1969 was also influenced by the transition from a plurality election system to proportional representation in the 1961 elections.¹³³ The MSP was founded in 1972 as a successor to the MNP after its ban. In the 1973 elections, 15 percent of AP votes went to the MSP and MHP, representatives of the political Islam and the far-right respectively. The votes of the middle and lower classes on the right ideological divide, who felt culturally and economically deprived, were partially dissociated from the AP.¹³⁴

At this point, Turkish Islamism must be distinguished from other Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa. First, the basic agents and carriers of political Islam in the Ottoman Empire were bureaucrats. Furthermore,

unlike its counterparts in the Middle East and North Africa, Kemalists deprived the *ulema* of its power base. Second, the long established Sufi tradition greatly hindered the radicalization of Islam. The Naqshbandi order that penetrated political parties, the intellectual realm, and the Anatolian capital always had a harmonious attitude toward secularism and state. Third, until recently, Islamism in Turkey was not influenced by the Islamist movements elsewhere; it had been detached from the Arab world since Ottoman times. Nationalism and Islamism are intertwined and excluded the application of Sharia from political Islam. Fourth, Turkey does not have a colonial past – Islam did not become the main motive for national liberation. Fifth, Turkish Islamism has been influenced by the state-dominant political culture. Sixth, political Islam is a diversified middle class, small artisan and urban (migrant) movement. Finally, the political tradition of the center-right to mediate between the state and Islamist circles has provided a buffer zone. Moreover, the pressure of the secular segments functioned as a balance check for the Islamists and pushed them to moderate their demands.¹³⁵

If we consider the MSP in particular, it called for the application of the Kur'an in a way that was considered by secular segments to be a sign of fundamentalism. However, as Dağı argues, the social practice based on the textual obligations in the Kur'an softened this movement's interaction with the political sphere. The developmentalist, modernist rhetoric and traditionalism revealed the conservative-traditionalist character of this peripheral movement.¹³⁶ Here, the tolerance of the military towards the MSP after the 1971 putsch must be noted. Both the MNP and TİP were closed, but unlike the leaders and members of the TİP who were convicted to long-term imprisonment, Erbakan was not brought to court and continued active politics in the MSP. Moreover, he became the deputy prime minister in the short-term coalition governments led by the CHP and AP between 1974 and 1978; for religious orders this was a sign of the MSP's transformation into a system party.¹³⁷

Çınar claims that modernity provides a vague concept for grasping the impact of state-Islam interaction on democracy. This paradigm ignores actors, institutions, and context; it strengthens cultural and political essentialism. Political Islam in Turkey posed a threat for the secular establishment, not because it prevents privatization and particularization of religious practice, but rather because it poses a rival ground for legitimation. State-Islam interaction had a negative impact on democracy, as it strengthened the vertical dimension, because political Islam conceives of society as a homogeneous unit and only problematizes the state in relation to the definition of this unit.¹³⁸ The state tolerated clientelistic relations between center-right and Islamist groups, because the leadership of political Islam was tied to the state, which enabled the state to control these groups. However, tutelary powers always made it possible to break this fragile tolerance.¹³⁹

How can we grasp the relations of cleavages in the 1970s? In 1972, the CHP was led by Bülent Ecevit, who challenged İnönü and criticized his

support of the military-sponsored government in 1971. The leadership change expelled the landlords who comprised one-third of the members. This center party assumed a social democratic stance in order to catch the votes of urban lower class migrants and workers. The new CHP did not have major rivals. The TİP split over the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the USSR in 1968. It disintegrated into several factions before it was banned by the interim government. In 1973, the CHP votes exceeded the AP. The CHP's promise of land reform attracted peasant votes and the support of small entrepreneurs. Its anti-American stance appealed to urban lower middle classes and leftist students. A majority party began, for the first time, to mobilize mass support for social democratic values.¹⁴⁰

Lipset and Rokkan argue that after the commercialization of agriculture, the commodity market reflected the cleavage between landed interests and industrial entrepreneurs. Europe after World War II witnessed the weakening of "friend-foe" oppositions and the softening of ideological tensions, especially due to the solid establishment of working class parties and their consequent absorption by the system. The national solidarity experienced during the war, the increase of living standards, and the rapid growth of the middle class bridged the gaps between the traditional working class and the bourgeoisie.¹⁴¹

In aliberal societies, characterized by Luebbert with the prevalence of pre-industrial cleavages, the middle and lower classes split into urban and rural classes. Where the hegemony of the liberals failed, the market was subordinated to politics. Social democracy and fascist dictatorships emerged as a result of the alliance between an urban class with a rural class. The first emerged from the coalition of family peasantry with an urban workers' party, the latter from the coalition between family peasantry and a far-right party.¹⁴²

In the Turkish aliberal society, cleavage constellations and voter alignments hindered social democracy and full-blown fascism due to the salience of the center-periphery cleavage. As the 1973 and 1977 elections demonstrate, the workers' votes did not align behind the workers' party, but behind the CHP. While family peasantry – the rural middle classes – in more modernized regions and urban middle classes voted for the CHP, the landed elites and family peasantry in other regions aligned their votes for the AP. As the middle classes were split, the demands of the urban working class exacerbated tensions between the modernizing centrist elite and the conservative periphery.¹⁴³

The social democratic policies of the CHP, for the inclusion of the periphery to the center, offered an opportunity for more democracy due to a possible alliance of the lower and middle classes. However, the inability of the leaders to forge a grand coalition, coupled with perverse institutionalization and the operations of autocratic cliques, prevented this move. Throughout the 1970s, neither the CHP nor the AP could gather an absolute majority to form a single-party government. Their inability to forge a grand coalition gave small parties disproportional leverage and paralyzed the parliament.

In the zero-sum game, where the military posited itself against party politics, the interaction effects between the AP's strategy to appease the military

and the policy of the CHP to find a social democratic solution by forging an alliance of urban and rural lower and middle classes reproduced the equilibrium of the negative feedback mechanism – the military intervention. In this decade, the “modern bandits” recruited from young fascist elements were deeper coopted into the deep state as autocratic cliques.

In the context of escalating political violence between left and right, Ecevit chose to make a coalition with the MSP on the basis of anti-capitalism and developmentalism. However, after Ecevit became a national hero in the Cyprus intervention in 1974, calculating that he could transfer this into a landslide victory in early elections, he resigned. Nonetheless, early elections were prevented by Demirel and his Nationalist Front (*Milliyetçi Cephe*) coalition governments supported by the Islamist MSP and far-right MHP. These parties’ trade-off for coalition was cabinet posts, which they extensively abused by invading the ministries with party loyalists. The 1977 election was won by the CHP which gained 41 percent of the votes. Nonetheless, this electoral victory did not suffice for an absolute majority; the second Nationalist Front coalition was formed on the same principle as the first.

“Turkish-Islamic synthesis” was used against the leftist opposition by the Nationalist Front governments. This vein of thought found representation in the MSP and MHP in the early 1970s and in the center-right ANAP in the 1980s. This synthesis claimed that conservative features of Turkish nationalism and Islam, precisely the Sunnite Islam, conditioned each other mutually. Staff members in all levels of the education system were changed for the propagators of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. İbrahim Kafesoğlu, the ideological founder of this political-philosophical synthesis, founded Intellectuals’ Heart (*Aydınlar Ocağı*), which defined secularism with the Sunnite, nationalist, solidarist cultural premises. The MHP used the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” as a banner in its ideology.

Autocratic cliques were strengthened during the Nationalist Front governments. The MHP infiltrated police and security forces extensively and developed into a paramilitary organization with its ultra-nationalist militants recruited from Idealist Hearts (and the Gray Wolves). These “modern bandits” conducted right-wing terror, massacres and unknown-assailant murders. The Gray Wolves were protected in their exceptionally violent struggle against the radical left and control the streets. Abdullah Çatlı, Oral Çelik, Mehmet Şener, Haluk Kırıcı, Ercüment Gedikli, and Yalçın Özbey collaborated with the ÖHD and MİT in covert joint operations. They received the generous help of “idealist” drug traffickers such as Abuzer Uğurlu and Bekir Çelenk.¹⁴⁴ Ecevit was the first prime minister to make the Counterguerilla public; he uncovered the ÖHD in 1974, as its chief asked him for finance after the US imposed an arms embargo and the Joint US Military Mission for Aid to Turkey ceased to finance the ÖHD as a response to Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus.¹⁴⁵

The effects of the 1973 oil crisis had manifold repercussions beyond its immediate blow to the industry. The European economic downturn lowered the demand for migrant workers in Europe and hence, the remittances. The

US embargo in 1975 and European economic sanctions due to the occupation of Northern Cyprus also aggravated the crisis-ridden economy which had also to finance the Turkish Cypriot part of the island. The rising unemployment of young school-leavers and the urban poor provided recruits for the radical right and left. The vast foreign exchange reserves gained from remittances that rose to 2 million US dollars in 1973 and covered 15 percent of the imports of capital goods drained away. The invasion of Cyprus made it impossible to borrow from the European and US governments. Therefore, short-term loans from private banks to the value of 7 million US dollars, at extremely high rates, saved the day between 1975 and 1977, but dragged the economy into severe crisis.¹⁴⁶

Ecevit attacked Counterguerilla in the 1977 election campaign. Together with the Cyprus intervention, his determined stance against the deep state brought him a landslide victory. However, perverse institutionalization undermined the potential for democratization. Social groups applied the same strategies in consolidated democracies to press their demands. However, in Turkey, the actors involved knew that there were additional games in forming governments. Ecevit survived an assassination attempt in 1977. Covert joint operations of the ÖHD and MİT increased dramatically in the late 1970s. The massacre of Taksim Square on May 1, 1977 was a serious blow to the workers' democratic movement.¹⁴⁷

In order to destabilize the country, and move it towards the declaration of martial law, notable members of the Gray Wolves conducted operations. In 1978, leftist students were massacred in Bahçelievler. Kırıcı and Gedikli were convicted because of the Bahçelievler massacre; Kırıcı was later involved in the murder of the DİSK leader Kemal Türkler in 1980. The Gray Wolves were the main gunmen of the massacre of Alevites in Kahramanmaraş in 1978. After this massacre, Ecevit declared martial law in 13 cities, which he had long resisted. Some of the members of the parliament resigned due to the rising repression in the Southeast during the martial law that expanded and continued until the 1980 coup. Moreover, the vice public prosecutor of Ankara, Doğan Öz, who wrote a report on the Counterguerilla and its covert operations, was assassinated in 1978. In 1979, journalist Abdi İpekçi, who was an effective voice of the peaceful settlement of political conflicts, was murdered. His murderer, Mehmet Ali Ağca from Idealist Hearts (who later attempted to assassinate the Pope John Paul II in 1981), escaped from one of the most strictly protected military prisons of the time.¹⁴⁸

With political polarization escalating, personal rivalry between Ecevit and Demirel increased to unprecedented levels after Ecevit formed a minority government in 1978 by giving cabinet posts to the defectors from the AP. Demirel even refused to call him prime minister.¹⁴⁹ The government faced a huge debt crisis and was forced to make concessions and began negotiations regarding new credits from the IMF. However, even this could not relieve the economic, social, and political turmoil, because Ecevit was indecisive in choosing between more étatist and liberal policies. He opted instead for

encouraging exports and tightening belts by decreasing consumption. The immediate consequence of this policy was an electoral loss for the CHP in 1979. The positive effects of this policy as a source of economic relief were felt in the 1980s.¹⁵⁰

Ecevit lost his majority after the Senate elections in 1979 and had to resign. From 1979 to September 1980, three issues impeded a grand coalition. Demirel wanted to give more authority to the commanders of martial law through the legislation on the state of emergency and State Security Courts. He also wanted constitutional amendments enabling the election of the president by public vote. The inability to resolve these disputes impeded legislation. In this period, early elections became a highly important issue for the AP, which expected a single-party government, but this suggestion was not accepted by the CHP. The early elections were considered to be a magic formula by Demirel, since it could be a countermeasure to prevent the approaching steps of the coup and give them the chance to change the constitution for presidential elections. Deadlock and paralysis during the presidential elections in 1980 proved the incapability of the parliament to elect the successor to Korutürk.¹⁵¹

Demirel founded a minority government in 1979 and made full compliance with the IMF proposals its primary task. The January 24, 1980, measures engineered by Turgut Özal, deputy prime minister for economic affairs, went beyond the desired austerity plan. The 1980 coup conducted by the most senior generals of the TSK guaranteed the stability required for implementing these structural changes for fulfilling the requirements of the liberal market. At this point, O'Donnell's argument on the bureaucratic-authoritarian (BA) character of the regime after the 1980 coup can be tested.¹⁵²

In his work, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in the South American Politics*,¹⁵³ O'Donnell traces bureaucratic authoritarianism back to dependent development in the global capitalist economy, particularly to import substitution industrialization. Regime change follows in three stages. Dependent development begins with the deepening of industrialization, from the production of simple consumer goods to the manufacturing of intermediate and capital goods in the earlier stages of deepening. Then, crisis erupts due to inflation, foreign exchange shortage, balance of payment problems and saturated domestic demand. The popular sector is politically activated in the early stages of this deepening. Transition to more advanced capital goods is introduced to counter the crisis. In the second stage, market-oriented policies and foreign investment are implemented. Strikes and protests that began during the economic crisis fuel political turmoil; and thus the technocratic role of the state and the private sector grows. In the third stage, the technocrats and the military make an alliance and form a coup coalition, and in this way a repressive bureaucratic-authoritarian regime is installed.¹⁵⁴

O'Donnell identifies BA as a type of capitalist state which aims at sustaining the effectiveness and reproduction of certain unequal relations between dominant and dominated social classes. In this state, "government is the apex

of the state apparatus, and the regime is the network of routes that lead to it".¹⁵⁵ Thus, BA has been regarded both as a regime type and a type of state. As a regime type, it is found under military regimes led mostly by a non-charismatic junta leadership which installs this type of regime and legitimizes it by calling for national security, modernization, and law and order.¹⁵⁶

The evidence suggests that this model cannot be extended to Turkey. Scholars who criticized this model referred to BA as both a regime and a state type. They pointed out its economic reductionism: they claimed that not all similar types of economic crises lead to BA; industrialization was not a common crucial determinant for its emergence; and the deepening of industrialization cannot be an explanatory variable.¹⁵⁷

The process leading to the 1980 coup is similar to the three stages of BA: dependent development was reflected in the deepening of industrialization through import substitution; the economic crisis and the "internal threat" posed by strikes and protests fueled crisis and political turmoil followed by a coup coalition of technocrats and the military. However, this crisis did not lead to BA. First, the Turkish military refrained from installing military regimes. Second, in the presence of the deep state, this type of regime was redundant, since the putsch would restore the deep state and increase repression; after installing democracy, putsch threat and reserved domains would constrain the decision-making capacities of the government, political parties, and the parliament. Third, unlike Argentina (1966–73, 1976–83), Brazil (1964–85), and Chile (1973–90), the Turkish military's economic power is derived from its political power, which is closely linked to the state ideology – economic reductionism would therefore hinder an understanding the Turkish deep state.

O'Donnell later revised his model and suggested that the transnationalization of production, instead of the deepening of industrialization, is the explanatory variable.¹⁵⁸ Unlike the above-mentioned Latin American countries, the beginnings of the transnationalization of Turkish big business dates back to the mid-1990s, when the Customs Union was made with the EU. Until the 2000s, the Turkish state was the main actor who engaged in borrowing activities from foreign creditors. Due to the resistance of interest coalitions within the state to privatization, national production was not integrated with transnational capital. This resistance was broken after the 2001 crisis, when transnationalization accelerated through direct foreign investment and the integration of small and medium-sized Anatolian capital with transnational capital.¹⁵⁹ Therefore, we cannot maintain that the dependency of the national bourgeoisie on the upper factions of the transnationalized bourgeoisie – the principal social base of the BA – forced the Turkish military to implant BA in order to create the capital accumulation that favors primarily oligopolistic private capital and some state institutions.¹⁶⁰

The coup makers in 1980 did not implant a BA state, but restored and strengthened the deep state. Beneath the economic crisis lay political paralysis. Ideological polarization was deepened by the political terror of autocratic

cliques being inflicted on workers, Alevites, left-wing students and intellectuals, and on persons like Doğan Öz and Abdi İpekçi. The vicious cycle of instability, marked by polarization, violence, and economic crisis, was sustained due to the very existence of the deep state. In 1979, if an early election had brought the AP to power, it could not have stopped the military intervention, since all the political parties were seen as incapable of stopping violence.¹⁶¹ The 1980 coup was ultimately legitimized under the premise of installing law and order and ending the bloodshed. Without the prime actors and institutions of the deep state, the legitimacy of the coup could not be ensured. Heightened political terror legitimized the state of emergency and the staging of the most repressive coup in Turkish history was orchestrated according to strict chain of command.

Military autonomy (1960–80)

In the professional sphere, ideological polarization bolstered the competition over the guardianship of state ideology. To illustrate, in the 1960s, Kemalism was used by leftists and Atatürkism by nationalist-conservatives. Nevertheless, the signifiers of these terms blurred as Atatürkism was also used by some leftist thinkers synonymously with the “1960 revolution” and called their opponents “wardrobe Atatürkists”.¹⁶² In these decades, state ideology was used extensively for fostering the military hierarchy through military doctrine and education. New professionalism figured prominently in the military’s corporate identity; the putsch threat was inscribed in the TSK Internal Service Code. Article 35 on the TSK internal services read: “The Armed Forces’ duty is to protect and safe keep the Turkish homeland and the Republic of Turkey, established via the Constitution.” This law also stipulated that “the Turkish Armed Forces lay outside and above all political influences and thoughts”. This article legitimized interventions, although the military is legally subordinated to the constitution and international treaties adopted by Turkey. After the 1971 memorandum, the hierarchical structure was supported by creating an official Kemalism of the military – Atatürkism.¹⁶³ The level of autonomy in this category, which was already very high, increased.

Force levels and military reform began to be controlled by the military. Turkey became the second largest armed force in NATO after the US. This increased the leverage of the military in the force levels and modernization projects; the level of autonomy increased to high. With respect to junior level personnel decisions, the autonomy level rose to very high. After the 1971 memorandum, disciplinary courts were created and the Higher Military Administrative Council assumed more powers to impose the power of the General Staff. After each coup, junior officers were expelled and their junta movements were closely observed by the hierarchy. After the 1960 coup, radical dissidents were expelled for restoring the hierarchy; after the second failed coup attempt in 1963, the entire student body of the military academy was expelled. After the 1971 memorandum, staff officers were expelled for

ideological reasons. The overall level of autonomy reached in this sphere was very high.

In the professional-political sphere, the category of organization of defense takes precedence, since it reflects the Janus-headed feature of formal institutions more evidently. In established democracies, the armed forces and their high command are subordinated to the “line” minister in an integrated Ministry of Defense. From 1960, the chief of staff was tied to the prime minister. The organization of defense resembles a “twin-stovepipe”,¹⁶⁴ because the chief of staff is accountable to the prime minister instead of the Ministry of Defense. Policy-making and programming have been the exclusive domains of the General Staff, particularly of the chief of staff. The Defense Ministry fulfils the administrative work regarding the military estate and procurement, carries out recruitment and other personnel-related work. After the 1971 memorandum, the General Staff was reorganized to strengthen the chain of command and to empower the chief of staff with more competences. The level of autonomy remained high, but increased slightly in this period.

In the category of senior promotions, the Higher Military Council (YAŞ) gained significance in strengthening the hierarchical structure. Formal codes prescribe the chief of staff's appointment by the prime minister after his nomination by YAŞ; the appointment takes effect upon its ratification by the president. Nonetheless, until 2011, the incumbent chief of staff had chosen his successor (from among the land forces) in consultation with senior commanders and announced it in a YAŞ meeting. The appointment of Gürler as the chief of staff in 1972, and then as a member of the Senate in 1973, was designed by the military to promote him as the new president. After Gürler, the appointment of Semih Sancar in 1973 as the chief of staff followed according to formal rules, but this success was owed to internal friction in the military. None of the Prime Ministers succeeded in changing this tradition in principle until 2011.¹⁶⁵ The level of autonomy increased from middle to high.

In the category of military budgets, the information asymmetry and the lack of civilian oversight increased the level of autonomy from low to high. The Court of Auditors could not audit the military. In the 1970s, especially, the defense spending rose due to the 1974 Cyprus intervention and the US arms embargo. According to the figures of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and NATO, the average of the ratio of defense spending to the GDP increased from 3.03 to 3.55 percent between 1970 and 1980.¹⁶⁶ According to NATO figures, defense expenditures rose from 556 million to 15,831 million Liras (in prices of the time) from 1971 to 1974. The burden of the military expenditures on the GNP increased with the 1973 oil crisis and the subsequent embargoes from 5 to 6 percent, above the NATO average.¹⁶⁷

In the category of arms production and procurement, the defense industry and arms procurement were managed by the TSK. The parliament and the government left it as a reserved domain of the military; civilian oversight capacities were not built in. After the Cyprus intervention of 1974, the

foundations for strengthening the armed, navy, and air forces were established and merged the foundations of these forces. The shortage of armed equipment for the TSK could not be covered due to the 1974 crisis and the arms embargo. Therefore, state enterprises were extended to arms industries. The defense industry company, ASELSAN, was established in 1975 to provide the military with tactical communications systems and defense electronic systems. However, the arms industry manufactured low-technology materials instead of critical military technologies.¹⁶⁸ The autonomy of the military increased from low to high levels, as the lucrative defense industry complied with the General Staff's priorities. The autonomy level in the professional-political sphere rose from middle to high.

In the political-judicial sphere, the level of autonomy in the internal security category increased from high to very high. The analysis of three formal institutions guides the estimation of the autonomy level in this category: the National Security Council (MGK), the post of president, and the gendarmerie. The 1961 Constitution gave the military constitutional prerogatives through the National Security Council that coordinates and connects the government and the military bureaucracy. The power to govern was downsized by authorized bodies. Since its inception after the 1960 coup, each military intervention promoted the status of the MGK. It was changed with the 1971–73 constitutional amendments from an advisory body to a semi-authoritative body. The MGK violated the separation of powers not only because it constituted parallel legislative and executive branches, but also because it united these branches in the hand of a single institution.

Presidency. After the end of the term of the first civilian president Celal Bayar following the 1960 coup, it became a tradition that a former chief of staff or a force commander held this post. In line with the policy of appeasement, the AP opted for candidates from the military to balance its relations with the TSK. President Sunay's willingness to compromise with the government made him a reliable mediator, if not an ally. Indeed, Sunay cooperated in halting the Aydemir riots. However, this method of preventing coups failed when Sunay did not communicate the 1971 memorandum to Demirel. After the 1971 memorandum, the AP changed this policy of opting for candidates from the military. The new strategy stipulated that the president should not be against the AP. The death of the Chief of Staff, Tağmaç brought the issue to the fore. The AP resisted the election of Gürlü as a president, since he collaborated in the 1971 memorandum which was seen as the continuation of the 1960 coup. The CHP and AP succeeded in electing a moderate figure, Fahri Korutürk, a retired former Chief of Navy, as the new president in 1973. However, their success was owed to the cooperation of the AP with the interim governments and to its full support of constitutional amendments.¹⁶⁹

The General Command of the Gendarmerie. The JGK operates formally under the Ministry of Interior outside that of the police force and lies outside the urban boundaries. However, in practice, it operated under the command of the General Staff and was loyal to the military instead of to the governors

and heads of districts while performing public-order duties. From the 1960s onwards, the gendarmerie was upgraded from divisions in the 1950s to brigades and then to army corps.

In the category of intelligence gathering, the lack of a legal base of operations for the MEH was an impediment to intelligence activities. With the establishment of the MİT under the Prime Ministry in 1965, it gained legal status. All the undersecretaries of the MİT were members of the military until 1992. In these two decades, the leadership of the MİT continued to play an active role in Counterguerrilla activities and operations. Although the MİT is directly attached to the prime minister, they were so loyal to the military that they did not notify the prime ministers of the military's plan to stage a coup in 1980.¹⁷⁰ The lack of democratic accountability of the intelligence gathering community grew in tandem with the increase in the covert operations of the deep state. The military's autonomy in this category increased from high to very high in this period.

In the category of judicial prosecution, the 1961 constitution provides insights. The constitution contained a provision on the establishment of military courts. The independence and impartiality of judges were violated; since the Ministry of National Defense had the power of abolishing and amending military courts, it also had oversight over the military judges, such as suspension, disciplinary punishments, retirement, appointment and relocation. Their promotion was left to the discretion of the administration, according to an administrative record method. Moreover, the presence of officers as members in the military courts harmed the principle of fair trial. In other words, this violated the natural judge principle.¹⁷¹

The level of autonomy increased to very high due to the heightened impunity of autocratic cliques in the 1970s. Most of the massacres, assassinations, and murders remain, to date, unknown-assailant murders. The perpetrators were generally not brought to justice; and when they were subject to trial, they were mostly released; when they were convicted they escaped from prison, as in the case of Ağca and Kırıcı. The "modern bandits" became the "chiefs" of the ultra-nationalist circles, like Çatlı. The overall autonomy level in the political-judicial sphere remained high.

Notes

- 1 Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction*.
- 2 Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*.
- 3 Zürcher, "Kemalist Düşüncenin Osmanlı Kaynakları," 51.
- 4 Mert, "Early Conservative Thought in Turkey: The Case of a Conservative Periodical, 'Türk Düşüncesi'," 4–7.
- 5 Mağcupyan, *Türkiye'yi Anlamak: Zihniyet, Değişim ve Kriz*, 288–289. Positivism is not a monolithic method – it includes a variety of conceptions ranging from relativist, pluralist to authoritarian mentality.
- 6 *Ibid.*, 293–296.
- 7 *Ibid.*, 59.

- 8 Zürcher, "Kemalist Düşüncenin Osmanlı Kaynakları," 44.
- 9 Mağcupyan, *Türkiye'yi Anlamak: Zihniyet, Değişim ve Kriz*, 57.
- 10 Zürcher, "Kemalist Düşüncenin Osmanlı Kaynakları," 45–49. The republicans imported the French model of secularism in their conviction that especially Islam as a religion hinders social progress; see Kadioğlu, *Cumhuriyet İdaresi Demokrasi Muhakemesi*.
- 11 Mardin, "Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey."
- 12 Mağcupyan, *Türkiye'yi Anlamak: Zihniyet, Değişim ve Kriz*, 61–62.
- 13 Parla, *Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm*; Parla and Davison, *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey*.
- 14 Trimberger, *Revolution from Above*, 27–28.
- 15 Kansu, "Türkiye'de Korporatist Düşünce ve Korporatizm Uygulamaları," 258–265.
- 16 Trimberger, *Revolution from Above*, 68–75.
- 17 Mağcupyan, *Türkiye'yi Anlamak: Zihniyet, Değişim ve Kriz*, 58–59.
- 18 Trimberger, *Revolution from Above*, 118–119.
- 19 Özbudun, *Party Politics and Social Cleavages in Turkey*, 24–26.
- 20 Demirel, *Birinci Meclis'te Muhalefet İkinci Grup*, 144–150. The official historiography can be traced back to the speech of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. See Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları – Cilt 1: Atatürk'ün Nutuk'u*.
- 21 Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, 183, 308.
- 22 Trimberger, *Revolution from Above*, 23.
- 23 Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 185.
- 24 Parla, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Rejimi: 1980–1989*, 72–74.
- 25 Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi, Makaleler 4*, 176–193.
- 26 Tunçay, *Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923–1931)*.
- 27 Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 181–182.
- 28 Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması*.
- 29 Koçak, "Tek Parti Yönetimi, Kemalizm ve Şefflik Sistemi: Ebedi Şef, Milli Şef."
- 30 Yeğen, "Kemalizm ve Hegemonya," 61–62.
- 31 İsmail Beşikçi calls the repression of the Dersim revolt genocide, while Martin van Bruinessen calls it an ethnocide. Beşikçi, *Tunceli Kanunu (1935) ve Dersim Jenosidi*; Bruinessen, "Genocide in Kurdistan? The Suppression of the Dersim Rebellion in Turkey (1937–38) and the Chemical War against the Iraqi Kurds (1988)."
- 32 Taşpınar, *Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey: Kemalist Identity in Transition*.
- 33 İnsel, "Giriş," 22.
- 34 Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, 97.
- 35 Koçak, "Tek Parti Yönetimi, Kemalizm ve Şefflik Sistemi: Ebedi Şef, Milli Şef," 119–134.
- 36 Haggard and Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*.
- 37 Huntington, *The Third Wave*.
- 38 Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years."
- 39 Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, 14.
- 40 O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 37.
- 41 Yılmaz, "Democratization from Above in Response to the International Context," 7–12.
- 42 Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 167.
- 43 Ülman, *Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri*, 57–58.
- 44 Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 299–300; Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı'ndan Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası*, 34.
- 45 Ülman, *Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri*, 65.
- 46 Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 15–21.

- 47 Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950–1975*, 40.
- 48 Özbudun, *Party Politics and Social Cleavages in Turkey*, 36.
- 49 Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi: Sosyal, Ekonomik, Kültürel Temeller*, 148; Özkurt, “Transition to Multi-Party Regime in Turkey: An Attempt at Re-Periodization.”
- 50 Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*, 60.
- 51 Özkurt, “Transition to Multi-Party Regime in Turkey: An Attempt at Re-Periodization,” 22–25.
- 52 Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*, 63.
- 53 *Ibid.*, 68.
- 54 Ülman, *Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri*, 69–72.
- 55 Armaoğlu, *Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri*, 431–435.
- 56 Özkurt, “Transition to Multi-Party Regime in Turkey: An Attempt at Re-Periodization,” 26–30.
- 57 Yıldız, “Recep Peker,” 61.
- 58 Yılmaz, “Democratization from Above in Response to the International Context,” 15.
- 59 Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 318–20; Gönübol and Ülman, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919–1990)*, 220.
- 60 Gönübol and Ülman, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919–1990)*, 214–18.
- 61 Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 320–23.
- 62 Sayarı and Sunar, “Democracy in Turkey,” 173; Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics*, 74; Özbudun, *Party Politics and Social Cleavages in Turkey*, 38–39.
- 63 Simpson, *Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945–1960*, 36–45.
- 64 Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 278–279.
- 65 *Ibid.*, 292–293.
- 66 Ganser, *NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe*, 224–245. Operation Gladio was set up in Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, France, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Turkey, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Spain, as well as in the neutral European countries of Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland.
- 67 Kılıç, *Özel Harp Dairesi: Türkiye’nin Gizli Tarihi-1*, 14, 48–51, 116, 144, 292.
- 68 Kılıç, *Özel Harp Dairesi*, 94–96. The Military Facilities Agreement was signed in 1954 as a legal basis for the large US military presence in Turkey. With a staff of 1200 by 1959, JUSMMAT/JAMMAT was the largest of the United States European Commands (USEUCOM), headed by a major general, and also the world’s largest military assistance and advisory group by 1951. See Robey and Vordermark, “Security Assistance Mission in the Republic of Turkey.” JUSMMAT was renamed the Office of Defense Cooperation Turkey (*ABD Savunma İşbirliği Ofisi*) on May 1, 1994; today it is called the Presidency for Defense Cooperation (*Savunma İşbirliği Başkanlığı*).
- 69 Güven, 6–7 Eylül Olayları, 94; Kuyucu, “Ethno-Religious ‘Unmixing’ of ‘Turkey’: 6–7 September Riots as a Case in Turkish Nationalism”; Hür, “6–7 Eylül’de Devlet’in Muhteşem Örgütlenmesi.”
- 70 Kılıç, *Özel Harp Dairesi*, 85–93.
- 71 Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, 18.
- 72 Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 32–63.
- 73 Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role-Expansion,” 51–58. This view is later acknowledged by Huntington, see Huntington, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations,” 10.
- 74 Akyaz, *Askeri Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi*, 61, fn.28.
- 75 Kayalı, *Ordu ve Siyaset: 27 Mayıs – 12 Mart*, 57–62.
- 76 Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics*.
- 77 Linz and Stepan, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*.

- 78 Trimberger, *Revolution from Above*, 130.
- 79 Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 121–131.
- 80 Cizre, “Egemen Ideoloji ve Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri: Kavramsal ve İlişkisel Bir Analiz,” 175.
- 81 Akyaz, *Askeri Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi*, 46–56.
- 82 Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 328–329.
- 83 Özbudun, *Party Politics and Social Cleavages in Turkey*, 87, 89–90.
- 84 Cizre, *Muktedirlerin Siyaseti: Merkez, Sağ, Ordu, İslamcılık*, 94.
- 85 Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950–1975*, 26.
- 86 Linz and Stepan, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, 81.
- 87 Trimberger, *Revolution from Above*, 182–183.
- 88 Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 234–240.
- 89 *Ibid.*, 241–242.
- 90 Özbudun, *Party Politics and Social Cleavages in Turkey*, 89.
- 91 Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America,” 85.
- 92 Yeğen, “Kemalizm ve Hegemonya,” 65.
- 93 Bora and Gültekinil, “Sunuş.”
- 94 Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 292.
- 95 Akyaz, *Askeri Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi*, 66–73.
- 96 Haydar, *İkili Anlaşmaların İçyüzü (İktisadi, Askeri, İdari)*, 174.
- 97 Valenzuela, “Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions,” 64.
- 98 Sarıbrahimoğlu, “Gendarmerie,” 105–106.
- 99 Kılıç, *Özel Harp Dairesi*, 23–37, 46–48, 61–63.
- 100 Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, 64.
- 101 Heper, “The Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy: Turkey and Germany Compared,” 181.
- 102 Parla, *Türkiye’nin Siyasal Rejimi: 1980–1989*, 126–27. The CHP government in 1977 could not get the vote of confidence and was replaced by the former government within a couple of weeks.
- 103 Agüero, *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy*.
- 104 Akyaz, *Askeri Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi*.
- 105 O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*.
- 106 Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*; Heper and Evin, *State Democracy and the Military*; Sayarı and Sunar, “Democracy in Turkey”; Heper and Güney, “The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic”; Özbudun, “Paradoxes of Turkish Democratic Development: The Struggle between the Military-Bureaucratic ‘Founders’ of Democracy and New Democratic Forces.”
- 107 Stepan, “Paths towards Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations,” 75–78.
- 108 Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, 25–26.
- 109 Akyaz, *Askeri Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi*, 130–173.
- 110 Parla, *Türkiye’nin Siyasal Rejimi: 1980–1989*, 74–80.
- 111 Kayalı, *Ordu ve Siyaset: 27 Mayıs – 12 Mart*, 73.
- 112 *Ibid.*, 64–65; Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950–1975*, 214–215.
- 113 Özbudun, *Party Politics and Social Cleavages in Turkey*, 67–68, 80–81.
- 114 Akyaz, *Askeri Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi*, 165–176.
- 115 Lipset and Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, 10.
- 116 Cizre, *AP-Ordu İlişkileri: Bir İkilemin Anatomisi*, 44–48.
- 117 *Ibid.*, 38–52.
- 118 Cizre, *Muktedirlerin Siyaseti: Merkez, Sağ, Ordu, İslamcılık*, 98–100; Cizre, *AP-Ordu İlişkileri: Bir İkilemin Anatomisi*, 74–84.

130 *Deep state: Reorganization and restoration*

- 119 Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 259, 265–269, 283.
120 Kılıç, *Özel Harp Dairesi*, 96–102.
121 Bora, *Milliyetçiliğin Kara Baharı*.
122 Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 279–280.
123 Parla, “Mercantile Militarism in Turkey, 1960–98”; Parla, “Türkiye’de Merkantilist Militarizm 1960–98.”
124 Buğra, *State and Business in Modern Turkey*, 165–168.
125 Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 285–86.
126 Lipset and Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, 22–23.
127 Cizre, *AP-Ordu İlişkileri: Bir İkilemin Anatomisi*, 271.
128 *Ibid.*, 88–98.
129 Akyaz, *Askeri Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi*, 264–272.
130 Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 272–273.
131 İlhan Selçuk, *Ziverbey Köşkü*; Turhan and Gökdemir, *Mehmet Eymür: Ziverbey’den Susurluk’a Bir MİT’çinin Portresi*.
132 Cizre, *AP-Ordu İlişkileri: Bir İkilemin Anatomisi*, 118–122.
133 Sayarı, “The Changing Party System,” 12.
134 Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 276.
135 Çınar and Duran, “The Specific Evolution of Contemporary Political Islam in Turkey and Its ‘Difference’,” 21–26.
136 Dağı, *Batılılaşma Korkusu: Avrupa Birliği, Demokrasi, İnsan Hakları*, 152–154.
137 Sunar and Toprak, “Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey,” 102.
138 Çınar, *Siyasal Bir Sorun Olarak İslamcılık*, 17–45.
139 Çınar and Duran, “The Specific Evolution of Contemporary Political Islam in Turkey and Its ‘Difference’,” 28.
140 Trimberger, *Revolution from Above*, 137–138.
141 Lipset and Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, 21–22.
142 Luebbert, *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy*, 6–11.
143 Çarkoğlu and Hinich, “A Spatial Analysis of Turkish Party Preferences,” 370, 384.
144 Lokman Kondakçı, a former militant of Idealist Hearts, confessed that, from 1978, those “soldiers” were rewarded by godfathers with status and shares from the drug business (Parlar, *Kontrgerilla Kışkacında Türkiye*, 399). According to Mehmet Eymür, a former member of the Special Intelligence Department and the former head of the Counterterror Department, these mafia bosses were hired and protected by the MİT from the mid-1970s onwards, see Yurdakul and Yalçın, *Reis. Gladio’nun Türk Tetikçisi*, 79.
145 Ecevit, *Karşı Anılar*, 40; “Türkiye’de Derin Devlet Var.”
146 Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 176–177.
147 Kılıç, *Özel Harp Dairesi*, 183–191.
148 Yurdakul and Yalçın, *Reis. Gladio’nun Türk Tetikçisi*; Öztürk, *Kırcı: 5–6–2 Tamam Reis*.
149 Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 275.
150 Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 178.
151 Cizre, *AP-Ordu İlişkileri: Bir İkilemin Anatomisi*, 227–238.
152 See O’Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*, 92–93.
153 O’Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*.
154 *Ibid.*, 55–68.
155 O’Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966–1973, in Comparative Perspective*, 4.
156 Merkel, *Systemtransformation*, 40.
157 Hirschmann, “The Turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the Search for Its Economic Determinants”; Serra, “Three Mistaken Theses Regarding the Connection between Industrialization and Authoritarian Regimes”; Cardoso,

- "On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America"; Collier, "The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model: Synthesis and Priorities for Future Research."
- 158 O'Donnell, "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy," 292–293.
- 159 Öniş, "Crises and Transformations in Turkish Political Economy," 49–50. See Öniş, "Power, Interests and Coalitions: The Political Economy of Mass Privatization in Turkey."
- 160 O'Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966–1973, in Comparative Perspective*, 31–32.
- 161 Cizre, *AP-Ordu İlişkileri: Bir İkilemin Anatomisi*, 267–268.
- 162 Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, 97.
- 163 Akyaz, *Askeri Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi*, 389–401.
- 164 Greenwood, "Turkish Civil-Military Relations and the EU: Preparation for Continuing Convergence. Final Expert Report of an International Task Force," 51.
- 165 Akyaz, *Askeri Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi*, 402–406.
- 166 Yelveren, "Military Spending and Income Inequality: Evidence on Cointegration and Causality for Turkey, 1963–2007," 291.
- 167 NATO Press Service, "Press Release."
- 168 Günlük-Şenesen, "An Overview of the Arms Industry Modernization Programme in Turkey."
- 169 Cizre, *AP-Ordu İlişkileri: Bir İkilemin Anatomisi*, 103–9.
- 170 Ünlü, "National Intelligence Organisation," 161. According to the journalist Mehmet ali Birand, the CIA Ankara Chief Paul Henze, a student of Gehlen, cabled US President Jimmy Carter: "our boys did it." See Birand, *12 Eylül Saat:04:00*, 213. Henze denied that, but Birand disproved it by releasing his interview with Henze dating back to 1997.
- 171 Kardaş, "Military Jurisdiction," 64–66.

5 The rise, decline and restoration of the deep state

The rise of state-banditry relations

This section traces the first part of the negative feedback mechanism that began after the 1980 coup and ended with the 1997 coup by memorandum, and which rose again as an equilibrium restoring the deep state. It covers the 1980s, which were marked by the rise of the deep state in the context of the transition to a liberal economy; the next section covers the 1990s when the deep state was transformed into “*the state*” in the context of low-intensity warfare and the transition to a neo-liberal economy after 1989. First, this section analyzes the 1982 Constitution and the consequences of the coup for the party system. Second, it examines the increasing returns mechanism with respect to the military-industrial complex that gathered pace after the transition to economic liberalism. It also elaborates the parallel redemocratization and liberalization, and the impact of these transitions on cleavages. Third, this section claims that the “modern bandits” were upgraded in the service of the state and deeper involved in organized crime. Furthermore, it contends that the Kurdish question paved the way for the emergence of new autocratic cliques for state consolidation. Finally, it starts to explore the cyclical process that began to reproduce organized crime and low-intensity conflict in this decade.

During the “interim period” between 1980 and 1983, the MGK cabinet immediately struck at civil rights. The military tribunals of the junta punished both the left and right with heavy sentences. 650,000 people were detained and tortured; 171 people died from torture; 230,000 were tried; 7,000 people were tried with capital punishment, 108 prisoners condemned to death penalty, and 50 people were hanged; 30,000 fled the country; 14,000 were excluded from citizenship. A total of 1,683,000 people were blacklisted.¹ Military tutelage stripped politics from the dimensions of accountability and representation. Furthermore, the political sphere was deprived of debate and contestation. The 1982 Constitution was made by an assembly, as was the 1961 constitution; unlike the 1960 assembly, whose members were elected on a limited basis, the members of the assembly in 1982 were appointed.

The 1982 Constitution extended the Janus-headed feature of state institutions by further strengthening the MGK at the expense of the legislative and

executive branches; the president's veto powers also controlled the parliament. The president presided over the executive organ. The wide-ranging rights and duties of the president were excluded from judicial control. The legal competences of the president empowered the executive organ to exert leverage over the judiciary and jeopardized its independence. State Security Courts (DGM) with military members extended the Janus-headed judiciary. DGM were supervised by the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (HSYK). HSYK and the members of the Court of Appeals were appointed by the president.²

The 1982 Constitution and the Law on Political Parties deepened perverse institutionalization. Repeated military interventions led to low-level institutionalization of the party system. The waning ties between the parties and the voters, as well as the organizational strength of parties, strengthened personalism and unentrenched power of the party leaders.³ Furthermore, the Law on Political Parties tied party institutions to leaders, so that the political arena could be more easily controlled. It was compounded by the weakness of intermediary social institutions such as associations, trade unions, and professional organizations. Moreover, the coups increased the presence of non-political resources (charisma, agrarian clientele, social capital resulting from profession or family) of the members of parliament instead of political (party) resources.⁴ Politicians focused on the acquisition of state resources. The relationship to the party became the main determinant for the role orientation among Turkish parliamentarians and the actualization of resources at their disposal.⁵ Personalistic and informal relations to party leaders replaced the importance of party identification. In the intra-party interaction of members of the parliament, the preponderance of patronage rose in contrast to ideological distinction.⁶

The MGK cabinet closed all political parties and banned their leaders – Ecevit, Demirel, Erbakan, and Türkeş – from active politics until 1987. The military allowed only three newly established parties in the elections of 1983. To the surprise of the generals, the ANAP led by Özal, a former bureaucrat of the MGK cabinet, who pursued a program of free market economy, won the elections with 45 percent of the vote instead of the military-backed party Nationalist Democracy Party (MDP) with around 18 percent. The center-left Peoples' Party (HP) gathered 30 percent of the votes. Scholars find the center-periphery and left-right divide not relevant for placing the position of the ANAP in the party system; instead, it is called a centrist and moderate catch-all party, which could absorb the anti-systemic votes of the far-right MHP and the Islamist MSP and implement market liberalization policies.⁷

Due to its nature as a coalition party and the repressive measures of the coup, the ANAP could break the power of the CHP and AP (the heir of DP), which had made up the governments since the 1950s. Contrary to the desires of the military, the re-emergence of the pre-1980 political parties after the national referendum allowed for the return of the old leadership to politics in 1987. Despite their return, the ANAP preserved its power in the 1987 elections.

It formed the governments from 1983 to 1991. Despite the decrease of its votes to 36 percent in the 1987 elections, the ANAP gained more seats in the parliament and formed a single-party government, since a change in electoral law lessened the size of the constituencies. The share of the strongest party could expand its parliamentary seats.⁸

The 1980 coup triggered a further fragmentation. The CHP's legacy in the left-of-center was represented by the Social Democrat Peoples' Party (SHP led by Erdal İnönü, the son of the late İsmet İnönü) as well as by the Democratic Left Party (DSP led by Bülent Ecevit after 1987). The main difference between these parties was the social democratic approach of the SHP to the Kurdish question based on civil and political rights, whereas the DSP saw the question as a matter of socio-economic inequality. However, this aspect lost its relevance in 1989, when Kurdish parliamentarians were ousted from the party. The DYP led by Demirel succeeded the AP and competed with the ANAP for center-right votes. Due to the 10 percent electoral threshold, the fragmentation of votes compared to the fragmentation of parliamentary seats increased. In 1983, three parties were able to gain parliamentary seats, while the effective number of parties was only 2.5; in 1987, five parties entered the parliament and the effective number of parties rose to 3.5; fractionalization of votes rose from 0.66 to 0.75. Özbudun excludes this period from the volatility index, since the military's intervention in the party system hinders an accurate estimation. As a corollary to that, lower polarization can mainly be traced back to the effects of the coup.⁹

How were the state-society relations shaped in economic terms? Ayşe Buğra refers to Polanyi's three allocation modes – exchange, reciprocity, and redistribution – to clarify state-economy-society relations in Turkey. According to Polanyi, the transition from the mode of reciprocity to redistribution implies two possibilities for state-society relations: the state might be formalized as an impersonal reflection of solidarity and generosity in the form of a welfare state, a certain type of redistribution by the state; the other possibility of state-society relations would be the state turning to a hub of informal relations based on particularistic interests.¹⁰ In its essence, the Turkish étatism never worked according to the principle of redistribution. State-citizenship relations were not formalized according to the reciprocity principle as in a Keynesian state; instead, personal/particularistic relationships, such as kinship and political ties, have been important.

The lack of a reciprocity principle in state-society relations had repercussions in the increasing particularistic relationships after the transition to democracy in tandem with the liberal economy in 1983. The liberal phase began without contestants, since the 1980 coup destroyed the labor unions and their corporatist networks with political parties. Political and economic rent-seeking coalitions between the business sector, the state bureaucracy, and the military were the distinguishing element of the Turkish liberalization experience.¹¹ As Akça aptly puts it, the established organic ties of the military with business and political elites increased the identification of the officers with the

upper-middle class. Due to their share in the economy, the military took sides in economic conflicts and joined with the upper-class bourgeoisie.¹²

In the context of mercantilist militarism epitomized by OYAK, the military-industrial complex combined the joint capital of the TSK as a collective shareholder, the higher echelon of civilian bureaucratic elites and the business elites.¹³ Due to the increasing returns mechanism underlying the special status of OYAK, this military enterprise ranked among the five largest holdings in Turkey, since it profited from the privatization of state-owned enterprises and enjoyed privileges ranging from special provisions and low interest rate credits to tax exemptions. It oversaw subsidiaries unrelated to security such as automotive, finance, energy, mining, construction, food, transportation logistics, tourism, and IT. OYAK's unmatched economic reach and political influence were telling facts about the difference in rhetoric concerning the military's "above-classes and above-politics" nature and the unpalatable reality.¹⁴

The Foundation for Strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces (TSKGV), with shares in thirty companies in defense industry, was established in 1987 as a sister organization of OYAK. Like OYAK, the TSKGV enjoyed exemption and privileges. With the TSKGV, the economy was militarized; joint ventures of OYAK and TSKGV blurred the distinction between public and private sector. This also largely hindered a non-committal bureaucracy.¹⁵ Above all, the moral hazard issue related to OYAK's access to classified economic decisions directly through the MGK has not been subject to public debate.¹⁶

During the ANAP governments of the 1980s, patronage mostly worked to the benefit of OYAK and its sister corporations, and the Istanbul oligarchy based on family business of Koç, Sabancı, and Eczacıbaşı. The government established organic ties with TÜSİAD.¹⁷ Trade liberalization and deregulation targeted export-led growth, and fiscal austerity measures were implemented through cuts in public spending and the introduction of Value Added Tax in 1985. Redistribution through paternalistic patronage deprived the bourgeoisie of a solid basis for autonomy.¹⁸ Patronage instruments included widespread tax rebates to exporters, cheap credit to investors in tourism and real estate, and the privatization of state-owned enterprises to favorites on particularistic terms. In this context, the underground economy that could not afford to enter into market relations was incorporated through gangs.¹⁹

This era deepened the distributional deterioration and regional inequalities that became a source of economic impasse in the 1990s. Özal used real wages and high inflation taxation as tools for liberalization. The so-called "Anatolian tigers" emanated from the pressure on real wages and the rise of unemployment increased the employment of unskilled, unorganized labor force of the urban poor in Anatolian towns. These mostly refer to small size, family enterprises with less than ten workers recruited from the urban poor. Özal supported the productive and investment capacity of the Anatolian capital with minimal subsidies. They made up 35 percent of the total manufacturing employment and 6 percent of the total value added.²⁰ Small-sized firms are an indicator of a high rate of labor without insurance. The breakdown of

agricultural employment was high; the ratio of paid labor to the ratio of freelancers and unpaid family labor was low. These account for economic growth despite macroeconomic instability. With their Islamic business ethics and anti-Western rhetoric in favor of a “just order”, they became the backbone of the social base of the Islamist RP.²¹

The state consolidated by upgrading the “modern bandits” in the service of the state. Here, the correlation between the rise of corruption, drug trafficking, and political terror is explored. In the 1980s, the Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) organized the assassinations of Turkish diplomats in foreign countries. Özal allowed the Turkish force commanders to implement joint secret operations of the gendarmerie, police and MİT cadres against the ASALA, since he was impressed by the operations of the CIA in South America and the MOSSAD (Israeli Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations) in the Middle East. The state subcontracted prominent ultra-nationalist mafia bosses and gunmen from the 1970s that were recruited from Gray Wolves, such as Abdullah Çatlı, Turgay Maraşlı, Oral Çelik, and Hadi Özcan. Protected by the shield of impunity, these gunmen were later deeply involved in the lucrative drug business.²²

Turkey’s role in drug trafficking dates back to the early nineteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire was one of the main producers of opium in the “Golden Triangle” together with China and America. Two-thirds of the opium in the US originated from the Ottoman Empire in the end of the nineteenth century. The narcotics industry was “nationalized” in the 1920s; the Turkish criminal syndicates entered the drug business after the 1931 understanding with the US and Britain that allowed the international monitoring of drug trafficking.²³ Until the agreement with the US in 1971, opium production was allowed and controlled by the state. Turkey had been the principal transshipment location for opium/heroin through the “French Connection” that began in the 1930s and reached its peak in the late 1960s; according to this scheme, until the early 1970s, opium was purchased in Turkey, processed in laboratories operated by Corsicans in Marseilles and smuggled into the US.²⁴ In the 1980s, hashish and opium derived from the “Golden Crescent” (Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran) and the “Golden Triangle” (Myanmar-Thailand-Laos) met in Turkey; heroin was produced in the illicit laboratories in Van-Hakkari provinces in Southeast Turkey.²⁵ The “Balkan Route” crossed Iran, Turkey, and the Balkan countries before reaching Europe, albeit this route was occasionally diverted through the Mediterranean Sea directly to Italy.²⁶

In the 1980s, Abdullah Çatlı’s international venture with Mehmet Ali Ağca and Oral Çelik demonstrated how the state upgraded “modern bandits” and granted impunity to their operations, including drug trafficking. After the coup, Çatlı cooperated with godfathers in Bulgaria. Mumcu points to the complicity of the Italian *Gladio*, mafia, and these three gunmen in the assassination attempt of the Pope John Paul II in 1981. Çatlı travelled to the US and Latin America for “training” purposes with an infamous leader of the Italian *Gladio*, Stefano della Chiaie.²⁷ His operations against the Armenian

community and the ASALA activists in France went parallel to drug trafficking, as testified by Oral Çelik.²⁸ Çatlı was arrested with heroin in France in 1984; he was transferred to Switzerland, where he was charged as a drug dealer in 1988 and escaped from prison in 1990.

The clashes between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the TSK in 1984, especially the proclamation of a state of emergency in Kurdish populated provinces, were a turning point for the rise of the deep state. The economic deprivation of East and Southeast Turkey was compounded by the repression of Kurdish (and in some provinces Kurdish and Alevite) identity. The pre-1980 political parties and organizations that represented these interests were suppressed. Due to the exclusion and coercion they faced after each military intervention, socialist and communist parties in Turkey gradually became "soziale Ghettoparteien"²⁹ that were isolated, anti-system movements with a strong ideological orientation. After the 1980 coup, speaking Kurdish *in private and public* and giving children Kurdish names was punishable by law. Speaking Kurdish *in private* was abolished in 1991.³⁰ Political terror, i.e. "violations of physical or personal integrity rights carried out by a state (or its agents)"³¹ in the form of systematic, grave torture of political Kurdish prisoners, especially in Diyarbakır prison, triggered the assaults of the PKK against the TSK in 1984. The fight against poverty in the rising urban squatters due to migration, specifically "enforced displacement"³² from the Kurdish populated provinces, was delegated by the state to charity organizations through the Fund for the Encouragement of Social Cooperation and Solidarity, to minimal effect.³³

In the late 1980s, organized crime and low-intensity warfare between the TSK and the PKK began to reproduce each other in a cyclical process. "Modern bandits" were brought to the service of state consolidation as the armed conflict intensified. MİT recruited to the Turkish *Gladio* mobsters and drug traffickers, such as Alaattin Çakıcı and Tefik Ağansoy, especially against the leftist dissidents and Kurdish militants in foreign countries.³⁴ The new autocratic cliques of the deep state, Gendarmerie Intelligence and Anti-Terror Organization (JİTEM) and village guards, were increasingly involved in drug trafficking, money laundering, and "unknown assailant" murders. The proclamation of the state of emergency in 1987 was decisive for this causal mechanism. The JİTEM, whose existence had been denied by the General Staff, became the headquarters of the deep state in these provinces.³⁵ The village guards had been paid by the state to operate as a paramilitary force under the JGK to counter the PKK since 1985. They were involved in several crimes ranging from burning and evacuating villages to tortures and killings. Some JİTEM members began to gather smuggling profits at customs of the eastern border.³⁶

In the 1980s, a *sui generis* type of businessmen emerged, whose capital was at least partially derived from illegality, specifically from flawed public procurements, land allocations, no-return credits, drug trafficking, money laundering, and fictitious exports. This capital accumulation was protected by the

ultra-nationalist mafia, whose blackmail potential created a tense relationship with these businessmen, who used the Gray Wolves to collect the funds appropriated in “pyramidal investing games”.³⁷ In his attempt to prevent organized crime and divert its capital to the state, Özal threatened to curb the mafia if they continue to operate in the illegal realm. After the amnesty law in 1985, some clan leaders in drug trafficking in the Southeast became “businessmen”. For a while, they abandoned skyrocketing profits and were satisfied with profits from fictitious exports. They took export credits from public banks on favorable conditions. Most of these exports were never realized and the credits were not returned. Fictitious exports were also used for money laundering due to the allowance of secret accounts.³⁸

Özal initiated reforms during the ANAP governments, such as the acceptance of the individual petition to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) before applying for full membership to the European Community in 1987, around 30 years after the application of Turkey in 1959. Despite Özal’s denial of any international influence, the decision about the individual petition to the ECtHR was taken after the resolution of the European Parliament over Turkey’s membership. Later, the application was rejected by the European Commission. Nevertheless, the human rights policy of Özal demonstrated a shift from the traditional skepticism about the ‘international leverage’, despite the arguments that the reservations of Turkey rendered the whole legal arrangement dysfunctional.³⁹ In his attempt to find a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question, Özal established the first contacts with the Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq, tried to open secret negotiations with the PKK leader Öcalan, and pressed for the legalization of the Kurdish language in public. He survived an assassination attempt in 1988. The assassin was identified as a commando of the Idealist Hearts. The parliamentary investigation commission into the case of Kemal Horzum, who was alleged to have defrauded the Emlakbank (a public housing credit bank), traced the assassin’s membership to the Counterguerilla organization in Afyon, but could not go further and disclose a possible network in the court case.⁴⁰

The liberalization of the political arena with the removal of the ban on former party leaders in 1987 increased contestation for state resources. The second half of the 1980s was marked by the influence of religious orders in this contestation. Political Islam filled the gap arising from the repression of political parties and interest groups and the destruction of the left. In the vacuum of formal channels for articulation of demands for social justice, political Islam assumed the role of a power broker. Religious orders were active in political parties, government bodies, public services, media, and finance capital circles; they occupied a critical role in the electoral fate of the center-right ANAP, the DYP, and the Islamist RP. The ANAP gained the support of Nakşibendi, Süleymanî, and Nurcu orders.⁴¹ Their integration into capitalism and politics, however, did not provide a threat to the Istanbul capital and the secular establishment in this decade. Business elites were also supportive of the idea of integrating Islam into official parameters. The

ANAP remained in power until 1991; its policies helped to integrate softer Islamist and traditional conservative segments into economic liberalism.⁴²

Military autonomy (1980–90)

After the 1980 coup, the term Atatürkism was preferred by the military instead of Kemalism. This period was characterized by polemics between “true” and “fake” Atatürkists; even the leadership of political Islam declared itself the “true” followers of Atatürkism.⁴³ Through the competition for ideological championship, the autonomy of the TSK remained very high with respect to military doctrine and education, which strengthened the monopoly of the military as the bearer and guardian of Atatürkism. The TSK Internal Service Code no. 35 continued to be a legal base for legitimizing putsch threat. The levels of autonomy regarding military reform and force levels increased from high to very high. The priority of the top brass was not military reform; instead, force levels were increased following the dictum that only a large military is capable of a successful putsch. The General Staff had complete autonomy over junior level personnel decisions. In the professional sphere, the level military autonomy remained very high.

In the professional-political sphere, the centralization of military authority increased the autonomy with respect to the organization of defense from high to very high. After the 1980 coup, the military hierarchy centralized the chain of command to a great extent. In countries with civilian supremacy, the General Staff functions merely as a coordinator. The coup brought all military forces’ commands under the control of the General Staff, which centralized military authority under one institution and tied the line of authority to the apex of the TSK. Each of these forces was subordinated to the General Staff. Moreover, the chief of staff continued to be accountable to the prime minister rather than to the minister of national defense.

Although the 1982 Constitution stated that the chief of staff can be elected from among all force commanders, the tradition is that the chief of staff is appointed from the land forces. The former Chief of Staff Necdet Üruğ, supported by a junta, wanted to appoint Necdet Öztoran in 1987 and to determine the future chiefs of staff until 2000. Özal intervened and appointed his candidate, Necip Torumtay, as the chief of staff according to traditions and formal rules in 1987, but this appointment complied with the will of Kenan Evren, the leader of the 1980 coup and the then President. Thus, Özal prevented the plans of the junta within the military with the confirmation of Evren.⁴⁴ From the 1980s onwards, the overcrowded pool of generals added to the hierarchy of the military and the General Staff was endowed with extreme powers. Normally, the higher an officer climbs in the hierarchy, the number of staff occupying these posts decreases. On the contrary, the general cadres in Turkey rose exponentially after the 1980 coup. In particular, the number of colonels rose, since lieutenants who were upgraded

to colonels were not retired after eight years service. The level of autonomy in senior promotions increased from high to very high.

The veil of secrecy over military budgets was fortified with extra-budgetary funds that were not included in the calculations of the state budget allocated to defense. In 1986, the Defense Industry Support Fund (SSDF) was formed a primary extra-budgetary fund that concealed the scale of rent distribution. This fund collected levies from earned income, cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, fuel, and bank interest earning collection, a share of the payments for exemption of military service. Between 1987 and 2000, defense budget covered 86 percent of overall defense expenditure, while the SSDF covered 14 percent of this spending. With respect to armaments, the defense budget covered 54 percent of expenditure, whereas the SSDF covered 44 percent of it.⁴⁵

According to official figures, which exclude extra-budgetary funds, the percentage of military spending in the consolidated annual budget decreased gradually from 17.2 percent in 1980 to 13.5 percent in 1992. However, taking into consideration the fact that the majority of budgetary sources were spent to pay off interest on the debt, it would be more realistic to observe the distribution of public resources after the realization of debt repayment. In other words, the primary budget (which reveals the amount of public funds after the interest payment is deducted) is a better source of information than the consolidated budget. According to the primary budget, military spending percentages were 17.7 percent in 1980, and 16.5 percent in 1992.⁴⁶ The SIPRI records point to an increase in military expenditure from 2.2 percent to 2.6 percent of GDP from the declaration of state of emergency in 1987 to 1990.⁴⁷ Because of the new methods of rent distribution and the secrecy in military budgets, the level of the military autonomy in military budgets rose from high to very high in this decade.

According to SIPRI, Turkey was not on the top 20 arms importer list between 1982 and 1987.⁴⁸ However, after the declaration of a state of emergency in 1987, Turkey ranked among the top 5 arms importers globally.⁴⁹ Between 1986 and 1990, the military spending on arms purchases led to a considerable rise in the budget deficit, which amounted to an increase varying from 18 percent to 26 percent of the deficit.⁵⁰

The Defense Industry Undersecretariat was founded in 1985 within the Ministry of Defense with the aim of creating a defense industry infrastructure in Turkey. The Undersecretariat for Defense Industry, headed by a civilian, managed the defense industry; the Undersecretariat of the Ministry of Defense, headed by a general, was responsible for arms procurement. Nevertheless, the lack of civilian democratic oversight undermined the principles of transparency and accountability. The role of the armed forces as both arms user and buyer had many drawbacks, since civilian authorities were excluded from decisions about arms imports and the oversight of these expenses.⁵¹ Due to the lack of civilian oversight and the rising burden on the budget produced by arms purchases, the level of autonomy in arms production and procurement reached its highest level.

In the political-judicial sphere, the level of autonomy in determining internal security remained very high and increased slightly. The estimation of the autonomy level in internal security is based on the analysis of the National Security Council, the post of president, and the gendarmerie. Since its inception after the 1960 coup, each military intervention promoted the status of the MGK. After the 1980 coup, it symbolized a Janus-headed executive and legislative, united in a single hand.⁵² After the 1980 coup, the MGK evolved into a body where force commanders and the chief of staff met with the prime minister and some other ministers under the chairmanship of the president. According to the MGK Law, their views should have had *prior consideration* in the Council of Ministers in “*formulating, determining and implementing the national security policy*” that practically entailed *all* policy arenas. National security was defined as “the protection of the state’s constitutional order, national existence and integrity and all of its political, social, cultural and economic interests and its treaty rights in the international arena against all the threats both internal and external.”⁵³

Through a secret regulation of the MGK Secretariat-General, the military was empowered to define national security and set the agenda in practically all policy issues through the National Security Policy Document that had been dubbed the “secret constitution”; to monopolize the management of (non)classified information flow; to send delegates to parliamentary commissions; and to coordinate and monitor policy implementation in the ministries and public institutions.⁵⁴ According to the only official source of information on this document, the Frequently Asked Questions link of the MGK Secretariat-General’s official website, this document is a classified document of the Council of Ministers, which is prepared by the Secretariat-General in coordination with the related ministries, institutions and organizations, then drafted for submission to the MGK. In practice, the document that was prepared by the General Staff and the MGK was approved *verbatim* by the Council of Ministers. National security policy is “determined by the Council of Ministers, within the views put forth by the National Security Council.”⁵⁵ The General Secretariat of the MGK authority to intervene was not limited to executive and administrative organs, but extended to legislative bodies as well, via the presence of General Secretariat members in parliamentary commissions and in budgetary planning processes.

The Presidency. The president’s key jurisdiction in the legislation, execution and judiciary made the Turkish political system a *de facto* semi-presidential system. The president played an important role in appointing members of the higher judiciary, who functioned as an “unarmed pillar” of the September 12 regime. Presidents were either former generals or civilians who would not attempt to challenge the military’s political priorities.⁵⁶ Up until 1989, the post of the president was held either by a former chief of staff or a force commander.

The General Command of the Gendarmerie. The basic law concerning JGK was the Law on the Establishment, Duties and Jurisdiction of Gendarmerie,

put into effect by the parliament in 1983. According to this law, JGK functions were listed under civil, judicial, military and other functions conferred to it by other laws and regulations. Formally, the JGK was a paramilitary security force subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in its law enforcement functions across 91 percent of Turkish territory.⁵⁷ However, it was subordinated under the command of the General Staff and has militarized internal security by occasionally violating the police force's jurisdiction and the urban boundaries. With the start of the clashes between the PKK and the TSK, the gendarmerie assumed more powers, since the clashes happened in provinces within the realm of the gendarmerie.

The level of autonomy in intelligence gathering remained very high. The military's influence on intelligence gathering was unquestionable. None of the appointed undersecretaries of the MİT until 1992 were civilians. Mostly, they were appointed before their retirement from the TSK. The security and intelligence world was in conflict between 1985 and 1996. The Susurluk report by the former chief of the Prime Ministry Inspection Committee highlighted the belligerence between two Mehments, the MİT chief Mehmet Eymür and the Chief of the Directorate General of Security, the high command of the police, Mehmet Ağar, who became the minister of internal affairs in 1996. Both the Police Force's Intelligence Unit and MİT performed frequent mutual technical stakeouts.⁵⁸

Nonetheless, this internal power struggle did not jeopardize the impunity of the autocratic cliques. Eymür leaked the first MİT report in 1987 to the press,⁵⁹ which alleged that Mehmet Ağar was involved in corrupt practices, with Nuri Gündeş from the MİT, and Ünal Erkan, who was later appointed as the Governor of the State of Emergency Region. Eymür and his mentor Hiram Abas were forced to assume passive duties in 1988. Hiram Abas, who implemented the Counterguerilla activities in the 1970s, worked in the 1980s in a firm that was a representative of US arms exporters. He died in an unknown assailant murder in 1990.⁶⁰

The very diffuse formulation of article 145 of the 1982 Constitution widened the jurisdiction of the military courts to *all* offenses committed by military personnel, including the gendarmerie. Moreover, the lack of a definition of military crime in the Military Penal Code allowed the span of authority of military courts to encompass common offenses as well. With respect to common offenses, the natural judge principle was violated by the provision that no military men can be brought to a civilian court. Moreover, this principle was also violated for civilians, since civilians were brought to military courts for offenses such as making propaganda against the military service. In general, the independence and impartiality of military judges is highly disputed, as they are answerable to commanders who affect their promotion and appointment. Furthermore, military judges are exposed to political manipulations, as these judges are reviewed by a committee attached to the Ministry of National Defense, which is entitled to administer disciplinary punishment.⁶¹ The level of autonomy in judicial prosecution remained very

high and slightly increased in this decade. The overall autonomy in the political-judicial sphere was very high.

The transformation of the deep state into *the* state (1990–2000)

This section traces the transformation of the deep state into *the* state, i.e. the emergence of the informal state, hence, the shift of the state to the boundary between democracy and autocracy, where the difference between an authoritarian regime and defective democracy is nominal. The negative feedback mechanism until 1997 is explored by referring to the cleavages and voter alignments, the recurring economic crises and high-level corruption in the context of the transition to neo-liberal capitalism after 1989. The increasing returns mechanism accounts for the rising economic power of the military-industrial complex. It demonstrates that the modern bandits of the deep state reinforced the cyclical process. Organized crime and armed conflict reproduced each other in the context of the symbiotic relationship between the Kurdish question and the deep state. It studies the interaction effects between armed conflict, rampant drug trafficking, political terror, and corruption.

The party system in the 1990s reflected the resilience of center-periphery cleavage and the particular salience of secular-religious cleavage and the ethnic cleavage in the periphery.⁶² Secular-religious and ethnic-linguistic fault lines had more impact on voter alignments than economic, worker-owner cleavages. In the center, the CHP (reestablished in 1992 under the leadership of Deniz Baykal) shifted from the left-of-center to a militantly secular, statist, and nationalist position. The far right MHP was placed here in the center due to its commitment to Turkish nationalism, although conservative rural and lower middle classes constituted the social base of its voters. The Islamist RP, a successor to the MSP and pro-Kurdish parties in the periphery represented the religious and ethnic Kurdish sides of the fault lines. The major center-right parties of the 1980s, the DYP and the ANAP continued their electoral competition; however, as they were deeper involved in corruption, their power was undermined by the pro-Kurdish and Islamist forces, which would become the main target of the deep state.

Cross-cutting of cleavages reinforced polarization in the party system. The urban-rural divide overlapped with the ethnic Kurdish divide due to the power of the state-controlled Istanbul capital and the uneven economic development and neglect of the Kurdish-populated areas in the East of Euphrates. Moreover, the secular-religious divide overlapped with the sectarian Sunnite-Alevite divide. Political Islam was perceived as a threat to the heterodox Alevite community, which believes in a Sufi interpretation of Islam and constitutes a minority dispersed in several cities and provinces of Turkey. In order to protect themselves from the Sunni majority, they sought protection in secularism and aligned their votes mainly for the CHP and its successor parties until the mid-1990s. The Sunni-Alevite divide was deepened by the anti-Alevite propaganda of the Islamist RP and the far-right MHP in their electoral

competition in Central Anatolia. After the 1993 Madımak massacre of Alevites under the DYP-SHP coalition government (1993–95), led by Minister Çiller, the Alevites' votes split mainly among the CHP and the DSP.⁶³

In the setting of perverse institutionalization, the deep state could punish the pro-Kurdish parties of the periphery. Party bans and the 10 percent electoral threshold led to serious discrimination in the election system: the Party of People's Labor (HEP (1990–93)), the Democracy Party (DEP (1991–94)), the Party of People's Democracy (HADEP (1994–2003)), the Democratic People's Party (DEHAP (1997–2005)), and the Democratic Society Party (DTP (2005–9)). Leyla Zana and four other Kurdish members of the parliament who were elected to the parliament in 1991 from the SHP led by Erdal İnönü were imprisoned due to Zana's speech in Kurdish at the opening of the parliament. It must be noted that the votes of Kurds were not based mainly on ethnical motives. After the SHP merged with the CHP in 1995, the votes of Kurds diverted away from the SHP to the RP and pro-Kurdish parties. The DYP also claimed its share of votes in the heavily Kurdish-populated provinces thanks to tribally mobilized bloc voting sponsored by autocratic cliques, village guard clans that were provided with money and weapons by the state.⁶⁴

Operation *Gladio* in the NATO member states was dissolved in the altered strategic and political post-Cold War universe of the 1990s. By contrast, in Turkey, the deep state became *the* state, especially during the term of the leader of the DYP, Tansu Çiller, as prime minister between 1993 and 1996. The Kurdish question was involved in a symbiotic relationship with the deep state as military autonomy escalated in tandem with the emerging hegemony of Kemalism. In the 1990s, the rising tide of political Islam, the changing tone of the PKK's belligerence in favor of secession, the first Gulf War, and the new global order in the post-Cold War era provided a conjuncture of threats which were countered by the restoration of Kemalism as Atatürkism, which propelled the personality cult of Atatürk to an overarching symbol of state-induced modernization and for the first time upgraded Kemalism as the prime ideological signifier of a nationwide political program.⁶⁵ Furthermore, the TSK's status as NATO's second largest standing army after the US granted critical tangible support. The 1997 coup (called the February 28 Process) confirmed the hegemony of Kemalism and banned the political party, which was the prime representative of political Islam.

In order to grasp the transformation of the deep state into *the* state in the 1990s, the neo-liberal transition in Turkey needs to be elaborated in detail. In the times of "Keynesian consensus" of the 1960s and 1970s, economic stability was achieved through exchange rate policies based on trade figures of goods and services. In the 1980s, international capital accumulation was based on the fluidity of finance capital. Short-term, speculative capital flows mostly determined the integration of the economies into global markets. Therefore, the IMF policies changed to stable exchange rate policies for increasing capital fluidity and for ensuring the profitability and stability of finance capital.

Unlike the former allocation mode involving production and trade, thereby including the dimension of reciprocity and redistribution, finance capital was dissociated from social bonds, as it is only related to the dimension of exchange.⁶⁶

The transformation from state capitalism to neo-liberal capitalism in Turkey began with the liberalization of capital transactions and the full convertibility of the Turkish Lira in 1989. This transformation did not include control mechanisms for short-term capital flows and realistic exchange rates. The capital accumulation by the banking and financial sectors considerably disengaged the economy from production in the post-1989 era in contrast to the expected outcome of the stimulation of savings, their channeling to productive investment and the reduction of investment costs. The average share of investment in manufacturing industries receded from 40 percent in the 1970s to 22 percent in 2001. The state regulated income transfer mechanisms for the interest of the rentiers at the expense of wage labor and peasants by manipulating fiscal debt. In this context, the flexible labor of the Anatolian small- and medium-sized enterprises was in line with the new adjustment to the global core-periphery model, since they made labor flexible, cheap, and unprotected, thereby facilitating the integration of the Anatolian capital to global capital. In the 1990s, they provided an economic power base for the Islamist RP.⁶⁷

The vicious cycle of the growth-instability crisis behind the 1994, 1999, and 2001 economic crises was mainly a result of the weak financial sectors that could not bear the burden of being a mediator in transactions. Similar prime movers caused the crises in Mexico and Turkey in 1994, and then expanded to Argentina, Brazil, Russia, Thailand, and the Philippines. First, flexible exchange rates were introduced, followed by the overvaluation of the national currency in the speculative, excessively large and liquid foreign exchange markets; concomitantly, excessive short-term financial capital inflow flooded the national currency market with foreign exchange; the appreciation of national currency decreased exports and increased the appeal of imports; and this caused an increase in current accounts deficit. The crisis reached its peak as the excessive short-term financial capital inflow left the country abruptly and led to the sudden devaluation of the national currency.⁶⁸

The significance of financial activities for the real economy rose because public sector borrowing suddenly increased due to the disappearance of possibilities for public disposable income, or the part of the money the government could spend, except the money which it spent on taxes, food and other basic needs. Due to populist policies in civil servant salary payments and transfer expenditures, public disposable income declined to 45 percent in real terms between 1990 and 1996.⁶⁹ Finances became subordinated to the external asset markets of “casino capitalism”,⁷⁰ based on speculative gains derived from “hot money”. Hot money partially stemmed from organized crime and injected into the financial system. In the fight against the PKK, the autocratic cliques of the deep state were involved in organized crime and

heightened state terror. The following elaborates on the cyclical process that comprises the reproduction of organized crime and armed conflict. It demonstrates that the modern bandits of the deep state expanded the cyclical process in the context of the Kurdish question in the 1990s.

The United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention reports that, globally, Turkey ranked as the third country in the seizure of heroin between 1987 and 1997; the first was Pakistan, followed by China.⁷¹ In the 1980s and 1990s, the highest amounts of heroin in Europe were seized in Turkey.⁷² Over these ten years, the upward trend in the illicit production of opium in Afghanistan continued; as a corollary to that, especially after 1995, dramatically rising volumes of heroin/morphine were seized in Iran and Turkey.⁷³ In 1999, Turkey ranked fourth with 8 percent in heroin/morphine seizures, following Iran (47 percent), China (9 percent), and Pakistan (8 percent).⁷⁴ The heroin wholesale trade in Western Europe was controlled by Turkish/Kurdish groups, though Albanian groups (in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania) obtained significant market share in some countries in the late 1990s.⁷⁵ The informal economy constituted about the half of the Turkish economy, 40 percent of which was comprised of smuggling. In 1998, the state budget amounted to 62 billion dollars, the foreign payments deficit to 19 billion dollars, and foreign exchange reserves in the Turkish Central Bank to 21 billion dollars. The drug profit, however, was 70 billion dollars, half of which remained in Turkey.⁷⁶

According to the Geopolitical Narcotics Monitor, which consulted both the European Union and the United Nations, the village guard clan families and ultra-nationalists in the drugs business were protected by the highest authorities in Turkey. Heroin was produced in the state of emergency area, which was strictly controlled by thousands of soldiers and policemen. Moreover, a part of the total amount of the seized heroin was unrecorded. A Monitor official maintained that the money from these seized narcotics was given to "the unofficial militia fighting the PKK".⁷⁷ Then Deputy Secretary of the British Home Office, Tom Sackville, claimed that more than 80 percent of the heroin seized in Britain originated from Turkey and narcotics operations failed because of the Turkish authorities. Rolf Schwalbe, a judge of the Frankfurt state court alleged that then Foreign Minister Çiller had personal contact with drug smuggling clans.⁷⁸ In an unknown assailant murder, the journalist Uğur Mumcu, who analyzed the links between drug tracking, state, and the PKK, was murdered in 1993.

Special Operations was added to the autocratic cliques in the 1990s. Ağar was the head of the Directorate General of Security between 1993 and 1995; Special Operations Department Presidency was attached to the directorate and was intensively employed against the PKK after 1993; Hüseyin Kocadağ was a former member of the Special Operations.⁷⁹ A mafia boss and casino owner, Sami Hoştan, testified on the Susurluk incident that Çatlı introduced him to Korkut Eken, a former member of the ÖHD, Special Forces, and MİT.⁸⁰ Eken and former vice chief of the Special Forces İbrahim Şahin were

sentenced to six years for establishing and leading a gang for criminal purposes, and Hoştan to four years of imprisonment, in 2001.

JİTEM was allegedly responsible for around 5,000 “unknown assailant” murders and 1,500 enforced disappearances between 1989 and 2008, including the Kurdish politician Vedat Aydın (1991), the intellectual Musa Anter (1992), 75 correspondents and distributors of the pro-Kurdish newspaper *Özgür Gündem* (1992–94) and its successors since 1992, Major Cem Ersever and Full General Eşref Bitlis (1993), and Diyarbakır police chief Gaffar Okkan (2001). Moreover, the ÖHD organized the bombing of the pro-Kurdish newspaper *Özgür Ülke* (1994) and the assassination of several Kurdish businessmen (1993–94).⁸¹ The then deputy Prime Minister Çiller defended the autocratic cliques in a speech to the parliamentary group of the DYP addressing Susurluk in 1996: “Those who shoot bullets or those who are the targets of bullets in the name of the state are both honorable. They are heroes.”⁸²

The rise of the deep state in the 1990s is confirmed by the Political Terror Scale (PTS) that measures the level of political imprisonment, torture, extrajudicial killings, and disappearances as major acts of state terror. The PTS is based on the coding of the Amnesty International annual reports and the US State Department reports on human rights along three dimensions: scope, intensity, and range. Scope refers to the type of violence (torture, killing, etc.); intensity refers to the frequency of the abuse over a given period; and range refers to the portion and segments of the population affected by state violence.⁸³ As demonstrated in the figure below, political terror reached a peak between 1992 and 1996. In the 1990s, the scale varied mostly between level 5 and 4. Level 4 refers to the expansion of civil and political rights violations to large numbers of population. Human rights violations, such as murders, disappearances, and torture affect those who interest themselves in politics. Level 5 indicates the expansion of political terror to affect society at large. No limits were placed on the means or thoroughness with which the state pursued its goals.⁸⁴

In the aftermath of the February 28th coup, the ANAP formed a coalition party with the DSP and the Democratic Turkey Party in June 1997. The Türkbank scandal of November 1998 demonstrated to what extent organized crime was connected to top politicians and the banking sector. During the process of the privatization of Türkbank, which had been controlled by the treasury after the 1994 economic crisis, Çakıcı made arrangements with businessmen (Erol Evcil and, later, Korkmaz Yiğit) to threaten those who took part in the public tender. When the records of conversations between Yiğit and Çakıcı were leaked to the press, a court case about the Türkbank bid was opened. Evcil and the vice Chief of the MİT's External Operations Department, Yavuz Ataç helped Çakıcı to escape to Greece with the passport of a former MİT member Faik Meral and the Schengen visa of the Beşiktaş Soccer Club.⁸⁵ When Çakıcı was captured in France in August 1998, he carried blackmail cassettes of recorded phone conversations with high-ranking




Figure 5.1 The level of political terror (1980–2013). The political terror scale (PTS) ranges from 0 (least) to 5 (most) “state terror”. Level 3 indicates extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Civil and political rights violations are widespread. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.

Source: “Political Terror Scale”, www.politicalterroryscale.org/download.php (accessed September 5, 2014)

politicians, such as Minister Eyüp Aşık from the ANAP. The so-called “cassette wars”, the records of conversations between Evcil and Ataç, followed.⁸⁶

Upon the parliament’s vote of no confidence in November 1998, Prime Minister Yılmaz and the Minister responsible for the Treasury, Güneş Taner, who were found at fault in the corruption scandal, resigned from office. A parliamentary commission which had investigated the allegations that Yılmaz and Aşık collaborated with gangs and mafia in the bidding process, and not acted against the activities of illegal organizations, decided not to file a lawsuit with the Supreme State Council (i.e. the Constitutional Court) in this case. In 2004, the parliament decided to send the former Prime Minister Yılmaz and Taner to the Supreme State Council on allegations of corruption. The Council decided that this offence was categorized under “misuse of power” instead of “tender-rigging”, and hence fell into the Law of Probation for certain offences committed before 1999. The Council did not reach a verdict.

“Businessmen” laundered money in tourism investments established on the land allocated by the state, such as hotels and casinos, which legalized drug money. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus provided conditions highly conducive to money laundering through casinos, offshore banks, restaurants, and hotels. In 2004, the US Department of the Treasury blacklisted the First Merchant Bank of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the grounds of its links with organized crime and laundering criminal proceeds; among the shareholders of this bank were Tarık Ümit, who was an informant of the MİT and a former partner of the mafia boss, Dünder Kılıç; Ağar was allegedly a secret shareholder of this bank.⁸⁷

The political terror against Kurdish politicians, journalists, and human rights defenders went parallel to the rivalry for drug money. In the beginning

of the 1990s, PKK friendly Kurdish clans and the Kurdish mafia became rivals to the deep state.⁸⁸ In the attempt to clean the market of competition, Ağar and his team allegedly killed Kurdish “businessmen” during the term of Çiller. The mysterious murders started shortly after then Prime Minister Çiller said on November 4, 1993: “We have a list of artists and businessmen who make payments to the PKK; we will deal with them”.⁸⁹ Several cliques ran protection rackets (in return for the possibility that the names of these businessmen might be “erased” from the list). These included Çatlı, Çakıcı, and a clique related to the MİT and JİTEM under Veli Küçük, who worked with the gunman codenamed “Green” (Yeşil), whose real name was purportedly Mahmut Yıldırım.⁹⁰

The second MİT Report appeared in 1996 – Ağar and Çatlı’s gang was alleged to have cooperated with drug traffickers, such as Hurşit Han, Nihat Buldan, and Şefik Karay from Yüksekova (a town near the Iranian border), in a large number of protection rackets. The report claimed that Çiller had founded a special organization tied to Ağar and administered by Korkut Eken; its members were from the police forces, the gendarmerie, Special Forces, and the MİT.⁹¹ Hurşit Han stated, in the Parliamentary Susurluk Commission hearings, that the gunman code-named Yeşil forced him several times to pay protection money. The Ziraat Bank Inspection Committee traced the transfer of high amounts by Kurdish businessmen to the bank account of Yeşil.⁹² The report of a parliamentary investigative committee of three CHP parliamentarians, Ercan Karakaş, Mahmut Işık, and Mustafa Yıldız on unknown assailant murders, and the report of the Prime Ministry Inspection Committee on the incidents in Yüksekova exposed another gang called “the Yüksekova gang” which included several members of special counter-insurgency teams and village guard contingents who extorted money through kidnapping.⁹³

The financial system collapsed in 1994 and 1999 in the context of heightened competition for rent-distribution and high-level corruption. Due to the lack of transparency in political parties’ finances and the structure of the banking system, the illegal capital was partially transferred to investment through the privatization of state-owned enterprises.⁹⁴ The investments were directed to industrial (mostly textile) enterprises, then to the media and banking sector. In the 1990s, around 80 new private banks emerged in the financial sector. Rent-distribution led to high domestic debt due to a catastrophic policy of borrowing. The state borrowed short-term government bonds, whose time limit was up to one year, for extremely high real interest rates, instead of preferring treasury bills that are limited to longer periods. In 1998, bonds comprised 50 percent of domestic debt.⁹⁵

Private banks and holdings borrowed in international markets and lent it to the state, making profits with 19 percent to 30 percent margins instead of the 10 percent they would have made if they had lent in international markets. The interest rates of the money lent to the state, just about reached the amount of the operational profits of private banks. In 1980, total domestic

debt amounted to 8,923 billion dollars. Up to 1999, the state paid 116 billion dollars and 242 billion dollars to cover the bonds and treasury bills respectively, including interest payments. Approximately 360 billion dollars payment could not cover the original domestic debt of 9 billion dollars; on the contrary, the domestic debt rose to 54 billion dollars.⁹⁶ The breakdown of interest payments with respect to budget expenses rose from 3.5 percent in 1980 to 52 percent in 2000; the breakdown of interest payments with respect to budget revenues rose from 3.5 percent in 1980 to 78 percent in 2000.⁹⁷ The annual growth of real gross domestic product rose by 3.4 percent in contrast to the 13 percent growth of the banking sector assets, demonstrating the speculative growth in the financial sector in the 1990s.⁹⁸

The 1994 financial crisis illustrates the pattern of growth-instability-crisis described above. The Treasury issued high interest bills and government bonds, as private commercial banks increased the interest rates in their competition for savings, and hence the Turkish Lira appreciated. But currency appreciation worsened trade imbalances by further weakening Turkish exports, which had already diminished after the export incentives ended due to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade regime and the Customs Union with the EU. The purchase of foreign bonds by banks led to the dollarization of the economy and devaluated the Lira. Due to a high current accounts deficit, high interest rates, and high inflation, the foreign reserves of the Central Bank declined, Turkey's credit rating was lowered, and therefore short-term funds left the country.

The IMF program of 1994 targeted fiscal austerity and regulation of the financial sector. However, the rent mechanism was restored later and caused another crisis of speculative growth and recession in 1999, in the same vein as the 1994 crisis. As the 1994 economic crisis erupted, the executive committees began to siphon off the assets of these private banks and invested in other sectors.⁹⁹ Süleyman Demirel's favourite, Cavit Çağlar, who was the minister in charge of state banks from 1995 to 1996, founded Interbank and developed it into a conglomerate. Media barons and new large industrial conglomerates of Doğan holding and later Cem Uzan, an associate of Ahmet Özal (the son of late President Turgut Özal), were products of the same mechanism. During the 1994 crisis, around 60 billion dollars were siphoned off from the registers of these banks.¹⁰⁰

In the context of fierce competition for rent distribution, population growth, rapid mobilization, and economic crisis, the party system, especially the center-right, fragmented greatly.¹⁰¹ None of the parliamentary elections in 1991, 1995, and 1999 could bring about a majority party government. Short-term coalition governments destabilized politics. The Islamist RP, which finished in first in the 1995 elections, the far-right MHP, which finished second in 1999, and the pro-Kurdish parties undermined the dominant role of the center-right parties. Fragmentation in the 1990s was caused by the competition between parties of similar ideological predispositions. Center-right votes were almost equally divided between the DYP and ANAP, while the CHP

lost votes to the DSP to the point that, in 1999, it could not meet the 10 percent threshold. This extremely high threshold, which was introduced after the 1980 coup to prevent fragmentation, produced adverse effects. The number of parties in the parliament rose tremendously during the legislative session; new parties were formed after factional splits and the party switches of parliamentarians.¹⁰²

The center-right competed in their militarist discourse against the pro-Kurdish parties. After the 1994 crisis, then Prime Minister Çiller employed a conservative strategy of crisis management based on national and religious sentiment, fuelled by anti-human rights rhetoric.¹⁰³ The dominant conservative discourse in the parliament from the second half of the 1990s to the early 2000s had an étatist ideological imprint. It included laicism in public life (a ban on head scarf), economized and stereotyped the Kurdish question by using the terms underdevelopment and the imperialist conspiracy; it also popularized and legitimized the MGK.¹⁰⁴

The ANAP, the creator of the urban middle classes and the metropolitan poor, could not integrate them into capitalism. Political leaders from all ideological convictions promised anti-inflationary reform and a fight against corruption; on the other hand, they exploited all the opportunities the incumbency offered them.¹⁰⁵ The 1990s witnessed rampant corruption in the center-right parties in their competition for rent-distribution. Parliamentary investigation commissions were formed to investigate allegations of corruption, but these parties covered each other's corruption scandals. On the basis of its findings, a prime minister or a minister could be brought before the Constitutional Court that would serve as the Supreme Court, if a minimum of 276 deputies out of a total 550 members of the parliament's general assembly voted for it. Investigation committees acquitted the party leaders. With the collapse of the DYP-ANAP coalition in June 1996, DYP deputies claimed that ANAP leader Yılmaz was responsible for irregularities at Emlakbank. Later Yılmaz declared activities during the Çiller period state secret and Emlakbank attracted less attention from the DYP.

Political Islam under Erbakan, the leader of the RP and the National View Movement, gained momentum as an answer for the urban conservative middle classes and the urban poor to the corruption of the center-right. The frustration with the center-right was reflected in the 1995 elections. The RP scored the highest votes in the 1995 elections and became the senior partner of the coalition government with the DYP in 1996. The RP did not only embrace rural, disillusioned traditional segments, but also urban nationalist-conservative upwardly mobile segments in developing regions, in which mass education and economic development increased the expectations of the urban population.¹⁰⁶ The crisis-ridden economy could not meet the urgent needs of the young metropolitan poor for identity and economic security. The RP molded pragmatism with Islamism. Political Islam, in its most diverse expressions has been state-friendly. It must be noted that the main feature of Islamist platforms has been their emphasis on cultural-moral rhetoric rather than

constructing a democratically transformative attitude towards socio-economic issues.¹⁰⁷

The rise of the RP in the 1990s was also caused by the rise of small- and medium-sized private enterprises in provincial towns, represented by the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (MÜSİAD) and the Confederation of Worker's Union (HAK-İŞ). The provincial capital that flourished during the time of Özal in the 1980s challenged the Istanbul (and Marmara Sea) capital in the mid-1990s. However, as discussed in the former section, the provincial capital reflected the solidarity principle – it emphasized conservative family and community ties, and it contradicted the formal redistribution principle, the protective role of the state towards its citizens.¹⁰⁸

Rent-distribution did not slow its pace under the RP-DYP coalition government in 1996 led by Erbakan. However, both partners of the coalition covered up the corruption scandals. During the coalition government, parliamentary investigation commissions were formed to investigate corruption allegations against Çiller in public procurements. The RP and DYP deputies voted en bloc in Çiller's favor. She was also cleared of the charges of another commission involving her assets. In return, the DYP cleared the RP in the parliamentary investigation of Süleyman Mercümeke, who was charged with directing donations for Bosnia to the RP. The committee found "an organic link" between Mercümeke and the RP. This time the DYP members effectively saved the RP members from being sent to court.¹⁰⁹

Since 1995, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International has supplied scholars an aggregate indicator that ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived by business people, political analysts and the general public to exist among public officials and politicians; put differently, the perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for both petty and grand forms of private gain, as well as "state capture"¹¹⁰ by elites and private interests. As shown in the figure below, Turkey ranked as a highly corrupt country from the mid-1990s to 2002.

The RP had a staunchly anti-Westernist/anti-capitalist rhetoric before the 1995 elections, but it must be stressed that the party was severely restricted in its actions during the coalition government. Several aspects induced a considerable gap between their discourse and the policies implemented, such as military and public pressure, international conjuncture that made the Customs Union with the EU profitable for the economic base of the RP and the US's increased role in northern Iraq.¹¹¹ Nonetheless, the RP-DYP government was subject to constant pressure from the MGK due to concerns around Islamist reactionism.

The military intervened although – as will be examined in the next section – Janus-headed state institutions secured the decision-making authority in the legislative, executive and judicial branches. Although military autonomy reached a peak in all spheres, short-lived coalitions, economic downturn, and corruption prevented the sustained and effective implementation of the policies desired by the military. The 1997 putsch, known as the "February 28th Process" overthrew the RP-DYP government led by Erbakan under the




Figure 5.2 Turkey's rank and score in the CPI (1995–2013). The scale ranges from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). It must be noted that CPI has covered different numbers of countries since 1995. In 1995, it included 41 countries; the number increased to 177 countries in 2013. Here, ranks and scores are transformed to a 10 point scale.

Source: Transparency International, “Transparency International Policy and Research Surveys and Indices”

premise of fighting reactionism. It confirmed the hegemony of Kemalism. The RP was closed, as was its predecessors from the National View Movement and the following Virtue Party (FP (1997–2001)). The negative feedback mechanism found its equilibrium and the putsch strengthened the deep state.

The February 28th Process led to the erosion of the power of the political center.¹¹² It shifted the previous Kemalist code of conduct of state-Islam relations based on negotiation and cooptation to a fierce antagonism by calling the social base of political Islam a danger to internal security; it further fragmented the political center and weakened center-right political parties, which had traditionally opposed both political Islam and radical secularism. All in all, the political center gravitated towards the state after 1997.¹¹³ The putsch was welcomed by “the militarized secular opposition” composed of the main opposition CHP and the old parties of the political center which had delegated secularism to the state, the former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, high-ranking members of the judiciary and academia, the older middle classes, and neo-nationalist NGOs and think-tanks. These circles appeal to an Orientalist modernization paradigm, which claims that the intrinsic nature of Islam is waging Jihad on all fronts, especially in politics; hence, full-fledged democracy in the absence of military tutelage is a dangerous path which would unavoidably lead to an anti-Western Islamist takeover.¹¹⁴

The coup was also directed against the new business elite with an Islamic pedigree, who promised more state subsidies at the expense of the Istanbul

capital. The 1997 putsch reorganized the finance capital in line with the interests of the media barons and generals in the executive committees of private banks, which were the main sponsors that lent money to the government. In 1999, another economic crisis erupted. The assets of private banks were again used for corrupt practices, as they were in the aftermath of the 1994 crisis. In retrospect, the February 28th Process ended mass protests over the Susurluk incident; it firstly veiled the Susurluk scandal, and then it shifted the media's attention away from the insolvency of private banks. The 1997 coup by memorandum could not have succeeded in ousting the government without the support of civil society. The hegemony of Kemalism was confirmed by the support of a wide array of organizations ranging from the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) to the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (TÜRK-İŞ) and the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions in Turkey (DİSK).

The 1999 IMF program brought some state economic enterprises and extra-budgetary funds under control. However, the banking regulation and anti-inflationary measures were not implemented. The state subvention of peasants, freelancers, and small- and medium-sized enterprises with low interest rate credits were blamed for the bankruptcy of the state. The real reason, however, was that the state acted like a money monger to its own institutions.¹¹⁵ The "duty losses" that derived from subventions in reality financed rents that were distributed to private banks through domestic debt. Two public banks, Ziraat Bank (established to support agricultural sector) and Halkbank (established to support small- and medium-sized businesses), remained as the major rent distributors. Rent-distribution (or incentive policies) created the so-called "unregistered budget costs" that these banks shouldered. These costs arose out to tax rebates and exemptions, the transfer of bankrupt private banks to the state, and the quasi-fiscal activities of the state-owned enterprises and their expenses to cover rents, such as the decrease of interest rates of payments in public procurements. In some cases, the state issued bonds and bills to cover interest payment of these "unregistered debts" and did not even register them as expenses. The government issued treasury bills in order to cover duty losses but did not register them as expenses as well. Only if they were paid in cash was it obligatory to register these expenses in the budget.¹¹⁶

In order to afford rent distribution, the duty losses were deliberately increased through a compensatory interest rate. Rent distribution through ever increasing duty losses proceeded as follows. The Treasury was obliged to cover the losses made by the subvention of cotton producers by the Ziraat Bank. Between 1993–94 the loss was 315 million dollars; the state raised the interest rate to 128 percent on the dollar base and used 3 times compensatory interest, so that the loss increased 18-fold over the 8 years to 2001; although the treasury paid 712 million dollars to cover the 315 million dollars worth of debt in 1997, it corresponded to only 51 million dollars of the main debt. The debt of the Ziraat Bank rose to 7.4 billion dollars by the end of 1998, corresponding to 39 percent of the total assets of the bank.¹¹⁷ Trapped in a vicious

cycle of perpetual debt, the government sold more treasury bills and government bonds, so that borrowings were also used in the payment of interest; inflation rose and the real interest rates for domestic debts increased further.¹¹⁸

Each crisis bolstered the increasing returns mechanism, which increased the profits of the military-industrial complex. OYAK had affiliations with domestic and international business groups. Retired generals were transferred to high executive positions of large business corporations operating in their field of service, or they provided “advisory services” without appearing officially on their payroll due to legal restrictions. OYAK profited from the maximum levels of rent-distribution. As shown above, the balance sheet and the actuarial profits of the military-industrial complex showed a continuous rise in the post-1989 era. Between 1961 and 1980, the OYAK Group reached 15,74 million US dollars average profitability; by 2001, this rose to approximately 99 million US dollars. In the neo-liberal era from 1990 to 2001, its average balance sheet profit jumped to 165,74 million US dollars, which shows that the OYAK Group was one of the main benefactors of the transition to a neo-liberal economy.¹¹⁹

Military autonomy (1990–2000)

The deep state’s rise to *the* state is correlated here with the highest levels of military autonomy. Both the Kurdish question and the rapid rise of the RP fuelled the siege paranoia, or Sèvres syndrome, which dates back to the partition plans of the Western European powers in 1920 and refers to the permanent fears that Turkey should be defended against enemies that seek to destroy the land.¹²⁰ Not coincidentally, both the Kurdish and Islam questions have their roots in the foundations of the Republic and were a consequence of political decisions of the state elites rather than those of external forces. It must be noted, however, that the perception of imminent threat was exacerbated by the international dimension of the Kurdish question, covering Syria, Iraq and Iran beside the involvement of the US and major European powers in the 1990s. Nonetheless, in line with *raison d’état*, the deep state fought strongly against “internal enemies”.

The February 28th Process confirmed the hegemonic power of state ideology in military education and doctrine. The YAŞ meetings witnessed massive dismissals of junior level personnel on the grounds of reactionary activities. It is fair to say that the deep state had seriously damaged military professionalism as demonstrated by the activities of autocratic cliques in the name of fighting terrorism. As NATO declared smart defense, smaller and more effective units and common usage of pool of forces as their post-Cold War targets, the Second Chief of Staff, Çevik Bir, announced in 1996 the most ambitious modernization project dictated by the military. According to this project, in the first eight to ten years, 25–30 billion US dollars worth of procurements would be realized and would reach 150 billion dollars by 2026.¹²¹

In the professional-political sphere, the level of autonomy with respect to the organization of defense remained very high; during the 1990s, the military hierarchy continued to centralize the chain of command. The subordination of the General Staff to their line ministry could not be brought to the agenda. The autonomy level in senior promotions remained very high. Top echelons of the General Staff during the 1997 coup became subject to prosecution in the 2010s. In 2012, the former Deputy Chief of Staff, Çevik Bir, was charged with leading the Western Study Group (*Batı Çalışma Grubu*), which allegedly conducted profiling activities about journalists, politicians, intellectuals, and bureaucrats according to their religious backgrounds during the February 28th process, and was therefore accused of manipulating and intimidating civil society organizations and media organs to pressure the government into dissolving itself. Upon the criminal complaint of Bir, İsmail Hakkı Karadayı, the Chief of Staff during the 1997 coup, gave his testimony as a suspect in 2013.¹²²

Despite rampant recession and devaluation, the military resisted reducing defense spending on the grounds of imminent internal threat. The budgetary allocations to defense ranked first in the state budget, followed by the allocations to education and health. The ratio of the military expenditure to the GDP (in Turkish Lira) rose steadily from 2.6 percent in 1990, to 3.3. percent in 1998, and to 4 percent in 1999.¹²³ The modernization project that amounted to 150 billion dollars in 30 years did not materialize due to economic instability, but the capacity of the military to reserve a considerable amount of state resources was enhanced by the 1997 putsch. The veil of secrecy over military spending had high socio-economic costs. Scholars have found a high correlation between defense spending and inequality, especially in the 1990s, and have emphasized the detrimental effects of military spending on budget deficits and income distribution.¹²⁴ The level of autonomy in this category reached its peak due to the power of the military in increasing military budgets despite recurring economic crises.

According to SIPRI, Turkey ranked first in the world's major arms importer list between 1991 and 1995, when the total arms purchase in this period is calculated. In the second half of this decade, Turkey ranked among the first five major arms importers.¹²⁵ The Undersecretariat for Defense Industry could only administer what was ordered by the General Staff. Extra-budget funds and exports were purportedly 10 billion dollars in the 1990s. In 2000, the Minister of Defense, Sabahattin Çakmakoglu, said that 30 percent of the budget was going to the military, but Turkey was dependent on importing basic technology. Eighteen defense industry firms that had been funded by off-budget funds could not relieve the dependent status in arms industry. The veil of secrecy caused concerns about corruption in arms procurement; it is estimated that one third of the amount paid for weapons buying went as bribe money to ex-officers. By contrast, the dependency on imports was around 85 percent.¹²⁶ The level of autonomy in this category reached its peak in tandem with the level of autonomy in military budgets.

In the political-judicial sphere, the overall level of autonomy in internal security reached its highest level. A common practice in this decade was the public speeches and statements of the military top brass that were regarded by public prosecutors as a directive to open court cases against political parties. Although the formal rules prohibit public speeches made by the military staff, these statements exerted influence in recurrently outlawing political parties.

National Security Council (MGK). The salience of the MGK as a major agenda setter increased after the 1997 military intervention. The authority of the General Secretariat of the MGK to intervene in executive and legislative bodies increased. Psychological operations were carried out among civil society, which could not be steered as easily as political cadres. The intelligence network was also restructured on the basis of this reasoning. A formal institutional structure was created to gather the intelligence originating from all units of the state. These operations were conducted by the Public Relations Department (*Toplumla İlişkiler Başkanlığı*), which was active especially during the February 28th Process. The Public Relations Department, which was responsible for planning and implementing psychological operations, reportedly had a budget of 3 million US dollars.¹²⁷ Alongside the Public Relations Department, the National Security Policy Department and the Information Gathering and Assessment Group Department functioned under the General Secretariat.

Presidency. This post symbolized the perseverance of Atatürk's secular legacy, which was fortified by legal powers in key institutions prescribed in the 1982 Constitution. After the end of the term of the first civilian president following the 1960 coup, it became a tradition that a former chief of staff or a force commander held this post; even when civilians began to hold the post after 1989, they could not override the informal institutions.

The General Command of the Gendarmerie. The military expanded its influence through a secret protocol called Security, Public Order and Assistance Units (EMASYA). Moreover, during the February 28th Process in 1997, as the state of exception was abolished in many cities, the General Staff and the Ministry of Internal Affairs signed the EMASYA protocol through which the JGK could monopolize social surveillance, subordinate the institutions that plan, evaluate, and gather intelligence to the military, and take over the jurisdiction of police forces.¹²⁸

In the category of intelligence gathering, the then President Özal appointed the first civilian head of the MİT in 1992, although Doğan Güreş, the then Chief of Staff, wanted to appoint the ex-officer Nuri Gündeş to the post. The first civilian undersecretary of the MİT to come from the organization's ranks was appointed in 1998. However, civilian heads did not alter the dominance of undemocratic informal institutions. Neither MİT nor the Directorate General of Security forwarded the depositions of suspects in unknown assailant murders. Both institutions were formally tied to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the 1980s, the center-right parties recruited

the top cadres, from the former members of the ultranationalist Idealist Hearts. In the 1990s, these cadres entered the cabinet of the coalition governments. The inactivity of the MİT and the high command of police guaranteed impunity. Moreover, as detailed in the former section, JİTEM operated as a semi-formal institution under the Gendarmerie, completely devoid of civilian control. The military autonomy in this category reached its highest level.

The Janus-headed judiciary in Turkey derives from the coexistence of civil and military courts. The jurisdiction of the military courts was widened to *all* offenses committed by the military personnel; thus, it granted them impunity, since the independence and impartiality of military judges was highly disputed. The impunity of the autocratic cliques was crucial for the transformation of the deep state to *the* state in the 1990s. The status of JİTEM within the military was raised to corps as the drug trafficking and unknown-assailant murders increased dramatically. Full General Eşref Bitlis, who was appointed as the Commander of the JGK in 1990 and opposed the murders and drug trafficking, died in a suspicious accident in 1993. Moreover, several murders were committed in the so-called “Sapanca Death-Triangle” on the Sapanca-Hendek-Düzce line between 1993 and 1996, when General Veli Küçük was the regional commander of the Gendarmerie. General Küçük was tried in the Ergenekon court case due to his involvement in the alleged coup plans, but he was not indicted for his alleged involvement in these murders, especially of Kurdish businessmen, including Behçet Cantürk.¹²⁹ Cases that have been opened against JİTEM members were for years subject to a ping-pong effect between civilian courts on the grounds of a lack of jurisdiction. Then they were passed to the Office of the Military Prosecutor, which had not processed them.¹³⁰ The level of autonomy in this category reached a peak.

The decline of the deep state: Critical juncture (1999–2002)

This critical juncture led to the gradual decline of the deep state amid the introduction of new (in)formalities in the 2000s. First, we examine the permissive conditions that changed the underlying context and increased the agents’ power to exert influence in the contingent period: the change of internal dynamics within the EU and the announcement of the EU candidacy of Turkey in 1999. Second, this section deals with the economic crisis of 2001, which was the productive condition of the critical juncture. Moreover, it addresses the critical antecedents, which refer to the rise of the provincial capital in the 1990s and the erosion of the political center after the 1997 putsch. Both influenced the causal effect of the productive condition. This section will argue that the emergence of a new cleavage structure and the electoral success of the AKP in 2002 closed the critical juncture and produced a “lock in” effect for the decline of the deep state and

military autonomy. Third, this section analyzes the failure of democratic consolidation in Turkey by elaborating on the deep state, international anchors, and elite settlement. It traces the institutional destabilization of the deep state back to the discontinuation of the negative feedback mechanism and the cyclical process.

A profound change in the distribution of power in the post-Cold War era and shared beliefs were set off as NATO's role shifted from a provider of collective defense to a "security exporter". Approximately four decades after the application of Turkey for accession to the European Economic Community in 1959, the EU became the supranational democratizing agent and a matter for domestic politics in Turkey after the Luxembourg Council Summit in 1997. The EU enlargement process created a permissive condition that changed the underlying context of Turkish politics and created a period of heightened contingency with increased prospects for change. The announcement of Turkey's candidacy was far from certain – negotiations, closed-door deals, and compromises decided about the last phase of EU-Turkey relations.

Turkey expected the announcement of its candidacy for EU membership at the Luxembourg Summit in 1997. However, the invitation of Turkey to the conference in Luxembourg was made subject to conditions. Turkey had been asked to improve its human rights record, respect and protect minority rights, take its disputes with Greece over continental shelf in the Aegean Sea to the International Court of Justice, and support the negotiations at the UN to find a political solution to the Cyprus issue following the resolutions of the UN Security Council. Upon receiving these demands, then Foreign Minister İsmail Cem announced that Turkey would suspend its relations with the EU on the grounds that these conditions contradicted the principle of equal treatment, taking into consideration the fact that the EU granted full prospective membership to the central and eastern European countries without imposing substantial preconditions.¹³¹

Propitious developments changed the internal dynamics of the Helsinki Summit: the German Social Democrats and the Greens came to power in 1998 in the place of Christian Democrats who were against the EU membership of Turkey; the capture of Öcalan in 1998 diminished the pressure of terror; Prime Minister Konstantinos Simitis and Foreign Minister Andrea Papan-dreou wanted Greece to enter the Euro-zone and pursued consensus-based attitudes; and the 1999 major earthquake that struck the Marmara region helped to lessen the tension between Greece and Turkey. In its regular progress report of 1999, the European Commission opted for the announcement of its candidacy status at the Helsinki Summit despite the continuing human rights violations. Accordingly, Turkey would be bound by the "Copenhagen political criteria" that stipulated that candidate countries comply with European standards in the rule of law, human rights, and minority rights.¹³² The timing of the coalition of Social Democrats and Greens in Germany and Greece's consensual attitude due to its wish to enter the Euro-zone were among the

contingent factors of this critical juncture. Moreover, the Greek-Turkish rapprochement after the earthquake in 1999 had positively contributed to finding a consensus between the EU and Turkey.

The Helsinki Summit lasted from December 10 to 11, 1999. On the first day, a crisis erupted after the Turkish government received the draft of the resolution that repeated the conditions demanded at the Luxembourg Summit. The then Prime Minister Ecevit rejected the invitation to the conference on December 11; Foreign Minister Cem told the EU President and Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen that Turkey would reject being a candidate for EU membership if it was not treated on equal terms with the Mediterranean island of Malta and 10 former eastern European states; that is, without preconditions.¹³³ Phone diplomacy between German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, and the French President Jacques Chirac before the start of the summit did not suffice to convince the Turkish government. On the night of December 10, 1999, a diplomatic delegation led by the Higher Representative of the EU, Javier Solana, the EU President, Lipponen, and the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Günter Verheugen, was dispatched to Ankara. Lipponen came with a letter confirming that the statements about the Cyprus question and the dispute over the continental shelf between Turkey and Greece would not be preconditions for EU membership; instead the EU sought only political dialogue to solve disputes.

The decision of the Turkish cabinet of the far right MHP, center-left DSP, and center-right ANAP was contingent on the outcome of the discussion on highly sensitive issues. The leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahçeli, raised his party's concern over the candidacy, since it might increase the leverage of the EU to interfere with the court decision on Abdullah Öcalan. The Minister responsible for the EU Affairs and Human Rights, Mehmet Ali İrtemçelik, from the ANAP convinced the cabinet members, especially Bahçeli, that the candidacy would not exert influence over the verdict on the imprisoned PKK leader, Öcalan. Another issue was whether Cyprus was perceived as a trade-off by the EU for accepting Turkey's candidacy. Ecevit convinced cabinet members that it would not be the case by reminding them of the Cyprus intervention in 1974.¹³⁴ In this way, Turkey accepted the invitation to the Helsinki Conference which announced Turkey's candidacy for accession into the EU.

It was a causal possibility that the actors would choose other paths. The MHP, that finished second best in the 1999 elections, could have refused the invitation to the summit due to the issues around Cyprus and Öcalan. The party fiercely supported capital punishment for Öcalan and did not want to jeopardize its electoral success. However, Ecevit and Bahçeli, two politicians from the center-left and far-right, who could never have built a coalition government in the 1970s, were coalition partners in 1999. At that time of heightened nationalist sentiments, there was no person more capable than Ecevit, the "hero of the Cyprus intervention", to convince others on the Cyprus issue. More importantly, the EU diplomatic success managed to win the consent

of Cem and Ecevit. This insistence was a necessary condition for the permissive condition. This diplomatic success was a necessary condition for the critical juncture: if the EU had not insisted on Turkey's participation in the Helsinki Summit, the critical juncture would not have happened. Turkey's candidacy for EU accession led to the closure connotes that increased the propensity of a particular path for Turkish politics, anchored by the Copenhagen criteria, compared to a range of possible outcomes before the decision was made. Moreover, closure connotes were supported by a major economic crisis that erupted in 2001 parallel to the signing of the National Program for the adoption of the EU *Acquis*.

The productive condition of this critical juncture was created with the major economic crisis that erupted in 2001 with the insolvency of private banks.¹³⁵ Cizre and Yeldan claim that the crisis was produced by the premature exposure of the overly fragile asset markets to foreign competition in 1989; they relate the crisis to the erroneous 1999 IMF program and unfettered free-market capitalism. Though acknowledging the role of wasteful populism and corruption of public bureaucracy, they point to the essential link of the crisis to private sector corruption, which was exacerbated by the state-regulated surplus creation mechanisms. Moreover, the anti-political implications of pledging for the dissociation of market from politics must be noted. This pledge dissociates economy from democratization discourses. If structural reforms, markets, labor, poverty, and corruption are not related to politics, not only the legitimacy of policies is undermined, but also the meaning and stability of these policies are endangered.¹³⁶

Experts regard external fragility, the ratio of short-term foreign debt to the Central Bank's international reserves as the most robust predictor of a currency crisis.¹³⁷ This ratio did not fall below 100 percent after the neo-liberal transition in 1989. The decline of foreign currency stocks after the mid-1990s also derived from the negligible foreign direct investment and trade imbalance. The rise of imports after the Customs Union with the EU in 1995 was cut short by the 1997 East Asian crisis that made their goods cheaper; the luggage trade with Russia decreased after 1998 Russian crisis. Moreover, the decrease of imports in advanced industrialized countries overvalued the Turkish currency and made export difficult. External fragility rose with the 1999 IMF program from 112 percent in June 2000 to 145 percent by December 2000.¹³⁸ The private banks depended on foreign loans. The short-term foreign debts of private banks and big holdings rose from 1 billion dollars in 1980 to 22 billion dollars in 1992; from 1994–98 it rose dramatically to 50 billion dollars and remained at this level until the 2001 crisis.¹³⁹ Indeed, foreign debts have been higher than domestic debts; foreign debt began to increase steadily in the 1980s. From 1989 to 1995, it rose to 48 percent of the GNP, then it began to decrease. In 1999, the foreign debt amounted to 36.3 percent of the GNP, while domestic debt rose to 26.3 percent of the GNP.¹⁴⁰

The IMF-backed program added 4 billion dollars in late November 2000 to the Central Bank, but this could not recover the domestic asset markets,

since the money was transferred to rentiers. The ratio of net new domestic borrowings rose from 37 percent to 70 percent of the domestic debt stock in 2001. Between 1995 and 1999, that ratio was half of the domestic debt stock. Fiscal authorities pursued a Ponzi-finance attitude, i.e. a way of deceiving investors in which money that a company receives from new customers for investment is not invested for them, but is used instead to pay interest that is owed to existing customers.¹⁴¹ The report of the Presidency for the Court of Accounts on the ratio of total public debts and official figures to the GNP between 1970 and 1999 shows the exclusion of real figures from the public: at the end of 1999, state total debt rose to 83.4 percent of the GNP, but in official figures it is 66 percent, because defense expenditures were not included in the foreign debt stock of the state.¹⁴² Extreme duty losses, which reached 13 quadrillion Turkish Lira at the end of 1999, were not depicted as public debt. These debts were governed under interest rates that can exceed 35 percent of the market average. High real interest rates increased Turkey's attraction for speculative foreign capital.¹⁴³

The increasing returns mechanism is demonstrated in the financial market transactions of OYAK. Demir assesses the median net financial profits (from operational activities such as foreign exchange transactions and interest rate) to sales ratio of OYAK-owned real sector companies, and compares these values with those of the nonofficial stock market firms between 1993 and 2003. This measurement shows that OYAK was a prime benefactor during the major economic crises of 1994, 1999, and 2001. Stock market profits, foreign exchange transactions, and interest earnings were the major source of profit for OYAK and TSKGV. The median net financial profits/net sales ratio of seven OYAK firms was 300 percent higher than the median of 152 nonofficial stock market firms between 1993 and 2003. More importantly, the financial profits/net sales ratio of OYAK firms climbed to 19 percent just before the crisis of 1994; to 23 percent before the crisis of 1999; and to 31 percent before the 2001 crisis. The domestic currency was devalued by 39 percent in the 1994 crisis and 40 percent in the 2001 crisis.¹⁴⁴

As Demir suggests, it is highly reasonable to question whether the regulations of the Banking Supervision Agency were applied in the same manner to the major bank owned by OYAK. The privatization of Sümerbank, a major public bank that owned five private banks that was transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF), is a case in point. Sümerbank was sold to OYAK at an extremely low price after the 2001 crisis. Neither the IMF nor the World Bank has shown research interest of public disclosure on the distortion in the market caused by OYAK and its wide-ranging privileges.¹⁴⁵

The post-2001 crisis management was marked by the inertia and status quo politics of the center-right. Structural reforms argued for stability and credibility; in fact, they served mainly the interests of foreign finance capital, and aimed at securing the debt obligations of the Turkish arbiters. The unusual longevity of the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government (1999–2002) was

owed to the absence of a real opposition and the international markets' pressure for governmental stability. As was the case in past crises, the links between representation and political power weakened further. The military further stigmatized the political elites as corrupt and incompetent; the bureaucrats and technocrats gathered their legitimacy. Reform and liberalization as the motto of all politicians was substituted for concrete debates and caused increasing apathy towards politics. In the post 9/11 period, the geopolitical strategic role of Turkey for the US rose; loan conditionality in a fragile region such as the Middle East was directed to Turkey for economic restructuring, but without activating the democratic dimension for the sake of not threatening the bonds between the Turkish state and the Euro-Atlantic community.¹⁴⁶

The rise of the provincial capital and the erosion of the political center after the 1997 putsch constituted the critical antecedents of this juncture. Both influenced the causal effect of the productive condition, the outcome of the 2001 economic crisis. Their influence was reflected in the defeat of the parties that were a product of the 1980 coup and the success of the AKP led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the 2002 elections. As with the RP, the AKP's conservative economic base comprises the small- and medium-sized enterprises in Anatolian provincial towns represented by MÜSİAD and regional and urban associations with Islamic identity. The provincial capital, which was repressed in the 28th February Process, backed the AKP. Since 2002, AKP governments have filled the void in the center-right that was created by the 1997 putsch.

The public outrage against the 2001 economic crisis was decisive in the outcome of the elections. None of the members of the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government could exceed the 10 percent electoral threshold; the same was the case with the DYP and the Felicity Party (the SP, the successor to the RP and the FP). Although it almost doubled its votes to 6 percent, the pro-Kurdish DEHAP also could not enter the parliament. The party system shifted from extreme multipartism with no dominant party in the 1990s to a moderate multipartism with a dominant party.

The 2002 parliamentary elections marked the end of the critical juncture. The AKP's leadership belonged to a splinter group of the National View Movement, in that they renounced Islamist roots and saw the EU accession process and democratization reforms as a proof of their transformation from Islamists to a pro-Western conservative center-right political elite which served as a protective shield from possible military intervention and as an opportunity to curb the military's tutelage. The democratic reform process of complying with the Copenhagen criteria "locked in" the path-dependent process that led to the decline and restoration of the deep state.

Historic reforms were adopted after the signing of the first National Program for the adoption of the EU *Acquis* in 2001 until 2005: more than one-third of the constitution was overhauled; more than two hundred provisions were amended, and new ones were issued within the context of ten "harmonization

packages".¹⁴⁷ Democratization reforms that partially reversed perverse institutionalization began with the constitutional amendments of the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government in 2001; nonetheless, most of the reforms were adopted during the AKP government.

The 2002 elections witnessed the emergence of a new cleavage in the EU accession process with respect to their stance toward military tutelage and the EU membership of Turkey. Pro-EU actors tried to question the relevance of the traditional security concept with its over-reliance on military defense and politicized issues that were kept in the realm of security, such as the Kurdish question. Euroskeptics tried to broaden the security agenda at the expense of civil liberties in Turkey. Democratization reforms were regarded as a source of insecurity. The anti-EU alignment cross-cut the Kemalist, Euro-phobic Islamists, and the Kurdish ultra-nationalists. This alignment is ironic given that for the first time, the center met with the Islamists and Kurdish nationalists. The statist-Westernizing elites were forced to take anti-Western positions, while the two movements of identity politics, especially AKP on the secular-religious axis and the pro-Kurdish DTP, the follower of DEHAP, in the ethnic divide took a pro-Western line. The electoral victory of the AKP and the support for the pro-Kurdish party in 2002 indicates that the majority did not approve the resistance to civilian supremacy and integration with the EU.¹⁴⁸

The degree of constraints posed by the critical juncture was quite high. Not only the AKP, but also the military was bound by the chosen path, because resistance to the path would cost them more than obeying it. Due to the public support of the EU accession, the military could not directly oppose reforms that undermined its supremacy. Underneath the military's atypical restraint to reforms was a "survival instinct" to rescue its vanguard role from the AKP because the EU project was supported by a vast majority of the public; the military confronted a new panorama amid its waning power over the Europeanized Cyprus issue, amplified by the disenchantment of the US after Turkey's refusal to invade Iraq. These shifts were coupled with the US's conspicuous sympathy towards the AKP as a role model in the Middle East.¹⁴⁹

How critical was this critical juncture? The probability jump refers to the degree an outcome becomes more probable at the conclusion of a critical juncture relative to its probability immediately before or during the lowest point of the critical juncture. The lowest point of the critical juncture was December 10, 1999, when the government received the draft resolution and rejected the invitation to the Helsinki Summit. At the conclusion of the critical juncture in 2002, the candidacy of Turkey to the EU set the path clearly toward more democratization. Without the EU conditionality that made democratization an imperative, the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government would not have enacted constitutional reforms in 2001. The major economic crisis of 2001 might have led to a change of government, but the AKP could not have succeeded in enacting the legal amendments that elevated it to the center if it was not legitimized with the reward of the EU accession. In this sense, the probability jump was quite high.

Temporal leverage is a measure of the duration of institutional self-reproduction relative to the duration of the juncture, which lasted from December 1999 to November 2002. As will be discussed below, the path-dependent process instigating the deep state's decline led to the discontinuation of the negative feedback mechanism and the cyclical process. On the one hand, this critical juncture affected the macro structure by undermining the military tutelage and allowing the AKP to achieve economic growth within the confines of the neo-liberal dictum. On the other hand, while democratic reforms reduced the deep state's power correlated to military autonomy, the AKP's authoritarian policies that gathered a new momentum after Gezi Park protests of May-June 2013 aimed at guaranteeing a transition from tutelary democracy to delegative democracy and at occupying the center by modifying the formal setting of the deep state. The continuity of power asymmetries sustains a dual modality of domination, hence, the restoration of the deep state. As the path-dependent process continues, the temporal leverage of this critical juncture is difficult to judge. However, it is fair to say that it might prove to be high considering the failure to forge a consensus on social peace and a civic constitution, the basis for fundamental liberties.

Democratic conditionality, i.e. the strategy of "reinforcement by reward", is effective through intergovernmental material bargaining compared to less effective factors such as social influence and transnational mobilization. The efficacy of democratic conditionality depends on the candidate government's domestic costs of compliance.¹⁵⁰ The EU functioned as a significant international anchor in the decline of the deep state. The political Copenhagen Criteria of the EU decreased the domestic costs of compliance and empowered the AKP to carry out the democratization reforms.

Amendments to the 1982 Constitution and ordinary law have been made several times since 1993. The substantive changes in this reform process relate to fundamental rights and liberties, political rights, rule of law and civil-military relations. Constitutional amendments in 2001 and 2004 stipulated that international agreements should take precedence over domestic laws in the case of a conflict; the death penalty and the State Security Courts have been abolished; the MGK's decisions have only advisory status. The amendments have improved freedom of association and civilianized the Higher Educational Board and the Radio and Television Supreme Council. Legal amendments have stated that trials in torture and mistreatment cases will be given priority; that the damages paid by Turkey as a result of the decisions of the ECtHR in torture and mistreatment cases will be claimed from the perpetrators; that the decisions of the ECtHR are recognized as grounds for renewal of a trial. The state of emergency was abolished in 2002. Constitutional amendments in 2004 abolished the State Security Courts that included military judges and tried civilians, and transferred its jurisdiction to the Special High Penal Courts. Moreover, the 80-year-old Turkish Criminal Law was completely revised. Cultural rights were improved, as the constitutional amendments lifted the ban on the use of languages other than Turkish and

facilitated education and broadcasting in Kurdish. The Seventh Harmonization Package of 2003 was important in breaking the taboo against reforming the military; this will be examined in the next section.¹⁵¹

As reforms destabilized the deep state institutionally, military interventions ceased to function as an equilibrium in the negative feedback mechanism. This process tracing demonstrates the heightened belligerence of the military and the CHP against the AKP after the latter's reformist period ended in 2005. The internal costs of compliance for the AKP increased dramatically with the backlash of the secular establishment, and the fierce struggle to occupy the center after 2005 – with the start of the EU negotiations in 2005, when the secular opposition's pressure on the AKP rose exponentially parallel to public resentment towards the EU, and when the Kurds pressed their case for fundamental rights and liberties. The AKP opted for a nationalist and chauvinist discourse, left the EU/democratization project aside, and decided to go with the “flow of xenophobic anti-politics”, which proved that avoiding a coup had a higher priority than democratization.¹⁵²

Autocratic cliques made the headlines again in 2005, when a bookstore was bombed in Şemdinli, a city in Southeast Turkey. A PKK informant and two non-commissioned officers, allegedly working for JİTEM, were caught red-handed. Despite its denial, JİTEM's existence has been ascertained through “certificates of appreciation, governmental salary rolls, investigation committee reports, depositions and confessions of those who worked for the organization”.¹⁵³ The Şemdinli court case did not bring JİTEM to justice; the perpetrators were punished as individuals. This semi-formal institution of the Turkish deep state has been subject to impunity. In general, the compliance with the Copenhagen criteria improved civil rights instead of providing the Kurds with “de jure minority status” and positive rights.¹⁵⁴ However, belated regulations have hindered implementation. Moreover, instead of forging a wider coalition for democratic consolidation, the government kept silent regarding the closure of DEHAP by the Constitutional Court in 2005.

Mahoney argues that structural and institutional persistence emanate from the presence of historical causes instead of constant causes: institutions may persist not only due to the beneficial consequences of the institution, but more often due to the actors' ideas and beliefs that maintain institutions.¹⁵⁵ Democratic reforms that undermined the deep state's power found their most ardent opponents in the neo-nationalist camp. The EU accession process, the Europeanization of Cyprus issue after the southern part became a EU member, and the Kurdish question have contributed to the resurgence of neo-nationalism (*ulusalcılık*). This neo-Kemalist camp, which is ideologically distinguished from official Kemalism, was represented by the MGK with its emphasis on anti-imperialism and national independence against the neo-liberal order, globalism, and the EU. The deep state has been related by this camp explicitly to the gangs (*çete*) of the nationalist struggle. Not coincidentally, one of the civil society organizations in this camp is called the Nationalist Forces (*Kuvayı Milliye*), referring to the irregular warfare of the gangs that

started the National Liberation War. These “revolutionaries” positioned themselves against the “anti-revolutionaries” comprising the proponents of Sharia, Kurdish nationalists, and neo-liberals. The neo-Kemalist forces found an ally in the far-right MHP.¹⁵⁶

The neo-nationalist forces consisted of civil society organizations, media, trade unions, political parties, and the OYAK. Civil society organizations included the National Forces Movement (*Kuvayı Milliye Hareketi*), the Atatürkist Thought Society (*Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği*) and the Patriotic Forces United Movement (*Vatansever Kuvvetler Güç Birliği Hareketi*) that are led by senior retired military officers, and the Great Union of Jurists (*Büyük Hukukçular Birliği*), whose leader, Kemal Kerinçsiz, opened several court cases against intellectuals, including that against Orhan Pamuk and Hrant Dink for “insulting Turkishness” under the article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. Trade unions, which have traditional economic ties with the state – such as the Turkish drivers and automotive owners association as well as those like DİSK, which was an important leftist organization during the 1970s – joined the neo-nationalist camp. OYAK successfully mobilized neo-nationalist sentiments in its bid for buying the state firm Erdemir steel factory in its competition with foreign firms. Erdemir was sold to OYAK for an extremely low price. Supported by the neo-nationalist media and neo-nationalist columnists in several mainstream newspapers, then CHP leader Deniz Baykal assumed the leadership of this camp.¹⁵⁷

This phase of highly tense relations between the neo-nationalist bloc and the AKP ended in a putsch threat during the 2007 presidential elections that was released on the General Staff’s website without any signature. The “e-memorandum” charged the AKP with having a hidden Islamic agenda and weighed in with a vote against its candidate Abdullah Gül.¹⁵⁸ The landslide victory of the AKP in the early elections manifested a “democratic reflex”¹⁵⁹ that made the military grudgingly step away from its putsch-politics, because a coup would have not been backed by the US, would have sabotaged the EU accession, and would have left Turkey in isolation. The 2007 memorandum failed to overthrow the government and ended the negative feedback mechanism.

The Constitutional Court retaliated against the failure of the putsch threat with a closure case against the ruling AKP, which survived the case with one vote in July 2008. The clear-cut decrease of a putsch threat’s leverage had a taboo-breaking effect that nurtured the first serious blow to judicial autonomy that began with the “Ergenekon” court case in July 2008. For the first time in the republic’s history, four-star generals were brought to justice for alleged coup plots. According to the indictment, several active-duty and retired top commanders, generals, mafia bosses, and police chiefs were implicated in a “gang” called “Ergenekon” and had planned four coups between 2003 and 2004. In 2010, the court cases named after the alleged coup plots called “Operation Sledgehammer” (drafted in 2003) and “the Action Plan to Fight Reactionism” (drafted in 2007) followed; the latter was merged with the case

against anti-government propaganda websites in 2011. However, these trials revolved around alleged coup plots; concomitantly, perpetrators are only accused of putsch plans. They did not expose the links of these networks with the Susurluk and Şemdinli incidents, former members of the government and parliament implicated in the deep state; thus, a great number of the autocratic cliques continue to enjoy impunity.

The process leading to the end of the negative feedback mechanism reflects the declining public trust in the military, which had been always high. According to the detailed breakdowns of the Global Corruption Barometer, the perception of corruption in the military among Turkish people has changed dramatically since 2005. It was the least corrupt national institution in 2004, whereas political parties and tax revenue were the most corrupt for 47 percent of the people. The perception of corruption in the military has risen since 2006; in 2010/2011, the military ranks were seen as corrupt as the political parties and the public officials/civil servants.¹⁶⁰

The cyclical process between armed conflict, drug trafficking, and corruption declined in the 2000s. The reports of the EU, UN and the US Department of State on drug trafficking indicate a decline. In the opium market, Turkey is called a major transshipment country together with Tajikistan in the larger Balkan route. In the same list with the US and Germany, Turkey has been a major money laundering country, "whose financial institutions engage in currency transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from international narcotics trafficking".¹⁶¹ Nevertheless, heroin seizures started to decline in 2010, when Turkey (13 tons) ranked second globally in the seizure of heroin, following Iran (27 tons).¹⁶² It further declined by 43 per cent to 7 tons in 2011.¹⁶³ The decline in seizures reported in Turkey and the EU in 2010 and 2011 is traced back to changes in both trafficking flows and law enforcement activity.¹⁶⁴ Heroin shortage in the United Kingdom is attributed to the success of the Turkish authorities and the dismantling of wholesale heroin processing/trafficking networks operating between Turkey and the UK.¹⁶⁵ It must be noted that the overall decline since 2002 can also be explained by the reduction of opium production in Afghanistan since 2001 and more frequent usage of the Central Asian route, especially after the US military operation following the terrorist attacks of September 11.¹⁶⁶ Moreover, there are indications that more Afghan opiates are being trafficked on routes other than the Balkan route, possibly due to reduced demand from the European market.¹⁶⁷

Reports point to the partial overlap of cocaine trafficking routes with the Balkan route for heroin trafficking, which currently transits limited quantities of cocaine to Central and Eastern Europe.¹⁶⁸ According to Turkish authorities, past heroin traffickers have shifted their operations, to some extent, to cocaine smuggling.¹⁶⁹ US authorities report that many major drug traffickers in Turkey are ethnic Kurds or Iranians. In 2012, the US Treasury Department sanctioned supporters of the PKK on the grounds that they control significant drug trafficking networks based in Moldova and Romania.¹⁷⁰

We can conclude that the decline in drug trafficking at large caused a discontinuity in this cyclical process. Moreover, a few members of the autocratic cliques were jailed during the recent court cases, especially the court case on “unknown-assailant murders” and the “Ergenekon” court case. These include JİTEM leader Arif Doğan, General Veli Küçük, Special Operations team leader İbrahim Şahin and mafia bosses, such as Sedat Peker. Although the Ergenekon court case referred only to the coup plans and did not delve into the political state terror and organized crime, the conviction of these autocratic cliques has contributed indirectly to the discontinuity of the cyclical process. On the other hand, the role of the PKK in drug trafficking and the impunity of the autocratic cliques involved in drug trafficking demonstrate the dangers related to the perseverance of the Kurdish question.

The decline of the deep state is foremost a result of democratic reforms. The constitutional amendments passed in a referendum in 2010 undermined the Janus-headed feature of the state. The referendum weakened the Janus-headed feature of judicial institutions by allowing coup plotters to be tried in civilian courts; it also granted military personnel who are dismissed from the TSK the right to appeal. Furthermore, the provisional article 15 of the constitution, which granted impunity to the 1980 coup leaders, was abolished. The amendments alleviated perverse institutionalization since they changed the structure of the Constitutional Court to allow some members to be elected by the parliament; furthermore, the ban of political parties was made less easy. The members of the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors were increased in number and their election and appointment procedure was diversified to provide for a more democratic procedure. All of these, especially the coup trials, have had a palpable psychological impact on the government, which began to rule out deeply engraved informal rules in the YAŞ – elaborated below – that decide on promotion, retirement, disciplinary measures, and dismissals. The critical assessment of the civil-military relations in the following section demonstrates the deep state’s gradual decline and yet continuing restoration.

Felice Casson, who exposed as a first instance judge the Italian *Gladio* in the late 1980s and played a major role in its dissolution in 1990, pointed to the main factors paving the way for the dissolution of this power center in his lecture at Istanbul Bilgi University in 2008: absolute compliance with the law, the independence of prosecutors and judges, parliamentary support, and communicating information to the public through media. In the Ergenekon court case, suspicion over the politicization of the judiciary, which has been one of the basic maladies regarding judicial independence in Turkey, coupled with political polarization in the parliament and media interference made the deepening of the investigations almost impossible. The prolonged investigations and trials raised questions about a fair trial; the leakage of information and documents under investigation to the press polarized the media into supporters and opponents of the Ergenekon investigation. The first was accused of “leakage”, the latter was accused of “diluting” the case.¹⁷¹ Media involvement increased speculation and jeopardized the success of the judicial process.

The survey conducted by Konda in 2010 reflects the conflictual climate focused on the “Ergenekon” court case and Sharia threat. As depicted in the figure below, CHP and MHP versus AKP and the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) are represented as antagonistic blocks, whose supporters gave different, even contrasting responses to questionnaires. The country average tipping point of polarization is 20 percent; this level rises to 35–40 percent when political preferences are taken into account.¹⁷² Fifty-six point five percent of the respondents thought that the government was fighting against criminal gangs through the Ergenekon court case, while 43.5 percent thought that it punished its opponents. Forty point six percent of the respondents (73 percent of the CHP voters respond affirmatively) feared a Sharia regime, while 46.2 percent did not. Thirty-eight point five percent of the respondents thought that the military could intervene, if necessary, while 47.1 percent disagreed. Fifty-seven point one percent of the respondents thought that political parties could be closed, if necessary, while 30.3 percent disagreed.¹⁷³ In addition, the Sunnite-Alevite divide sharpened in the last decade – the Alevites voted decisively against the AKP.¹⁷⁴

The detrimental effect of this polarized cultural climate for the prospect of democratic consolidation was observed in the drafting process of a new constitution and was heightened against the backdrop of the AKP’s authoritarian response to the Gezi Park Protests and the power struggle between the AKP and the Gülen Movement. The first half of the 2010s has shown that the solution of the Kurdish question and the making of a civic, democratic constitution are the litmus test for the breakdown of the deep state. The following examines the background of the conflict between the AKP and Gülen Movement, and the recent evolution of the deep state, and the AKP’s policies to install delegative democracy and restore the deep state.




Figure 5.3 Political polarization (2010).

Source: Ağırdir, *Siyasette ve Toplumda Kutuplaşma*, 18

The major ally of the AKP, Fethullah Gülen's movement became politically the most influential religious order in the 2000s, when it gained power in tandem with the power of the ruling AKP. Since the 1970s, Gülen's considerably advantageous relations to political leaders ranging from the National Front coalition governments in the 1970s that began with Erbakan's MSP, developed well with Demirel's AP, Özal's ANAP, Çiller's DYP, and stretched to Ecevit's DSP in the secular divide before the 1997 coup. The key to success rested in the negation of the direct politicization of Islam and the absolute favor of statism. This Sufi-based community, which follows the Koranic exegesis of Said-i Nursi (1873–1960), adopted the patriarchal and authoritarian mentalities that were once harmoniously combined during the Ottoman times, when informal bridges maintained *asabiyya*, a form of socio-political identity and solidarity, and when jeopardizing the harmony, hierarchy, and heterogeneity of world order was considered a threat to the state and divine powers.

Zürcher argues that Gülen, a founder of Erzurum's branch of "Associations for Struggling with Communism" in 1963, functioned as an intermediary in the implementation of Evren's "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" policy after the 1980 coup. Evren's Islamism shows parallels to the elements of use of Islam as an antidote by Abdulhamit II to establish state control, to combat diversity and unify the nation, and to use mosques, schools, and religious instruction to strengthen the state. Gülen's unrelenting rise and political influence in the 1980s and early 1990s can be traced back to his full support of the 1980 coup and the policies of the Presidium of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı).¹⁷⁵

The Gülen movement is undoubtedly more than a faith community. Since the 1990s, it has grown into an international conglomerate, which is active in trade, industry and finance, owns several media enterprises and hundreds of high schools and several universities based on secular education in Turkey and abroad, especially in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. It was only after the 1997 coup that the military perceived this movement as an enemy. The elitist and statist feature of the Gülen movement is best illustrated by its distanced political stance from Erbakan's RP during the 1997 coup. Since 1999, Gülen has been living in Pennsylvania, US.¹⁷⁶

Obviously, the AKP could not have gained the upper hand in the conflict with the power center without the backing of the Gülen network, which provided ostensibly political human resources whose experience in different sectors of bureaucracy were indispensable for the ruling AKP.¹⁷⁷ The 1997 coup that aimed at dissolving the Gülen movement proved to be decisive turn, which tied the fate of the movement with that of the AKP, especially after the websites close to the network published intelligence leaked on the coup plots "Ayışığı" and "Sarıköz" in 2003 and 2004. The 2007 e-memorandum was another significant event since, in the aftermath of its failure, "open war" was declared on the military by the alliance between the Gülen network and the AKP. These coup plans were covered in Ergenekon investigations in 2008.¹⁷⁸

The strong fear of the Sharia among the 40.6 percent of the Konda survey respondents can be understood in the context of the coup trials which separated the secular segments from the most powerful political agent. Specifically the expansion of the cadres in the police and its organization in the Specially Authorized Courts, coupled with the dependence of the prosecutors on the work of the police, strengthened the convictions of the opposition concerning the illegitimacy of the coup trials and the allegations about the growth of the AKP and Gülenists as a state within the state. It must be borne in mind that both the weakness of the prosecutors and the abundance of religious-traditionalist cadres in the security sector (as opposed to the secular cadres in the military) had been at play long before the AKP came into existence. However, as Seufert concludes, the Gülen cadres had a significant role in the coordinated steering of wide-ranging investigations, which received support from the large sections of the security apparatus since they shared their political and socio-moral orientation.¹⁷⁹

The power struggle between the secular establishment in the center and the religious-conservative periphery in the 2000s turned into a conflict to conquer the center within the religious-conservative alliance in the 2010s, when the alliance between the security sector, judiciary, and parliament crumbled. This conflict focused on the security sector and both sides resorted to anti-democratic means. Authoritarian policies aroused legitimate concerns about the reorganization of the deep state under the AKP and the Gülen movement. As Bayramoğlu suggests, the lack of transparency about the organization, as well as the ambiguity surrounding its politics, has certainly contributed to these claims. In 2010, the Ergenekon investigations triggered a heightened power struggle within the police, which led to the conviction of former chief of police Hanefi Avcı, who had revealed the mafia connections of several Ergenekon convicts, for aiding a left-wing terrorist organization.¹⁸⁰ In another wave of operations, the journalists Şener and Şık, critical of the Gülen movement, were detained in 2011 for their alleged violation of confidentiality in the Ergenekon investigations, but were released in 2012.¹⁸¹ Moreover, the so-called Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) operations, allegedly the urban wing of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), led to the detention of hundreds of politicians and human rights defenders between 2009 and 2010. Each operation gave more leverage to the Gülen movement with respect to the Kurdish question. After the wave of detentions in 2011, it claimed decision-making power on this issue.¹⁸²

A major rift erupted when the MİT assumed more power in the Kurdish question. Between 2009 and 2012, there had been two failed ceasefire attempts. As top MİT officials were tied to Prime Minister Erdoğan, and the MİT started secret peace talks with the PKK in Oslo in 2010, the Gülen movement saw its control waning. However, the ceasefire was interrupted by the AKP before the 2011 elections and broke down after the PKK killed soldiers in 2011. When media uncovered the Oslo talks, the opposition parties blamed the AKP of making secret deals with the PKK. In a strategic move, a

specially authorized prosecutor summoned top MİT officials, including MİT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan, in order to testify as part of the KCK operations. In February 2012, the AKP hastily passed the legal amendment to make the prime minister's consent obligatory to prosecute the MİT undersecretary, as well as special envoys tasked by the prime minister. In October 2012, the Turkish government started open peace talks with the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, who had been serving a life sentence on the prison island, İmralı, in the Marmara Sea for 14 years.

The drafting of a new constitution by the Parliamentary Constitutional Consensus Committee began in October 2011 and symbolized a “new beginning,” which could play a key role in the solution of the Kurdish question. As the figures on political polarization indicate, the AKP and the BDP had the potential to form a democratic cleavage alliance between the center and the periphery, between the political parties representing the ethnic and secular-religious divide. While all parties agreed on the making of a new constitution, which is a relic of the 1980 coup, the red-lines of the political parties rendered consensus-making impossible. The removal of ideological references to the “principles of Atatürkism” and “Atatürk nationalism” in the first four articles of the constitution, which stipulate that the amendment of these articles cannot even be proposed, have been considered as “red-lines” by the CHP and the MHP. The demands for official recognition of Kurdish identity in the constitution and the removal of the ethnicity-based definition of nationhood could not be negotiated. The paradigm of Kemalism, with its authoritarian ambitions of a homogeneous nation, military tutelage, and exclusive secularism proved to be incompatible with democracy and hindered a resolution of the Kurdish question.

The most controversially debated provisions were those related to administrative decentralisation, specifically “democratic autonomy” put forward by the BDP. Despite the fact that the Turkish state is highly centralized and that giving more power to local authorities would comply with the requirements of modern governance, autonomy has been considered synonymous with separatism. The demands of the Kurdish movement regarding full rights to education and public services in mother languages were also subject to controversy. The 1982 Constitution bans education in languages other than Turkish as the native language. The use of Kurdish as a mother tongue language has become the center of debate, especially during the KCK trials. A legal amendment in January 2013 allowed the defendants to speak in their mother tongue. However, disagreements between the parties have caused a deadlock on the exclusive usage of Kurdish language in education.

When the Parliamentary Constitutional Consensus Committee dissolved in December 2013, it had forged consensus on 60 of 177 articles of the constitution, none of which, in the end, were passed by parliament. This process, that might have offered chances for the consolidation of democracy was hindered primarily by the predetermined red-lines. Moreover, the AKP's insistence on changing the parliamentary system to presidentialism proved to be a major

hindrance, since all the provisions with the terms Prime Ministry and Council of Ministers were subject to reservations from the AKP. The parties showed none of the flexibility that is generally required in the drafting process. In addition, they did not try to form alliances in order to convince the other parties to show flexibility.¹⁸³

Here, the insistence on presidentialism needs to be critically assessed with respect to its implications for the installation of delegative democracy. Firstly, the argument of the AKP about “governmental stability” as a value-added of presidentialism mistakenly equates governmental stability with political stability. The first undermines the major advantage of presidentialism, i.e. the “balance and oversight” between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Secondly, according to the AKP’s propositions, “presidential decrees” give the president decision-making powers on issues that are not decided by the legislation. Put differently, it gives the executive the right to usurp the competences of legislation. Thirdly, the simultaneity of presidential elections and general elections would be contrary to the principle that the legislative and executive organs are separately formed and carries the danger that the head of the executive controls the legislative branch at the same time. This flaw is compounded by another proposal that the president should be entitled to decide on the renewal of the legislative organ’s elections and vice versa. Finally, a significant aspect of presidentialism, decentralization and concomitant bicameralism, are absent in these propositions.¹⁸⁴

This type of presidentialism introduces “*decretismo*”,¹⁸⁵ a common form of violation in delegative democracies, which allows presidents or the executive to infringe on the law-making powers of the parliament. The violation of separation of powers provides a breeding ground for corruption, which occurs either through “the abuse of the rights of a public post for private purposes” (violation of the principle, government for the people) or through the abuse of these rights in a way that affects political decisions (violation of the principle, government of the people).¹⁸⁶ The government’s crackdown on the media after the police raids on the grounds of high-level corruption, bid-rigging and money laundering, was telling about the way the AKP was heading. Intimidation of the press, mass firings, tax investigations, wiretapping by the MİT, and mass detention and imprisonment of journalists under anti-terrorism laws, have shown the impact of executive power’s excessive rights.¹⁸⁷ In the case of presidentialism as proposed by the AKP, Turkish delegative democracy might possibly operate to the full as in the case of its well-known Latin American counterparts.

The restoration of the deep state is indicated by the new formal setting of intelligence gathering, which empowers the executive through undemocratic oversight of the security sector. The new law on the MİT grants extraordinary powers, such as the right to conduct operations abroad, extensive phone tapping, and greater immunity from prosecution to agents. In accordance with this, prosecutors will contact MİT executives in case of complaints regarding MİT members and their duties and activities. A court of serious crimes in

Ankara, to be chosen by the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), will be authorized to try those who are charged with personal crimes or charged with crimes regarding their duties. The Supreme Court of Appeals will also be responsible for trying the MİT undersecretary, who is Turkey's top intelligence chief, if any case is opened against him or her.

With regard to the possibility of an elite settlement between the AKP and the BDP, the international scene in the Middle East offered a new perspective. The BDP overcame the 10 percent threshold in 2011 elections by entering the parliament as independent candidates. The Kurds have established a Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq and have become a power broker in Syria.¹⁸⁸ On March 21, 2013 Öcalan called on his organization to declare a ceasefire and withdraw from Turkish territory. In the peace talks with Öcalan, the BDP and later the HDP have functioned as an interlocutor and an intermediary between him and the PKK commanders in the Kandil mountains in northern Iraq. On the other hand, further indicators signal the restoration of deep state, such as the AKP's new policing strategy based on "risk prevention" and the controversial bill on internal security that aim at expanding vague and broad police powers and sidelining the supervisory role of prosecutors and judges. These bear the danger of creating new forms of state of exception.

Both the Turkish government and the Kurdish movement have a stake in peace. The end of bloodshed will be a great victory, an end of mutual destruction that has cost the lives of around 40,000 people. On the one hand, the methods of withdrawal and full disarmament are to be negotiated. On the other hand, the reluctance to purge JİTEM can be explained by fact that these autocratic cliques are seen as indispensable tools as long as the Kurdish question remains unsolved. The ambition of the AKP to make Turkey a regional power in the Middle East remains unrealistic unless the government reaches a democratic peace deal. Prospects of a leading role for Turkey in the Middle East have already been undermined by the Syrian and Iraqi quagmire and the crackdown on the Arab Spring by authoritarian governments. Undoubtedly, the violent repression of the Gezi Park protests of 2013 cost the AKP international credibility, which was once called a role model in the league of "Muslim democrats".¹⁸⁹

Abusive use of force by police, including tear gas, water cannons and beatings turned a small demonstration of several hundred environmentalists to save Gezi Park, one of the last green spaces in central Istanbul, from destruction on May 30, 2013 to a nationwide movement against the government, which cut across social, ideological, and cultural divides. Thousands of protestors were wounded; several protestors lost their lives. According to the Konda survey, political polarization on the first anniversary of protests indicates a polarization along the lines of pro-AKP and anti-AKP camps, which simultaneously operates with Turkish-Kurdish and Sunni-Alevite cultural polarization and comprises "concerned modernists" and "politicized religious-conservatives". Forty percent of the survey respondents thought that protestors were defending their democratic rights and freedoms, whereas

54 percent regard it as a provocation of “external power centers”, including the US, a combination of several countries including the European states, even internal actors, such as separatists, CHP, and general opposition to the AKP.¹⁹⁰

Coupled with insufficient pressure from the US and the EU as international anchors and the lack of elite settlement, the consolidation of democracy was bound to fail. Uğur finds an anchor dilemma for the EU and a credibility dilemma for Turkey in the EU membership process. The anchor dilemma arises from the limited share of the EU in carrying the short-term costs of realizing its commitments and its limited ability to using sanctions. The credibility problem on the side of Turkey is the perceived wish to take decisions, but the resistance and weak political will to implement them.¹⁹¹ The “Accession Partnership” documents and regular reports of the European Commission have been used as “gate keeping” instruments to induce compliance through benchmarking and monitoring. The European Council takes them into account in its decisions on financial assistance and on the progress of the accession process. However, as will be examined in the next section, after the start of negotiations in 2005, the AKP partially reversed the democratization process by not enacting relevant regulations for implementation and by adopting legal amendments contrary to democratic norms and rules.

In the past decade, the EU has gradually lost its major role as an international anchor for democratic consolidation. The Europeanization of Cyprus question in 2004 paved the way for a political and technical stalemate due to the blockage of negotiation chapters; the Eurozone crisis since 2009 shifted Greece’s and the EU’s attention away from the Cyprus issue; and the current indeterminacy over the future of European integration has added to the disenchantment of the Turkish public with respect to elusive EU membership. Neither the EU nor Turkey came to the point of ending the accession process, but accession talks came to a standstill. Since 2005, only one of the 35 chapters in the *acquis* has been provisionally closed. Accession reports in the 2010s have expressed disappointment with Turkey’s progress on several realms including judicial reform, media freedom, freedom of expression. Relations were even more strained after the Gezi protests, which further alienated those who argue against Turkey’s eligibility for EU membership. As scepticism over Turkey has grown, EU accession has drifted from Turkey’s agenda.

In the post-Cold War international scene, the main focus of Turkish-US relations has shifted from Europe to the Middle East. In line with Cold War logic, Turkey had been primarily defined as a European stronghold against the USSR. However, the new threat perception of the US shifted to “rogue states” such as Iran and Syria along the borders of Turkey. Taşpınar argues that Turkish foreign policy can only be understood in the context of public resentment based on the belief that the West has not shown the respect Turkey deserves. Having upgraded its status as the sixteenth largest economy in the world in 2011, Turkey gained self-confidence and independence vis-à-vis

the West and searched for an economic and strategic alliance with Russia, India, China, and the Middle East and Africa.¹⁹²

The electoral success of the AKP stems mainly from its economic performance. However, Yeldan warns against the shrinkage of the public sector resulting from speculative-led jobless-growth pattern in the post-2001 era. The chain of reaction between high rates of interest, the high inflow of hot money finance to the Turkish financial markets, and the overvaluation of the Turkish Lira culminated in expanding deficits on the commodity trade and current account balances. In other words, growth bears the seeds of crisis. As foreign direct investment functions as a source of financing the current account deficit, it exacerbates destabilizing external fragility. Moreover, the burden of an import-dependent domestic industry is absorbed by wage-labor. Due to the shrinkage of the public sector, the middle-class and the poor suffer from the decreasing public funds for education and health.¹⁹³

Is this type of growth democratic? Scholars also contrast the waning power of the statist bureaucracy in contrast to the rise of the neo-liberal wing of the Turkish economic bureaucracy during the AKP era. As Öniş argues, hyper-privatization through the block sale method implicates the preference of the government for rapid revenue maximization rather than the inclusion of wider segments of the population through the capital markets. He also adds that major Turkish conglomerates and banks, such as OYAK, have actively participated in the privatization process and acted with a global profit-maximization objective. On the other hand, class-based reaction to the costs of privatization, illustrated in the case of the TEKEL workers, remained temporary and sporadic in the asymmetric power relations.¹⁹⁴

Military autonomy and undemocratic civilian supremacy (2000–2014)

The constitutional amendments and legislative reforms led to the decline of military autonomy in the 2000s. The AKP was forced to respond to the secular establishment's backlash with reforms. Indeed, one of the great paradoxes of the Turkish democratization process is that societal polarization has made reforms unavoidable, which has ultimately ended military tutelage. After its record election result in 2011, the AKP showed that civilian supremacy should not be confused with democratic oversight of the security sector. As was the case with the former conservative-nationalist center-right parties of the AP and the DYP, the AKP pursued status quo policies that remind us of the deep-seated feelings of insecurity informing these parties' pragmatic conformity with the military-centered "state" tradition and calculated using it as an instrument of gathering support, as long as the military did not interfere with the government's business.¹⁹⁵

In the 2000s, Turkey witnessed a rapid transition from the sheer lack of civilian supremacy to an undemocratic and insufficient control of the armed forces. High levels of autonomy in the 2010s might at first sight seem to be contradictory, but it is a rule rather than an exception as the post-transition

unstable defective democracies of South America and Southeast Asia have proven in the past decades. The military can be forced to leave the political power center, but still be allowed to enforce discretion in several categories on the professional-political-judicial continuum. In order to defend corporate interests, the militaries around the world have claimed high autonomy in the professional sphere. The question is whether this autonomy turns out to be a convincing weapon, intimidating and destroying civilians' rule, paving the way for unprofessionalism. The question is also whether the government allows the military to retain political and judicial domains, as in the case with the lack of budgetary control and the impunity of autocratic cliques.

In the professional sphere, autonomy in military education and doctrine decreased, but the level is high. Backed by the AKP's reluctance to purge all autocratic cliques, the Turkish military's silence over the operations of ÖHD and JİTEM illustrates new forms of professionalism. Unprofessionalism threatens the life of civilians. In 2011, 34 members of fuel oil and cigarette smuggler families lost their lives in the province of Roboski (Uludere) bordering Iraq in a military airstrike based on false intelligence gathering which claimed that they were PKK members. The parliamentary investigative sub-commission found (with the majority votes of the AKP members) no "deliberate intent" and the Office of General Staff Military Prosecutor decided not to press charges on those operationally responsible for this incident. A major positive development occurred in July 2013 with the amendment of the TSK Internal Service Law Article 35, which had been used to justify military interventions.

According to the "White Book" of the National Defense Ministry published in 2000, the TSK military personnel amounted to 800,000, 600,000 of which were conscripted. In 2011, the TSK declared on its website that from 666,576 of the military personnel 465,197 are conscripted.¹⁹⁶ Yentürk notes that the following factors undermine effective public and parliamentary debate: the lack of information on the breakdown of the numbers of military professionals by rank; restrictions on information about the salaries of the professional staff and the total expenditure allocated to them and to conscripts; and insufficient information about the types of duty that conscripts carry out.¹⁹⁷ Moreover, despite the decrease of force levels, the TSK is among the world's largest armed forces, where compulsory military service remains the only service modality, since they are deemed indispensable for political indoctrination.¹⁹⁸

The current modernization plans target the nationalization of the defense industry, an increase in research and development and procurement expenses,¹⁹⁹ but they lack a convincing rationale and prove a budgetary burden. Besides, the lack of transparency in personnel policy hinders an accurate assessment of policy changes; reforms have been limited to the improvement of conditions for some lower ranks, changes in appointment mechanisms, and professionalization for a limited scale of duties.²⁰⁰

The dismissal of junior ranking officers allegedly implicated in Islamist fundamentalist activities was a tradition in the YAŞ. President Gül expressed

his reservations about the dismissals in a 2008 YAŞ meeting, since these decisions were immune from judicial review. The YAŞ meeting in 2008 was a breach of this tradition. Constitutional amendments in 2010 abolished judicial immunity for the decisions of the YAŞ on dismissals. The level of autonomy has decreased from very high to high, because the YAŞ has still an excessive jurisdiction and its composition and formal powers do not comply with democratic standards.²⁰¹ The overall level of autonomy in the professional sphere has decreased to high.

In the professional-political sphere, the autonomy level with respect to the organization of defense decreased to high. During the drafting of new constitution in February 2013, four parties agreed to make the Chief of Staff accountable to the Prime Minister instead of the Ministry of National Defense. As with other aspects of consensus, this amendment was suspended after the dissolution of the Parliamentary Committee for Consensus on Constitution. Despite the significance of this consensus and the compliance of the Chief of Staff with civilian authority, it must be noted that even if the chief of staff was subordinated to the “line” ministry, the ministerial staff comprises mainly military men, who are subordinated to the General Staff. The lack of civilian staff with expertise on defense and security has a direct impact on civilian supremacy in the implementation of defense policies. The Ministry of National Defense must be restructured from scratch. According to Narcís Serra, former Spanish Defense Minister who served during the term of Felipe González (1982–91), without democratic consolidation, the military is not accountable to civilians.²⁰²

The Ergenekon and Sledgehammer court cases have led to a critical turn in senior promotions. The Law on the TSK Personnel prescribes that the military personnel who are suspects in such trials cannot be promoted; they are either suspended by the “line” minister or retired if they have completed the waiting term in their rank; suspects, who were released pending trial, were appointed to passive posts. In a 2010 YAŞ meeting, Prime Minister Erdoğan resisted informal rules by not promoting eleven generals whose arrest as suspects in the Sledgehammer trial was ordered by a civilian court. They were appointed to different posts. These generals were released from prison after the Constitutional Court issued a ruling calling for a retrial. In a 2014 YAŞ meeting, they were put on the retired list like those suspects in the Ergenekon trial. The term of duty of suspects in the 28 February ‘coup’ of 1997 were extended.

Shortly before the 2011 YAŞ meeting, faced with the prospect of “retirement waves”, the Chief of Staff Işık Koşaner together with the commanders of the Land Forces, Navy and Air Force resigned in protest. Unprecedentedly, in the absence of four members, the YAŞ appointed the Chief of Staff. As a gesture, the current Chief of Staff, Necdet Özel, has removed the e-memorandum of 2007 from the General Staff’s website. Due to the compliance of the General Staff with civilian supremacy, the level of autonomy has decreased to low in the 2010s.

Amid a veil of secrecy, defense budget proposals have been prepared by the General Staff and approved verbatim in the parliament. Futile parliamentary committees only examine draft laws and law proposals; they are not entitled to examine military budgets or to submit proposals.²⁰³ According to Transparency International, Turkey scores moderate to low on budget transparency (in the same league with Tanzania, Venezuela, and Afghanistan), which reflects little willingness or capacity to enforce oversight and to disclose defense budget figures, little or no defense and security audits, and significant off-budget military expenditure.²⁰⁴

Since the adoption of the law on public financial management and control in 2003, the publications of the Ministry of Finance have provided a large amount of data on military spending. However, access to the data on defense expenditures still proves an impediment to making an exact calculation. For categories such as Defense Industry Support Fund (*Savunma Sanayii Destekleme Fonu, SSDF*), the village guards, the Secret Fund (*Örtülü Ödenek*), military research and development, foreign credits intended for military spending, and financial transfers to Northern Cyprus for military purposes, there is only limited access to information. We have little or no information on the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TSKGV) and the pensions of retired military and civil personnel who served in the Turkish Armed Forces.²⁰⁵

Since 2004, the budget share of education has exceeded the share of the defense ministry.²⁰⁶ It is estimated that the share of the total military expenditure in the GDP (in Turkish Lira) had a general downward trend from 3.7 percent in 2000 to 2.5 percent in 2005, while military spending increased from 6,248 million YTL to 16,232 million YTL;²⁰⁷ since 2006, the military burden has been relatively high, around 2.4 percent, while military expenditure rose from 19,416 million YTL to 41,104 million YTL between 2006 and 2014. In 2012, Turkey ranked 15th in the world's top military spenders list.²⁰⁸

A reform package in 2003 entitled the Court of Auditors to audit accounts and transactions of all types of organizations, including military expenditures upon the request of parliament. The 2003 Law on Public Financial Administration and Control introduced internal audit. An amendment to article 160 of the constitution in 2004 removed the secrecy clause over the military's state-owned assets. However, the military institutions provide very limited information in their activity reports and are exempt from publishing their strategic plans. The effective control of the feasibility of projects is further curtailed by the lack of performance auditing. Moreover, the government restricted the oversight with amendments to the Law on the Court of Auditors in 2010, which stipulated that the court is not permitted to question the reasonableness and effectiveness of the military's expenditure policies. An independent audit based on these principles has neither been done nor made public to date. With a regulation in 2012, the government limited the publication of audit reports about security, defense, and intelligence agencies. The TSK was entitled to censor the publication of information in these reports with respect to state property holdings and the assets of related institutions.²⁰⁹

Therefore, the poor record in budgetary transparency should be primarily attributed to the government's reluctance rather than the military's resistance. Since accountability would jeopardize the AKP's strategy of restoring the deep state, it perceives high level military autonomy in budgets not as a threat but as a means to undemocratic civilian supremacy as long as the General Staff acts in conformity with the government.

The same rule applies to the category of arms production and procurement. Despite the decline in the ranking compared to the 1990s, Turkey was the world's 14th major arms importer between 2006 and 2010; it ranked the 3rd largest arms importer in the Middle East in 2013.²¹⁰ Arms purchases continue to be excluded from parliamentary approval. Moreover, arms spending will probably increase in the future due to the acquisition of advanced power-projection capabilities in line with the modernization program, whose rationale is questionable given the decreased level of conflict with the PKK in the 2000s.²¹¹ As a part of modernization, the domestic industry's share in arms supply was increased to 42 percent; nonetheless, Turkey remains largely dependent on the import of high technologies.²¹² Although the legislation permits the external audit of the movable expenditures (weapons) of the military, due to lack of relevant legislation, the audit of firms of the TSKGV has remained outside parliamentary oversight.²¹³

Corruption pertains to this category as well. In 2010, the former Minister of Defense, Vecdi Gönül, described the corruption resulting from the high commissions taken from the agents of arms production firms in direct purchases. He maintained that the Ministry reduced direct purchases, or put differently, the contact of these agents directly with the ministry and the General Staff; instead they focused on common ventures with the arms industry. He also argued that the State Auditing Commission, the Prime Ministry Inspection Board, and the parliamentary commissions should take measures against corruption in arms purchases.²¹⁴ As of 2009, the Undersecretariat for the Defense Industry has broken with the military's monopoly in buying arms, but it did not improve transparency as arms tenders have not been subject to parliamentary debate. The level of autonomy in arms production and procurement decreased to high levels.

A major reverse to military tutelage occurred in the political-judicial sphere, specifically in the category of internal security. In 2001, constitutional amendments ensured the voting majority of the MGK's civilian members and downgraded the MGK's decisions to being advisory to the government. In 2003, reforms abolished the monopoly of the Secretariat-General on collecting information and documents, repealed its large-scale executive and supervisory authorities, and allowed a civilian to be appointed as the secretary general. To take over the former roles of the MGK Secretariat-General, the Prime Ministry established the General Directorate of Security Affairs in 2006 and the Undersecretariat for Public Order and Security was founded under the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2010 to coordinate crisis management. In 2010, for the first time, the government reviewed the National

Security Policy Document and set its priorities in subsequent years.²¹⁵ The military's autonomy decreased to middle.

After the defeat of the putsch threat in 2007, specifically during the presidency of Gül, the significance of the post of president in securing military autonomy has decreased substantially. The direct and popular election of Erdoğan as a president in 2014 has rendered it trivial. With regard to the Gendarmerie, the military's autonomy declined to medium levels. However, unless the JGK is directly tied to the line ministry, the civilian oversight of its law enforcement activities remains to be constrained. The JGK's excessive use of authority was illustrated in the Şemdinli incident of 2005, the interception scandal in 2008, and the Republican Working Group's subversive activities. Contrary to this activism, its inaction and neglect in the murder of Armenian intellectual, Hrant Dink, in 2007 have fueled suspicions about the JGK.²¹⁶ The state of emergency was abolished in 2004, but has continued *de facto* through the village guard system and the secret protocol called EMASYA. The EMASYA protocol was annulled in 2010 due to its alleged role in coup plots.²¹⁷ In compliance with the 2008 National Program with the EU, the government amended the Regulation on the Organization and Duties of the Gendarmerie to formally separate the authority of the gendarmerie from the police's powers, transferred some residential areas to the police, and established the Undersecretariat for Public Order and Security to introduce civilian oversight. However, these changes remain insufficient to improve oversight.²¹⁸ The overall level of military autonomy in determining internal security has decreased to middle.

From 1992 onwards, the leadership of MİT have been civilians, who have collaborated with the government against Ergenekon. In the context of the rise of civilian supremacy, the government and the MİT instead of the military have become more in charge of the Kurdish question. However, as elaborated above, the current undemocratic formal setting governing the MİT empowers the executive to constrain the judiciary. In contrast to the denial of JİTEM, the establishment of the Gendarmerie Intelligence Agency (Jandarma İstihbarat Teşkilatı, JİT) in 2005 raised the question of whether legal status has been granted to this semi-formal institution. In 2011, upon an investigation of a public prosecutor, the JGK declared that JİTEM had existed, but was abolished in 1990; the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the General Staff accepted that JİTEM had existed, but denied any responsibility for its establishment.²¹⁹ However, reportedly, only JİTEM's name was erased, while its cadres were transferred to some units of the JGK in 1999.²²⁰ The recent MİT Law and the JİTEM's formalization under the AKP rule as well as the apparent agreement over its existence decreased the level of autonomy in intelligence gathering to moderate levels.

With respect to judicial prosecution, some of the Susurluk suspects were brought to justice and sentenced to prison terms disproportionate to the crime spectrum committed. The perpetrators of the Şemdinli incident were released by a military court in 2007. To date no JİTEM member has been convicted of

JİTEM activities. Extrajudicial killings were a daily routine between 1992 and 1994. Since the statutory period of limitations for cases that are not processed by public prosecutors is twenty years, since 2014, it has become not possible to bring many of the murderers to justice unless they are declared as having committed crimes against humanity. Reforms have weakened the Janus-headed judiciary, but the duality continues. Constitutional amendments in 2010 entitled civilian courts to try crimes committed by military men against the constitutional order; they lifted the powers of military courts to try civilians; they changed the composition and working procedures of the Constitutional Court and HSYK; and they made the HSYK decisions on dismissals subject to revision. Moreover, de facto total impunity of the Chief of Staff and force commanders was abolished, as the Constitutional Court was entitled to try them. In 2011, the Military Appeals Court referred the Şemdinli case to a civilian court. However, the decisions of the Military Appeals Court are still not subject to civilian supervision and the High Military Administrative Court maintains the duality of civil and military courts. To conclude, the ÖHD, JİTEM, village guards, are still not held accountable for their deeds. The level of autonomy for this category has decreased to high. The overall level of autonomy in the political-judicial sphere has decreased from very high to medium.

Table 5.1 The level of military autonomy (1950–2014)

<i>Spheres of the military's autonomy</i>	<i>1950–60 high</i>	<i>1960–80 high</i>	<i>1980–90 very high</i>	<i>1990–2000 very high</i>	<i>2000–14 middle</i>
Professional sphere	middle	high	very high	very high	high
Military education and doctrine	very high	very high	very high	very high	high
Force levels	low	high	very high	very high	very high
Military reform	low	high	very high	very high	very high
Junior level personnel decisions	low	very high	very high	very high	high
Professional-political sphere	middle	high	very high	very high	high
Organization of defense	high	high	very high	very high	high
Senior promotions	middle	high	very high	very high	low
Military budgets	low	high	very high	very high	high
Arms production and procurement	low	high	very high	very high	high
Political-judicial sphere	high	very high	very high	very high	middle
Internal security	high	high	very high	very high	middle
Intelligence gathering	high	very high	very high	very high	middle
Judicial prosecution	high	very high	very high	very high	high

Notes

- 1 See Belge, *12 Yıl Sonra 12 Eylül*.
- 2 Parla, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Rejimi: 1980–1989*, 55–61.
- 3 Sayarı, “The Changing Party System,” 24–27.
- 4 Dorronsoro and Massicard, “Being a Member of Parliament in Contemporary Turkey.”
- 5 Massicard, “Differences in Role Orientation among Turkish MPs.”
- 6 Kalaycıoğlu, “The Turkish Grand National Assembly: A Brief Inquiry into the Politics of Representation in Turkey,” 60.
- 7 Ergüder and Hoferbert, “The 1983 General Elections in Turkey: Continuity and Change in Voting Patterns?”; Ayata and Ayata, “Ethnic and Religious Bases of Voting.” In Özbudun, *Party Politics and Social Cleavages in Turkey*, 49.
- 8 Sayarı, “The Changing Party System,” 15–17.
- 9 Özbudun, *Party Politics and Social Cleavages in Turkey*, 74–75, 78–79, 90–91.
- 10 Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. In Buğra, “Bir Krize ve Bir Ahlakî Ekonominin Çöküşüne Dair,” 51. Exchange refers to the exchange of goods at prices determined by supply and demand. Redistribution means the movement of goods towards an administrative center and their reallocation. Reciprocity refers to the exchange of goods between people in non-market, non-hierarchical relationships.
- 11 Demir, “The Militarization of the Market and Rent-Seeking Coalitions in Turkey.” For a neo-Marxist perspective of the intrinsic linkage of the military to the corporate capitalism, see Jacoby, “Semi-Authoritarian Incorporation and Autocratic Militarism in Turkey.”
- 12 Akça, “Kollektif Bir Sermayedar Olarak Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri,” 264–267.
- 13 Parla, “Türkiye’de Merkantilist Militarizm 1960–98,” 210.
- 14 Akça, “OYAK: Kimin Ekonomik Güvenliği,” 179–81; Akça, “Kollektif Bir Sermayedar Olarak Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri”; Akça, “OYAK: Kimin Ekonomik Güvenliği.”
- 15 Parla, “Türkiye’de Merkantilist Militarizm 1960–98,” 220.
- 16 Demir, “The Militarization of the Market and Rent-Seeking Coalitions in Turkey,” 682.
- 17 Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, “Labour: The Battered Community.”
- 18 Buğra, *State and Business in Modern Turkey*, 51.
- 19 Buğra, “Bir Krize ve Bir Ahlakî Ekonominin Çöküşüne Dair,” 55–56.
- 20 Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, “Labour: The Battered Community,” 500, fn. 21. These figures are gathered from the joint survey of the State Planning Organization and the State Institute of Statistics in 1997.
- 21 Öniş, “The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective.”
- 22 Kılıç, *Özel Harp Dairesi*, 253–265.
- 23 Gingeras, “Beyond Istanbul’s ‘Laz Underworld’: Ottoman Paramilitarism and the Rise of Turkish Organised Crime, 1908–50,” 223.
- 24 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *World Drug Report 2012*, 67. In the 1990s, the Silk Route that begins in northern Afghanistan and crosses the Central Asian Republics to Russia and then from conventional trade routes to European countries gained significance.
- 25 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *World Drug Report 2004*, 71.
- 26 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Global Illicit Drug Trends 2001*, 39.
- 27 Berberoğlu, *Susurluk: 20 Yıllık Domino Oyunu*, 53; Mumcu, *Papa-Mafya-Ağca*.
- 28 Özdemir, *Susurluk Belgeleri Cilt: 2. İfade Tutanakları. TBMM Komisyon Raporu’na Muhalefet Şerhleri ile Birlikte*.
- 29 Lipset and Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, 22, fn. 43.

- 30 For a detailed analysis of the Kurdish linguistic rights in Turkey, see Uçarlar, *Between Majority Power and Minority Resistance: Kurdish Linguistic Rights in Turkey*.
- 31 Wood and Gibney, "The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-Introduction and a Comparison to CIRI," 369.
- 32 Kurban, "The Village Guard System as a 'Security' Policy." According to a survey of the Hacettepe University, 953,680–1,201,200 persons were displaced between 1986–2005; see Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, "IDMC | Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Turkey." According to İHD the number varies between 3 and 4 million; see "Human Rights Association."
- 33 Buğra, "Poverty and Citizenship: An Overview of the Social-Policy Environment in Republican Turkey."
- 34 Yavuz Ataç, who worked as the vice chief of the MİT's External Operations Department, was affiliated to the ÖHD and trained as a "saboteur" in the *Gladio* camps in the USA and Israel. The former MİT Chief of Counterterror Department Mehmet Eymür (1994–98) for the first time acknowledged in his statement as a witness in the Susurluk court case in 1998 that MİT hired Alaattin Çakıcı. See Kılıç, "Ataç: Çakıcı'yı MİT Eğitti."
- 35 Kılıç, "JİTEM'in Öyküsü," 220–221; Kılıç, *Jitem: Türkiye'nin Faili Meçhul Tarihi*.
- 36 Yalçın, *Binbaşı Ersever'in İtirafı*.
- 37 Bora and Can, *Devlet-Ocak-Dergâh. 12 Eylül'den 1990'lara Ülkücü Hareketi*, 332.
- 38 İnşel, "Kutsal Devletin Çeteleri," 24–25.
- 39 Dağı, "Human Rights, Democratization and the European Community in Turkish Politics: The Özal Years, 1983–87," 35.
- 40 Dündar and Kazdağlı, *Ergenekon: Devlet İçinde Devlet*, 128.
- 41 Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan Türkiye'de İslami Oluşumlar*.
- 42 Cizre, "Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey."
- 43 Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, 97.
- 44 Sazak, "Toruntay."
- 45 Günlük-Şenesen, *Türkiye'de Savunma Harcamaları ve Ekonomik Etkileri, 1980–2001*, 10.
- 46 Günlük-Şenesen, *Türkiye'de Savunma Harcamaları ve Ekonomik Etkileri, 1980–2001*; Günlük-Şenesen, "Budgetary Trade-Offs of Security Expenditures in Turkey"; Günlük-Şenesen, "Turkey's Defense Expenditures in the 2000s."
- 47 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), "The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database"; Yentürk, *Askeri ve İç Güvenlik Harcamaları İzleme Kılavuzu*, 41.
- 48 SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 1987: World Armaments and Disarmament*, 201.
- 49 SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security*, 466.
- 50 Günlük-Şenesen, *Türkiye'de Savunma Harcamaları ve Ekonomik Etkileri, 1980–2001*, 87–88.
- 51 Sarıbrahimoğlu, "The Defense Industry," 153.
- 52 Kardaş, "Askeri Gücün Anayasal Bir Yargı Alanı Yaratması ve Yürütme Erkini Etkin Bir Şekilde Kullanması."
- 53 National Security Council, "National Security Council." Emphasis added by the author.
- 54 Şarlak, "National Security Council," 93–94.
- 55 National Security Council, "National Security Council."
- 56 Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy," 158.
- 57 Sarıbrahimoğlu, "Gendarmerie," 101.
- 58 Ünlü, "National Intelligence Organisation."

- 59 "MİT Raporu"; "MİT Raporu Olayındaki 125 Sayfalık Ek."
- 60 For a detailed story of the former MİT chief, Hiram Abas, see Yurdakul and Yalçın, *Reis. Gladio'nun Türk Tetikçisi*.
- 61 Kardaş, "Military Judiciary," 52–55.
- 62 Çarkoğlu and Hinich, "A Spatial Analysis of Turkish Party Preferences," 378.
- 63 Schüler, "Aleviler ve Sosyal Demokratların İttifak Arayışı," 158–61.
- 64 Ayata and Ayata, "Ethnic and Religious Bases of Voting," 141–47.
- 65 Yeğen, "Kemalizm ve Hegemonya," 69–72.
- 66 Buğra, "Bir Krize ve Bir Ahlaki Ekonominin Çöküşüne Dair," 51–56.
- 67 Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan, "Politics, Society and Financial Liberalization: Turkey in the 1990s," 500–501.
- 68 Buğra, "Bir Krize ve Bir Ahlaki Ekonominin Çöküşüne Dair," 48; Cizre and Yeldan, "The Turkish Encounter with Neo-Liberalism: Economics and Politics in the 2000/2001," 393–394. For a wider perspective of this mechanism in other regions, see Adelman and Yeldan, "The Minimal Conditions for a Financial Crisis: A Multi-Regional Inter-Temporal CGE Model of the Asian Crisis"; Öniş and Aysan, "Neoliberal Globalization, the Nation-State and Financial Crises in the Semi-Periphery: A Comparative Analysis"; Velasco, "Financial Crises and Balance of Payments Crises: A Simple Model of Southern Cone Experience."
- 69 Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan, "Politics, Society and Financial Liberalization: Turkey in the 1990s," 489.
- 70 Strange, *Casino Capitalism*.
- 71 UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP), *Global Illicit Drug Trends 1999*, 39.
- 72 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Global Illicit Drug Trends 2003*, 216. To illustrate, in 1996, 233 tones were seized in Turkey followed by Germany with 45,3 tones.
- 73 UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP), *Global Illicit Drug Trends 1999*, 30–31.
- 74 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Global Illicit Drug Trends 2001*, 107.
- 75 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *World Drug Report 2004*, 71.
- 76 Düzel, "Eroin Sıkıyönetimlerle Yerleşti."
- 77 Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues, *Rapport Annuel 1997*.
- 78 "First Germany, Now Britain and France Are Accusing Turkey."
- 79 Beşe, "Office of Special Operations."
- 80 Kılıç, "Komutanlar Konuşursa Susurluk Aydınlanır." In the investigation of the murder of the "king of casinos", Ömer Lütfi Topal, in July 1996, the fingerprints of Çatlı were found on the cartridge clip of the weapon that was used in the murder. See "Topal Cinayetinde Çatlı'nın Parmak İzi."
- 81 "Human Rights Association"; Kılıç, "5 Bin Kişiyi Öldüren JİTEM Dağıtılmadı."
- 82 "Çiller: Çatlı Şerefli."
- 83 In choosing these dimensions, Reed M. Wood and Mark Gibney refer to an earlier study: Stohl, Carleton, and Samuels, "State Violation of Human Rights and: Issues and Problems of Measurement," 600–603; Wood and Gibney, "The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-Introduction and a Comparison to CIRI," 373. Another index, "Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project" based on the same sources, is not preferred here due to its significant weaknesses: first, the PTS includes a wider range of actors committing state violation, such as the paramilitary. Although the CIRI index regards the paramilitary as a government agent, Wood and Gibney find a number of cases in which both differ in significant margins, where these agents were not taken into account. Second, the CIRI index lacks the "range" aspect; the lack of scaling for population size can lead to measurement problems. Third, the CIRI index sums disaggregated components of different types of violations; this is not justified

- considering that it equates torture to extrajudicial killings. Moreover, double measurement can occur if political prisoners are killed. Finally, the CIRI index sets the threshold for “frequent practice” to 50 incidents. However, counting incidents is quite difficult and these figures should be measured after scaling for population size. *Ibid.*, 375–380.
- 84 “Political Terror Scale.”
- 85 Sazak, “Beşiktaş Kongresi”; “Çakıcı’ya BJK Vizesi: Buzdağının Görünen Yüzü.” The mafia heavily influenced the soccer federation. In the presidency elections of the Turkish soccer federation in 1997, three candidates ran for presidency: Mustafa Kefeli who was Çakıcı’s friend and a former Beşiktaş soccer player; Haluk Ulusoy, who was protected by Ağar’s gang; and former Galatasaray club president Alp Yalman. Ağar’s gang won the elections. See Kılıç, *Kirli Kramponlar*.
- 86 Şener, *Kod Adı Atilla*, 268–87.
- 87 “CHP Deputy Claims Alleged Saudi Links with Susurluk Incident.”
- 88 It must be noted that it is quite difficult to achieve transparent information on corruptive practices in the security sector. The CPI deals with the perception of corruption in general since 1995. Only the Global Corruption Barometer has dealt with the perception of corruption in the military since 2004 (this item was not included in the report of 2009). Corruption in the paramilitary institutions is even more difficult to track, when paramilitaries engage in drug trafficking and use state terror for material gains.
- 89 “Eski Bakandan Faili Meçhul İtiraf.”
- 90 Düzel, “Eroin Sıkıyönetimlerle Yerleşti.”
- 91 “Yeni MİT Raporu.”
- 92 Savaş, *Susurluk Raporu*.
- 93 *Yasadışı Örgütlerin Devletle Olan Bağlantıları İle Susurlukta Meydana Gelen Kaza Olayının Arkasındaki İlişkilerin Aydınığa Kavuşturulması Amacıyla Kurulan Meclis Araştırma Komisyonu Raporu*; Berberoğlu, *Kod Adı Yüksekova: Susurluk, Ankara, Bodrum, Yüksekova Fay Hattı*.
- 94 Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues, *Rapport Annuel 1997*.
- 95 T. C. Sayıştay Başkanlığı, *2000 Yılı Mali Raporu*, 83–84.
- 96 Akman, “Devletin Borç Çukuru,” 33–35.
- 97 T. C. Sayıştay Başkanlığı, *2000 Yılı Mali Raporu*, 66.
- 98 Yeldan and Balkan, “Peripheral Development under Financial Liberalization: The Turkish Experience.”
- 99 10 Alper and Öniş, *Soft Budget Constraints, Government Ownership of Banks and Regulatory Failure: The Political Economy of the Turkish Banking System in the Post-Capital Account Liberalization Era*.
- 100 Ertürk, *Soygunu Gören Adam Ahmet Ertürk Konuşuyor*.
- 101 Ergüder, “The Turkish Party System and the Future of Turkish Democracy,” 71.
- 102 Sayarı, “The Changing Party System,” 18–20.
- 103 Cizre, “From Ruler to Pariah: The Life and Times of the True Path Party.”
- 104 İnsel and Bozyiğit, *Demokratisierungsdiskurse Der Türkischen Parlamentarier Bezüglich Der EU-Beitrittsoption Der Türkei. Demokratisierung À La Turca Und Die Europäische Union: Eine Inhaltsanalytische Untersuchung Der Demokratisierungsdiskurse Im Türkischen Parlament (1996 – 2003)*, 68–69.
- 105 Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan, “Politics, Society and Financial Liberalization: Turkey in the 1990s,” 503–505.
- 106 Sunar and Toprak, “Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey.”
- 107 Cizre, *Muktedirlerin Siyaseti: Merkez, Sağ, Ordu, İslamcılık*, 114–115.
- 108 Buğra, “Bir Krize ve Bir Ahlaki Ekonominin Çöküşüne Dair,” 57.
- 109 Şener, *Tepeden Tırnağa Yolsuzluk*; Seymen, *Amiral Battı*.
- 110 Kaufmann, *Governance, Aid and Corruption in Transition: Taking State Capture Seriously*. The concept of “state capture” relates to high-level or legal corruption

in its definition as an “undue and often corrupt influence of the powerful elite to shape the institutions and policies, laws and regulations for their own benefit rather than for the public good.” This concept is misleading as a metaphor for grasping the deep state, since it reduces the phenomenon to powerful economic groups, military, ethnic or religious sects, or autocrat’s family who abuse the state (resources) for their particularistic purposes. However, deep state cannot be reduced to a corrupt network within or outside the state. For a detailed analysis of “state capture”, see Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann, “Seize the State, Seize the Day: An Empirical Analysis of State Capture and Corruption in Transition Economies.”

- 111 Dağı, *Kimlik Söylem ve Siyaset: Doğu-Batı Ayrımında Refah Partisi Geleneği*.
- 112 Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan, “Politics, Society and Financial Liberalization: Turkey in the 1990s,” 501.
- 113 Cizre and Çınar, “Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process”; Cizre, “Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey.”
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- 119 Demir, “The Militarization of the Market and Rent-Seeking Coalitions in Turkey,” 680, 682–683. Demir uses the figures from OYAK balance sheets from various years (US dollars of 1995 deflated by the US Wholesale Price Index).
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- 130 Aksoy, “The Gendarmerie,” 182–184.
- 131 Cem, *Avrupa’nın “Birliği” ve Türkiye*, 63.
- 132 Commission of the European Communities, *1999 Regular Report From the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession*.
- 133 Birand, *Türkiye’nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası (1959–2004)*, 391–392.
- 134 Yetkin, *Avrupa Birliği Bekleme Odasında Türkiye*, 23–39.
- 135 After the 2001 crisis, 21 bankrupt banks were transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu, TMSF). Demirel’s favourite, Çağlar’s Interbank, was one of these bankrupt banks. The former Chief of the TMSF, Ahmet Ertürk, argues that this size of corruption could not succeed without the collaboration of politicians and bureaucrats. The “Whirlwind Operation” brought only the bankers to justice. See Ertürk, *Soygunu Gören Adam Ahmet Ertürk Konuşuyor*.

- 136 Cizre and Yeldan, "The Turkish Encounter with Neo-Liberalism: Economics and Politics in the 2000/2001," 391–393.
- 137 Rodrik and Velasco, *Short-Term Capital Flows*, 60–61. In Cizre and Yeldan, "The Turkish Encounter with Neo-Liberalism: Economics and Politics in the 2000/2001," 396.
- 138 Yeldan, "On the IMF-Directed Disinflation Program in Turkey: A Program for Stabilization and Austerity or a Recipe for Impoverishment and Financial Chaos?"
- 139 T. C. Sayıştay Başkanlığı, *2000 Yılı Mali Raporu*, 137.
- 140 *Ibid.*, 82.
- 141 Cizre and Yeldan, "The Turkish Encounter with Neo-Liberalism: Economics and Politics in the 2000/2001," 397.
- 142 T. C. Sayıştay Başkanlığı, *2000 Yılı Mali Raporu*, 55–56.
- 143 *Ibid.*, 84–85.
- 144 Demir, "The Militarization of the Market and Rent-Seeking Coalitions in Turkey," 682–683.
- 145 *Ibid.*, 684.
- 146 Cizre and Yeldan, "The Turkish Encounter with Neo-Liberalism: Economics and Politics in the 2000/2001," 398–403.
- 147 "Harmonization package" is a term of reference for "a draft law consisting of a collection of amendments to different laws designed to amend more than one code or law at a time, which was approved or rejected in a single voting session in the parliament" (Keyman and Aydın, "European Integration and the Transformation of Turkish Democracy," 15). For the content of these reforms, see Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği, *Avrupa Birliği Uyum Yasa Paketleri*.
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- 149 Cizre, "The Justice and Development Party and the Military: Recreating the Past after Reforming It?," 140–44.
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- 156 Erdoğan, "Neo-Kemalizm, Organik Bunalım ve Hegemonya."
- 157 Uslu, "Ulusalçılık: The Neo-Nationalist Resurgence in Turkey," 87–88, 93.
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- 159 Dağı, *Turkey Between Democracy and Militarism: Post Kemalist Perspectives*, 207–209.
- 160 These reports are available on the website of the TI. See Transparency International, "Transparency International Policy and Research Surveys and Indices."
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- 164 *EU Drug Markets Report: A Strategic Analysis*, 30.
- 165 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *World Drug Report 2012*, 32.
- 166 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *World Drug Report 2004*, 77, 15.
- 167 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *World Drug Report 2013*, 22, 30.
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- 169 *Turkish Report of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime*, 2011.
- 170 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, 306.
- 171 For a comprehensive analysis of the press's perception of judicial independence, fair trial, and impunity with respect to the court cases related to the deep state by Meryem Erdal, see Aydın *et al.*, *Just Expectations: A Compilation of TESEV Research Studies on the Judiciary in Turkey*, 91–144.
- 172 Ağırdir, *Siyasette ve Toplumda Kutuplaşma*, 18. The questions are as follows: 1. Via the Ergenekon court case, the government a) fights against criminal gangs or b) punishes the opposition. 2. With respect to the attitude of the government towards the judiciary, the government a) exerts pressure or b) doesn't meddle with the judiciary. 3. The 2010 constitutional amendments are a) necessary for democratization or b) adopted to install a civilian dictatorship. 4. a) Coups or b) reactionaryism is a greater threat. 5. Reactionaryism increased during the term of AKP a) true or b) neither true nor false or c) false. 6. During the term of the AKP, the government made very important reforms in some aspects a) true or b) neither true nor false or c) false. 7. The military can intervene, if necessary a) true or b) neither true nor false. 8. Political parties can be banned, if necessary a) true or b) neither true nor false. 9. I fear of the installment of a Sharia regime a) true or b) neither true nor false.
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- 174 *Ibid.*, 17.
- 175 Zürcher, "The Importance of Being Secular: Islam in the Service of the National and Pre-National State," 64–65.
- 176 Yavuz and Esposito, *Turkish Islam and the Secular State*.
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- 178 Çakır, "İslami Kesim İçinde Cumhuriyet Tarihinin En Büyük Kavgası Yaşanıyor."
- 179 Seufert, *Überdehnt Sich Die Bewegung von Fethullah Gülen? Eine Türkische Religionsgemeinde Als Naitonaler Und Internationaler Akteur*, 19.
- 180 Düzel, "Ali Bayramoğlu: 'Cemaat Şeffaflaşmalı, Tartışılmalı.'" For Avcı's controversial book on Ergenekon and the Gülen movement, see Avcı, *Haliç'te Yaşayan Simonlar: Dün Devlet, Bugün Cemaat*. For a comprehensive account of the ambiguity inherent in the movement, see Hendrick, *Gülen: The Ambiguous Politics of Market Islam in Turkey and the World*.
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- 182 Çakır, "İslami Kesim İçinde Cumhuriyet Tarihinin En Büyük Kavgası Yaşanıyor."
- 183 Coşkun, *Anayasa Süreci Nerede Tıkanı*.
- 184 Köker, *Yeni Anayasada Temel İlkeler ve Hükümet Sistemi Tercihi*, 18–21.
- 185 O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy."
- 186 Merkel *et al.*, *Defekte Demokratie*, Bd.1: *Theorie*, 89.
- 187 Corke *et al.*, *Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey*.
- 188 Dağı, "A State in the Making: Kurdistan."
- 189 Springborg, *Political Islam and Europe – Views from the Arab Mediterranean States and Turkey*.

- 190 *Gezi Raporu: Toplumun "Gezi Parkı Olayları" Algısı Gezi Parkındakiler Kimlerdi?*, 69, 72–73, 78.
- 191 Uğur, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye: İnandırıcılık ve Dayanak İkilemi*.
- 192 Taşpınar, "The Rise of Turkish Gaullism: Getting Turkish-American Relations Right."
- 193 Yeldan, "Patterns of Adjustment under the Age of Finance: The Case of Turkey as a Peripheral Agent of Neoliberal Globalization," 4–7, 9.
- 194 Öniş, "Power, Interests and Coalitions: The Political Economy of Mass Privatization in Turkey," 7–9, 17.
- 195 Cizre, "İktidarın Yeni İdeolojisi: Statükocu Reformizm."
- 196 Milli Savunma Bakanlığı, *Beyaz Kitap Türkiye 2000*; Turkish Armed Forces, "Force Levels of the Turkish Armed Forces."
- 197 20 Yentürk, *Measuring Turkish Military Expenditure*, 17.
- 198 Sariibrahimoğlu, "Turkish Armed Forces," 62–63, 72; Gencer and Sümer, *Recruiting and Retention of Military Personnel: Turkey*, 3.
- 199 Hen-Tov, "The Political Economy of Turkish Military Modernization."
- 200 Akay, "Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri: Kurumsal ve Askeri Boyut," 127.
- 201 Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü, *Yüksek Askeri Şura ve Hükümet-TSK İlişkileri*.
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6 Conclusion

This single case study traced the within-case temporal variation of the Turkish state (formation, consolidation, and breakdown) from the seventeenth century Ottoman Empire to the contemporary Turkish Republic. It generated an analytical framework of a path-dependent phenomenon called “deep state” and discussed the conditions for the consolidation of democracy in this macro-social setting. Theory-building was based on an eclectic theorization of analytical frameworks of democratization, state consolidation, revolution, civil-military relations, and democratic consolidation. They were modified and combined to generate a middle-range theory, specifically, as Rueschemeyer calls it, a focused meta-theory which suggests few directly testable hypotheses, but which focuses on problem formation as well as on the generation and revision of related concepts.

In order to strengthen the causal inferences against the basic limits of case studies, the inferences were based on a historical approach to causality – specifically, on path-dependent explanations – which identifies causal mechanisms and justifies hypotheses through theoretically grounded causal process observations. This path-dependent explanation showed that the deep state emerged as a result of a self-reinforcing historical causation initiated after a critical juncture – i.e. a time of heightened contingency during a narrowly circumscribed period, when specific decisions had high political impact with long-term consequences, and paved the way for the formation of institutions that have self-reproducing properties.

The other examples of historical causation depicted in this book were slow-moving causal processes: causal chains, cumulative causes, and threshold effects. The persuasiveness of the causal chains was sustained and, in order to avoid an infinite regression during process tracing, causal chains were broken according to theoretical guidelines, at critical junctures, or at points where it proved to be difficult to trace causal connections. Theorized causal mechanisms shed light on the path-dependent emergence, rise, and decline of the deep state. The types of common causal mechanisms of institutional creation and resilience followed during the path-dependent development of the Turkish deep state were increasing returns, negative feedback, and cyclical process. Moreover, the interaction between the state and democracy was examined by

integrating cleavages, political parties, and elites as secondary units into the analysis.

The theory-driven type of process tracing necessitated aligning methodology with ontology. Two-level theories and three-level concepts allowed for conceptual precision. Four types of causal processes were illustrated in the process-tracing explanations. Concepts such as revolution, deep state, and democratic consolidation were theorized as *complex forms of causality* – i.e. a conjunction of several variables and conditions in a multi-level theory. The *path-dependent causal process* examined the emergence and trajectory of the deep state. Moreover, the *interaction effects* between formal and informal institutions were elaborated as the change of the state and the political regime are related in a reciprocal causality. Finally, *linear causality* was exemplified by the simple micro-level phenomena that can be examined through the analysis of the direct chain of events.

With the aim of contributing to the Moore Research Program on the emergence of democracy and authoritarianism, the theoretical chapter introduced state and cleavages as new causal variables for regime change and suggested an alternative explanation for *regime change through state transformation*. A central role was given to the state at the macro-structural level. This chapter applied an integrative path-dependent strategy, which regards institutions as mediatory units between the structure and agency. It established links to the deep state and democracy on four levels of analysis. It discussed state formation, consolidation, and breakdown in the context of international/world systemic developments. It specified the impact of the state as a macro structure and cleavages as a domestic structure on democracy. The concept of deep state was generated by relating it to the military as a meso-level institution, along with the formal and informal institutions. On the micro-level, actor constellations, decisions, and their outcomes were examined. The breakdown of the deep state, international anchors, and elite settlement were hypothesized as the causes of democratic consolidation.

As listed by Mahoney, the analytical components of a path-dependent explanation in terms of sequential stages involve, at the first stage, antecedent historical conditions that influence the options available for actors. In the second stage, the critical juncture occurs when a window of opportunity for various actions is opened to actors who select a particular option from among alternatives. In the third stage, that particular option creates an institution which is reproduced due to structural persistence. In the fourth stage, a reactive sequence – i.e. reactions and counter-reactions to that institution – intervene and challenge the structural persistence. In the last stage, the regime outcome depends on the resolution of the conflict.

In order to examine the antecedent conditions, we needed an explanatory scheme which adequately accounts for macro-social settings different to those in Western Europe whose early modern, feudal roots in the liberal democracy were traced by Downing to the prior existence of medieval constitutionalism and the absence of a military revolution predating the rise of the bourgeoisie.

Referring to Weber, Barkey, Tilly, and Mann, the features of Western European feudal domination were contrasted to the patrimonial domination of the Ottoman state according to the type of land tenure, style of state centralization, transformation to capitalist economy, and sources of social change and state breakdown. The informal source of the Turkish deep state was traced back to the brokerage style of state centralization under the Ottoman patrimonial domination that involved the fabrication of, and negotiation with, bandits. A two-level theory based on Trimberger's *Revolution from above* was constructed. The formal source of the Turkish deep state was traced back to the autonomy of the bureaucrats, one of the secondary level causes of the revolution from above.

At the domestic-structural level, this book referred to the hypotheses of Lipset and Rokkan on cleavages. It confirmed Skocpol's hypothesis that particular class and cleavage constellations were not a cause but an outcome of the way the state was organized. The strong state played a crucial role in the securing a center-periphery cleavage constellation and exerted influence in controlling the party system. It distorted, through military interventions, constitutional measures, party closures, and changing election systems, the translation of infrastructural conflicts to party systems. Therefore, the reproduction of state-cleavage structures replaced state-class structures in the third stage in the template of path-dependent explanations of regime change – structural persistence.

Before generating the three-level concept of deep state, this study addressed the question of political regimes. It opted for a continuous concept of political regimes and distinguished the negative pole (autocracy) from the positive pole (democracy) through legitimation, monopoly, structure, and the use of domination, as well as access and claim to domination. Diminished subtypes of authoritarian regimes were categorized according to the criteria of access to power and the legitimation of power. This study referred to the positive pole of the basic level (liberal democracy) and employed the concept of "defective democracy" developed by Merkel *et al.* to explain the gray zone between autocracy and liberal democracy. It claimed that defective democracies that lack democratic civilian oversight have the potential to become deep state.

The three-level concept of deep state was constructed by placing the state at the basic level. The basic level causes are found down the ladder of abstraction, in political regimes, tutelary democracy and delegative democracy. The concepts of military autonomy and the undemocratic control of the security sector were placed at the secondary level. The basic and secondary levels were tied together theoretically with causality. This study extracted secondary level variables primarily from the interaction between the formal and informal institutions in post-transitional settings where perverse institutionalization enables undemocratic formal and informal rules to prevent formal democratic institutionalization. The *sui generis* repertoire of the deep state's informal institutions comprises forms of special relationships, of violent exertion of

influence, and of material exchange. The indicator level provided a detailed causal analysis of the secondary level dimension.

On the basic level, concept generation made the positive pole (semi-formal state) and the negative pole (informal state) explicit; it specified the content between these poles and theorized the gray zone. The necessary conditions for the formal, semi-formal, and informal state were made explicit. The form of the state changes according to the extent of undemocratic informal institutions' fusion with formal institutions, whether civilian rulers tilt the balance in the informal domination's favor, or whether the deep state exerts ideological hegemony. A sufficiency criterion for the emergence of semi-formal and informal states was identified. In the semi-formal state under military tutelage, dual domination through high level military autonomy signals deep state's existence and civilian rulers appease this modality of domination, whereas in the informal state they actively cooperate to enforce the *sui generis* repertoire. In the informal state, the military autonomy reaches the highest levels; deep state is converted into *the* state and the difference between an authoritarian regime and defective democracy is nominal.

The two-level theory of democratic consolidation indicated a *regime change through state transformation*, which comprises, as the basic level jointly sufficient causes, the breakdown of the deep state, international anchors, and elite settlements. Elite settlements were defined as a deliberate consensus and compromise between disunified elites for making democracy the "only game in town". Consolidation succeeds when perverse institutionalization is reversed and the interplay of formal and informal institutions is changed to destroy the deep state. The two-level theory directly related the secondary level variable to the outcome variable – the consolidation of democracy – in an ontological relationship with state transformation, elite settlement, and cleavage transformation.

As this book explicitly referred to a historical context and explored a conjunction of variables leading to an outcome, it enabled us to make "context-specific generalizations"¹ pertaining to the deep state in tutelary and delegative democracies. Single-case analyses have higher internal validity compared to cross-case analyses. Further research has the potential to establish conceptual equivalences and complementarity with cross-case analysis, and to thereby establish the external validity of the theoretical propositions of this book. It would be fruitful to extend this approach to selected cases of tutelary democracy with a history of protracted armed conflict, such as Pakistan and Indonesia. A comparison with the Turkish case could explore the critical junctures that paved the way for the installation of the deep state. Permissive conditions could guide us in finding out the underlying context of the contingency responsible for leading to a specific path being taken; productive conditions could enable us to grasp the outcomes of the critical juncture and "lock in" effects; critical antecedents could be connected to productive conditions for elucidating the differential causal effects of the independent variables between the cases.

Russia, the Philippines, Colombia, and Peru, all of whom have shifted between illiberal and delegative democracy in their history, could be further

cases for a comparative analysis of deep states. The analysis of critical junctures and the *sui generis* repertoire of the deep state's informal institutions would remain the same, putsch threat being excluded. Path dependent explanation would trace causal mechanisms and help us in grasping the functioning of perverse institutionalization in these countries that allows the executive branch to steer patronage networks in the deep state; concomitantly, it would evaluate the effective deterrence and compromise imposed by the executive branch on the formal security apparatus.

The third chapter elucidated the antecedent conditions of the Turkish deep state's path dependency. It demonstrated the Turkish deep state's informal and formal sources, state-banditry relations in the seventeenth century and the autonomy of the military bureaucrats in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, respectively. In contrast to the early medieval Western Europe described by Downing, Ottoman patrimonial domination impeded medieval constitutionalism; military revolution was absent because of the presence of a standing army. State consolidation proceeded in a causal chain related to the long-term dissolution of provincial *timar* system that was implemented as a response to the exigencies of the global crisis in the seventeenth century. The worldwide systemic impacts of the crisis created a multi-sequence and multi-stage causal process with major long-term outcomes. At the end of the crisis, the Ottoman economy was transformed into a semi-feudal type of peripheral formation.

Referring to Barkey, the Ottoman brokerage-style consolidation was contrasted with the Chinese incorporation of bandits and the Russian incorporation of the Cossack region. Banditry in China was a rural, societal creation. In the long-run, peasant revolutions destroyed the Russian and Chinese states. The Ottoman patrimonial state imposed a brokerage-style consolidation. Banditry was fabricated by the state and incorporated into the state. Lacking regional power-holders, the Ottoman state isolated each class on the vertical and horizontal lines of the social structure; the state made deals with bandits to control and repress rural society during the long-term dissolution of the provincial *timar* system. Following Heper, the Ottoman-Turkish monist polity was placed at the extreme pole on the continuum of strong states developed by Dyson, who placed at the other side of the pole the Prussian-German dual polity.

The decline and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire encompassed two causal chains leading to the emergence of bureaucratic takeover, a basic level cause of the revolution from above. These chains comprised the secondary variables of bureaucratic takeover: autonomy from class domination, landlord vulnerability, and the radicalization of the bureaucrats. The first causal chain from the eighteenth century to the *Tanzimat* period in the mid-nineteenth century dealt with the rise of the Janissaries and the *ayan* as well as the expansion of banditry associated with the shifting power relations. The palace crushed the Janissaries and *ayan*, while reforms granted bureaucrats with autonomy and paved the way for the emergence of local notables as the new landed upper class, vulnerable to the political power of these elites. Following

Mardin and Özbudun, it was argued that the cultural center-periphery cleavage between the rulers and the ruled, or between the secularized bureaucratic center and the Islamic opposition, overlapped with the church-state cleavage.

The second causal chain began with the emergence of the Young Ottoman movement. The gradual radicalization of the bureaucratic opposition of the Young Turks ended with the bureaucratic takeover of 1908. Banditry rose in the Balkans and Western Anatolia from the late nineteenth century onwards in the context of military defeats and the mass Muslim-Turkish migration to Anatolia from the lost Balkan territories. The bureaucrats' underground organization called the Committee of Union and Progress collaborated with Macedonian gangs against the absolutist regime in the revolution of 1908. The critical juncture for the emergence of the deep state started in June 1908 Reval meeting of the Great Powers on the Macedonian issue. After the closure of this juncture in July 1913 with the formation of the Young Turk dictatorship, the deep state's informal institutions were installed. The members of the main autocratic clique of the deep state, the clandestine Special Organization, were mainly former bandits. Extrajudicial executions, corruption and organized crime were inseparably intertwined in the First World War, when the ethnic and religious structure of Anatolia was reshaped.

This study confirmed the continuity between the pre-World War I Young Turk era and the making of the nation state during the War of Independence. The 1908 revolution did not lead to state breakdown, instead the extreme international pressure, culminating in a total War of Independence after World War I was a necessary cause of the revolutionary crisis that led to the Ottoman state's demise. Indeed, the 1908 revolution functioned as a "dress rehearsal" for the revolution from above. The revolution from above was again facilitated by collaboration with bandits. Gangs, the backbone of the National Forces (*Kuva-yı Milliye*), gained a highly positive connotation by symbolizing the pioneers of national liberation.

The fourth chapter categorized the authoritarian regime during the single-party rule of the CHP. According to the criteria of the legitimatization of power, the regime was called an authoritarian-modernizing regime with corporatist features. With respect to the criteria of access to power, this book analyzed the formal design of the regime, its constitutional tenets, and its internal party dynamics were discussed. It was argued that the regime gained clear-cut personalist features after the prominent pashas resigned and the "chief system" was adopted in 1927. The legacy of this period for the deep state was the association of *raison d'état* with secularism and nationalism. Kemalism defined the borders of politics and the ideological perception of an "Islamist threat" underpinned perverse institutionalization, especially of putsch threat and serious discrimination in the electoral system. Referring to Trimberger, it was argued that the bureaucrats' coalition with the local rentier landlords had political costs for the rural middle classes, since it depoliticized the family peasantry. This coalition was also an impediment to self-sufficient autonomous industrialization.

The causal chain was broken at the critical juncture for the transition to democracy and the deep state, which lasted from June 1945 Soviet threat to the announcement of the multi-party system by İnönü in July 1947. The choices of powerful international actors and the Turkish ruling elite paved the way for the transition to democracy; at the same time these decisions closed off alternatives other than the reemergence of the deep state. In other words, this critical juncture paved the way for the *change of the state through regime transformation*. Turkey's deep state was embedded in the Western Bloc through a dependent relationship with the US under the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. From 1947 to 1952, autocratic cliques were installed and extrajudicial executions carried out extensively. The main autocratic clique was established as a part of "Operation *Gladio*", under NATO, to counter the "communist threat". The Turkish *Gladio* or the Counterguerilla's official name was the Special Warfare Department (ÖHD). During the Cold War, the ÖHD cooperated closely with the CIA and the Military Mission for US Aid in Turkey. The tense relations with Greece over Cyprus paved the way for the first large-scale operation of the deep state: the pogrom of September 6–7, 1955.

The fourth chapter traced the effects of the Truman and Marshall aids at the international macro level on the interaction between the military and political elites. Hypotheses on civil-military relations were compared for explaining the causes of the 1960 coup. The landslide electoral success of the DP in 1950 enabled the periphery to challenge the center, as represented by the state elites. The 1960 coup disproved Nordlinger's arguments about the preservation of middle-class interests and distributional coalitions as the motivation of putschists and proved correct Linz and Stepan who referred to the dispersion of political power between the loyal, semi-loyal and disloyal factions. The Truman and Marshall aids created factionalism among junior officers, who were critical of the growing US dominance in Turkey. Moreover, opposition inside the DP grew with the economic downturn and the authoritarian tendencies of Menderes. Although it operated within the confines of market capitalism and Kemalist étatism, the putsch threat was compounded by rhetoric about "reactionary threat". The coup overthrew the DP government in 1960.

The high military autonomy level in the 1950s confirmed the deep state's existence. The level in the professional sphere was middle. In contrast to the very high autonomy in military doctrine and education due to the impact of Kemalism, autonomy in other categories was low because the TSK was bound by the Law on the US Aid to Greece and Turkey in terms of force levels, modernization and reform, and junior level personnel decisions. The level of autonomy in the professional-political sphere was middle. High level was estimated in the organization of defense, despite the formal subordination of the General Staff to civil authority stipulated by the agreement with the US. The level in senior promotions was middle, considering the partial compromise of the higher cadres with the government and the relevance of the power relations between major cliques within the military in promotions. Due to dependence on the US in military budgets and in arms production and

procurement, the level in these categories was low. High levels were estimated in all categories of the political-judicial sphere. The ÖHD, the post of president, and the gendarmerie secured high autonomy in internal security. Organic ties of the ÖHD chiefs and cadres with the intelligence agency were established. With respect to judicial prosecution, the Janus-headed judiciary was traced back to the coexistence of civil and military courts.

The fourth chapter traced increasing returns and negative feedback as self-reinforcing causal mechanisms of the deep state between 1960 and 1980. These mechanisms worked together rather than competing with each other. The military interventions in 1971 and 1980 – equilibriums in the negative feedback mechanism – occurred due to the paradoxical consequences of the cooperation of civil and military elites in hindering junta movements and restoring the hierarchy. This cooperation strengthened internal cohesion and the autonomy of the military. The top military brass's priority to preserve the corporate identity of officers led to redemocratizations.

This book argued that the state conquered the center of politics and situated itself against the periphery. The military interventions, formal institutional changes, and the *sui generis* repertoire of the deep state's informal institutions targeted the exclusion of social powers in the periphery by the center. In the 1960s and 1970s, the deep state was restored and strengthened to maintain the cleavage constellation based on the deep state's power, which deepened ideological polarization; in the 1980s and 1990s, the pressure of the state to maintain this center-periphery divide gradually eroded the power of the political center and brought those cleavages more distant from the center to the fore: the secular-Islamist and ethnic divides. In the 1990s, political Islam and the Kurdish question were countered by transforming the deep state into "the state".

The heuristic grid of Lipset and Rokkan, comprising a two dimensional space, placed alliances of voters within the center-periphery axis and the cross-local-functional axis of ideological divide. In the 1960s and 1970s, left-right ideological tension, which was connoted with (anti-)communism and (anti-)Islamism, steadily increased. The extension of liberties with the 1961 Constitution increased leftist political activism. As Cizre argued, the AP, the successor to the DP in the periphery, struggled to counter the putsch threat by approaching the center ideologically through a staunchly anti-communist stance. The AP employed a double-discourse: a secularist rhetoric appeasing the military and a softly belligerent rhetoric confronting it. The CHP in the center sought to widen its constituency by moving, in 1965, to the left of the center and competed with the socialist TİP for the votes of the urban lower classes. This book claimed that, as the Ottoman state fabricated banditry for state consolidation, the Turkish state fabricated banditry by recruiting "modern gangs" in the late 1960s. ÖHD cadres were strengthened with young fascist elements of the Idealist Hearts recruited from the urban poor and university students. These "modern bandits", Gray Wolves, in the service of the state engaged in gradually escalating political violence with the leftist opposition.

Moreover, political capitalism tied the capitalists' fate to the state. The military-industrial complex under the military-held OYAK, established after the 1960 coup, provided increasing returns for the military, and played a pivotal role in shaping the import substitution policy between 1960 and 1980.

This study also discussed the interaction effects between the cleavages and classes in these two decades. Lipset and Rokkan refer to the democratic effect of the middle class after World War II in bridging the gaps between the working class and the bourgeoisie. However, in the Turkish aliberal society, in which pre-industrial cleavages prevailed, cleavage constellations and voter alignments hindered both social democracy and full-blown fascism due to the salience of the center-periphery cleavage. As the middle classes were split, the demands of the urban working class exacerbated tensions between the modernizing centrist elite and the conservative periphery.

The coup by memorandum in 1971 was another balancing force that restored and strengthened the deep state in the negative feedback mechanism. Civil liberties were curbed with the support of the AP, which shifted from its strategy of double-discourse to a discourse of order. The Islamist MSP partially dissociated the votes of middle and lower classes from the AP on the right ideological divide. The social democratic policies of the CHP offered more democracy through an alliance of lower and middle classes. Social and political polarization increased. The 1973 oil crisis, the US embargo in 1975 and the European economic sanctions after the intervention in Cyprus aggravated the crisis-ridden economy. The inability of the CHP and the AP to forge a grand coalition led the small parties like the Islamist MNP and the far-right MHP to form short-lived coalition governments, with disproportionate leverage, and paralyzed the parliament.

The fragmentation of the party system was compounded by deep state activities. "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" was used against the leftist opposition by the Nationalist Front governments, specifically by the MHP and the MSP. Autocratic cliques were strengthened during the Nationalist Front governments. Political violence reached unprecedented levels in the late 1970s, as the MHP developed into a paramilitary organization with its "modern bandits" recruited from the Gray Wolves and the massacres and unknown-assailant murders of the ÖHD and MİT rose dramatically. The 1980 coup balanced the negative feedback mechanism and provided stability to apply the measures necessary to comply with the liberal market.

The evidence of this study refuted the idea of extending the BA model to Turkey. The economic crisis that paved the way for the 1980 coup did not lead to BA, although the process was similar to the three stages described by O'Donnell. First, the Turkish military refrained from installing military regimes. Second, the deep state made this type of regime (or state) redundant. Third, unlike Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the Turkish military's economic power derived from its political power, which is closely linked to the official ideology. Economic reductionism would not help in understanding Turkey. Fourth, the Turkish economy was not transnationalized until the 2000s. The vicious cycle

of instability marked by polarization, violence, and economic crisis was sustained due to the deep state. The coup makers did not implant a BA state, but restored and expanded the deep state.

The military autonomy levels rose to very high in the two decades after the 1960 coup. The level in the professional sphere increased to high. In military education and doctrine the level increased to very high, since putsch threat was inscribed in the TSK Internal Service Code by invoking Kemalism. The autonomy in determining force levels and military reform increased to high levels with NATO membership. With respect to the category of junior officers, the military autonomy rose to high levels, since the General Staff could tighten its control over the lower cadres and punished those acting outside the hierarchical order and ideological parameters by expelling them from the military.

The level in the professional-political sphere increased to high levels as well. The level increased in the organization of defense, since the chief of staff was formally tied to the Prime Minister. The level in senior promotions increased to high because of the informal codes governing the YAŞ. The lack of democratic accountability over military budgets, as well as arms production and procurement, increased the autonomy level to high. The level in the political-judicial sphere rose to very high. The MGK, the post of president, and the gendarmerie secured very high autonomy in internal security. In intelligence gathering, the lack of democratic accountability was exacerbated in tandem with the increase in the number of covert operations of the deep state. With respect to judicial prosecution, the level of military autonomy increased to very high due to the heightened impunity of autocratic cliques.

The fifth chapter traced three path-dependent causal mechanisms of the deep state – negative feedback, increasing returns, and cyclical process – from 1980 to 2000 as well as the break of the negative feedback mechanism and the decline of the cyclical process in the 2000s. The first two sections traced the negative feedback mechanism that began after the 1980 coup and ended in the 1997 coup by memorandum. The first section covered the 1980s, which were marked by the transition to a liberal economy; the next section evaluated the 1990s when the deep state was transformed into “*the state*” in the context of the low-intensity warfare and the transition to a neo-liberal economy. The 1982 Constitution deepened perverse institutionalization by extending the Janus-headed feature of the state institutions with the MGK’s widened jurisdiction, the president’s veto powers, and State Security Courts. Repeated military interventions gave way to low-level institutionalization of the party system and weakened the power of the party leaders.

The center-right ANAP formed the governments in the 1980s. This decade deepened the distributional deterioration, since real wages and high inflation taxation served as tools for liberalization. The secular-Islamist cleavage overlapped with the urban-rural divide and was exacerbated due to the widening regional distributional inequalities. The small- and medium-sized enterprises that constituted the “Anatolian tigers” flourished with the unskilled labor

force recruited from the urban poor. Özal supported their production and investment capacity with minimal subsidies. Liberalization of the political arena in 1987 exacerbated contestation for state resources. The second half of the 1980s was marked by the integration of the religious orders into capitalism and they influenced the electoral fate of the center-right ANAP, the DYP, and the Islamist RP. The integration of religious orders into capitalism, however, did not threaten big business and the secular establishment in this decade. The increasing returns mechanism, with respect to the military-industrial complex, gathered pace in the liberal era. OYAK ranked among the five largest holdings in Turkey due to its share in the redistribution through paternalistic patronage, which deprived the bourgeoisie from a solid basis for autonomy. The underground economy that could not afford to enter market relations was incorporated through gangs.

In the 1980s, organized crime and armed conflict began to reproduce each other in a cyclical process. As the Ottoman state fabricated banditry and hired bandits for state consolidation, the Turkish state integrated “modern bandits” into the service of the state. The cyclical process was demonstrated with the correlation between the rise of corruption, drug trafficking, and political terror in the transformation of political capitalism. The state recruited prominent ultra-nationalist mafia bosses and gunmen from the Gray Wolves to fight against ASALA. These gunmen began to be involved in the lucrative heroin business. The clashes with the PKK in East and Southeast Turkey in 1984, especially the proclamation of a state of emergency in 1987, were a turning point for the deep state. The Gendarmerie Intelligence and Anti-Terror Organization (JITEM) and the village guards were included in the autocratic cliques. They were increasingly involved in drug trafficking, money laundering, and unknown-assailant murders. In the 1980s, a type of businessmen emerged whose capital was at least partially derived from illegality. Profits from fictitious exports were a widespread form of corruption in this decade.

The military autonomy increased from high to very high in the 1980s. The level in the professional sphere was very high. The competition for ideological championship ensured very high autonomy levels in military doctrine and education. With respect to military reform and force levels, autonomy increased through the influence of the MGK. The autonomy level in junior level personnel decisions remained very high. In the professional-political sphere, the autonomy increased to very high levels. In the organization of defense, the military hierarchy centralized the chain of command under the General Staff. In senior promotions, the chief of staff was appointed according to informal rules, and general cadres rose exponentially. The level in military budgets rose to very high due to the addition of extra methods which enabled rent distribution and secrecy. Turkey ranked among the first 5 top arms importers globally after the declaration of the state of emergency in 1987. The level in arms production and procurement reached its peak due to a lack of civilian oversight despite the detrimental effect of arms spending on the budget deficit. The level in the political-judicial sphere was very high. In internal security,

the MGK acquired competences in formulating and implementing the security policy. The National Security Policy Document functioned as the “secret constitution”. The presidency and the gendarmerie continued to bolster the influence of the TSK. The level in intelligence gathering remained very high, especially through the undersecretaries recruited from the military. The autonomy level in judicial prosecution increased, since the 1982 Constitution widened the jurisdiction of the military courts.

In the 1990s, the deep state was transformed to *the* state, i.e. the informal state, and the Turkish state shifted to the boundary between democracy and autocracy. The cyclical process continued to reproduce organized crime and armed conflict in the context of the symbiotic relationship between the Kurdish question and the deep state. This book analyzed the interaction effects between low-intensified warfare, rampant drug trafficking, political terror, and corruption. Turkey played a major role in global heroin trafficking in the 1990s. In 1998, the state budget amounted to 62 billion dollars, whereas the drug profit was 70 billion dollars, half of which remained in Turkey. The Special Operations Department of the police high command joined the autocratic cliques made up of the ÖHD, MİT, JİTEM, and the village guards.

The Susurluk scandal in 1996 brought state-mafia connections into the headlines. A car accident exposed the relationship between Abdullah Çatlı, a wanted killer and drug trafficker on the Interpol’s Red List, Hüseyin Kocadağ, a former deputy head of the Istanbul Police Department, and Sedat Bucak, the leader of a Kurdish village guard clan who also was a member of the parliament from the DYP. Official investigations into Susurluk implicated the then Minister of Internal Affairs Mehmet Ağar in the RP-DYP government. Several gangs, including the Ağar gang and the Çatlı gang, were involved in drug trafficking and the fight against the PKK. According to the Political Terror Scale, state terror varied between the highest levels (4 and 5) in this decade. It reached a peak between 1992 and 1996, especially during the term of DYP leader, Çiller, as prime minister.

The main cause behind the vicious cycle of the growth-instability-crisis after the transition to neo-liberal capitalism in 1989 was the weakness of the financial sectors. Flexible exchange rates, overvaluation of the national currency in foreign exchange markets, the current accounts deficit, and the sudden devaluation of the national currency were the prime movers of the crises in Turkey in 1994, similar to the crises in Mexico, Argentina, and Russia. In Turkey, as disposable income declined, finances become accountable to external asset markets based on speculative gains derived from “hot money” which was partially derived from organized crime.

The financial system collapsed in 1994 in the context of fierce competition for rent-distribution, high domestic debt, and high-level corruption. The illegal capital was partially transferred to investment through the privatization of state-owned enterprises, but mostly to the media and banking sectors. The party system, especially the center-right, became extremely fragmented. Fragmentation in the 1990s was caused by the competition between parties of similar

ideological predispositions, unlike the 1970s. The Islamist RP, the far-right MHP, and the pro-Kurdish parties undermined the dominant role of the center-right parties. The 1990s witnessed rampant corruption in the center-right parties and their mutual understanding in covering up each other's scandals. Turkey ranked as a highly corrupt country from the mid-1990s to 2002 according to the Corruption Perception Index. Political Islam gained momentum as an answer to the corruption of the center-right for the urban conservative middle classes and the urban poor. The rise of the RP was also caused by the "Anatolian tigers", which became the backbone of the social base of this party. The 1997 putsch overthrew the RP-DYP government led by Erbakan under the premise of fighting reactionism. The coup led to the erosion of the power of the political center at large.

The party system in the 1990s reflected the resilience of the center-periphery cleavage and the particular salience of the secular-religious cleavage and the ethnic cleavage in the periphery. Secular-religious and ethnic-linguistic fault lines had more impact on voter alignments than economic, worker-owner cleavages. The rising tide of political Islam, the changing tone of the PKK's belligerence in favor of secession, the first Gulf War, and the new global order in the post-Cold War era provided a conjunction of threats which were countered by rising military autonomy and the hegemony of Kemalism. The 1997 putsch reorganized the finance capital along the interests of the media barons and generals in the executive committees of private banks, which were the main lenders to the government.

Another crisis of speculative growth and recession followed in 1999. As was the case after the 1994 economic crisis, the executive committees of private banks "siphoned off" the assets of these banks. In order to grasp how the rent mechanism functioned, the creation of duty losses in public banks was examined. The figures showed that the state acted like a money monger to its own institutions. In order to afford rent distribution, the duty losses were increased deliberately through a compensatory interest rate. Moreover, each economic crisis bolstered the increasing returns mechanism. OYAK's balance sheet and actuarial profits showed that the average profitability of the OYAK Group jumped dramatically after each crisis.

The highest levels of military autonomy demonstrated the shift to the informal state in the 1990s. In all spheres, autonomy reached a peak. The level in military doctrine and education increased due to the hegemony of Kemalism. Force levels, modernization and reform were brought under the monopoly of the TSK. The massive dismissals of junior level personnel at YAŞ meetings were immune from judicial review. In the professional-political sphere, very high levels were estimated in the categories of organization of defense and senior promotions, bolstering the leverage of putsch threat. The veil of secrecy secured a lack of transparency in military budgets and arms production and procurement. Turkey ranked first in the world's major arms importer list between 1991 and 1995. The autonomy in all categories of the political-judicial sphere reached their farthest limit: the MGK implemented psychological

operations; the post of presidency strengthened military autonomy; and the secret protocol called EMASYA granted the military a monopoly on social surveillance. The extrajudicial executions were covered by intelligence gathering. With respect to judicial prosecution, autonomy reached its highest level, since the status of JİTEM was raised to corps and the autocratic cliques enjoyed complete impunity.

The critical juncture between 1999 and 2002 paved the way for the gradual decline of the deep state. The permissive conditions were the change of internal dynamics within the EU before the Helsinki Summit in favor of Turkey's invitation and the announcement of Turkey's EU candidacy in 1999. Turkey's candidacy for EU accession led to the closure connotes that increased the propensity of a path anchored by the "Copenhagen criteria" compared to the range of possibilities before the decision was made. The productive condition was the economic crisis of 2001. The financial market transactions of OYAK demonstrated again that this military holding was a prime benefactor during the major economic crises of 1994, 1999, and 2001.

The critical antecedents were the rise of the provincial capital and the erosion of the political center after the 1997 putsch. Both influenced the causal effect of the outcome of the productive condition, the 2001 economic crisis. The result was reflected in the 2002 elections. The emergence of a new cleavage structure and the electoral success of the AKP in 2002 closed the critical juncture and produced a "lock in" effect for the decline of the deep state. A new cleavage emerged with respect to their stance toward military tutelage and the EU membership of Turkey: the anti-EU alignment cross-cut the Kemalist, Europhobic Islamists, and the Kurdish ultra-nationalists; in the pro-EU axis, the AKP on the secular-Islamist divide and the pro-Kurdish DTP in the ethnic divide were represented. The degree of constraints posed by the critical juncture was quite high. The AKP and the military were both bound by the chosen path.

The 2000s have been characterized by the gradual decline and retaliatory responses of the deep state. Changes in the (inter)national distribution of power and shared beliefs, especially NATO's post-Cold War security identity, the new Middle East policy of the US, and the candidacy of Turkey to enter the EU enabled the AKP to curb military autonomy through formal institutional changes. The decline of the deep state was examined through an analysis of the democratic conditionality of the EU as an international anchor, military autonomy, the changing cleavage structure and the prospect for an elite settlement. After 2005, the AKP put the EU/democratization project to one side. Democratic reforms heightened the belligerence of the center, represented by the military and the CHP and supported by the neo-nationalist camp, which related the deep state positively to the gangs of the nationalist struggle. These armed and "unarmed" forces resisted with an e-memorandum in 2007 and the closure case against the AKP in 2008. Both ended with a clear-cut decrease in the leverage of putsch threat and placed the AKP in the center.

Since 2008, the court cases against putsch plans have discredited military interventions, and this is considered as a sign of the discontinuation of the

negative feedback mechanism. Although the court cases refer only to the coup plans, the conviction of some perpetrators exerted an indirect influence on the discontinuation of the cyclical process. On the other hand, the Ergenekon court case reflected the divide and distrust between those who regard the deep state as a real danger, and those who see it as a conspiracy by the AKP to punish opponents. The detention of journalists and violation of defendants' right to fast and fair trial deepened this divide. Ergenekon trials failed to expose the deep state. Democratic reforms have lowered the deep state's power correlated to military autonomy, whereas the AKP's authoritarian policies, that have gathered a new momentum after Gezi Park protests of May-June 2013, indicate a transition from tutelary democracy to delegative democracy, which is reflected in the excessive prerogatives of the executive, the infringement of civil rights, and the undemocratic control of the security sector.

Whether the second critical juncture will lead to a reactive sequence in the form of the consolidation of democracy will depend on the political elites' ability to forge a settlement of disputes and abolish the deep state. The openness to political change of the voters of the AKP and the pro-Kurdish political parties offered the possibility of a cleavage alliance. Put differently, the political parties in the secular-Islamist and Turkish-Kurdish ethnic divide representing the center and periphery are the key for the consolidation of democracy. The drafting of a new constitution offered a great opportunity for democratic consolidation and a stepping-stone for the solution to the Kurdish question. However, the predetermined red-lines of the political parties prevented a consensus on a new civic constitution based on the recognition of fundamental human rights. The AKP's insistence on presidentialism was analyzed with respect to its implications on the installation of delegative democracy.

Elite settlement based on a peace settlement can pave the way for solving the Kurdish question, which has a symbiotic relationship with the deep state. The negotiations between the government and Öcalan produced a ceasefire declaration in March 2013. Fostering the prospects of elite settlement, for the first time in the thirty years of conflict, a pro-Kurdish political party assumed the role of interlocutor during the peace talks. Nevertheless, the impunity of autocratic cliques like JITEM and the village guards points to the fact that they are considered by the government and the military as indispensable tools in the conflict as long as the Kurdish question remains unsolved.

Developments since the 2010s reveal that the decline of the deep state is followed by its restoration. The conflict between the secular establishment in the center and the religious-conservative periphery in the 2000s turned into a conflict to conquer the center within the religious-conservative alliance in the 2010s. The Gülen Movement, whose alliance with the AKP provided critical support in the conflict with the military, could exert influence on state institutions, such as the police and the judiciary. This led to allegations about the growth of the AKP and Gülenists as a state within the state. A major rift erupted when the MİT assumed more power in Kurdish question. In response,

the AKP strengthened its grip on the security sector by granting the MİT extraordinary powers.

Democratic consolidation also depends on international anchors, especially on the EU accession process. Over the last decade the EU has gradually lost its major role in this regard. The Cyprus question was a major stumbling block during the accession negotiations, which came to a standstill after the Eurozone crisis and the current indeterminacy over the future of European integration. These added to the disenchantment of the Turkish public with respect to the elusive EU membership. Moreover, Turkish-US relations altered in the post-Cold war international scene, when the US's threat perceptions shifted to the Middle East, specifically to the neighbors of Turkey.

Turkey in the 2000s witnessed a rapid transition from a complete lack of civilian supremacy to an undemocratic and insufficient control of the armed forces. The overall military autonomy has declined from very high to medium level in the past 14 years. In a tacit agreement with the AKP, the military enforces discretion in several categories on the professional-political-judicial continuum. The military has high levels of autonomy in the professional sphere, which has less weight than the other spheres. High-level military autonomy over budgets and arms production and procurement are in tune with the AKP's reluctance in establishing accountability that would jeopardize the restoration of the deep state. The major retreat of the military in determining internal security was on the MGK front and the post of president. In intelligence gathering, civilianization of the MİT went parallel with detrimental developments. Reforms have weakened the Janus-headed judiciary, but the majority of autocratic cliques elaborated in this book still enjoy impunity.

The vicious cycle of state crisis and the restoration of the deep state has not been broken. The coup cases were decisive in undermining the moral authority of coup plotters and in closing the era of military tutelage. However, the legitimacy of these trials has already been undermined due to several reasons, mainly due to the concerns about the impartiality of judiciary. More importantly, they have become an instrument of power in the conflict between the AKP and the Gülen Movement. The convicted suspects in the Ergenekon trials were released after the AKP's declaration that this coup was a plot against the army. Upon the ruling of the Constitutional Court over flawed evidence, the Sledgehammer defendants were released to be subject of a retrial.

These trials did not challenge the impunity of the majority of the autocratic cliques. Even if the deep state should be reduced to "gangs", these trials affected only the tip of the iceberg. Similarly, the life-long imprisonment of Kenan Evren and Tahsin Şahinkaya, the two aging, surviving perpetrators of the 1980 coup, bears only a symbolic meaning, instead of a real confrontation with the past, including the 60 years of deep state under military tutelage. The major questions with respect to the deep state appear to be whether it is possible for the Turkish political elite, with a militarist-statist mindset and proclivity to high-level corruption, to choose consolidating democracy instead

of the state; whether Turkish society can unequivocally condemn the deep state's oppression which has been directed against "internal enemies", whose definition has always had the potential to change. As the deep state continues to be restored, state-banditry relations remain unchallenged due to the lack of political will to expose deep state institutions and perpetrators. Against the backdrop of autocratic cliques' impunity, the undemocratic and inadequate control of security forces, nationalist discourse of the political elite, and policies to establish new forms of state of exception, the deep state is being reorganized. Without recognizing the deep state's symbiotic relationship with the Kurdish question, establishing peace and making a new civil and inclusive constitution, democracy in Turkey will always be fragile and vulnerable to authoritarian turns, which provide essential means to restore the deep state.

Note

- 1 Munck, "Tools for Qualitative Research."

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